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The International Law Studies (the "Blue Book") series was inaugurated by the
Naval War College in 1901 as a forum for essays, treatises, and articles that
promote a broader understanding ofinternational law. The eighty-second volume of
this historic series, The Law of War in the 21st Century: Weaponry and the Use of
Force, is a compilation of scholarly papers derived from the proceedings of a June
2005 colloquium hosted by the Naval War College.
The purpose of this colloquium was to examine international legal standards
applicable to the use of force, as well as the development and employment of
weapons systems in the 21st century. Participants came to Newport from more
than 20 countries and included government officials, military commanders, repre-
sentatives ofnongovernmental organizations, esteemed international law scholars,
and military and civilian lawyers. During the course of events, attendees grappled
with vexing issues such as the suitability of principles developed for inter-State
conflict to a global threat environment increasingly influenced by non-State actors.
Undoubtedly, the ideas generated during the summer colloquium and revisited in
this Blue Book volume will contribute substantially to the ongoing examination of
the major legal challenges accompanying 21 st-century armed conflict.
On behalf of the Secretary of the Navy, the Chief of Naval Operations, and the
Commandant of the Marine Corps, I extend a warm thank you to Professor
Charles Garraway, the 2004-2005 Stockton Professor of International Law, and
Major Richard Jaques, USMC, under whose leadership this colloquium was orga-
nized. I also wish to thank the authors and editors for their invaluable contribu-
tions and for engendering a greater understanding of international law. Thanks
also to the Lieber Society of the American Society of International Law and Roger
Williams University's Ralph R. Papitto School of Law, gracious cosponsors of this
colloquium. And, finally, a very special note of gratitude goes to the Naval War
College Foundation and Israel Yearbook on Human Rights, whose tremendous
support made this conference and, particularly, this "Blue Book" possible.
JACOB L. SHUFORD
Rear Admiral, U.S. Navy
President, Naval War College

Introduction
The Naval War College hosts an annual conference to examine international
law issues and developments that affect military operations, both in peace-
time and during armed conflict. The 2001 conference examined the Legal and Ethi-
cal Lessons ofNATO's Kosovo Campaign. In 2002, following the tragic events of 9/
1 1, we looked at International Law and the War on Terror. In 2003, a broad spec-
trum of issues were analyzed in Current Issues in International Law and Military
Operations, including, of course, a discussion of the initial events of Operation
Iraqi Freedom, which had begun on March 20th of that year. In 2004 the work of
the 2002 conference was continued in Homeland Security& Combating Terrorism.
By 2005, we determined that it was time to examine the manner in which rapid
advances in the types and capabilities ofweapons and the methods ofwarfare were
changing how warfare will be conducted in the future, and the implications of that
change for the law ofarmed conflict. The conference began with a discussion ofthe
International Committee of the Red Cross's then just published Customary Inter-
national Humanitarian Law study (hereinafter the Study). We were fortunate
enough to have Jean-Marie Henckaerts, one of the authors, present an overview of
the Study, which purports to be a "restatement of contemporary customary inter-
national law." A panel of equally distinguished scholars and government and mili-
tary lawyers questioned both the methodology of the Study and certain of its
conclusions, while acknowledging it was an indispensable resource. The scholarly
articles contributed to this volume by Mr. Henckaerts and the panelists provide
valuable insight into the Study.
Another important development is that participation by the United States in fu-
ture conflicts is likely to be as one member of a coalition of nations, as was the case
in Operations Allied Force, Desert Storm, Enduring Freedom, and Iraqi Freedom.
The panel on coalition warfare addressed the implications and challenges ofbring-
ing together warfighters whose nations may have differing views on the content of
customary law and are parties to different treaties.
Immediately following the conclusion of the conference, a Conference Sum-
mary was prepared and distributed to the participants. This excellent review sum-
marized the remarks of the speakers and the discussion that followed. It has been
incorporated into the Preface. I encourage you to read it.
The conference was cosponsored by the Lieber Society on the Law ofArmed Con-
flict of the American Society of International Law and was organized under the
leadership of Professor Charles Garraway, the Naval War College's Charles H.
Stockton Professor of International Law, and Major Richard Jaques, US Marine
Corps, of the International Law Department. It was made possible with the support
of the Naval War College Foundation and the Israel Yearbook on Human Rights.
Without the dedicated efforts and support and assistance ofthese individuals and or-
ganizations, neither the conference nor this volume would have been possible.
I would particularly like to recognize and express my appreciation to Rear Ad-
miral Joseph Strasser, Executive Director ofthe Naval War College Foundation, for
the continuing contributions of the Foundation to our annual conferences and the
publication of the "Blue Book" series that reflect the proceedings of those confer-
ences. On the eve of Admiral Strasser's retirement as Executive Director of the
Foundation, we extend to him our profound thanks, both for the Foundation's
contributions and his own personal support ofthe International Law Department.
I also would like to extend my sincere thanks and gratitude to editors extraor-
dinaire, Captains Jack Grunawalt and Ralph Thomas, USN JAGC (Ret.). Responsible
for the "nuts and bolts" editing ofthese outstanding papers, Jack and Ralph devoted
myriad hours to this project, assuring painstakingly and skillfully that this work
would be the best-ever International Law Studies volume. Colonel Tony Helm,
JAGC, US Army, Deputy Chairman, International Law Department, served as man-
aging editor ofthis volume. His dedication and perseverance in communicating with
contributing authors throughout the world, marshaling authors' papers, packaging
the volume, and overseeing the complex publishing and distribution process also are
deserving of special thanks. In short, this Department is truly indebted to these three
professionals who worked so diligently to bring this Blue Book to its readers.
For over one hundred years the United States Naval War College has committed
itself to combining a scholarly understanding of the laws of war with an apprecia-
tion for and insight into the perspective ofthe warfighter—the one who must apply
those laws in the crucible of conflict on land, at sea and in the air. This conference
and this "Blue Book" continue that tradition.
DENNIS L. MANDSAGER




While planning this volume of the International Law Studies series, we
concluded that an excellent conference summary prepared painstak-
ingly by Captains Timothy Flynn and Stephen Sarnoski, both reserve officers in the
Navy Judge Advocate General's Corps, would be a fitting preface for this book.
Major Richard Jaques, USMC, who was the 2005 conference coordinator for the
International Law Department, also played a key role in this compilation.
Thus, we offer the following edited summary as both a snapshot of the 2005 In-
ternational Law Conference and an appropriate retrospective context from which
the works in this volume flow. Of course, at the first mention of editing, it is fitting
to thank and praise those who breathed life into this volume—Professor Emeritus
and Captain Jack Grunawalt and Captain Ralph Thomas, both retired Navy Judge
Advocates and long-time supporters ofthe International Law Department. Indeed,
they made tidying up the text and scouring the footnotes of the authors' papers
look easy, and it was plain to us from the start that they love their work just as much
as we truly enjoy and love having them work side-by-side with us in the Depart-
ment. I can think ofno one else I'd rather entrust my own writings to than Jack and
Ralph. They know the law, understand the dynamics ofthe annual conference, and
have internalized the protocols and nuances of the legal writer's bible we refer to
respectfully as "the other Bluebook." Indeed, but for their genuine sense of mod-
esty, their names unquestionably should grace the spine ofthis volume ofthe Inter-
national Law Studies series. Gentlemen . . . Bravo Zulu—well done. A hearty thank-
you is also in order for several key members of the Naval War College Desktop
Publishing Office. As Jack and Ralph brought this volume to life, Ms. Susan Meyer
was personally responsible for its care and feeding—formatting, providing "cam-
era-ready" copy, and otherwise completely packaging the volume for publication.
It would be hard to find a more responsive, thorough, and dedicated professional
than Ms. Meyer. Likewise, Ms. Meyer's boss, Mr. Jeremiah Lenihan, was instru-
mental in resolving ticklish formatting matters, and two superb proofreaders, Ms.
Susan Farley and Ms. Angela Daughtry, whose eagle eyes caught every figurative
uncrossed "t" and undotted "i," also were indispensable Blue Book contributors.
Again, thanks to all at Desktop Publishing for helping deliver such a quality project
to our distinguished readers.
Preface
Introduction
As alluded to above, as time passed and the dust of conference past settled, we be-
lieved it would be useful to recount salient themes and highlights—not just for his-
toric value but as a basis for understanding and appreciating the fine works of this
volume's contributors. For example, during the 2005 Conference, The Law ofWar
in the 21st Century: Weaponry and the Use ofForce, participants debated energeti-
cally the measure of importance and authority to be accorded the recently pub-
lished International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) Customary International
Humanitarian Law study. Attendees and panelists also pointed out the need for
careful and timely legal review of weapons development programs to ensure their
by-products ultimately would pass legal muster under international law. Another
recurring general theme—undoubtedly a truism—was that the realities of today's
substantially asymmetrical conflicts raise unique international law issues that de-
mand serious examination. Participants also emphasized the importance of coali-
tions and stressed the need for a common methodology for conducting combined
operations, particularly with regard to rules of engagement (ROE) and detainee
treatment. Finally, the colloquium wrestled with an array of challenges emanating
from technological advances that will affect future navies and require careful dis-
cussion and analysis today.
Keynote Address
In his keynote address, Professor David Kennedy observed initially that the aspira-
tions of international humanitarian law proponents and the goals of those who
practice the military arts are inextricably intertwined. He observed that evolving
principles of the law of armed conflict have engendered an alliance between mili-
tary and civilian practitioners and between warriors and their lawyers. Recognizing
that conflict presents more than a set of easily recognizable legal problems, Profes-
sor Kennedy addressed the future of international humanitarian law by challeng-
ing the colloquium to answer several incisive questions. Do law of war principles
differ depending upon the nature of a conflict? Does it matter whether the survival
of a nation is at stake or a coalition of nations is simply enforcing a United Nations
mandate to preserve or restore peace following a low-intensity conflict? If conflict
presents something more than a complex set of legal problems resolved by applica-
tion of a discrete set of principles and procedures, does application of the modern
law of armed conflict also require moral judgments using a broader interpretive
framework? Professor Kennedy concluded by inviting the conference attendees to
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answer these and other questions, recognizing that "[l]aw doesn't provide the an-
swers . . . we do."
Conference Panel I—Defining Customary International Humanitarian Law
Following Dr. Kennedy's presentation, Conference Panel I opened with a stimulat-
ing debate about the efficacy of the ICRC Customary International Humanitarian
Law study. Mr. Jean-Marie Henckaerts, ICRC legal adviser and co-author of the
study, explained that the study was commissioned in 1995 by the 26th Interna-
tional Conference of the Red Cross and the Red Crescent in Geneva, Switzerland.
During the course of the study, members consulted extensively with 35 law of
armed conflict experts, reviewed the practices of 47 States, and delved into ICRC
archives covering more than 40 international and non-international armed con-
flicts. Study members adopted an inductive reasoning process, reviewing State
practices and producing 161 rules, most of which address both international and
non-international conflicts. Mr. Henckaerts also explained the principal reasons
for embarking on a study aimed at defining principles reflective of customary in-
ternational law: international humanitarian law treaties bind only those States that
ratify them, and parties to the same conflict may be bound by different treaty obli-
gations; treaties governing non-international armed conflict are not always well
developed; and characterizing a conflict is required before determining which trea-
ties or protocols apply. In fact, Mr. Henckaerts emphasized that while certain as-
pects of international humanitarian law exist in treaties, not all States are parties to
such treaties and not all elements of international humanitarian law are codified in
such treaties. Likewise, according to Mr. Henckaerts, not all current treaties reflect
a normative framework for non-international conflicts.
Professor Tim McCormack, the Australian Red Cross Professor of International
Humanitarian Law at Melbourne University and the Director of the Asia-Pacific
Centre for Military Law in Australia, characterized the ICRC study as an invaluable
primary source of information on the practice of States in international humani-
tarian law. He asserted, however, that criticism of the study was inevitable because
any attempt to identify the content of customary international law is invariably
controversial and because the authors of the study have relied on official docu-
ments which in some cases were drafted and tabled with no thought to their status
as examples of State practice.
Mr. Joshua Dorosin, Assistant Legal Adviser for Political-Military Affairs in the
U.S. State Department Office of the Legal Adviser, noted the ICRC study is an in-
dispensable resource, but he also expressed concern over the methodology of for-
mulating the rules in the study. In his view, the rules are not adequately analyzed
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and do not reflect a separate consideration of State practice versus opinio juris. In-
deed, in some parts of the study, there are very few references to State practice.
Former Charles H. Stockton Professor of International Law, Professor Yoram
Dinstein from Tel Aviv University expressed grave concern over the ICRC study's
reliance on numerous statements that have no bearing on the practice of States,
which is the bedrock of customary international law. As examples, he referred to
various reports submitted by rapporteurs to United Nations bodies and to com-
ments made by persons not representing States. Professor Dinstein also observed
that, although military Manuals are indeed a primary source ofcustomary interna-
tional law, at least two of the so-called manuals referred to in the study are not real
manuals. He also highlighted a number of inconsistencies and errors in both the
black-letter rules and commentary of the study.
In an afternoon session, Mr. Henckaerts noted that the ICRC study was not in-
tended to be the last word on customary international humanitarian law. Instead,
the study is where enlightened discussion about further development and clarifica-
tion of the subject must begin. During ensuing general discussion, conference at-
tendees emphasized that there is a clear distinction between State practice, as such,
and customary international law. Likewise, Professor Dinstein stressed the need to
distinguish between State practice and opinio juris, a distinction that, in his view,
was not made adequately in the study. He also challenged the leap from treaty law
to customary law and emphasized that, although treaties may stimulate custom,
the evidence must be found in the practice of or vis-a-vis non-contracting Parties.
Others also noted that the ICRC study cannot be viewed as evidence of a substan-
tive body of customary international law merely because States have signed Addi-
tional Protocol I to the 1949 Geneva Conventions. In this regard, it was widely
agreed that evidence of any State practice in support of the existence of customary
international law must be formulated independently of the voluntarily assumed
treaty obligations of signatory States.
Conference Panel II—Disseminating International Humanitarian Law
Conference Panel II focused on the public awareness ofand appreciation for inter-
national humanitarian law. Commentators emphasized that the Red Cross and
Red Crescent Societies (RCRC) were founded and operate on the fundamental
principles ofhumanity, neutrality, and impartiality. In particular, Dr. Mohammed
Al-Hadid, President, Jordanian National Red Crescent Society, emphasized that
there is no religious connotation associated with either the Red Cross or the Red
Crescent emblems. Both are meant to be purely humanitarian symbols. Dr. Hadid
also voiced his support for the creation of a third additional protocol to the 1949
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Geneva Conventions that would adopt a new emblem—the Red Crystal—to en-
hance the protection of victims and the status of humanitarian assistance, espe-
cially during armed conflict, where in recent years respect for protective emblems
has eroded. This third protocol also would promote the universality of the ICRC
movement and help overcome the objection of certain States to the use of the two
traditional symbols.
Ms. Lucy Brown, Senior Adviser, International Humanitarian Law, American
National Red Cross Society, emphasized the need to increase public awareness of
and support for the principles of international humanitarian law, particularly
among school age children and youth. Ms. Brown introduced the "Exploring Hu-
manitarian Law" curriculum to the conference and noted that it is being piloted or
implemented in the United States and 94 other countries. Ms. Brown observed that
a necessary by-product of dissemination is the reinforcement of principles ofpeace-
ful coexistence and facilitation ofa return to peace in the event ofan armed conflict.
Mr. David Lloyd Roberts, MBE, and formerly of the ICRC addressed the efforts
of the ICRC to bring international humanitarian law training to the armed forces.
He cited the importance ofthe supporting role played by the ICRC and urged con-
ference participants to ensure training is completed during peacetime because
"[o]nce the fighting has started, it's too late." Mr. Roberts outlined certain poten-
tial obstacles to successful implementation of international humanitarian law
training and noted the lack of support for international humanitarian law princi-
ples among some senior military personnel, skepticism concerning the effective-
ness of training, and the difficulty of adapting such training to the realities and
pressures of combat.
Conference Panel III—Modern Weaponry and Warfare
On a completely different tack and heading, Conference Panel III addressed issues
associated with modern weaponry and warfare. Mr. Ed Cummings, Assistant Legal
Adviser for Arms Control, Office ofthe Legal Adviser, US State Department, began
by recounting the substantial development of conventional weapons principles
over the past 100 years. Reminding the audience that weapons treaty negotiations
necessarily occur in a political context, he reinforced the fact that the United States
always seeks treaty consensus with an overriding goal of reducing human suffering
during armed conflict. Mr. Cummings noted that the rules focused originally on
the effect ofweapons on combatants but that rules tend now to concentrate on ef-
fects on civilians. Mr. Cummings also explained that States are reluctant to be too
technical when negotiating agreements because rapid technological advances may
make definitions and descriptions of weapons obsolete shortly after agreements
xvi 1
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are executed. On the other hand, he observed that advances in technology can im-
prove the reliability of weapons and reduce casualty rates. Indeed, the US Depart-
ment of Defense has directed that at least 99 percent of its submunitions produced
detonate properly and has proposed an amendment to the treaty covering anti-
vehicle mines that calls for inclusion of detection devices for such weapons.
Doctor Marie Jacobsson, Principal Legal Adviser on International Law to the
Swedish Ministry for Foreign Affairs, discussed Sweden's compliance with Article
36 ofAdditional Protocol I to the Geneva Conventions. This article requires that a
State party determine whether employment of a new weapon would be prohibited
by Protocol I or any other rule of international law applicable to that State party.
She averred that very few States complete weapons studies and that ICRC repre-
sentatives have been discussing what the parameters for such studies should be. In
1974, it established a delegation to review conventional weapons, which factors
humanitarian, human rights, and disarmament laws into its Article 36 studies.
The delegation may set conditions on the development ofweapons relating to pri-
mary, secondary, and indiscriminate effects, and occasionally it proposes alterna-
tive designs or limits the use of a weapon in military or law enforcement
applications. In 2003, Sweden pledged to review whether international humani-
tarian law also should be considered when evaluating weapons for export. Dr.
Jacobsson commented further that weapons reviews occasionally are stymied by
the absence of a clear distinction between interstate armed conflict and operations
such as peacekeeping.
Colonel Ken Watkin, Canadian Defense Forces Deputy Judge Advocate General/
Operations, offered his views on whether certain legal principles developed for in-
ternational armed conflict should apply equally to asymmetric warfare between
States and non-State actors. Colonel Watkin framed the issue with two weapons in
mind—chemical agents and expanding bullets. A large body of well-developed
treaty law bars the use of chemical weapons in armed conflict, but not for law en-
forcement purposes. Colonel Watkin, however, argues that it may be more hu-
mane to use prohibited riot control agents to clear a cave in combat than to use a
flame thrower or grenade for the same purpose. Certain chemical agents, such as
malodorants, calmatives, and darts, though prohibited by treaty law, may offer
non-lethal alternatives to deadly force in armed conflict. Colonel Watkin observed
that expanding bullets were banned by the 1899 Hague Declaration. He queried,
however, whether their use should be prohibited in all aspects of non-interna-
tional armed conflict particularly where the military forces are executing a law en-
forcement function. If use by police in a domestic law enforcement context is




Professor Mike Schmitt from the George C. Marshall European Center for Se-
curity Studies, Garmisch, Germany, opined that law and conflict are in a mutually
affective relationship and mused how future military technology may affect the ex-
istence, application, and interpretation of the law of armed conflict. Professor
Schmitt noted further that while a substantial number of treaties govern specific
means and methods of warfare, future agreements may cover depleted uranium
shells, computer network attacks, and space-based offensive operations. Indeed, in
February 2005, the US Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA)
published a report listing likely future developments in US military technology and
means, including detection and destruction of elusive surface targets, robust tac-
tical networks, networked manned and unmanned systems, detection of under-
ground structures, assured use of space, cognitive computing, and the bio-
revolution. According to Professor Schmitt, developments of this nature will in-
crease weapon precision, enhance command and control, render the battlespace
more transparent, and promote use of autonomous unmanned attack platforms.
In the context of the law of armed conflict, these developments also will increase
the asymmetry between technologically advantaged and disadvantaged combat-
ants. Professor Schmitt commented further that asymmetry disrupts the balance
between military necessity and humanitarian concerns because the law does not
operate equally for both sides. Thus, the disadvantaged combatant may resort to
tactics prohibited under the law of armed conflict as a way to survive or prevail in
battle, because legally permissible tactics likely will be futile. Such tactics may in-
clude fighting in civilian clothes, use of human shields and protected places, per-
fidy, marking mustering points with protected symbols of the ICRC, and resort to
suicide bombers. Even if a technologically disadvantaged combatant does not dis-
regard the law of armed conflict, the combatant may instead compensate for its
disadvantage by defining military objectives broadly while undervaluing collateral
damage. A technologically advantaged combatant may engage in effects-based op-
erations rather than a serial destruction of the enemy's military force. During the
question and answer session, Professor Schmitt asserted that many critics are "cap-
tured by technology" and have proposed that a State should reduce the asymmetry
in armed conflict by foregoing use of advanced weapons.
Conference Panel IV—Coalition Warfare
Conference Panel IV tackled the timely and highly relevant topic of coalition war-
fare. Discussion began with comments by Brigadier General Charles Dunlap, Jr.,
USAF, Staff Judge Advocate, Headquarters, Air Combat Command, Langley Air
Force Base, Virginia. General Dunlap noted that 21st century warfare has become
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increasingly legalistic and complex, and that coalition warfare is no exception. He
identified a number of challenges facing coalition partners, including differences
in treaty obligations between and among coalition partners, disagreement over
what constitutes customary international law, and differences in domestic imple-
menting legislation. General Dunlap emphasized the importance of developing
ROE for all coalition forces, but noted the obvious difficulty in achieving this goal,
particularly with regard to the definition of self-defense and the meaning ofhostile
intent. He also cautioned that legal hurdles facing coalition forces, e.g., the inability
ofUS forces to provide logistic support to its coalition partners absent an interna-
tional agreement concerning reimbursement for costs, have important operational
effects that cannot be ignored by military commanders. General Dunlap com-
mented that creating a formal judge advocate general corps among coalition part-
ners would be a positive initiative. He observed that when coalition partners
deploy JAGs with their operational forces, coordination is facilitated and synergies
result. The General emphasized, however, that military commanders must under-
stand and internalize the proper role of their military legal advisers, instructing
that "JAGs provide advice; commanders make decisions." General Dunlap con-
cluded by warning conferees about the development of the phenomenon of
"lawfare," which he described as the use of legal principles such as those applicable
to the law of armed conflict to mischaracterize and undermine a State's actions.
The General emphasized the importance of recognizing the practice of "lawfare,"
and encouraged the US and its coalition partners to meet lawfare activity head-on
by actively and publicly providing their own legal analysis and justification for
their actions.
Commander (CMDR) Dale Stephens of the Royal Australian Navy and liaison
officer to the International Law Department, US Naval War College, echoed Gen-
eral Dunlap's comments concerning the importance of harmonizing ROE among
coalition partners, and briefly summarized the process through which such ROE
might be developed. CMDR Stephens warned against a purely formalistic ap-
proach to the development of coalition ROE, however, emphasizing that a more
realistic approach is necessary. Among considerations pertinent to the develop-
ment of coalition ROE, CMDR Stephens mentioned the importance of exercising
"calibrated discretion on key operational law concepts," the value ofthe socializing
experience achieved by participation in international coalition operations, and the
need to globalize the training of military officers. Commander Stephens also iden-
tified a number of challenges to the effective development of common coalition
ROE, including difficulties associated with translating the principles of the law of
armed conflict into a State's domestic law and the pressing need to reinforce a
commonality of language between international military lawyers and internal
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government agencies. He capped his presentation with a quote from renowned au-
thor and Professor Louis Henkin, who once stated, "Almost all nations observe al-
most all principles of international law and almost all oftheir obligations almost all
of the time."
Professor Charles Garraway, the 2004-2005 Charles H. Stockton Professor of
International Law, US Naval War College, observed that in order for a multi-na-
tional coalition to work, the principles underlying the reason for coming together
in the first place must be internally and externally consistent. Professor Garraway
wisely commented that " [i] fthere is no coalescing, there is no coalition." Professor
Garraway instructed that the distinctiveness of each coalition partner need not be
sacrificed in order achieve the goals of a successful coalition. Rather, he noted, the
secret is to work around those distinctions. Professor Garraway also voiced con-
cern about the apparent uncertainty regarding the US position on which principles
ofthe law ofarmed conflict codified in Additional Protocol I are considered by the
United States to reflect customary international law. Professor Garraway noted
that the only existing US viewpoint, articulated in 1987 by Michael J. Matheson in
The United States Position on the Relation of Customary International Law to the
1977 Protocols Additional to the 1949 Geneva Conventions, is no longer considered
authoritative. Professor Garraway concluded his presentation by questioning
whether the principles ofhuman rights law, codified, for example, in the Interna-
tional Covenant of Civil and Political Rights, coexist with or are replaced by law of
armed conflict principles during times ofarmed conflict. He asserted that the lan-
guage ofthe various human rights conventions made it clear that the two legal re-
gimes were intended to co-exist, despite the former being considered lexgeneralis
and the latter lex specialis. Professor Garraway again noted a lack of clarity in the
US stance on this matter and called for the United States to articulate its position
more clearly.
Leslie Green, Professor Emeritus, University of Alberta, Canada, and former
Charles H. Stockton Professor of International Law, picked up where Professor
Garraway left off. He opined that the law ofarmed conflict prevails in situations of
armed conflict where its principles deviate from those embraced by human rights
law. Professor Green agreed with previous commentators, however, in calling for
the development ofcommon ROE and a mutual understanding of detainee opera-
tions. Professor Green also commented that it was time for a new treaty to replace
the current NATO treaty. In his view, NATO has become an international organi-
zation that has transcended its original mandate. Professor Green argued that a
new treaty would reflect more accurately NATO's current goals and aspirations
and would be more representative of its current membership.
xxi
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Conference Panel V—Future Navies
The penultimate conference panel generally considered the shape, methods, and
means of future navies. RADM Robert Cox, Associate Director, Assessment Divi-
sion, Office of the Chief of Naval Operations, tracked the progression of opera-
tional concepts in the ongoing transformation of the US Navy. In short, the Navy
has evolved from the 1950s task group with specific missions, to the platform
centric motifofthe 1970s sporting multi-mission battle groups, to today's network
centric force focused on defeating anti-access capabilities. According to RADM
Cox, the future Navy must be joint, distributed, netted, persistent, surge-based,
and surge-ready at home. Planning now occurs in minutes and hours rather than
in days. Naval forces must be fully netted with required kinetic and non-kinetic ca-
pability, employable when directed by the Combatant Commander. In this con-
text, sea basing does not consist only of technology. Sound doctrine is required to
support the best use offerees in an effects-based environment. A move from a plat-
form centric to a network centric environment has spawned legal challenges con-
cerning employment of unmanned aerial vehicles, civilian mariners, frequency
spectrum management, and the maritime commons while the United States strives
to maintain a global naval presence through doctrinal and technological
transformation.
Rear Admiral Raydon Gates ofthe Royal Australian Navy spoke of a future navy
from the perspective ofan operator in a mid-sized sea service. The trend for the fu-
ture is projection of naval power at home and offshore, wherever Australia's inter-
ests are at stake. Australia's participation in coalition operations may reflect its
national interests in the endeavor rather than common interests with other partici-
pants. Different national objectives reflect different national priorities, and mili-
tary commanders must manage and harmonize these varied interests. Joint
application ofpower is another trend. According to Admiral Gates, national mili-
tary forces must not only operate jointly, but must work with other instruments of
national power to assure a concerted defense effort. There will be a maritime ele-
ment to future security undertakings, particularly in the littoral environment and
primarily involving ROE development and targeting principles. Technological de-
velopments in weapons systems also will breed legal issues related, in particular, to
the employment of missiles with artificial intelligence and development of corre-
sponding ROE. Australian forces also will be required to balance the implementa-
tion of network centric warfare with existing technology and fiscal considerations.
The Royal Australian Navy ofthe future will be smaller with no corresponding de-
crease in operational tempo, while its operating budget likely will not increase. On
the other hand, future ships will feature more automation and be staffed with fewer
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sailors. Greater use of contractors to support naval forces also will raise questions
about whether to characterize contractor employees as combatants and appropri-
ate methods of command and discipline.
Captain Jane Dalton, Assistant Judge Advocate General (Civil Law) and Com-
manding Officer, Naval Civil Law Support Activity, identified several aspects offu-
ture navies that require timely consideration by military lawyers. For example,
employment of civilian mariners aboard naval ships in billets historically held by
military members grows out of the Chief of Naval Operations' effort to move sail-
ors from non-war fighting jobs to positions in direct support of fleet and combat
operations. Likewise, the proposed Maritime Prepositioning Force cargo ship is a
key part ofthe sea basing concept and will serve as a floating logistics center. Use of
this ship in an "assault echelon" with combat forces and aircraft aboard raises the
question of whether civilian mariners lawfully may manage engineering, naviga-
tion, and deck functions. Under international law, a warship must be "manned by
a crew which is under regular armed forces discipline." Yet this phrase is undefined
and calls into question whether the civilian crew must be subject to the same sys-
tem ofdiscipline as the military members. Whether civilian mariners could be con-
sidered unlawful combatants depends upon whether they take a direct or active
part in hostilities. Would manning a weapons system or navigating a ship consti-
tute direct activity? The Navy has developed a legislative proposal that includes
Navy Reserve affiliation as a requirement for detailing civilian mariners to a war-
ship. Unmanned airborne and undersea vehicles are already engaged in combat
operations. Should they be treated like their manned counterparts? Is an un-
manned undersea vehicle a "vessel" under international rules to prevent collisions
at sea and are they required to comply with the innocent and transit passages re-
gimes under the UN Convention on the Law ofthe Sea? Captain Dalton also noted
unanswered questions related to hospital ships, which, while protected by law from
capture or intentional attack, may not utilize encrypted communications. Changes
in technology, domestic laws on privacy, and national communications policy,
however, have prompted the Navy to insist that its two hospital ships deploy with
secure communications systems in order to complete their humanitarian missions
and comply with domestic law. Captain Dalton also observed that the Law of the
Sea Convention supports Sea Power 21 and the Proliferation Security Initiative,
and does not affect US intelligence-gathering activity. She would contend further
that reference in the Convention to use of the high seas for other internationally
lawful uses permits the United States to stage forward-deployed sea bases in the ex-
clusive economic zones of coastal States. In any event, US sea basing will comport
with the law, whether the operation involves humanitarian relief, UN sanctions en-
forcement, or international armed conflict.
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Professor Doctor Wolff Heintschel von Heinegg of the University of Frankfurt-
Oder and University of Augsburg, Germany, also a former Charles H. Stockton
Professor of International Law at the US Naval War College, reviewed the current
state of the law of naval warfare and its future challenges. Professor Heintschel von
Heinegg noted first that current provisions regarding signal encryption and arm-
ing of hospital ships have been questioned and may be somewhat anachronistic.
He noted further that deception rules and principles must be adjusted to reflect de-
velopments in the electronic environment. Similarly, according to Professor
Heintschel von Heinegg, the concept ofblockade remains settled, but must be dis-
tinguished from other methods of naval warfare, such as maritime interception,
zones, and control of enemy commerce and operations under a UN Security
Council resolution. Professor Heintschel von Heinegg asserted, as well, that mari-
time zones must be analyzed carefully to determine whether they are intended to
be unlawful free fire zones or legal ruses ofwar. In short, a zone must have a legiti-
mate purpose and must limit the area of naval warfare, protect neutral and inno-
cent shipping, and subject neutral shipping and aviation to extensive control
measures. In Professor Heintschel von Heinegg's view, future challenges to the law
ofnaval warfare include excessive maritime claims to well-defined geographical ar-
eas, different interpretations ofbasic legal concepts, confusion about political aims
and legal targets, and the impact ofhuman rights law. Additionally, challenges re-
garding asymmetric actors are based on the increasing multitude of terrorists and
non-State actors and other difficult questions have arisen as well from the indefati-
gable trend toward civilianizing positions within the armed forces. The technology
gap in naval warfare also has raised the technological inferiority argument which
has engendered a decreasing willingness to accept legal regulation of armed con-
flict. So, too, has the illusion of "clean warfare" been fostered by today's precision
weaponry generated by advances in technology. According to Professor Heintschel
von Heinegg, however, these various challenges to the law of naval warfare do not
justify the various demands for new rules.
Conclusion
The foregoing, in a nutshell, was an overview of the 2005 International Law De-
partment conference and a glimpse ofthe scintillating views, discussion, and opin-
ions cloaked by the pages of this the 82d volume of the International Law Studies
series. And if this conference and volume have taught us anything, it is that, as this
world entered the Age of Aquarius, it changed in ways only the most forward
thinkers could have imagined—speed-of-light communication available to the
masses; transnational enemies who rely on this capability, as well as the ready
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means to flit about the globe with relative ease; enemies who have waged with im-
punity a type of asymmetrical conflict that endures without regard for even the
most basic tenets of international humanitarian law; the "lawfare" phenomenon
that thrives on the Internet and other mass media and is used by our enemies daily
to contest the legitimacy ofwell-intentioned acts or highlight isolated failings; pro-
lific use of unmanned vehicles and precision weaponry; basing a fighting force at
sea where coastal access is curtailed; and attempts to over-define ("codify" indi-
rectly?) specific principles of customary international humanitarian law; and the
growing practice ofemploying civilians in positions traditionally held by members
of the military, to name a few. In the wake of these changes, those entrusted with
the defense of their nations have struggled to adapt both technologically and oper-
ationally. It is perhaps for these reasons and in the face ofother such challenges that
Professor Kennedy recognized so poignantly that a firm and durable alliance has
been struck between warriors and their lawyers.
In closing, then, it is our sincere desire that the following works of the preemi-
nent authors who contributed so graciously to this volume will assist those seeking







IWar and International Law:
Distinguishing Military and Humanitarian
Professions
David Kennedy*
Introduction: a Common Profession
I
would like to begin by thanking Admiral Shuford, Professor Dennis
Mandsager and Professor Charles Garraway, as well as Major Richard Jaques
and Commander Dale Stephens, who have given me—and my students—a warm
welcome at the Naval War College. I appreciate their generous hospitality and
good counsel.
For civilian students and academics like me, who have never served in uniform,
the military profession can seem to be a different universe. But how different are
we, professionals within and outside the armed services? How different are the pro-
fessions ofwar and peace?
When I was a young man, they could not have seemed more different. I regis-
tered as a conscientious objector after the Christmas bombings of Hanoi in 1972,
and eventually became an international lawyer. I hoped I would find work promot-
ing peace, economic development, humanitarian and progressive values on the
global stage. Nothing seemed as different as the humanitarian and military
* Manley O. Hudson Professor of Law, Harvard Law School. The viewpoints expressed in this
article are the author's alone.
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professions—the one made war, the other sought to limit war's incidence and
moderate war's violence.
Indeed, the military seemed to me then all that international law was not
—
violence and aggression in contradiction to our reason and restraint. It was only
later that I learned how many international lawyers serve with the military—and
how readily humanitarians have rushed to legitimate the use of force.
War and peace. I studied history and political science. War, we learned, "broke
out" when "disputes" could not be resolved peacefully, when cosmopolitan reason
gave way to nationalist passion, when the normal "balance ofpower" was upset by
abnormal statesmen. These bad guy statesmen pursued outmoded projects of ag-
grandizement, domination, aggression or imperialism. They were in cahoots with
what we called "the military industrial complex"; not knowing we were quoting
Eisenhower.
Realpolitik was the disease; the softer wisdom of international law and interna-
tional relations was the cure. The key to peace was wise statecraft and conflict man-
agement. We put our faith in negotiations among the disputing parties—which we
hoped to facilitate. We were sure that reasonable aspirations for peaceful change
should—and would—be accommodated by wise leaders, for whom we would
serve as advisors. Leaders who would act for the common good, in a global human-
itarian and cosmopolitan spirit. Leaders like that would address the roots ofwar in
poverty, cultural backwardness, nationalist isolation, or ideological fervor. They
would need—and want—help from the institutional machinery of the interna-
tional community.
More than anything else, management for peace would require procedures
good practices, good offices, a steady and imaginative institutional framework and a
cadre of dedicated humanitarian policy experts who could express and implement
the world's general interest in peace. The United Nations, the non-governmental
organizations (NGOs), and civil society, the peacemakers and peacekeepers,
needed to succeed so that the military would never again be needed.
How did we imagine the military? Our knowledge was limited, our imagery
vague. All that ceremony and hierarchy, training to kill. They were hot, passionate;
we were cooler heads prevailing. We were dry, focused, pragmatic and manage-
rial. I think we imagined war as it is depicted in films of the ancient world. The
troops mass at the border, a command is given and everyone rushes forward helter-
skelter, applying lethal force as fast and furiously as possible.
But of course it is not like this at all. Scoundrels do rule—often there simply is
no wise and benevolent ruler waiting for our advice about the general good.
More importantly, military and civilian professionals, although certainly different,
are no longer oil and water. War must also be managed by experts. The more I have
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known military officers and military lawyers, the more obvious the parallels be-
tween our professions have become. The more I've come to see us all as managers.
And the more I've seen that when we differ, it is often the military that are the
cooler heads.
Some years ago, before the current war in Iraq, I spent some days on board the
USS Independence in the Persian Gulf. Nothing was as striking about the military
culture I encountered there as its intensely regulated feel. Five thousand sailors,
thousands of miles from base, managing complex technologies and weaponry,
constant turnover and flux. It was absolutely clear that even ifyou could afford to
buy an aircraft carrier, you couldn't operate it. The carrier, like the military, is a so-
cial system, requiring a complex and entrenched culture of standard practices and
shared experiences, rules and discipline.
The carrier is also a small town. I remember the eager salesman in a crowded
mess hall selling Chevrolets for delivery when the crew next hit shore. I came
away completely ready to believe that, at least in principle, no ship moves, no
weapon is fired, no target selected without review for compliance with regulation,
not because the military has gone soft, but because there was simply no other way
to make modern warfare work. Warfare has become rule and regulation.
In a way, of course, the routinization of law—humanitarian law—in the mili-
tary professions is a terrific achievement. Military professionalism affirms civilian
control. But more, our military and humanitarian professions have merged, yield-
ing a humanitarian military and a realistic, pragmatic humanitarianism.
But I worry. Was there nothing valuable in the separation ofmilitary and human-
itarian professions? As our professions merge, what happens to the virtues of
standing outside, speaking humanist truth to military power? And what happens to
the real political necessity for the military to break some eggs when the going gets
tough? What, moreover, happens to the legal "principle ofdistinction?"—the prin-
ciple that military and civilian professions must be distinguished.
My project this morning is to retrace the laws about warfare to illuminate, as
best I can, the ways in which the military and legal professions have marked and
unmarked the boundary between war and peace, and some of the virtues and vices
of strengthening and weakening our sense that humanitarian and military profes-
sionals march to different drummers.
Looking back, the legal mind has sometimes sharply distinguished war and
peace, and sometimes blurred them together. The modern laws ofwar inherit both
traditions—and now offer us a confusing mix of distinctions that can melt into air
when we press on them too firmly. A law of firm rules and loose exceptions, of
foundational principles—and counter principles. This complex professional lan-
guage can certainly limit our vision. For the legal professional—whether serving in
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the military or the humanitarian world—the challenge is to engage this slippery
body of material strategically as a partner in, rather than a substitute for, political
leadership and command responsibility.
The narrative line in this very complex historical story is actually quite simple
—
the rise and fall of a distinction between war and peace. For the early 19th-century
jurist, war and peace were far less distinct than they came to seem in the half cen-
tury before the First World War. After that war, 20th-century international lawyers
sought to bridge the gap that had opened between war and peace, to routinize hu-
manitarianism in the military profession and pragmatism among humanitarians.
Although they were quite successful—our professions have merged—the
potential to distinguish has not been eliminated. Instead, the relationship between
war and peace has become, for the humanitarian lawyer and military professional,
itselfsomething to be managed. We now have the rhetorical and doctrinal tools to
make and unmake the distinction between war and peace. And we do so as a tactic
in both war and peace. The result is less a difference between the outside ofhuman-
itarian virtue and the inside of military violence than a common profession whose
practitioners manage the relationship between war and peace within a common
language; all the while working in the shadow of a new outside, the world we think
of as "politics."
Historical Backdrop: the Rise of "Modern War"
Our laws ofwar were forged in the shadow of a new "modern" conception ofwar-
fare. In the late 18th and early 19th centuries, what had been an aristocratic en-
deavor of the old regime became the general project of a nation—an extension of
public policy, an act of the whole.
This is the development crystallized by Clausewitz as a continuity between war
and peace. We have come to treat his formulation as classic:
We know, certainly, that War is only called forth through the political intercourse of
Governments and Nations; but in general it is supposed that such intercourse is broken
offby War, and that a totally different state of things ensues, subject to no laws but its
own. We maintain, on the contrary, that War is nothing but a continuation of political
intercourse, with a mixture of other means. 1
The new attitude Clausewitz proposes had been building for a generation. But
the revolutionary break with the ancien regime—and the Napoleonic wars that fol-
lowed—drove it home. The transformation ofwar from the interpersonal, dynas-
tic and religious struggles of an aristocracy to the public struggles of a nation—
a
David Kennedy
citizens' army, the levee en masse, the army "of the republic"—made war visible as
an extension of national policy, as a project of the whole society.
War became continuous with the political intercourse ofpeacetime as it became
the public affair of a nation—an instrument of national policy, an expression of
national sovereignty, a sign of national honor. The ancient marks of military dis-
tinctiveness, the uniform, the profession, the codes ofhonor, became synonymous
not with aristocratic status, but with public life—and often with submission to
civilian leadership.
Latent in the merger of war and public policy lay a distinction between the old
war and the new—wars of chivalry, honor and passion, versus wars of reason, cal-
culation and policy.
It took some time for this new vision to take hold. In 1838, a few years after
Clausewitz wrote, and long before he would became a wartime president, Abra-
ham Lincoln spoke ofthe abolitionist cause in these terms: "Passion has helped us,
but can do so no more. It will in future be our enemy. Reason, cold, calculating,
unimpassioned reason, must furnish all the materials for our future support and
defense."2
In saying this, Lincoln was understood to set himselfagainst war—the just cause
would need the calm determination of cooler peacetime heads. Two and a half de-
cades later, however, Lincoln would be embroiled in a war that would confound
this easy opposition of passionate war and reasoned peace.
Our Civil War—birthplace for so much ofthe law in war—is often remembered
as the first "modern" war. In part, this is winner's history—a war of the modern
North against the antebellum South, a war of industrial power and the Federal Na-
tion, against the old military order of chivalry and the old sectarianism of region. A
culture of commerce defeating a culture of honor, cold Northern reason slowly
quenching the hot passions of the South in the name of a National Whole.
But the Civil War's modernity lay not only in the Northern victory. For both
sides, this was a war pitting the full economic and spiritual powers of their imag-
ined community against another in a struggle for national identity. Modern war
conducted as total war, war ofthe whole, war for the whole. In this sense, Lincoln's
unimpassioned reason would not forestall war; it would become war. But neither
would it remain split from passion, as Lincoln's inspired vocabulary of sacrifice,
sanctification
—
"we cannot dedicate, we cannot consecrate, we cannot hallow this
ground" 3—would attest.
More than anything, the modernity of the Civil War lay in the strange brew of
reason and passion through which the struggle was understood by both sides. The
Northern cause was also a crusade, the Southern military also a redoubt of profes-
sional skill, thought, and art, against an often brutal Northern campaign. The
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rhetorical tools for distinguishing war and peace, new wars and old wars, were
there, but they were redirected to define the relations between the warring parties.
This mix ofpassion, reason and national expression on both sides conjured up a
war of singular ferocity. In a sense, the Clausewitzian vision had been realized
—
war had become continuous, in reason and passion, with the great political strug-
gles of the nation.
Legal War: Modern War Encounters Modern Law
On the one hand, 19th-century legal developments contributed to this emerging vi-
sion of warfare. The private modes ofwarfare associated with the old regime, now
thought incompatible with a unitary public sovereign monopoly of force, were
progressively eliminated. The 1856 Paris Declaration,4 for example, eliminated
"privateering," a complex legal institution through which "letters of marque" au-
thorized private vessels to carry out belligerent acts. Henceforth there would be
one sovereign, one military.
At the same time, however, late 19th century changes in legal consciousness
transformed what it meant for war to be the exclusive act of a public sovereign.
Most crucially, by the end ofthe 19th century, it no longer meant that war was con-
tinuous with peace, or a project of the whole—more the opposite.
The emergence ofa sharp distinction between public and private brought with it
the image of a transnational commercial space that should be kept free from con-
tamination by public force. Private armies, mercenaries, privateers; all these were
outmoded, not only because they were part ofan aristocratic past, but because they
did not fit with the new, exclusively public nature of sovereign war powers.
The public realm had become one sphere of power among many, marked off
from the private realm of the market and the family. Public warfare that had
seemed general, continuous with the whole society, now seemed, in legal terms,
specific—the project of the government, not the society.
Law's Allies: Humanitarians Speaking Virtue to Violence
Humanitarian voices supported the legal separation of war from the domain of
peace. Broad pacifist campaigns arose from diverse sources: church leaders, propo-
nents ofwoman's suffrage, heirs to the abolition movement, as well as political ac-
tivists of all types—anarchists, socialists, populists, progressives, Catholics.
These diverse voices marked the distinction between war and peace in various
ways—as ethics against politics, as faith against the cruel logic of commerce, as
calm reason against fanaticism, modern logic against the primitive culture of
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honor. In fact, the terms with which they marked the line from peace to war paral-
lel those by which both sides distinguished North and South.
All these voices spoke to war, to the statesmen and militarywho made war, from
outside—in the name ofan alternative ethical vision, sometimes national, more of-
ten universal. War and peace were separate—Clausewitz was now the problem. We
might now say they pled for peace by speaking truth to power. The point was to
shrink the domain ofwar through moral suasion, agitation, shaming, and prosely-
tizing. In their view, blurring war with peace was both dangerous and immoral.
This conviction lent an ethical urgency to the emergence of a sharp legal distinc-
tion between war and peace. Each was now a legal status, separated by a declara-
tion. Combatants and noncombatants, neutrals and belligerents have different
bundles of legal rights and privileges. The battlefield, the territory of belligerency,
was legally demarcated. The legal treatises of the period began to place the law of
peace and the law of war in separate volumes. In part, these distinctions aimed to
limit the carnage of war by expanding the privileges of civilians and limiting the
military privilege to kill.
These distinctions were also part of a broader reorganization of legal thought,
sharpening the distinction between the public and the private sphere, hardening
private rights and limiting public powers to their respective spheres.
For all, peace and war were to be legally separated, for example, private rights
were increasingly thought to be continuous across the boundary. It is here that we
began to see the logic ofthinking that when the dust settles after a war claiming the
lives of millions, destroying empires, and remaking the political and economic
landscape of the planet, people might reasonably feel they are still entitled to get
their property back.
In short, the late 19th century developed an alliance between two rather differ-
ent sets of ideas. A moral conviction that the forces of peace stand outside war, de-
manding that swords be beaten into ploughshares, and a legal project to sharpen
the distinction between public powers and private rights.
The result was a legal conception ofwar as a public project limited to its sphere.
The legal distinctiveness ofwar reinforced the idea that war was itselfa discrete and
limited phenomenon—over there, the domain of combat. It seemed reasonable to
expect that warriors stay over there—and that protected persons, even women sol-
diers, stay outside the domain of combat.
This alliance of ethics and legal form has continued across the 20th century and
is with us still. We see it in the effort to restrain war by emphasizing its moral and
legal distinctiveness—by walling it off from peace and shrinking its domain. We
see its echo in the many varieties of 20th-century pacifism, in efforts to revive "just
war" theory as an exogenous truth that can limit military power, and in the struggle
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to bring the language ofhuman rights to bear on the military, that is, to judge the
effects ofwar by a different and higher ethical standard. But we also see it in efforts
to treat combat and "police action" as fundamentally—ethically, legally—different;
the one the domain of human rights, the other the proper domain of the law of
armed conflict.
I have a great deal of sympathy for this outsider approach. It is where my own
professional and ethical journey began; in a moral world for which the
Clausewitzian perspective was precisely the problem. To think war and peace con-
tinuous was to think the unthinkable. And to embrace a cynical, realpolitik point of
view which, because it could think war, would also find itselfmaking war, was simi-
larly unthinkable. If you can't tell the difference between war and peace, how can
we even have a conversation about limiting war's violence? In this view, our only
hope is to bring an external reason to bear on the violence ofwar—and an external
ethical passion to the cold calculation that war might sometimes make sense.
The Dark Sides ofOutsider Virtue: Limits to the Alliance
Nevertheless, the dark sides ofthis outsider's perspective are now familiar. There is,
and I will come back to this, the uneasy feeling that war simply is no longer as dis-
tinct as all that. Even assuming war might be conducted "over there," in its own do-
main, it has always been difficult to keep one's ethical distance from warfare in
modern discussions of international affairs.
There is the nagging problem that force also has humanitarian uses in a wicked
world. Moreover, war can strengthen our moral determination. We know that
great moral claims often become stronger when men and women kill and die in
their name. There is some kind of feedback loop between our ethical convictions
and our use of force. Moreover, we know how easily moral clarity calls forth vio-
lence and justifies warfare. It is a rare military campaign today that is not launched
for some humanitarian purpose.
Looking back, this was a great lesson ofthe Civil War—both parties experienced
their project and excoriated their opponents as both cool reason and hot crusade.
Both battled in the name of the National Whole. Everyone was speaking truth to
power as they went at one another tooth and nail.
In the years since, we have learned how easily ethical denunciation and out-
rage—triggering intervention in Kosovo, Afghanistan, even Iraq—can get us into
circumstances where we are not able to follow through and cause the making of
humanitarian promises which war cannot deliver. The universal claims ofhuman
rights can seem to promise the existence ofan "international community" which is
simply not available to back them up.
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Indeed, the discourse of ethical denunciation often has a tip ofthe iceberg prob-
lem. Take Abu Ghraib. Sexually humiliating, even torturing and killing prisoners is
probably not, ethically speaking, the worst or most shocking thing our Coalition
has done in Iraq. We should worry that our outrage at the photos may also be a way
of not thinking about other injuries, deaths and mutilations our government has
wrought.
Outrage can distract us from the hard questions. Was the problem in Abu
Ghraib a legal violation—or a failure of leadership? Was the failure one ofhuman
dignity—or tactics? The whole episode was clearly a military defeat. But we are left
with the nagging question. If it could be kept secret, if it could be done pursuant to a
warrant, perhaps sexual humiliation can help win the war; might, on balance, reduce
the suffering of civilians and combatants alike.
We know, moreover, that following absolute ethical precepts in wartime—as
any other time—can become its own idolatry. Is it sensible to clear the cave with a
firebomb because pepper spray, lawful when policing, is unlawful in "combat"?
Absolute rules lead us to imagine we know what violence is just and what is unjust,
always and for everyone. But justice is not like that, it must be imagined, built by
people, struggled for, and redefined, in each conflict in new ways. Justice requires
leadership—on the battlefield and off.
Ofcourse, for all these difficulties, much can sometimes be achieved by bringing
humanitarian reason to bear on cultures ofviolence and by opposing the cruel cal-
culations of cynical statesmen with ethical commitment.
Still, an external moral discourse may not be able to stay all that external. Often,
the trouble begins when it hits the problem of exceptions. What if it were Hitler,
what if there were genocide, what if they were raping your mother? What about
self-defense? What about deterrence? These classic questions take us straight to the
doctrinal world of flexible standards, balancing conflicting considerations, assess-
ing proportionality that is familiar to the professional weighing costs to achieve
gains. To figure out when and how much self-defense is "just," we need technical,
professional military expertise.
Some commentators reacted to the 1996 International Court of Justice opinion
on the Legality ofthe Threat or Use ofNuclear Weapons5—a fabric of legal equivoca-
tions—by shaming the Court for speaking with nuance about an apocalypse; for
parsing the "slaughter of the innocents" into the awkward categories of Article 38;
for worrying more about the validity of norms than the future of humanity.
The horrors of warfare, the dead and mangled bodies, the lives and families
ripped apart, the intense anxiety and suffering on and offthe battlefield, the pain of
a single wounded child crying out, it seems obscene to speak of these things in any
language but that of moral clarity, regret and outrage.
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But is there, in fact, an alternative mode of discussion on which to ground this
sensibility? Once we set out to speak ofnuclear war as "slaughtering the innocents,"
we would soon enough need a definition for innocent. We would need to account
not merely for the horrors of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, but also for their singular-
ity. How can the dangers of nuclear proliferation, nuclear error, nuclear first use
best be prevented? Serious, difficult questions. What about deterrence, does it
work? When? And, of course, what about torture? When does it work?
Moreover, presuming we speak about the slaughter of the innocents in order to
reduce the likelihood of nuclear war—rather than merely to bear witness, we will
need to assess ethical denunciation itself in tactical terms. What are the costs and
benefits ofdenunciation? When should we trim our sails a bit, hold back, even flat-
ter those whose fingers are on the button, in the name of an effective pacifism? Of
course, ifwe hold our rhetorical fire this time people may die. People whose death
we might have prevented, in whose torture we acquiesce, whom we sacrifice for the
larger ethical objective of a stronger law in war, or a more legitimate International
Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC).
Strategy Switching: Humanitarian Pragmatism and Antiformalism
Over the last century, these difficulties and ambiguities have eroded confidence in
the outsider strategy; an erosion sped by the fate of the legal consciousness with
which this strategy had been allied. The first half of the 20th century saw a wide-
spread loss offaith in the formal distinctions ofclassical legal thought; in the wisdom,
as well as the plausibility, of separating law sharply from politics, or private right
sharply from public power.
This loss of faith has had consequences for efforts to limit the violence ofwarfare
through law; both undermining classic distinctions, between belligerent and neu-
tral, for example, and opening new strategies for moving more fluidly between mil-
itary and humanitarian professional vocabularies.
As a result, the strategy of external denunciation—naming and shaming—has
never had the grip in the law of force that it has had, say, in the field of human
rights. Indeed, the modern law of force represents a triumph for grasping the nettle
of costs and benefits and infiltrating the background decision-making of those
whom it would bend to humanitarian ends.
The result was a new, modern law in war. This is the law known to the ICRC and
much ofthe European international law establishment as "humanitarian law," and
to the US military as the "law ofarmed conflict." They are speaking about the same
thing. I prefer the classic term "laws in war" or jus in bello.
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As early as the Civil War, the humanitarian project sought less to distinguish
war from peace, or just war from unjust war, or good guys from bad guys, than to
limit the violence of all sides through an insider strategy ofprofessionalization. It is
not surprisingly that Francis Lieber, author of an early code of conduct for battle6
had relatives on both sides in our Civil War. The law in war we have inherited elo-
quently illustrates the strengths and weaknesses ofthis professionalization strategy.
The "law in war"—associated most prominently with the International Com-
mittee of the Red Cross—has always prided itself on its pragmatic relationship
with military professionals. It is not unusual to hear military lawyers speak of the
ICRC lawyers as their "partners" in codification—and compliance—and vice
versa. They attend the same conferences, and speak the same language, even when
they differ on this or that detail.
Developing a common insider vocabulary did not mean jettisoning rules; it
meant first of all placing the rules on a firmer footing in the militarily plausible.
Rules are not external expressions of virtue, but internal expressions of profes-
sional discipline.
Already in the 19th century, many humanitarians thought the best way to pro-
ceed was to work with the military to codify detailed rules they can respect—no ex-
ploding bullets, respect for ambulances and medical personnel, and so forth. To
this day, the most significant codifications have indeed been negotiated among
diplomatic and military authorities.
In this, the codified 19th-century law in war was something of an exception to
the prevailing spirit of classical legal thought—and a precursor for what would fol-
low in the 20th century. Rather than elaborating private rights against public pow-
ers, it harnessed the authority of public sovereignty to the articulation of limits;
foreshadowing an international legal positivism that would be theorized only in
the early decades of the 20th century as a repudiation of 19th-century efforts to
ground law outside sovereign consent.
Of course, this reliance on military acquiescence limited what could be
achieved—military leaders outlaw weapons which they no longer need, which they
feel will be potent tools only for their adversaries, or against which defense would
be too expensive or difficult. Narrowly drawn rules permit a great deal—and legiti-
mate what is permitted.
Recognition ofthese costs is one reason the pragmatism ofthe law in war has al-
ways meant more than positivism; more than deference to sovereign consent;
more than legal clarity; more than realism about the power of nation States. Prag-
matism has also meant antiformalism
—
principles and standards replacing rules.
As you all know, since at least 1945, a vocabulary of principles has grown up
alongside tough-minded military bargains over weaponry. The detailed rules of
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The Hague or Geneva law have morphed into standards—simple ideas which can
be printed on a wallet-sized card and taught easily to soldiers in the field. "The
means of war are not unlimited," "each use of force must be necessary" and "pro-
portional." These have become ethical baselines for a universal modern
civilization.
Humanitarians have sought to turn rules into principles to render the narrow
achievements of negotiation in more general terms; transforming narrow treaties
into broad custom. Military professionals have done the same for different rea-
sons—to ease training through simplification, to emphasize the importance of
judgment by soldiers and commanders operating under the rules, or simply to
cover situations not included under the formal rules with a consistent practice. Ap-
parently, for example, a standard Canadian military manual instructs that the
"spirit and principles" 7 of the international law of armed conflict apply to non-
international conflicts not covered by the terms of the agreed rules.
It is not just that rules have become principles—we as often find the reverse.
Military lawyers turn broad principles and nuanced judgments into simple bright
line rules of engagement for soldiers in combat. Humanitarians comb military
handbooks and government statements of principle promulgated for all sorts of
purposes, to distill "rules" ofcustomary international law. The ICRC's recent three
volume restatement ofthe customary law ofarmed conflict is a monumental work
of advocacy ofjust this type.
In the modern law in war, both rules and standards are simultaneously under-
stood in the quite different registers of "validity" and "persuasion." In the world of
validity, the law is the law
—
you should follow it because it is valid. If your battle-
field acts do not fall under a valid prohibition, you remain privileged to kill. Full
stop. On the other hand, however, as a tool ofpersuasion, the law in war overflows
these banks. It will be hard to argue
—
particularly to persistent opposers—that
many of the purportedly customary rules in the ICRC restatement are, strictly
speaking, "valid." But there is no gainsaying their likely persuasiveness in many
contexts and to many audiences.
We are used to working with the law ofarmed conflict in the key ofvalidity. We
make rules by careful negotiation. We influence customary rules by intentioned
and public behavior. We send ships through straits or close to shorelines both to
assert and to strengthen rights.
But we will need to become more adept at operations in the law of persuasion.
The domain in which the image of a single dead civilian can make a persuasive case




The law in war of persuasion is not only the product of overreaching humani-
tarian outsiders, of course. The military also interprets, advocates, seeks to per-
suade. This reinterpretation of rules and principles has brought humanitarian law
inside the vocabulary of the military profession and brought complex consider-
ations of strategy to the humanitarian professions. As a framework for debate and
judgment, this new law in war embraced the unavoidability of trade-offs, of bal-
ancing harms, of accepting costs to achieve benefit—an experience common to
both military strategists and humanitarians.
Take civilian casualties. Of course, civilians will be killed in war. Limiting civil-
ian death had become a pragmatic commitment—no unnecessary damage, not
one more civilian than necessary. In the vernacular of humanitarian law, this be-
comes no "superfluous injury" and no "unnecessary suffering." The range ofcom-
plex strategic calculations opened up by this idea, for those inside and outside the
military, is broad indeed.
We might say that the old distinction between combatants and civilians has
been relativized. What, in any event, can it mean for the distinction between mili-
tary and civilian to have itselfbecome a principle? The "principle of distinction"
—
there is something oxymoronic here—either it is a distinction, or it is a principle.
Of course, it is but a short step from here to "effects-based targeting," and the
elimination of the doctrinal firewall between civilian and military, belligerent and
neutral. But, thinking in humanitarian terms, why shouldn't military operations
be judged by their effects, rather than by their adherence to narrow rules that might
well have all manner of perverse and unpredictable outcomes?
I was struck during the NATO bombardment of Belgrade
—
justified by the in-
ternational community's humanitarian objectives in Kosovo—by the public dis-
cussions among military strategists and humanitarian international lawyers of the
appropriateness of targeting the civilian elites most strongly supporting the
Milosevic regime. Ifbombing the bourgeoisie would have been more effective than
a long march inland toward the capital, would it have been proportional, neces-
sary, indeed humanitarian to place the war's burden on young draftees in the field
rather than upon the civilian population who sent them there? Some argued that
targeting civilians supporting an outlaw, if democratic, regime would also extend
the Nuremberg principle of individual responsibility. Others disagreed, of course.
But the terms of their disagreement were provided by shared principles.
The law in war today offers the basis for both external denunciation of military
action and internal calculation of its necessity or proportionality. Although they
do not lie easily with one another, our thinking fades easily from one to the other.
Take the Abu Ghraib photos. The law in war offers us two quite different vocabu-
laries for reacting to the photographs, neither of which is satisfactory. First, moral
15
Distinguishing Military and Humanitarian Professions
outrage. We have repeatedly heard it said that the administration, like so many
others, was "shocked by the photos." They may have been—but I wonder. If
Rumsfeld was indeed shocked, might he not be just a bit too naive to be entrusted
with taking the country to war? He was shocked in part, as we all were, because
the violence was gratuitous, unnecessary, not instrumentally justified, and, of
course, because it was photographed. But was it really not necessary? How does
sleep or sensory deprivation compare to humiliation, or to chills, or to intense
fear? Which is more humane? Which more effective? Can we still distinguish the
two questions?
Asymmetry—Severing the Laws of Validity and Persuasion
There is something else about this new vocabulary that is disturbing. You may re-
member Major General James Mattis, poised to invade Falluja, concluding his de-
mand that the insurgents stand down with these words: "We will always be
humanitarian in all our efforts. We will fight the enemy on our terms. May God
help them when we're done with them." 8 1 know I shivered at his juxtaposition of
humanitarian claims and blunt threats.
It is troubling, ofcourse, that this so often has been a vocabulary for judgment of
the center against the periphery. When the Iraqi insurgent quoted on the same
page of the New York Times as Mattis threatened to decapitate civilian hostages if
the coalition forces did not withdraw, he was also threatening innocent civilian
death—less of it actually—but without the humanitarian promise. And he also
made me shiver.
It is no secret that technological advances have heightened the asymmetry of
warfare. In the framework ofvalidity, it is clear that all are bound by the same rules.
But as persuasion, this assumption is coming undone. When the poor deviate from
the best military practices ofthe rich, it is tempting to treat their entire campaign as
illegitimate. But before we jump to the legitimacy of their cause, how should we
evaluate the strategic use ofperfidy by every outgunned insurgency battling a mod-
ern occupation army? From an effects-based perspective, perfidious attacks on our
military—from mosques, by insurgents dressing as civilians or using human
shields—may have more humanitarian consequences than any number of alterna-
tive tactics. And they are very likely to be interpreted by many as reasonable, "fair"
responses by an outgunned, but legitimate force.
There is no question that technological asymmetry erodes the persuasiveness of
the "all bound by the same rules" idea. It should not be surprising that forces with
vastly superior arms and intelligence capacity are held to a higher standard in the
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court of world public opinion than their adversaries. As persuasion, the law in
force has indeed become a sliding scale.
Persuasion and the CNN Effect
In 1996, 1 traveled to Senegal as a civilian instructor with the Naval Justice School
from here in Newport to train members of the Senegalese military in the laws of
war and human rights. At the time, the training program was operating in 53 coun-
tries, from Albania to Zimbabwe. As I recall it, our training message was clear: hu-
manitarian law is not a way of being nice. By internalizing human rights and
humanitarian law, you will make your force interoperable with international coali-
tions, suitable for international peacekeeping missions. To use our sophisticated
weapons, your military culture must have parallel rules of operation and engage-
ment to our own. Most importantly, we insisted, humanitarian law will make your
military more effective—will make your use of force something you can sustain
and proudly stand behind.
I was struck when we broke into small groups for simulated exercises, by a re-
gional commander who kept asking the hard questions—when you capture some
guerrillas, isn't it better to place a guy's head on a stake for deterrence? Well, no, we
would patiently explain, this will strengthen the hostility ofvillagers to your troops,
and imagine what would happen if CNN were nearby. They would all laugh, of
course, and respond "we must be sure the press stays away."
Ah, but this is no longer possible, we said, if you want to play on the interna-
tional stage, you need to be ready to have CNN constantly by your side. You must
place an imaginary CNN webcam on your helmet, or, better, just over your
shoulder. Not because force must be limited and not because CNN might show
up, but because only force which can imagine itself being seen can be enduring.
An act of violence one can disclose and be proud of is ultimately stronger, more
legitimate.
Our lesson was written completely in the key of persuasion, not validity. It was
a lesson apparently lost on those who considered the interrogation of "high value
targets" in our own war on terror. Nevertheless, the Senegalese had learned, as
Secretary Rumsfeld now seems to be learning, what was required for a culture of
violence to be something one could proudly stand behind. What was required, in a
word, for warfare to be civilized. The more I thought about that, however, the
more it made me shiver as well.
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Comparative Law: the International Law ofArmed Conflict and
Military Discipline
I have been speaking about the law in war as if we could rather easily identify its
terms. But what law governs the battlefield? Ifyou ask an international commercial
lawyer, what law governs the transaction, the answer will be anything but straight-
forward. Treaty law on the subject—even the World Trade Organization agree-
ments—would only be the beginning. There would be international private law, of
course. But far more importantly, national regulation with transnational effects,
and the national private law built into the transaction through private ordering.
Assessing the significance of these various bodies of law requires not only inquiry
into their formal jurisdictional validity, but also their sociological effect. Who will
want to regulate the transaction? Who will be able to do so? What rules will influ-
ence the transaction even absent enforcement?
The answer for warfare is no simpler, particularly for coalition operations, or for
campaigns that stretch the "battlespace" across numerous jurisdictions. Who will
try to apply what rules, who will succeed? When the Italians decide to prosecute
CIA operatives for their alleged participation in a black operation of kidnapping
and rendition, the law of the battlefield has shifted. The practice of military law to-
day requires complex and shifting predictions of fact and law. Whose interpreta-
tion will prevail and before what audience?
This kind of analysis will require sophisticated comparative law, for there are
more than one laws ofarmed conflict. The rules simply look different ifyou antici-
pate battle against a technologically superior foe, or live in a Palestinian refugee
camp in Gaza. Moreover, although a national military may translate the words of
the international law of armed conflict directly into its operations manual, the in-
terpretation and intent may well be different. More often, different nations, even in
the same coalition, will have implemented and interpreted the shared rules and
principles quite differently. Humanitarians looking at the same rules might lean
toward restrictive interpretations, adopting the perspective of the potential "vic-
tim," while the military might lean towards greater freedom of maneuver. Al-
though we might disagree with one another's interpretation, we must recognize
that our professional materials are elastic enough to enable quite diverse interpre-
tations. Military law is comparative law.
As humanitarians, when we compare international rules with the military's
rules of engagement, we might well be surprised: the military rules might well be
the stricter. The strength and significance ofthe military's own culture ofdiscipline
can be difficult for civilians to grasp. I have tried to explain it to civilian audiences
by saying it is bureaucratic necessity, central to the effectiveness of the mission and
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to the safety of colleagues. But my sense is that military discipline is as much pas-
sion as reason; instrumentalism wrapped in honor and integrity in a culture set off
from civilian life—a higher calling.
As a social production, military discipline is also of course, and perhaps more
importantly, a work on the self. The United States Army runs recruitment com-
mercials which implore "see your recruiter, become an Army of One." The prom-
ise is power, to be sure. But also discipline—self-discipline. Ifyou join, you will be
transformed inside
—
you will become an army, coordinated, disciplined, your
own commanding officer, your own platoon, embodying within yourself the force
of hundreds because of the work you will do, and we will do, on you.
Of course, there is opportunity for individual judgment—and error. Soldiers
who run amok. We remember the pilots who flew beneath the Italian ski lift slicing
the cables. And the precision guided missile fired in Kosovo with the tail fins put on
backwards, spinning ever further from its programmed target until it exploded in a
crowded civilian marketplace. We remember the American pilots who bombed
their Canadian allies. Or, for that matter, My Lai, the abuse of prisoners in Bagh-
dad, and all the other tales of atrocity in war.
It can be particularly hard for civilians to grasp that when soldiers are tried for
breach of military discipline, their defense is often stronger under the vague stan-
dards of international humanitarian law than under national criminal or military
law. Or that international law provides the framework less for disciplining the force
than for unleashing the spear at its tip.
Indeed, the international legal standards of self-defense, proportionality and
necessity are so broad that they are routinely invoked to refer to the zone of discre-
tion rather than limitation. I have spoken to numerous Navy pilots who describe
briefings filled with technical rules of engagement and military law. After the mili-
tary lawyer leaves, the commanding officer summarizes in the empowering lan-
guage of international law—"just don't do anything you don't feel is necessary"
and "defend yourself; don't get killed out there." The fighter pilot heads out on a
leash of rules, assembled in a package coordinated by a complex transnational ar-
ray ofoperating procedures. Only at the last moment, in contact with the enemy, is
he released to the discretion framed by the law ofarmed conflict, that is, necessity,
and self-defense.
What are we to make of the widespread sense that military professionals are the
most disturbed by the current administration's efforts to shrink or skirt humani-
tarian standards in their war on terror? Has the military gone soft? Become less
willing than their civilian masters to condone harsh tactics? Or is the scandal that
the JAG Corps has been more courageous in their opposition to harsh tactics than
those civilian humanists who stand outside, wringing their hands, but uncertain
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whether they are in fact qualified to judge? Perhaps the scandal is our sense that to
torture or not to torture has become a professional judgment in the first place, un-
avoidably linked to the question ofwhether harsh treatment will work. Again, how
effective, in fact, is sexual humiliation, or isolation, or torture?
After the GulfWar, it was widely acknowledged that the decision to take down
the electrical grid by striking the generators had left power out for far longer than
necessary, contributing to unsanitary water supply and the unnecessary death of
many thousands from cholera. Military planners involved have admitted this was a
mistake, and they have reportedly revised their procedures accordingly. In Kosovo
and Iraq, such a devastating blow to the electrical grid was not struck.
But in reviewing the GulfWar experience, they will not say that taking out the
generators lacked proportionality or necessity, or that it was excessive given what
they knew then and what they were trying to achieve. These legal standards remain
the solid ground on which their acts, and, ultimately the deaths ofmany thousands,
can remain legitimated
Weighing and Balancing—What Exactly?
The transformation of the law in war into a vocabulary of persuasion about legiti-
macy is not the end ofthe matter. We still need to figure out, for a given purpose, a
given argument, just what is, in fact, necessary or proportional. And of course, it is
in this spirit that targets in the recent Iraq conflict were pored over by lawyers. But
even in the best of times, the promise of weighing and balancing is rarely met.
I have learned that if you ask a military professional precisely how many civil-
ians can you kill to offset how much risk to one ofyour own men, you won't receive
a straight answer. When the Senegalese asked us, we'd say "it's a judgment call." In-
deed, at least so far as I have been able to ascertain, there is no background ex-
change rate for civilian life. What you find instead are rules kicking the decision up
the chain of command as the number of civilians increases, until the decision
moves offstage from military professionals to politicians.
In the early days of the Iraq war, coalition forces were certainly frustrated by
Iraqi soldiers who advanced in the company of civilians. A Corporal Mikael
Mcintosh reported that he and a colleague had declined several times to shoot sol-
diers in fear of harming civilians. "It's a judgment call," he said, "if the risks out-
weigh the losses, then you don't take the shot." He offered an example: "There was
one Iraqi soldier, and 25 women and children, I didn't take the shot." His col-
league, Sergeant Eric Schrumpf chipped in to describe facing one soldier among
two or three civilians, opening fire, and killing civilians: "We dropped a few civil-
ians, but what do you do. I'm sorry, but the chick was in the way."9
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There is no avoidance of decisions of this type in warfare. The difficulty arises
when humanitarian law transforms decisions about whom to kill into judgments.
When it encourages us to think the chick's death resulted not from an exercise of
human freedom, for which a moral being is responsible, but rather from the ab-
stract operation of professional principles.
We know there are clear cases both ways—destroying the village to save it, or
minor accidental damage en route to victory—but we also know that the principles
are most significant in the great run of situations that fall in between. What does it
mean to pretend these decisions are principled judgments? How should we evalu-
ate the irreducibly imaginary quality of the promise that costs and benefits will be
weighed, that warfare will be proportional, its violence necessary?
I was struck that Iraq war reporting was filled with anecdotes about soldiers
overcome by remorse at having slaughtered civilians, and being counseled back to
duty by their officers, their chaplains, and their mental health professionals, who
explained that what they had done was necessary, proportional, and therefore just.
Of course, ifyou ask leading humanitarian law experts how many civilians you
can kill for this or that, you will also not get an answer. Rather than saying "it's a
judgment call," however, they are likely to say something like "you just can't target
civilians," thereby refusing to engage in the pragmatic assessments necessary to
make that rule applicable in combat; defaulting, ifyou will, to the external strategy
of denunciation abandoned a century ago by humanitarian law.
In psychological terms, it is hard to avoid interpreting this pragmatism-promised-
but-not-delivered as a form of denial; a collaborative denial—by humanitarians
and military lawyers—of their participation in the machinery of war.
In the military vernacular, it might be more accurate to sense a collaborative
avoidance of command responsibility and leadership; a willingness to push re-
sponsibility up to the domain of politics or down to the domain of rules. The ten-
dency to blame the civilian leadership—or the lawyers—is well known. But we also
know lawyers, whether inside or outside the military, who make that easy by pre-
tending the law is more decisive—or more open—than it is.
The Law in War Comes Unstuck
In this audience, I do not need to emphasize the extent to which the traditional law
in war is becoming unstuck; questioned from every angle.
In part this is a matter of blurring boundaries—new technologies and new
modes of warfare pressing a doctrinal world imagined in the wake of wars that
seemed "modern" in the 1860s. The language has proliferated—self-defense, war,
hostilities, the use of force, resort to arms, police action, peace enforcement,
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peacemaking, peacekeeping. Who can align them confidently, like "chop," "whip,"
"blend" on the Cuisinart? They are all technical terms in military parlance and legal
doctrine, but also in ethical and political discourse.
Earlier this month I participated in a lengthy discussion at the Council on For-
eign Relations on "post-conflict" reconstruction. All agreed we were far from 19th-
century warfare. Who was the enemy and where was the battlefield? The old days of
industrial warfare are over; you're not trying to blow stuffup on the battlefield un-
til the political leadership surrenders. It's asymmetric, it's chaotic, it's not linear.
The battlespace is at once global and intensely local; there are no front lines. Here at
home, we hardly seem at war—the enemy, the conflict, the political goal, all have
become slippery.
For the military, everything important and difficult seems to happen in a kind of
grey area between war and peace. The idea of a boundary between law enforce-
ment, limited by human rights law, and military action, limited by the laws of
armed conflict, seems ever less tenable. In the same city troops are at once engaging
in conflict, stabilizing a neighborhood after conflict, and performing humanitar-
ian, nation-building tasks.
I heard military men with experience in Bosnia, Kosovo, and Iraq all stress the
continuities of the transition from war to peace; they insisted the term "post-conflict"
was a misnomer. In principle, planning and training for the post-conflict phase
should begin before the conflict, even if it seems hard to imagine identifying
"spare" troops in the preparation phase who might be saved for later tasks. In any
event, restoring water or eliminating sewage after the conflict are part of winning
the war. To paraphrase Clausewitz, post-conflict action is the continuation of con-
flict by other means. Anyway, they wondered, when did the war start—on 9/1 1? In
1991? In 2003?
The boundaries are blurry. Everywhere we find public/private partnerships,
outsourcing, insurgents who melt into the mosque, armed soldiers who turn out to
work for private contractors. There are civilians all over the battlefield, not only in-
surgents dressed as refugees, but special forces operatives dressing like natives, pri-
vate contractors dressing like Arnold Schwarzenegger, and all the civilians running
the complex technology and logistical chains "behind" modern warfare.
The rules of engagement are no longer just those of humanitarian law or mili-
tary discipline, there is also private law, contract, environmental regulation. Ap-
parently at one point the Swiss company backing up life insurance contracts for
private convoy drivers in Iraq imposed a requirement ofadditional armed guards if
they were to pay on any claim, slowing the whole operation.
There is no question that all this generates enormously difficult doctrinal prob-
lems; we will deal with many of them over the next days. Why should weapons
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permissible in domestic riot control and policing—non-penetrating bullets, cer-
tain gases—not be available on the battlefield if combat blurs easily with stabiliza-
tion and law enforcement? In close quarters on board a ship interdicted during a
blockade should seamen be issued weaponry appropriate for combat or law en-
forcement? To what extent does law shape or limit this decision?
In this new environment, we hear that humanitarian law will have to be re-
thought. But this is more than simply a more complex legal situation requiring
more sophisticated analysis. Adjusting the law in war to post-modern warfare will
require more than doctrinal ingenuity. It will require a new way of thinking about
the role of law—and warfare.
Indeed, it might be more accurate to say that the fluid modern vocabulary of
clear rules and sharp distinctions, broad principles and vague calculations of pro-
portionality and necessity was designed precisely for this. It is a professional vocab-
ulary for making distinctions and eroding them, for applying principles and simply
invoking them. What will be required is a new understanding of the work oflaw
—
and of the responsibilities of command.
Sophisticated analyses ofnecessity and proportionality, no less than the external
vocabulary ofdistinction and denunciation, seem ever less convincing. Each has, in
its own way, become a vocabulary of warfare. More importantly, we are increas-
ingly likely to interpret whatever military or humanitarian professionals say about
the use of force in strategic terms, that is as things said for a reason, things said for
tactical advantage. As professionals, civilian or military, we know how to make
and unmake—the distinctions between war and peace, between civilian and
combatant.
Brigadier General Charles Dunlap gave me the arresting term "lawfare," using
law as a weapon, offensively and defensively, to legally condition the battlefield.
Partly this is public relations; shaping expectations about what will happen and
what will be legitimate. Getting the word out that we will—and we may—kill some
civilians.
Take the difficult question, when does war end? The answer is not to be found in
law or fact, but in strategy. Declaring the end of hostilities might be a matter of
election theater or military assessment. Just like announcing that there remains "a
long way to go," or that the "insurgency is in its final throes." These appear as fac-
tual or legal assessments, but we should understand them as arguments—messages
but also weapons. Communicating the war is fighting the war.
The old distinctions have not disappeared. Indeed, we sometimes want to insist
upon a bright line. For the military, after all, defining the battlefield defines the
privilege to kill in the same way that aid agencies want the guys digging the wells to
be seen as humanitarians, not post-conflict combatants. Defining the
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not-battlefield opens a "space" for humanitarian action. For both professions, dis-
tinguishing, like balancing, has become at once a mode ofwarfare and ofpacifism.
Ending conflict, calling it occupation; ending occupation, calling it sovereignty;
then opening hostilities, calling it a police action; suspending the judicial require-
ments of policing, declaring a state of emergence, a zone of insurgency. All these
things are also tactics in the conflict. We are occupying, but Falluja, for a few weeks,
is again a combat zone, and so on. Defining the battlefield is both a matter of de-
ployed force and a rhetorical claim. This is a war, this is an occupation, this is a po-
lice action, this is a security zone. These are insurgents, those are criminals, these
are illegal combatants, and so on. And these are all claims with audiences. The old
legal issues are there—the claim must have a plausible validity; we must under-
stand its persuasive potential.
Audience reaction matters. For detainees at Guantanamo the "war" may never
end. What war, which war? The war on terror? The war on poverty? Al Qaida? In
Iraq? The Taliban? Afghanistan? The war for security, for oil, for ... ? What is, pre-
cisely, the objective that once achieved will end their war? What limits our ability to
extend the war for which they are held indefinitely—doctrines of the law ofarmed
conflict? Hardly, the CNN effect gets closer to the mark. When publics with power
to impede our ability to achieve our strategic objectives find our argument that the
war for those prisoners has not ended so unpersuasive that they exercise that
power, we will need to change course.
We have heard that police and combat operations now go side-by-side; the zone
of combat abuts, overlaps the zones of occupation and military action. Must we
therefore conclude that human rights law and the law of armed conflict operate
concurrently, across the battlespace? Yes and no. The assertion that human rights
limits action in combat will seem persuasive to some audiences in some situations;
as will the assertion that the activities are distinct, the laws separate. Lawfare
—
managing law and war together—requires a strategic assessment of both claims
and both responses, and an active strategy by military and humanitarian actors to
frame the situation in one or the other.
In these strategic assessments, the legal questions become these: who, under-
standing the law in what way, will be able to do what to affect our ongoing efforts?
How, using what mix ofbehavior and assertion, can we transform the strategic sit-
uation to our advantage? This is not a question of validity, not even of persuasion.
This requires a social analysis of the dynamic interaction between ideas about the
law and strategic objectives.
As humanitarian and military professionals work with the law ofarmed conflict,
they change it. Of course the law that pre-exists a conflict constrains its course
conditioning expectations, establishing habits ofmind and standard procedures of
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operation. Humanitarians and military professionals are used to thinking about
influencing the law in peacetime through careful negotiations, through codifica-
tion, through advocacy, and through assertions of right. It can be hard, in combat,
to see that the law is, ifanything, more open to change. When humanitarian voices
seize on vivid images of civilian casualties to raise expectations about the required
accuracy of military targeting, they are changing the legal fabric.
In the Kosovo campaign, news reports of collateral damage often noted that co-
alition pilots could have improved their technical accuracy by flying lower, al-
though this would have exposed their planes and pilots to more risk. The law of
armed conflict does not require you to fly low or take more risk to avoid collateral
damage; it requires you to avoid superfluous injury and unnecessary suffering. But
these news reports changed the legal context—flying high to reduce risk seemed
"unfair." Humanitarians seized the moment, developing various theories to de-
mand "feasible compliance" that would hold the military to technically achievable
levels of care. In conference after conference, negotiation after negotiation, repre-
sentatives of the US military have argued that this is simply not "the law." Perhaps
not, but the effect of the legal claim is hard to deny.
Of course, the military also seeks to affect the legal context through its public af-
fairs activity and through its action on the battlefield. Asserting a right to attack a
given objective may induce defenders to tie up assets in its defense, regardless of
whether you intend to attack it or not. Attacking—or not attacking—a mosque is
as much a message, as a tactic on the ground.
Military action has become legal action, just as legal acts have become weapons.
When the United States uses the United Nations Security Council to certify lists of
terrorists to force seizure of their assets abroad, we might say that they have
weaponized the law since they could, presumably, have immobilized those assets
using other technologies. Similarly when they use contracts to buy up access to
commercially available satellite images of the battlefield, they could presumably
have denied their adversary access to those images using other weapons. The legal
and military professions have indeed merged.
None of this would have surprised Clausewitz. He continued his famous para-
graph on war as a continuation of policy with a striking turn to language:
[T]he chief lines on which the events of the War progress, and to which they are
attached, are only the general features of policy which run all through the War until
peace takes place. And how can we conceive it to be otherwise? Does the cessation of
diplomatic notes stop the political relations between different Nations and
Governments? Is not War merely another kind of writing and language for political
thoughts? It has certainly a grammar of its own, but its logic is not peculiar to itself. 10
25
Distinguishing Military and Humanitarian Professions
Clausewitz might well be surprised, however, by the extent to which the turn to
language has revitalized the distinction between warfare and the political. In my
experience, military and humanitarian professionals operating in this vocabulary
share a sense that somewhere else, outside or beyond their careful calculations,
somebody else makes decisions in a different way—exercises political judgment
and discretion. This is why the absence of a clear exchange rate for civilian lives is
untroubling; if the number is high enough, it will become a political decision.
The Law ofWar—Do Politicians Think Differently?
This takes us directly to the law of war. Normally, of course, for military profes-
sionals, the law of war is far less present. Civilian leadership means leaving ques-
tions about the legitimacy of the conflict—the decision to go to war in the first
place—to a different, the political, domain.
But, as the law in war has begun to come unstuck, professionals find themselves
turning increasingly to the law of war; find themselves unable to assess the legiti-
macy of wartime violence without assessing the legitimacy of the war itself. We
might say that the law ofwar has become the law in war's destiny. Ifthe use offeree
is to be proportional—more force for more important objectives—it seems rea-
sonable to think there would be a sliding scale for more and less important wars.
Wars for national survival, wars to stop genocide—shouldn't they legitimate more
than run of the mill efforts to enforce UN resolutions?
There can be something perverse here—harsher tactics more legitimate in more
"humanitarian" campaigns? But once the law ofarmed conflict becomes relative, a
function of the conflict's legitimacy, we must ask whether the vocabulary we use to
make the "political" decision to go to war differs in kind from that we use to fight
—
and restrain—the conflict once underway. Are "political" decisions, in fact, differ-
ent from decisions of commanding officers and humanitarian advocates?
As it turns out, while the law in war has infiltrated the military profession, the
law ofwar has been engaged in a collateral—and equally successful—campaign to
infiltrate the vocabulary of politics. The law about going to war has a history quite
parallel to that of humanitarian law. As a result, the distinction between profes-
sional and political judgments is far less clear than we might wish.
This story, which can be told in shorter compass, begins with a period of rather
fluid justifications expressed in a mixed vocabulary ofjustice and sovereign right. It
is not clear, that 17th-century "unjust" war ideas ever really limited the use of mili-




In any event, by the late 19th century, international law had very little to say
about the decision to go to war, a silence rooted in the assumption that war was an
unrestrained prerogative of sovereign power. The modern law of war is a century
long pragmatic reaction against this 19th -century legal silence.
The right and capacity to make war was so central to the late 19th-century legal
definition ofsovereignty that even in the 1920s, we still find jurists assessing the in-
ternational legal personality of the League of Nations by asking whether it has the
"right" to make war. But the League's purpose was another.
The diplomats who made the League sought to replace legal doctrines with a po-
litical institution that could sanction and deter aggression, while providing a
framework for peaceful change and the peaceful settlement of "disputes." The
brave new world of institutional management was born.
After the Second World War, again in the name ofpragmatism, this scheme ma-
tured into a comprehensive constitutional system. As we all know, the UN Charter
aimed to establish an international monopoly of force, placing responsibility for
maintaining the peace with the Security Council. War was prohibited—except as
authorized by the UN Charter. Not as authorized by the United Nations, but as au-
thorized by the Charter.
Like a constitution, the Charter was drafted in broad strokes and would need to
be interpreted. Over the years, what began as an effort to monopolize force has be-
come a constitutional regime of legitimate justifications for war.
This modern vocabulary of force has a jurisprudence—an attitude about the re-
lationship between law and power. It is the flexible jurisprudence of principles and
policies, of balancing conflicting considerations, familiar from many domestic
constitutional systems.
Legal scholar Oscar Schachter gave perhaps the best description in his eulogy for
Dag Hammarskjold, who epitomized the new jurisprudential spirit:
Hammarskjold made no sharp distinction between law and policy; in this he departed
clearly from the prevailing positivist approach. He viewed the body oflaw not merely
as a technical set of rules and procedures, but as the authoritative expression of
principles that determine the goals and directions of collective action. ... It is also of
significance in evaluating Hammarskjold's flexibility that he characteristically
expressed basic principles in terms of opposing tendencies (applying, one might say,
the philosophic concept of polarity or dialectical opposition). He never lost sight ofthe
fact that a principle, such as that of observance ofhuman rights, was balanced by the
concept of non-intervention, or that the notion of equality of States had to be
considered in a context which included the special responsibilities of the great Powers.
The fact that such precepts had contradictory implications meant that they could not
provide automatic answers to particular problems, but rather that they served as
criteria which had to be weighed and balanced in order to achieve a rational solution of
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the particular problem He did not, therefore, attempt to set law against power. He
sought rather to find within the limits of power the elements of common interest on
the basis ofwhich joint action and agreed standards could be established. 11
There is no doubt that this system of principles has legitimated a great deal of
warfare. Indeed, it is hard to think of a use of force that could not be legitimated in
these terms. It is a rare statesman who launches a war simply to be aggressive. There
is almost always something else to be said—the province is actually ours; our rights
have been violated; our enemy is not, in fact, a State; we were invited to help; they
were about to attack us; we are promoting the purposes and principles of the
United Nations. Something.
As the law in war became a matter of standards, balancing, and pragmatic calcu-
lation, the difficult, discretionary decisions were exported to the political realm. As
the political vocabulary has itselfbecome a matter of constitutional interpretation,
our understanding of the political process has also been transformed.
This convergence of humanitarianism and militarism has transformed our un-
derstanding of international politics. Idealism no longer provides a standpoint ex-
ternal to the ebbs and flows of the policy conversation. Action legitimates norms,
norms legitimate action. Humanitarians and statesmen, idealists and realists are in
the same game, and are increasingly difficult to distinguish from one another.
International Politics: a Conversation about Legitimacy
In the international world, we imagine this shared vocabulary of principles and
policy judgment to operate through conversation. States, private actors, NGOs,
and national courts are participants in an ongoing conversation about the legiti-
macy of State behavior—legitimacyjudged by their compatibility with UN Charter
principles.
Conversing before the court ofworld public opinion, statesmen not only assert
their prerogatives, they also test and establish those prerogatives through action.
Political assertions come armed with little packets of legal legitimacy, just as legal
assertions carry a small backpack of political corroboration. As lawyers must har-
ness enforcement to their norms, States must defend their prerogatives to keep
them—must back up their assertions with action to maintain their credibility. A
great many military campaigns have been undertaken for just this kind ofcredibility
—
missiles become missives.
It was, after all, in this spirit that President Bush went to the United Nations to
announce that he would enforce the Charter; and if he succeeded and the Iraq re-
gime were to change and democracy and freedom released, the legitimacy deposit
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in his account would be a direct transfer from the United Nations. Ofcourse, it was
a risk; but the United Nations was also daring, and risking in resisting.
When the United Nations withholds approval or refuses to participate, it may
de-legitimate the military campaign. Let us suppose it does not stop it; a deter-
mined coalition pushes ahead in the name of Charter principles. In the easy cases,
the campaign succeeds; the United Nations has missed out. Or the campaign fails;
the United Nations is vindicated.
The difficult case is now ours. The occupation is more difficult than anticipated,
the post-conflict/post-war/peace-building/nation-building phase holds hostage
the ultimate success or failure ofthe campaign. Op-ed writers urge all parties to ig-
nore sunk costs, to focus on the future. Surely, they argue, we all have a stake in a
successful outcome, and it makes sense for the United States and the international
community to cooperate.
Perhaps, but sunk costs cannot be ignored so readily. Seen dynamically, it makes
sense for Bush to resist relying on the United Nations to make good his original
wager as precedent for the next case; just as it makes sense for the United Nations to
resist engagement. It is no accident that we sometimes feel the Europeans want the
project to fail, and sometimes they do, for in this game of meaning and precedent,
to ignore sunk costs and get with the program is to take a legitimacy hit.
Either way, Iraqi citizens are paying the price, not in the "great game" of 19th -
century diplomacy, but in the "great conversation" of 20th-century legitimacy.
If, interpreting the law in war, humanitarians were loath to speak about the
civilians who might legitimately be killed—"you just can't target civilians"—they
also resist the suggestion in the law of war that they, like military planners, decide
when to draw down and when to pay into their legitimacy stockpile, and, therefore,
when to accept civilian casualties as necessary for longer term objectives.
Although humanitarians talk about the long-run benefits ofbuilding up the UN
system or promoting the law offorce, they do not make such long-run calculations.
Current costs are discounted, future benefits promised as if there were nothing to
weigh against expansion of humanitarian institutions and ideas; no civilians who
needed to be allowed to die for the legitimacy of the United Nations. But in this, we
depart from pragmatic calculation altogether and move into the domain of abso-
lute virtue. We are back speaking truth to power.
When I speak to civilian audiences, there is something scandalous about pre-
senting an aircraft carrier sailing off to war as the realization of international hu-
manitarianism. Aircraft carriers are the instruments of statesmen. Civilians prefer
to think of humanitarians as gentle civilizers, lawyers whispering in the admiral's
ear, protesters marching in the streets for peace, scholars documenting the norms
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and standards of humanitarian law, teachers instructing soldiers in the limits to
warfare. Humanitarian rulership is often rulership denied.
The transformation of the law of war into a set of constitutional standards at
once defined and enforced through an ex-post assessment oflegitimacy earned and
spent offers an open-ended vocabulary for diplomatic and military conversation.
Any and all criteria that turn out to affect the legitimacy of the action in the eyes of
those with the power to affect its success will, retrospectively, turn out to have been
persuasive requirements of the law of war. Like the "preferences" we think stand
behind market behavior, standards oflegitimacy are inevitably subjective when we
look forward, objective when we look back. Professionalism has, in this sense,
taken us as far as it can—fully occupying the field.
Yet this new vocabulary has its own limits, blind spots, biases. Not all voices are
equally heard, not all concerns equally calculated by the group of elites we call "the
international community."
Those in the loop are likely to focus too much on the United Nations as proxy
for world public opinion. Were opponents of the Iraq war serious when they
claimed their objection to the war was the lack ofUN approval? Would the war re-
ally have made more sense to them had France had a different government?
I worry when great debates about war and peace, staged in the vocabulary of the
Charter, capture our attention. One unfortunate result: it has become routine to
say that international law had little effect on the Iraq war. Arguments made by a few
international lawyers that the war was illegal failed to stop the American adminis-
tration and its allies, who were determined to go ahead, and who had, after all, their
own international lawyers.
But this lets international law off the hook too easily. Ifwe expand the aperture
from the decision to invade, war looks ever more to be a product oflaw: the laws in
war that legitimated targeting, the laws ofwar that provided the vocabulary for as-
sessing its legitimacy, the laws of sovereignty that defined and limited Saddam's
prerogatives and have structured the occupation, not to mention commercial
rules, financial rules, and private law regimes through which Iraq gamed the sanc-
tions system and through which the coalition built its response. The UN law offeree
makes these background rules seem matters of fact, rather than points of choice.
The Charter scheme encourages us to think of global policy as a combination of
short multilateral police actions and humanitarian assistance. It distracts our at-
tention from the economic side of the story—and from the development policy
that comes with an invasion. It shortens our sense of how long and how difficult
war to build nations or change regimes is likely to be.
In the Iraq case, international law and the UN Charter focused our attention on
weapons, which when not forthcoming, de-legitimated the entire enterprise.
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International law urges us to respect Iraqi sovereignty, making it all too easy to
think our intervention in Iraqi affairs began with the invasion and ended with the
handover of the bundle of rights we have decided to call "sovereignty."
The vocabulary ofthe Charter can make it more difficult to address the motives
for war and devise alternative policies. Let us say the administration's hawks were
right; suppose that after 9/11 it was necessary to "change regimes" from eastern
Turkey to western Pakistan. In the months before the war, the international com-
munity found it difficult to discuss regime change straightforwardly. Ideas about
sovereignty, the limits of the Charter, core humanitarian commitments to the re-
nunciation of empire; all placed regime change outside legitimate debate.
Yet supposedly sovereign regimes are already entangled with one another. They
struggle every day to change one another's regimes in all manner of legitimate
ways. Why should this all become taboo when force is added to the mix, unless war
is no longer, in fact, in Clausewitz's terms, "a continuation of political intercourse,
with a mixture of other means." 12
When it comes to force, the Charter vocabulary offered an easy and irresponsi-
ble way out. We never needed to ask how should the regimes in the Middle East
—
our regimes—be changed? Is Iraq the place to start? Is military intervention the
way to do it? How do we compare various ways of combining military and non-
military "means" to the end of regime change?
Had the Europeans not had the United Nations to shield them, not felt the ge-
ography of the European Union (EU) marked a legitimate boundary to their
global responsibilities, they might well have drawn on their own experiences with
"regime change" in Spain, Portugal and Greece in the '80s, with the old East Ger-
many in the '90s, and now with the ten new member States in central and eastern
Europe. Why not EU membership for Turkey, Morocco, Jordan, Palestine, Israel,
Egypt—regime change through the promise and example of social and economic
inclusion rather than military force.
Had our debates not been framed by the laws of war, we might well have found
other solutions and escaped the limited choices ofUN sanctions, humanitarian aid
and war—in short, thought outside the box.
Decisionism: Command Responsibility, Leadership and Politics
I began this morning with a worry about the relationship between the military and
humanitarian professions. Should we celebrate their merger in a new pragmatism
or should we reinvigorate the pacifist impulse to stand outside and denounce?
The choice turns out to be a false one. The military and humanitarian profes-
sions have merged in a shared practice ofmaking and unmaking the distinctions of
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war and peace that once marked the line between their respective domains. If ours
has become a culture of violence, it is a shared culture, a product of military and
humanitarian hands. If ours is history's most humane empire, that also is the col-
laborative achievement of humanitarian and military professionals.
The laws of force increasingly provide the vocabulary not only for restraining
the violence and incidence of war, but also for waging war and deciding to go to
war. We should be clear; this bold new vocabulary beats ploughshares into swords
as often as the reverse. It forecloses our attention to other causes, consequences and
alternatives to warfare.
The problem for humanitarians is no longer an unwillingness to be tough; hu-
manitarians have advocated all manner oftough and forceful action in the name of
humanitarian pragmatism, and their words have legitimated still more. The prob-
lem is an unwillingness to do so responsibly—facing squarely the dark sides, risks
and costs of what they propose.
The problem for military professionals is no longer a lack ofhumanitarian com-
mitment. The military has built humanitarianism into its professional routines.
The problem is loss of the human experience of responsible freedom, of discretion
to kill, and a loss of the political experience of free decision.
The worry I find most unsettling is the difficulty of locating a moment of re-
sponsible political discretion in the broader process. We are all experts, humanitar-
ians, military professionals and statesmen, speaking a common military and
humanitarian vocabulary.
The way out will not be to tinker with doctrines ofthe laws offeree. The way for-
ward will require a new posture and professional sensibility among those who
work in this common language. When speaking to civilian audiences, I use the vo-
cabulary ofdecisionism to evoke what I have in mind. Rather than fleeing from the
exercise of responsible decision to the comfortable interpretive routines of their
professional discourse, humanitarians should, I argue, learn to embrace the exer-
cise ofpower, acknowledge their participation in governance, and cultivate the ex-
perience of professional discretion and the posture of ethically responsible
personal freedom. International humanitarians, I argue, inside and outside the
military, have sought power, but have not accepted responsibility. They have advo-
cated and denounced, mobilized and killed, while remaining content that others
governed and others decided.
The military vocabulary of command responsibility and leadership evokes
many ofthe same ideas. The new law ofarmed conflict requires a different collabora-
tion between the legal and military professions. The lawyer is brought along to carry
the briefcase of rules and restrictions rather than as a participant in discussions of
strategy for which he or she would share ethical, if not command, responsibility.
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But military and humanitarian professionals alike, however close their partner-
ship, however flexible, fluid and strategic their approach to law, yearn for an exter-
nal judgment—by political leaders or others—that what they have gotten up to is,
in fact, an ethically responsible national politics. In a sense, the commander who
offloads responsibility for warfare to the civilian leadership is no different from the
foot soldier who cites failures of leadership, or the lawyer who faults limitations in
the rules.
The posture ofprofessionalism against decision, or in contrast to responsibility,
is only plausible so long as the ethicists and politicians are speaking another lan-
guage. But they no longer do. Our language has become the language of politics
and the language of ethics. The challenge for all of us is to recapture the freedom,
and the responsibility, of discretion. Clausewitz was right; war is the continuation
of political intercourse. When we make war, humanitarian and military profes-
sionals together, let us experience politics as our vocation.
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Abstract
This article explains the rationale behind a study on customary international
humanitarian law recently undertaken by the International Committee of
the Red Cross (ICRC) at the request of the International Conference of the Red
Cross and Red Crescent. It describes the methodology used and how the study was
organized and summarizes some major findings. It does not, however, purport to
provide a complete overview or analysis of these findings.
Introduction
In the 50 years or so since the adoption of the Geneva Conventions of 1949, man-
kind has experienced an alarming number ofarmed conflicts affecting almost every
continent. During this time, the four Geneva Conventions and their Additional
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Protocols of 1977 have provided legal protection to persons not or no longer par-
ticipating directly in hostilities (the wounded, sick and shipwrecked, persons de-
prived of their liberty for reasons related to an armed conflict, and civilians). Even
so, there have been numerous violations ofthese treaties, resulting in suffering and
death which might have been avoided had international humanitarian law been
better respected.
The general opinion is that violations of international humanitarian law are not
due to the inadequacy of its rules. Rather, they stem from an unwillingness to re-
spect the rules, from insufficient means to enforce them, from uncertainty as to
their application in some circumstances and from a lack of awareness of them on
the part of political leaders, commanders, combatants and the general public.
The International Conference for the Protection of War Victims, convened in
Geneva in August-September 1993, discussed in particular ways to address viola-
tions of international humanitarian law but did not propose the adoption of new
treaty provisions. Instead, in its Final Declaration adopted by consensus, the Con-
ference reaffirmed "the necessity to make the implementation ofhumanitarian law
more effective" and called upon the Swiss government "to convene an open-ended
intergovernmental group of experts to study practical means ofpromoting full re-
spect for and compliance with that law, and to prepare a report for submission to
the States and to the next session of the International Conference of the Red Cross
and Red Crescent." 1
The Intergovernmental Group ofExperts for the Protection ofWar Victims met
in Geneva in January 1995 and adopted a series of recommendations aimed at en-
hancing respect for international humanitarian law, in particular by means of pre-
ventive measures that would ensure better knowledge and more effective
implementation of the law. Recommendation II of the Intergovernmental Group
of Experts proposed that:
The ICRC be invited to prepare, with the assistance of experts in IHL [international
humanitarian law] representing various geographical regions and different legal
systems, and in consultation with experts from governments and international
organizations, a report on customary rules ofIHL applicable in international and non-
international armed conflicts, and to circulate the report to States and competent
international bodies. 2
In December 1995, the 26th International Conference of the Red Cross and
Red Crescent endorsed this recommendation and officially mandated the ICRC
to prepare a report on customary rules of international humanitarian law appli-
cable in international and non-international armed conflicts. 3 Nearly ten years
later, in 2005, after extensive research and widespread consultation of experts,
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this report, now referred to as the study on customary international humanitar-
ian law, has been published.4
Purpose
The purpose of the study on customary international humanitarian law was to
overcome some of the problems related to the application of international hu-
manitarian treaty law. Treaty law is well developed and covers many aspects of
warfare, affording protection to a range of persons during wartime and limiting
permissible means and methods of warfare. The Geneva Conventions and their
Additional Protocols provide an extensive regime for the protection of persons
not or no longer participating directly in hostilities. The regulation of means and
methods ofwarfare in treaty law goes back to the 1868 St. Petersburg Declaration,
the 1899 and 1907 Hague Regulations and the 1925 Geneva Gas Protocol, and has
most recently been addressed in the 1972 Biological Weapons Convention, the
1977 Additional Protocols, the 1980 Convention on Certain Conventional
Weapons and its five Protocols, the 1993 Chemical Weapons Convention and the
1997 Ottawa Convention on the Prohibition of Anti-personnel Mines. The pro-
tection of cultural properly in the event of armed conflict is regulated in detail in
the 1954 Hague Convention and its two Protocols. The 1998 Statute of the Inter-
national Criminal Court contains, inter alia y a list of war crimes subject to the ju-
risdiction of the Court.
There are, however, two serious impediments to the application of these treaties
in current armed conflicts and which explain why a study on customary interna-
tional humanitarian law is necessary and useful. First, treaties apply only to the
States that have ratified them. This means that different treaties of international
humanitarian law apply in different armed conflicts depending on which treaties
the States involved have ratified. While the four Geneva Conventions of 1949 have
been universally ratified, the same is not true for other treaties of humanitarian
law, for example the Additional Protocols. Even though Additional Protocol I has
been ratified by more than 160 States, its efficacy today is limited because several
States that have been involved in international armed conflicts are not party to it.
Similarly, while nearly 160 States have ratified Additional Protocol II, several States
in which non-international armed conflicts are taking place have not done so. In
these non-international armed conflicts, common Article 3 of the four Geneva
Conventions often remains the only applicable humanitarian treaty provision. The
first purpose of the study was therefore to determine which rules of international
humanitarian law are part ofcustomary international law and therefore applicable
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to all parties to a conflict, regardless ofwhether or not they have ratified the treaties
containing the same or similar rules.
Second, humanitarian treaty law does not regulate in sufficient detail a large
proportion of today's armed conflicts, that is non-international armed conflicts,
because these conflicts are subject to far fewer treaty rules than are international
conflicts. Only a limited number of treaties apply to non-international armed con-
flicts, namely the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons as amended, the
Statute of the International Criminal Court, the Ottawa Convention on the Prohi-
bition of Anti-personnel Mines, the Chemical Weapons Convention, the Hague
Convention for the Protection ofCultural Property and its Second Protocol and, as
already mentioned, Additional Protocol II and Article 3 common to the four
Geneva Conventions. While common Article 3 is of fundamental importance, it
only provides a rudimentary framework of minimum standards. Additional Pro-
tocol II usefully supplements common Article 3, but it is still less detailed than the
rules governing international armed conflicts in the Geneva Conventions and
Additional Protocol I.
Additional Protocol II contains a mere 15 substantive articles, whereas Addi-
tional Protocol I has more than 80. While numbers alone do not tell the full story,
they are an indication of a significant disparity in regulation by treaty law between
international and non-international armed conflicts, particularly when it comes to
detailed rules and definitions. The second purpose ofthe study was therefore to de-
termine whether customary international law regulates non-international armed
conflict in more detail than does treaty law and if so, to what extent.
Methodology
The Statute ofthe International Court of Justice describes customary international
law as "a general practice accepted as law." 5 It is widely agreed that the existence of
a rule of customary international law requires the presence of two elements,
namely State practice {usus) and a belief that such practice is required, prohibited
or allowed, depending on the nature ofthe rule, as a matter oflaw (opinio juris sive
necessitatis). As the International Court of Justice stated in the Continental Shelf
case: "It is ofcourse axiomatic that the material ofcustomary international law is to
be looked for primarily in the actual practice and opinio juris of States."6 The exact
meaning and content ofthese two elements have been the subject ofmuch academic
writing. The approach taken in the study to determine whether a rule ofgeneral cus-
tomary international law exists was a classic one, set out by the International Court




State practice must be looked at from two angles: what practice contributes to the
creation of customary international law (selection of State practice) and whether
this practice establishes a rule of customary international law (assessment of State
practice).
Selection ofState Practice
Both physical and verbal acts of States constitute practice that contributes to the
creation ofcustomary international law. Physical acts include, for example, battle-
field behavior, the use of certain weapons and the treatment afforded to different
categories of persons. Verbal acts include military manuals, national legislation,
national case law, instructions to armed and security forces, military
communiques during war, diplomatic protests, opinions of official legal advisers,
comments by governments on draft treaties, executive decisions and regulations,
pleadings before international tribunals, statements in international fora, and gov-
ernment positions on resolutions adopted by international organizations. This list
shows that the practice ofthe executive, legislative and judicial organs ofa State can
contribute to the formation of customary international law.
The negotiation and adoption of resolutions by international organizations or
conferences, together with the explanations of vote, are acts of the States involved.
It is recognized that, with a few exceptions, resolutions are normally not binding
in themselves and therefore the value accorded to any particular resolution in the
assessment of the formation of a rule of customary international law depends on
its content, its degree of acceptance and the consistency of related State practice. 8
The greater the support for the resolution, the more importance it is to be
accorded.
Although decisions of international courts are subsidiary sources of interna-
tional law, 9 they do not constitute State practice. This is because, unlike national
courts, international courts are not State organs. The decisions of international
courts were nevertheless included in the study because a finding by an interna-
tional court that a rule of customary international law exists constitutes persuasive
evidence to that effect. In addition, because of the precedential value of their deci-
sions, international courts can also contribute to the emergence of a rule of cus-
tomary international law by influencing the subsequent practice of States and
international organizations.
The practice of armed opposition groups, such as codes of conduct, commit-
ments made to observe certain rules of international humanitarian law and other
statements, does not constitute State practice as such. While such practice may
contain evidence of the acceptance of certain rules in non-international armed
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conflicts, its legal significance is unclear and, as a result, was not relied upon to
prove the existence ofcustomary international law. Examples ofsuch practice were
listed under "other practice" in Volume II of the study.
Assessment ofState Practice
State practice has to be weighed to assess whether it is sufficiently "dense" to create
a rule of customary international law. 10 To establish a rule of customary interna-
tional law, State practice has to be virtually uniform, extensive and representa-
tive. 11 Let us look more closely at what this means.
First, for State practice to create a rule ofcustomary international law, it must be
virtually uniform. Different States must not have engaged in substantially different
conduct. The jurisprudence of the International Court of Justice shows that con-
trary practice which, at first sight, appears to undermine the uniformity of the
practice concerned, does not prevent the formation of a rule ofcustomary interna-
tional law as long as this contrary practice is condemned by other States or denied
by the government itself. Through such condemnation or denial, the rule in ques-
tion is actually confirmed. 12
This is particularly relevant for a number of rules of international humanitarian
law for which there is overwhelming evidence ofverbal State practice in support of
a rule, alongside repeated evidence ofviolations ofthat rule. Where violations have
been accompanied by excuses or justifications by the party concerned and/or
condemnation by other States, they are not of a nature to challenge the existence
of the rule in question. States wishing to change an existing rule of customary in-
ternational law have to do so through their official practice and claim to be acting
as of right.
Second, for a rule ofgeneral customary international law to come into existence,
the State practice concerned must be both extensive and representative. It does not,
however, need to be universal; a "general" practice suffices. 13 No precise number or
percentage of States is required. One reason it is impossible to put an exact figure
on the extent of participation required is that the criterion is in a sense qualitative
rather than quantitative. That is to say, it is not simply a question of how many
States participate in the practice, but also which States. 14 In the words of the Inter-
national Court of Justice in the North Sea Continental Shelf cases, the practice must
"include that of States whose interests are specially affected." 15
This consideration has two implications: (1) if all "specially affected States" are
represented, it is not essential for a majority of States to have actively participated,
but they must have at least acquiesced in the practice of "specially affected States";
and (2) if "specially affected States" do not accept the practice, it cannot mature
into a rule of customary international law, even though unanimity is not required
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as explained. 16 Who is "specially affected" under international humanitarian law
may vary according to circumstances. Concerning the legality of the use of blind-
ing laser weapons, for example, "specially affected States" include those identified
as having been in the process of developing such weapons, even though other
States could potentially become the objects of their use. Similarly, States whose
population is in need ofhumanitarian aid are "specially affected" just as are States
which frequently provide such aid. With respect to any rule of international hu-
manitarian law, countries that participated in an armed conflict are "specially af-
fected" when their practice examined for a certain rule was relevant to that armed
conflict. Although there may be specially affected States in certain areas of inter-
national humanitarian law, it is also true that all States have a legal interest in re-
quiring respect for international humanitarian law by other States, even if they
are not a party to the conflict. 17 In addition, all States can suffer from means or
methods of warfare deployed by other States. As a result, the practice of all States
must be considered, whether or not they are "specially affected" in the strict sense
of that term.
The study took no view on whether it is legally possible to be a "persistent objec-
tor" in relation to customary rules of international humanitarian law. While many
commentators believe that it is not possible to be a persistent objector in the case of
rules ofjus cogens^ there are others who doubt the continued validity of the persis-
tent objector concept altogether. 18 If one accepts that it is legally possible to be a
persistent objector, the State concerned must have objected to the emergence of a
new norm during its formation and continue to object persistently afterwards; it is
not possible to be a "subsequent objector." 19
While some time will normally elapse before a rule of customary international
law emerges, there is no specified timeframe. Rather, it is the accumulation of a
practice ofsufficient density, in terms ofuniformity, extent and representativeness,
which is the determining factor.20
Opinio Juris
The requirement of opinio juris in establishing the existence of a rule of customary
international law refers to the legal conviction that a particular practice is carried
out "as of right." The form in which the practice and the legal conviction are ex-
pressed may well differ depending on whether the rule concerned contains a prohi-
bition, an obligation or merely a right to behave in a certain manner.
During work on the study, it proved very difficult and largely theoretical to
strictly separate elements of practice and legal conviction. Often, the same act re-
flects both practice and legal conviction. As the International Law Association
pointed out, the International Court of Justice "has not in fact said in so many
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words that just because there are (allegedly) distinct elements in customary law the
same conduct cannot manifest both. It is in fact often difficult or even impossible
to disentangle the two elements." 21 This is particularly so because verbal acts, such
as military manuals, count as State practice and often reflect the legal conviction of
the State involved at the same time.
When there is sufficiently dense practice, an opinio juris is generally contained
within that practice and, as a result, it is not usually necessary to demonstrate sepa-
rately the existence of an opinio juris. In situations where practice is ambiguous,
however, opinio juris plays an important role in determining whether or not that
practice counts towards the formation of custom. This is often the case with omis-
sions, when States do not act or react but it is not clear why. It is in such cases that
both the International Court of Justice and its predecessor, the Permanent Court
of International Justice, have sought to establish the separate existence ofan opinio
juris in order to determine whether instances of ambiguous practice counted to-
wards the establishment of customary international law. 22
In the area of international humanitarian law, where many rules require absten-
tion from certain conduct, omissions pose a particular problem in the assessment
of opinio juris because it has to be proved that the abstention is not a coincidence
but based on a legitimate expectation. When such a requirement of abstention is
indicated in international instruments and official statements, the existence ofa le-
gal requirement to abstain from the conduct in question can usually be proved. In
addition, such abstentions may occur after the behavior in question created a cer-
tain controversy, which also helps to show that the abstention was not coinciden-
tal, although it is not always easy to prove that the abstention occurred out of a
sense of legal obligation.
Impact of Treaty Law
Treaties are also relevant in determining the existence of customary international
law because they help shed light on how States view certain rules of international
law. Hence, the ratification, interpretation and implementation of a treaty, includ-
ing reservations and statements of interpretation made upon ratification, were in-
cluded in the study. In the North Sea Continental Shelf cases, the International
Court of Justice clearly considered the degree of ratification of a treaty to be relevant
to the assessment of customary international law. In that case, the Court stated that
"the number ofratifications and accessions so far secured [39] is, though respectable,
hardly sufficient", especially in a context where practice outside the treaty was con-
tradictory.23 Conversely, in the Nicaragua case, the Court placed a great deal of
weight, when assessing the customary status of the non-intervention rule, on the
fact that the Charter of the United Nations was almost universally ratified.24 It can
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even be the case that a treaty provision reflects customary law, even though the
treaty is not yet in force, provided that there is sufficiently similar practice, includ-
ing by specially affected States, so that there remains little likelihood of significant
opposition to the rule in question.25
In practice, the drafting of treaty norms helps to focus world legal opinion and
has an undeniable influence on the subsequent behavior and legal conviction of
States. The International Court of Justice recognized this in its judgment in the
Continental Shelfcase in which it stated that "multilateral conventions may have an
important role to play in recording and defining rules deriving from custom, or in-
deed in developing them."26 The Court thus confirmed that treaties may codify
pre-existing customary international law but may also lay the foundation for the
development ofnew customs based on the norms contained in those treaties. The
Court has even gone so far as to state that "it might be that ... a very widespread
and representative participation in [a] convention might suffice of itself, provided
it included that of States whose interests were specially affected."27
The study took the cautious approach that widespread ratification is only an in-
dication and has to be assessed in relation to other elements of practice, in particu-
lar the practice of States not party to the treaty in question. Consistent practice of
States not party was considered as important positive evidence. Contrary practice
of States not party, however, was considered as important negative evidence. The
practice of States party to a treaty vis-a-vis States not party is also particularly
relevant.
Thus, the study did not limit itself to the practice of States not party to the rele-
vant treaties of international humanitarian law. To limit the study to a consider-
ation of the practice of only the 30-odd States that have not ratified the Additional
Protocols, for example, would not comply with the requirement that customary
international law be based on widespread and representative practice. Therefore,
the assessment ofthe existence ofcustomary law took into account that, at the time
the study was published, Additional Protocol I had been ratified by 162 States and
Additional Protocol II by 157 States.
It should be stressed that the study did not seek to determine the customary na-
ture of each treaty rule of international humanitarian law and, as a result, did not
necessarily follow the structure of existing treaties. Rather, it sought to analyse is-
sues in order to establish what rules of customary international law can be found
inductively on the basis of State practice in relation to these issues. As the approach
chosen does not analyse each treaty provision with a view to establishing whether
or not it is customary, it cannot be concluded that any particular treaty rule is not
customary merely because it does not appear as such in the study.
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Organization of the Study
To determine the best way of fulfilling the mandate entrusted to the ICRC, the au-
thors consulted a group of academic experts in international humanitarian law,
who formed the Steering Committee of the study.28 The Steering Committee
adopted a plan of action in June 1996, and research started the following October.
Research was conducted using both national and international sources reflecting
State practice and focused on the six parts of the study identified in the plan of
action:
• Principle of distinction
• Specifically protected persons and objects
• Specific methods of warfare
• Weapons
• Treatment of civilians and persons hors de combat
• Implementation
Research in National Sources
Since national sources are more easily accessible from within a country, it was de-
cided to seek the cooperation of national researchers. To this end, a researcher or
group of researchers was identified in nearly 50 States (9 in Africa, 1 1 in the Ameri-
cas, 15 in Asia, 1 in Australasia and 1 1 in Europe) and asked to produce a report on
their respective State's practice. 29 Countries were selected on the basis of geo-
graphic representation, as well as recent experience of different kinds of armed
conflict in which a variety of methods of warfare had been used.
The military manuals and national legislation of countries not covered by the
reports on State practice were also researched and collected. This work was facili-
tated by the network ofICRC delegations around the world and the extensive col-
lection of national legislation gathered by the ICRC Advisory Service on
International Humanitarian Law.
Research in International Sources
State practice gleaned from international sources was collected by six teams, each
ofwhich concentrated on one part of the study. 30 These teams researched practice
in the framework of the United Nations and other international organizations, in-
cluding the African Union (formerly the Organization of African Unity), the
Council of Europe, the Gulf Cooperation Council, the European Union, the
League of Arab States, the Organization of American States, the Organization of
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the Islamic Conference and the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Eu-
rope. International case law was also collected to the extent that it provides evi-
dence of the existence of rules of customary international law.
Research in ICRC Archives
To complement the research carried out in national and international sources, the
ICRC looked into its own archives relating to nearly 40 recent armed conflicts (21
in Africa, 2 in the Americas, 8 in Asia and 8 in Europe). 31 In general, these conflicts
were selected so that countries and conflicts not dealt with by a report on State
practice would also be covered.
The result of this three-pronged approach—research in national, international
and ICRC sources—is that practice from all parts of the world is cited. In the
nature of things, however, this research cannot purport to be complete. The study
focused in particular on practice from the last 30 years to ensure that the result
would be a restatement of contemporary customary international law, but, where
still relevant, older practice was also cited.
Expert Consultations
In a first round of consultations, the ICRC invited the international research teams
to produce an executive summary containing a preliminary assessment ofcustom-
ary international humanitarian law on the basis ofthe practice collected. These ex-
ecutive summaries were discussed within the Steering Committee at three
meetings in Geneva in 1998. The executive summaries were duly revised and, dur-
ing a second round ofconsultations, submitted to a group ofacademic and govern-
mental experts from all regions of the world. These experts were invited in their
personal capacity by the ICRC to attend two meetings with the Steering Committee
in Geneva in 1999, during which they helped to evaluate the practice collected and
indicated particular practice that had been missed. 32
Writing of the Report
The assessment by the Steering Committee, as reviewed by the group of academic
and governmental experts, served as a basis for the writing of the final report. The
authors of the study re-examined the practice, reassessed the existence of custom,
reviewed the formulation and the order of the rules and drafted the commentaries.
These draft texts were submitted to the Steering Committee, the group ofacademic
and governmental experts and the ICRC Legal Division for comment. The text was
further updated and finalized, taking into account the comments received.
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Summary ofFindings
The great majority of the provisions of the Geneva Conventions, including com-
mon Article 3, are considered to be part ofcustomary international law. 33 Further-
more, given that there are now 192 parties to the Geneva Conventions, they are
binding on nearly all States as a matter of treaty law. Therefore, the customary na-
ture of the provisions of the Conventions was not the subject as such of the study.
Rather, the study focused on issues regulated by treaties that have not been univer-
sally ratified, in particular the Additional Protocols, the Hague Convention for the
Protection of Cultural Property and a number of specific conventions regulating
the use of weapons.
The description below of rules of customary international law does not seek to
explain why these rules are customary, nor does it present the practice on the basis
ofwhich this conclusion was reached. The explanation ofwhy a rule is considered
customary can be found in Volume I ofthe study, while the corresponding practice
can be found in Volume II.
International Armed Conflicts
Additional Protocol I codified pre-existing rules of customary international law
but also laid the foundation for the formation ofnew customary rules. The practice
collected in the framework of the study bears witness to the profound impact of
Additional Protocol I on the practice of States, not only in international but also in
non-international armed conflicts (see below). In particular, the study found that
the basic principles ofAdditional Protocol I have been very widely accepted, more
widely than the ratification record of Additional Protocol I would suggest.
Even though the study did not seek to determine the customary nature of spe-
cific treaty provisions, in the end it became clear that there are many customary
rules which are identical or similar to those found in treaty law. Examples of rules
found to be customary and which have corresponding provisions in Additional
Protocol I include: the principle of distinction between civilians and combatants
and between civilian objects and military objectives;34 the prohibition of indis-
criminate attacks;35 the principle of proportionality in attack;36 the obligation to
take feasible precautions in attack and against the effects of attack;37 the obligation
to respect and protect medical and religious personnel, medical units and trans-
ports,38 humanitarian relief personnel and objects,39 and civilian journalists;40 the
obligation to protect medical duties;41 the prohibition of attacks on non-defended
localities and demilitarized zones;42 the obligation to provide quarter and to safe-
guard an enemy hors de combat^ the prohibition of starvation;44 the prohibition
of attacks on objects indispensable to the survival of the civilian population;45 the
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prohibition of improper use of emblems and perfidy;46 the obligation to respect
the fundamental guarantees of civilians and persons hors de combat;47 the obliga-
tion to account for missing persons;48 and the specific protections afforded to
women and children.49
Non-international Armed Conflicts
Over the last few decades, there has been a considerable amount of practice insist-
ing on the protection of international humanitarian law in this type of conflicts.
This body ofpractice has had a significant influence on the formation ofcustomary
law applicable in non-international armed conflicts. Like Additional Protocol I,
Additional Protocol II has had a far-reaching effect on this practice and, as a result,
many of its provisions are now considered to be part of customary international
law. Examples of rules found to be customary and which have corresponding pro-
visions in Additional Protocol II include: the prohibition of attacks on civilians;50
the obligation to respect and protect medical and religious personnel, medical
units and transports; 51 the obligation to protect medical duties;52 the prohibition of
starvation;53 the prohibition of attacks on objects indispensable to the survival of
the civilian population;54 the obligation to respect the fundamental guarantees of
civilians and persons hors de combat;55 the obligation to search for and respect and
protect the wounded, sick and shipwrecked;56 the obligation to search for and pro-
tect the dead;57 the obligation to protect persons deprived oftheir liberty;58 the pro-
hibition of forced movement of civilians;59 and the specific protections afforded to
women and children. 60
However, the most significant contribution ofcustomary international human-
itarian law to the regulation of internal armed conflicts is that it goes beyond the
provisions of Additional Protocol II. Indeed, practice has created a substantial
number ofcustomary rules that are more detailed than the often rudimentary pro-
visions in Additional Protocol II and has thus filled important gaps in the regula-
tion of internal conflicts.
For example, Additional Protocol II contains only a rudimentary regulation of
the conduct of hostilities. Article 13 provides that "the civilian population as such,
as well as individual civilians, shall not be the object ofattack . . . unless and for such
time as they take a direct part in hostilities." Unlike Additional Protocol I, Addi-
tional Protocol II does not contain specific rules and definitions with respect to the
principles of distinction and proportionality.
The gaps in the regulation of the conduct of hostilities in Additional Protocol II
have, however, largely been filled through State practice, which has led to the cre-
ation of rules parallel to those in Additional Protocol I, but applicable as customary
law to non-international armed conflicts. This covers the basic principles on the
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conduct of hostilities and includes rules on specifically protected persons and ob-
jects and specific methods of warfare. 61
Similarly, Additional Protocol II contains only a very general provision on hu-
manitarian relieffor civilian populations in need. Article 18(2) provides that "ifthe
civilian population is suffering undue hardship owing to a lack of the supplies es-
sential for its survival . . . relief actions for the civilian population which are of an
exclusively humanitarian and impartial nature and which are conducted without
any adverse distinction shall be undertaken." Unlike Additional Protocol I, Addi-
tional Protocol II does not contain specific provisions requiring respect for and
protection ofhumanitarian reliefpersonnel and objects and obliging parties to the
conflict to allow and facilitate rapid and unimpeded passage ofhumanitarian relief
for civilians in need and to ensure the freedom ofmovement ofauthorized human-
itarian relief personnel, although it can be argued that such requirements are im-
plicit in Article 18(2) of the Protocol. These requirements have crystallized,
however, into customary international law applicable in both international and
non-international armed conflicts as a result ofwidespread, representative and vir-
tually uniform practice to that effect.
In this respect it should be noted that while both Additional Protocols I and II
require the consent of the parties concerned for relief actions to take place,62 most
of the practice collected does not mention this requirement. It is nonetheless self-
evident that a humanitarian organization cannot operate without the consent of
the party concerned. However, such consent must not be refused on arbitrary
grounds. If it is established that a civilian population is threatened with starvation
and a humanitarian organization which provides relief on an impartial and non-
discriminatory basis is able to remedy the situation, a party is obliged to give con-
sent.63 While consent may not be withheld for arbitrary reasons, practice recog-
nizes that the party concerned may exercise control over the relief action and that
humanitarian reliefpersonnel must respect domestic law on access to territory and
security requirements in force.
Issues Requiring Further Clarification
The study also revealed a number of areas where practice is not clear. For example,
while the terms "combatants" and "civilians" are clearly defined in international
armed conflicts,64 in non-international armed conflicts practice is ambiguous as to
whether, for purposes of the conduct of hostilities, members of armed opposition
groups are considered members ofarmed forces or civilians. In particular, it is not
clear whether members of armed opposition groups are civilians who lose their
protection from attack when directly participating in hostilities or whether mem-
bers ofsuch groups are liable to attack as such. This lack of clarity is also reflected in
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treaty law. Additional Protocol II, for example, does not contain a definition of ci-
vilians or of the civilian population even though these terms are used in several
provisions.65 Subsequent treaties, applicable in non-international armed conflicts,
similarly use the terms civilians and civilian population without defining them.66
A related area of uncertainty affecting the regulation of both international and
non-international armed conflicts is the absence of a precise definition of the term
"direct participation in hostilities." Loss of protection against attack is clear and
uncontested when a civilian uses weapons or other means to commit acts of vio-
lence against human or material enemy forces. But there is also considerable prac-
tice which gives little or no guidance on the interpretation of the term "direct
participation," stating, for example, that an assessment has to be made on a case-
by-case basis or simply repeating the general rule that direct participation in hostil-
ities causes civilians to lose protection against attack. Related to this issue is the
question ofhow to qualify a person in case ofdoubt. Because ofthese uncertainties,
the ICRC is seeking to clarify the notion of direct participation by means of a series
of expert meetings that began in 2003.67
Another issue still open to question is the exact scope and application of the
principle of proportionality in attack. While the study revealed widespread
support for this principle, it does not provide more clarification than con-
tained in treaty law as to how to balance military advantage against incidental
civilian losses.
Selected Issues on the Conduct of Hostilities
Additional Protocols I and II introduced a new rule prohibiting attacks on works
and installations containing dangerous forces, even where these objects are mili-
tary objectives, if such attack may cause the release of dangerous forces and conse-
quent severe losses among the civilian population. 68 While it is not clear whether
these specific rules have become part of customary law, practice shows that States
are conscious of the high risk of severe incidental losses which can result from
attacks against such works and installations when they constitute military objec-
tives. Consequently, they recognize that in any armed conflict particular care
must be taken in case of attack in order to avoid the release of dangerous forces
and consequent severe losses among the civilian population, and this require-
ment was found to be part of customary international law applicable in any
armed conflict.
Another new rule introduced in Additional Protocol I is the prohibition of the
use ofmethods or means ofwarfare that are intended, or maybe expected, to cause
widespread, long-term and severe damage to the natural environment. Since the
adoption of Additional Protocol I, this prohibition has received such extensive
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support in State practice that it has crystallized into customary law, even though
some States have persistently maintained that the rule does not apply to nuclear
weapons and that they may, therefore, not be bound by it in respect of nuclear
weapons.69 Beyond this specific rule, the study found that the natural environment
is considered to be a civilian object and as such it is protected by the same princi-
ples and rules that protect other civilian objects, in particular the principles of dis-
tinction and proportionality and the requirement to take precautions in attack.
This means that no part of the natural environment may be made the object of at-
tack, unless it is a military objective, and that an attack against a military objective
which may be expected to cause incidental damage to the environment which
would be excessive in relation to the concrete and direct military advantage antici-
pated is prohibited. In its advisory opinion in the Nuclear Weapons case, for exam-
ple, the International Court of Justice stated that "States must take environmental
considerations into account when assessing what is necessary and proportionate in
the pursuit of legitimate military objectives."70 In addition, parties to a conflict are
required to take all feasible precautions in the conduct ofhostilities to avoid, and in
any event to minimize, incidental damage to the environment. Lack of scientific
certainty as to the effects on the environment of certain military operations does
not absolve a party to the conflict from taking such precautions. 71
There are also issues that are not as such addressed in the Additional Protocols.
For example, the Additional Protocols do not contain any specific provision con-
cerning the protection of personnel and objects involved in a peacekeeping mis-
sion. In practice, however, such personnel and objects were given protection
against attack equivalent to that of civilians and civilian objects respectively. As a
result, a rule prohibiting attacks against personnel and objects involved in a peace-
keeping mission in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, as long as
they are entitled to the protection given to civilians and civilian objects under in-
ternational humanitarian law, developed in State practice and was included in the
Statute of the International Criminal Court. It is now part of customary interna-
tional law applicable in any type of armed conflict. 72
A number of issues related to the conduct of hostilities are regulated by the
Hague Regulations. These regulations have long been considered customary in in-
ternational armed conflict. 73 Some oftheir rules, however, are now also accepted as
customary in non-international armed conflict. For example, the long-standing
rules of customary international law that prohibit (1) destruction or seizure of the
property of an adversary, unless required by imperative military necessity, and (2)
pillage apply equally in non-international armed conflicts. Pillage is the forcible
taking of private property from the enemy's subjects for private or personal use.74
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Both prohibitions do not affect the customary practice ofseizing as war booty mili-
tary equipment belonging to an adverse party.
Under customary international law, commanders may enter into non-hostile
contact through any means ofcommunication, but such contact must be based on
good faith. Practice indicates that communication may be carried out via interme-
diaries known as parlementaires but also by various other means, such as telephone
and radio. A parlementaire is a person belonging to a party to the conflict who has
been authorized to enter into communication with another party to the conflict
and who is, as a result, inviolable. The traditional method ofmaking oneselfknown
as a. parlementaire by advancing bearing a white flag has been found to be still valid.
In addition, it is recognized practice that the parties may appeal to a third party to
facilitate communication, for example a protecting power or an impartial and neu-
tral humanitarian organization acting as a substitute, in particular the ICRC, but
also an international organization or a peacekeeping force. Collected practice
shows that various institutions and organizations have acted as intermediaries in
negotiations in both international and non-international armed conflicts, and that
this is generally accepted. The rules governing parlementaires go back to the Hague
Regulations and have long been considered customary in international armed con-
flict. On the basis of practice in the last 50 years or so, they have become customary
in non-international armed conflicts as well. 75
Practice reveals two strains of law that protect cultural property. A first strain
dates back to the Hague Regulations and requires that special care be taken in mili-
tary operations to avoid damage to buildings dedicated to religion, art, science, ed-
ucation or charitable purposes and historic monuments, unless they are military
objectives. It also prohibits seizure of or destruction or willful damage to such
buildings and monuments. While these rules have long been considered customary
in international armed conflicts, they are now also accepted as customary in non-
international armed conflicts.
A second strain is based on the specific provisions of the 1954 Hague Conven-
tion for the Protection of Cultural Property, which protects "property of great im-
portance to the cultural heritage of every people" and introduces a specific distinc-
tive sign to identify such property. Customary law today requires that such objects
not be attacked nor used for purposes which are likely to expose them to destruction
or damage, unless imperatively required by military necessity. It also prohibits any
form of theft, pillage or misappropriation of, and any acts of vandalism directed
against, such property. These prohibitions correspond to provisions set forth in
the Hague Convention and are evidence of the influence the Convention has had
on State practice concerning the protection of important cultural property.
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Weapons
The general principles prohibiting the use of weapons that cause superfluous in-
jury or unnecessary suffering and weapons that are by nature indiscriminate were
found to be customary in any armed conflict. In addition, and largely on the basis
of these principles, State practice has prohibited the use (or certain types of use) of
a number of specific weapons under customary international law: poison or poi-
soned weapons; biological weapons; chemical weapons; riot-control agents as a
method of warfare; herbicides as a method of warfare;76 bullets which expand or
flatten easily in the human body; anti-personnel use of bullets which explode
within the human body; weapons the primary effect of which is to injure by frag-
ments which are not detectable by X-rays in the human body; booby-traps which
are in any way attached to or associated with objects or persons entitled to special
protection under international humanitarian law or objects that are likely to at-
tract civilians; and laser weapons that are specifically designed, as their sole combat
function or as one of their combat functions, to cause permanent blindness to
unenhanced vision.
Some weapons which are not prohibited as such by customary law are neverthe-
less subject to restrictions. This is the case, for example, for landmines and incendi-
ary weapons.
Particular care must be taken to minimize the indiscriminate effects of land-
mines. This includes, for example, the principle that a party to the conflict using
landmines must record their placement, as far as possible. Also, at the end of active
hostilities, a party to the conflict which has used landmines must remove or other-
wise render them harmless to civilians, or facilitate their removal.
With over 140 ratifications of the Ottawa Convention, and others on the way,
the majority of States are treaty-bound no longer to use, produce, stockpile and
transfer anti-personnel landmines. While this prohibition is not part ofcustomary
international law because of significant contrary practice of States not party to the
Convention, almost all States, including those that are not party to the Ottawa
Convention and are not in favor of their immediate ban, have recognized the need
to work towards the eventual elimination of anti-personnel landmines.
The anti-personnel use of incendiary weapons is prohibited, unless it is not fea-
sible to use a less harmful weapon to render a person hors de combat. In addition, if
they are used, particular care must be taken to avoid, and in any event to minimize,
incidental loss of civilian life, injury to civilians and damage to civilian objects.
Most of these rules correspond to treaty provisions that originally applied only
to international armed conflicts. That trend has gradually been reversed, for exam-
ple by the amendment of Protocol II to the Convention on Certain Conventional
Weapons in 1996, which also applies to non-international armed conflicts and,
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most recently, by the amendment of the Convention on Certain Conventional
Weapons in 2001 to extend the scope ofapplication ofProtocols I-IV to non-inter-
national armed conflicts. The customary prohibitions and restrictions referred to
above apply in any armed conflict.
When the ICRC received the mandate to undertake the study on customary in-
ternational humanitarian law, the International Court of Justice was considering
the legality of the threat or use of nuclear weapons, following a request for an advi-
sory opinion on the issue from the UN General Assembly. The ICRC decided
therefore not to embark on its own analysis of this question. In its advisory opin-
ion, the International Court of Justice held unanimously that "a threat or use of
nuclear weapons should also be compatible with the requirements of the interna-
tional law applicable in armed conflict, particularly those of the principles and
rules of international humanitarian law."77 This finding is significant given that a
number of States undertook the negotiation ofAdditional Protocol I on the under-
standing that the Protocol would not apply to the use of nuclear weapons. The
opinion of the Court, however, means that the rules on the conduct of hostilities
and the general principles on the use ofweapons apply to the use of nuclear weap-
ons. In application of these principles and rules, the Court concluded, "the threat
or use of nuclear weapons would generally be contrary to the rules of international
law applicable in armed conflict, and in particular the principles and rules of hu-
manitarian law." 78
Fundamental Guarantees
Fundamental guarantees apply to all civilians in the power of a party to the conflict
and who do not or have ceased to take a direct part in hostilities, as well as to all per-
sons who are hors de combat. Because fundamental guarantees are overarching
rules that apply to all persons, they were not sub-divided in the study into specific
rules relating to different types of persons.
These fundamental guarantees all have a firm basis in international humanitar-
ian law applicable in both international and non-international armed conflicts. In
the study, most of the rules relating to fundamental guarantees are couched in tradi-
tional humanitarian law language, because this best reflected the substance of the
corresponding customary rule. 79 Some rules, however, were drafted so as to capture
the essence of a range of detailed provisions relating to a specific subject, in partic-
ular the rules prohibiting uncompensated or abusive forced labor, enforced disap-
pearances and arbitrary detention and the rule requiring respect for family life. 80
Where relevant, practice under international human rights law was included in
the study and in particular in the chapter on fundamental guarantees. This was
done because international human rights law continues to apply during armed
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conflicts, as expressly stated in the human rights treaties themselves, although
some provisions may, subject to certain conditions, be derogated from in time of
public emergency. The continued applicability ofhuman rights law during armed
conflict has been confirmed on numerous occasions in State practice and by hu-
man rights bodies and the International Court of Justice. 81 Most recently, the
Court, in its advisory opinion on the legal consequences of the construction of a
wall in the occupied Palestinian territories, confirmed that "the protection offered
by human rights conventions does not cease in case of armed conflict" and that
while there may be rights that are exclusively matters of international humanitar-
ian law or ofhuman rights law, there are others that "may be matters ofboth these
branches of international law."82 The study does not set out, however, to provide
an assessment of customary human rights law. Instead, practice under human
rights law has been included in order to support, strengthen and clarify analogous
principles of international humanitarian law.
Implementation
A number of rules on the implementation of international humanitarian law have
become part of customary international law. In particular, each party to the con-
flict must respect and ensure respect for international humanitarian law by its
armed forces and other persons or groups acting in fact on its instructions or under
its direction or control. As a result, each party to the conflict, including armed op-
position groups, must provide instruction in international humanitarian law to its
armed forces. Beyond these general obligations, it is less clear to what extent other
specific implementation mechanisms that are binding upon States are also binding
upon armed opposition groups. For example, the obligation to issue orders and in-
structions to the armed forces which ensure respect for international humanitarian
law is clearly set forth in international law for States but not so for armed opposition
groups. Similarly, there is an obligation on States to make legal advisers available,
when necessary, to advise military commanders at the appropriate level on the appli-
cation of international humanitarian law, but not on armed opposition groups.
A State is responsible for violations of international humanitarian law attribut-
able to it and is required to make full reparation for the loss or injury caused by
such violations. It is unclear whether armed opposition groups incur an equivalent
responsibility for violations committed by their members and what the conse-
quences ofsuch responsibilitywould be. As stated above, armed opposition groups
must respect international humanitarian law and they must operate under a "re-
sponsible command."83 As a result, it can be argued that armed opposition groups
incur responsibility for acts committed by persons forming part of such groups.
The consequences of such responsibility, however, are not clear. In particular, it is
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unclear to what extent armed opposition groups are under an obligation to make
full reparation, even though in many countries victims can bring a civil suit for
damages against the offenders.
When it comes to individual responsibility, customary international humani-
tarian law places criminal responsibility on all persons who commit, who order the
commission of or who are otherwise responsible as commanders or superiors for
the commission ofwar crimes. The implementation of the war crimes regime, that
is, the investigation ofwar crimes and the prosecution ofthe suspects, is an obliga-
tion incumbent upon States. States may discharge this obligation by setting up in-
ternational or mixed tribunals to that effect.
Conclusion
The study did not attempt to determine the customary nature ofeach treaty rule of
international humanitarian law but sought to analyse issues in order to establish
what rules of customary international law can be found inductively on the basis of
State practice in relation to these issues. A brief overview ofsome ofthe findings of
the study nevertheless shows that the principles and rules contained in treaty law
have received widespread acceptance in practice and have greatly influenced the
formation of customary international law. Many of these principles and rules are
now part of customary international law. As such, they are binding on all States
regardless of ratification of treaties and also on armed opposition groups in case of
rules applicable to all parties to a non-international armed conflict.
The study also indicates that many rules ofcustomary international law apply in
both international and non-international armed conflicts and shows the extent to
which State practice has gone beyond existing treaty law and expanded the rules
applicable to non-international armed conflicts. The regulation of the conduct of
hostilities and the treatment ofpersons in internal armed conflicts is thus more de-
tailed and complete than that which exists under treaty law. It remains to be ex-
plored to what extent, from a humanitarian and military perspective, this more
detailed and complete regulation is sufficient or whether further developments in
the law are required.
As is the case for treaty law, effective implementation of the rules of customary
international humanitarian law is required through dissemination, training and
enforcement. These rules should be incorporated into military manuals and na-
tional legislation, wherever this is not already the case.
The study also reveals areas where the law is not clear and points to issues which
require further clarification or agreement, such as the definition of civilians in
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non-international armed conflicts, the concept of direct participation in hostilities
and the scope and application of the principle of proportionality.
In the light of the achievements to date and the work that remains to be done,
the study should not be seen as the end but rather as the beginning of a new process
aimed at improving understanding ofand agreement on the principles and rules of
international humanitarian law. In this process, the study can form the basis of a
rich discussion and dialogue on the implementation, clarification and possible de-
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Annex
List ofCustomary Rules ofInternational Humanitarian Law
Note. This list is based on the conclusions set out in Volume I of the study on cus-
tomary international humanitarian law. As the study did not seek to determine the
customary nature ofeach treaty rule of international humanitarian law, it does not
necessarily follow the structure of existing treaties. The scope of application of the
rules is indicated in square brackets. The abbreviation IAC refers to customary
rules applicable in international armed conflicts and the abbreviation NIAC to cus-
tomary rules applicable in non-international armed conflicts. In the latter case,
some rules are indicated as being "arguably" applicable because practice generally
pointed in that direction but was less extensive.
The Principle ofDistinction
Distinction between Civilians and Combatants
Rule 1. The parties to the conflict must at all times distinguish between civilians
and combatants. Attacks may only be directed against combatants. Attacks must
not be directed against civilians. [IAC/NIAC]
Rule 2. Acts or threats ofviolence the primary purpose ofwhich is to spread terror
among the civilian population are prohibited. [IAC/NIAC]
Rule 3. All members of the armed forces of a party to the conflict are combatants,
except medical and religious personnel. [IAC]
Rule 4. The armed forces of a party to the conflict consist of all organized armed
forces, groups and units which are under a command responsible to that party for
the conduct of its subordinates. [IAC]
Rule 5. Civilians are persons who are not members ofthe armed forces. The civilian
population comprises all persons who are civilians. [IAC/NIAC]
Rule 6. Civilians are protected against attack, unless and for such time as they take a
direct part in hostilities. [IAC/NIAC]
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Distinction between Civilian Objects and Military Objectives
Rule 7. The parties to the conflict must at all times distinguish between civilian ob-
jects and military objectives. Attacks may only be directed against military objec-
tives. Attacks must not be directed against civilian objects. [IAC/NIAC]
Rule 8. In so far as objects are concerned, military objectives are limited to those
objects which by their nature, location, purpose or use make an effective contribu-
tion to military action and whose partial or total destruction, capture or neutraliza-
tion, in the circumstances ruling at the time, offers a definite military advantage.
[IAC/NIAC]
Rule 9. Civilian objects are all objects that are not military objectives. [IAC/NIAC]
Rule 10. Civilian objects are protected against attack, unless and for such time as
they are military objectives. [IAC/NIAC]
Indiscriminate Attacks
Rule 11. Indiscriminate attacks are prohibited. [IAC/NIAC]
Rule 12. Indiscriminate attacks are those:
(a) which are not directed at a specific military objective;
(b) which employ a method or means ofcombat which cannot be directed at
a specific military objective; or
(c) which employ a method or means of combat the effects ofwhich cannot
be limited as required by international humanitarian law;
and consequently, in each such case, are ofa nature to strike military objectives and
civilians or civilian objects without distinction. [IAC/NIAC]
Rule 13. Attacks by bombardment by any method or means which treats as a single
military objective a number of clearly separated and distinct military objectives lo-
cated in a city, town, village or other area containing a similar concentration of ci-
vilians or civilian objects are prohibited. [IAC/NIAC]
Proportionality in Attack
Rule 14. Launching an attack which may be expected to cause incidental loss of ci-
vilian life, injury to civilians, damage to civilian objects, or a combination thereof,
which would be excessive in relation to the concrete and direct military advantage
anticipated, is prohibited. [IAC/NIAC]
Precautions in Attack
Rule 15. In the conduct ofmilitary operations, constant care must be taken to spare
the civilian population, civilians and civilian objects. All feasible precautions must
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be taken to avoid, and in any event to minimize, incidental loss of civilian life, in-
jury to civilians and damage to civilian objects. [IAC/NIAC]
Rule 16. Each party to the conflict must do everything feasible to verify that targets
are military objectives. [IAC/NIAC]
Rule 1 7. Each party to the conflict must take all feasible precautions in the choice of
means and methods of warfare with a view to avoiding, and in any event to mini-
mizing, incidental loss of civilian life, injury to civilians and damage to civilian ob-
jects. [IAC/NIAC]
Rule 18. Each party to the conflict must do everything feasible to assess whether the
attack may be expected to cause incidental loss of civilian life, injury to civilians,
damage to civilian objects, or a combination thereof, which would be excessive in
relation to the concrete and direct military advantage anticipated. [IAC/NIAC]
Rule 19. Each party to the conflict must do everything feasible to cancel or suspend
an attack if it becomes apparent that the target is not a military objective or that the
attack may be expected to cause incidental loss of civilian life, injury to civilians,
damage to civilian objects, or a combination thereof, which would be excessive in
relation to the concrete and direct military advantage anticipated. [IAC/NIAC]
Rule 20. Each party to the conflict must give effective advance warning of attacks
which may affect the civilian population, unless circumstances do not permit.
[IAC/NIAC]
Rule 21. When a choice is possible between several military objectives for obtaining
a similar military advantage, the objective to be selected must be that the attack on
which may be expected to cause the least danger to civilian lives and to civilian ob-
jects. [IAC/arguablyNIAC]
Precautions against the Effects of Attacks
Rule 22. The parties to the conflict must take all feasible precautions to protect the
civilian population and civilian objects under their control against the effects of at-
tacks. [IAC/NIAC]
Rule 23. Each party to the conflict must, to the extent feasible, avoid locating mili-
tary objectives within or near densely populated areas. [IAC/arguably NIAC]
Rule 24. Each party to the conflict must, to the extent feasible, remove civilian per-
sons and objects under its control from the vicinity of military objectives. [IAC/ar-
guably NIAC]
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Specifically Protected Persons And Objects
Medical and Religious Personnel and Objects
Rule 25. Medical personnel exclusively assigned to medical duties must be re-
spected and protected in all circumstances. They lose their protection if they com-
mit, outside their humanitarian function, acts harmful to the enemy. [IAC/NIAC]
Rule 26. Punishing a person for performing medical duties compatible with medi-
cal ethics or compelling a person engaged in medical activities to perform acts con-
trary to medical ethics is prohibited. [IAC/NIAC]
Rule 27. Religious personnel exclusively assigned to religious duties must be re-
spected and protected in all circumstances. They lose their protection if they com-
mit, outside their humanitarian function, acts harmful to the enemy. [IAC/NIAC]
Rule 28. Medical units exclusively assigned to medical purposes must be respected
and protected in all circumstances. They lose their protection if they are being
used, outside their humanitarian function, to commit acts harmful to the enemy.
[IAC/NIAC]
Rule 29. Medical transports assigned exclusively to medical transportation must be
respected and protected in all circumstances. They lose their protection if they are
being used, outside their humanitarian function, to commit acts harmful to the en-
emy. [IAC/NIAC]
Rule 30. Attacks directed against medical and religious personnel and objects dis-
playing the distinctive emblems of the Geneva Conventions in conformity with in-
ternational law are prohibited. [IAC/NIAC]
Humanitarian Relief Personnel and Objects
Rule 31. Humanitarian relief personnel must be respected and protected. [IAC/
NIAC]
Rule 32. Objects used for humanitarian relief operations must be respected and
protected. [IAC/NIAC]
Personnel and Objects Involved in a Peacekeeping Mission
Rule 33. Directing an attack against personnel and objects involved in a peacekeep-
ing mission in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, as long as they
are entitled to the protection given to civilians and civilian objects under interna-




Rule 34. Civilian journalists engaged in professional missions in areas of armed
conflict must be respected and protected as long as they are not taking a direct part
in hostilities. [IAC/NIAC]
Protected Zones
Rule 35. Directing an attack against a zone established to shelter the wounded, the
sick and civilians from the effects of hostilities is prohibited. [IAC/NIAC]
Rule 36. Directing an attack against a demilitarized zone agreed upon between the
parties to the conflict is prohibited. [IAC/NIAC]
Rule 37. Directing an attack against a non-defended locality is prohibited. [LAC/
MAC]
Cultural Property
Rule 38. Each party to the conflict must respect cultural property:
A. Special care must be taken in military operations to avoid damage to
buildings dedicated to religion, art, science, education or charitable purposes
and historic monuments unless they are military objectives.
B. Property ofgreat importance to the cultural heritage ofevery people must
not be the object of attack unless imperatively required by military necessity.
[IAC/NIAC]
Rule 39. The use of property of great importance to the cultural heritage of every
people for purposes which are likely to expose it to destruction or damage is pro-
hibited, unless imperatively required by military necessity. [IAC/NIAC]
Rule 40. Each party to the conflict must protect cultural property:
A. All seizure of or destruction or willful damage done to institutions
dedicated to religion, charity, education, the arts and sciences, historic
monuments and works of art and science is prohibited.
B. Any form of theft, pillage or misappropriation of, and any acts of
vandalism directed against, property of great importance to the cultural
heritage of every people is prohibited.
[IAC/NIAC]
Rule 41. The occupying power must prevent the illicit export of cultural property
from occupied territory and must return illicitly exported property to the compe-
tent authorities of the occupied territory. [IAC]
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Works and Installations Containing Dangerous Forces
Rule 42. Particular care must be taken if works and installations containing dan-
gerous forces, namely dams, dykes and nuclear electrical generating stations, and
other installations located at or in their vicinity are attacked, in order to avoid the
release of dangerous forces and consequent severe losses among the civilian popu-
lation. [IAC/NIAC]
The Natural Environment
Rule 43. The general principles on the conduct of hostilities apply to the natural
environment:
A. No part ofthe natural environment may be attacked, unless it is a military
objective.
B. Destruction of any part of the natural environment is prohibited, unless
required by imperative military necessity.
C. Launching an attack against a military objective which may be expected
to cause incidental damage to the environment which would be excessive in
relation to the concrete and direct military advantage anticipated is prohibited.
[IAC/NIAC]
Rule 44. Methods and means of warfare must be employed with due regard to the
protection and preservation ofthe natural environment. In the conduct of military
operations, all feasible precautions must be taken to avoid, and in any event to
minimize, incidental damage to the environment. Lack of scientific certainty as to
the effects on the environment of certain military operations does not absolve a
party to the conflict from taking such precautions. [IAC/arguably NIAC]
Rule 45. The use of methods or means of warfare that are intended, or may be ex-
pected, to cause widespread, long-term and severe damage to the natural environ-
ment is prohibited. Destruction of the natural environment may not be used as a
weapon. [IAC/arguably NIAC]
Specific Methods Of Warfare
Denial of Quarter
Rule 46. Ordering that no quarter will be given, threatening an adversary therewith
or conducting hostilities on this basis is prohibited. [IAC/NIAC]
Rule 47. Attacking persons who are recognized as hors de combat is prohibited. A
person hors de combat is:
(a) anyone who is in the power of an adverse party;
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(b) anyone who is defenseless because of unconsciousness, shipwreck,
wounds or sickness; or
(c) anyone who clearly expresses an intention to surrender;
provided he or she abstains from any hostile act and does not attempt to escape.
[IAC/NIAC]
Rule 48. Making persons parachuting from an aircraft in distress the object of at-
tack during their descent is prohibited. [IAC/NIAC]
Destruction and Seizure of Property
Rule 49. The parties to the conflict may seize military equipment belonging to an
adverse party as war booty. [IAC]
Rule 50. The destruction or seizure of the property of an adversary is prohibited,
unless required by imperative military necessity. [IAC/NIAC]
Rule 51. In occupied territory:
(a) movable public property that can be used for military operations may be
confiscated;
(b) immovable public property must be administered according to the rule
of usufruct; and
(c) private property must be respected and may not be confiscated;
except where destruction or seizure ofsuch property is required by imperative mil-
itary necessity. [IAC]
Rule 52. Pillage is prohibited. [IAC/NIAC]
Starvation and Access to Humanitarian Relief
Rule 53. The use of starvation of the civilian population as a method of warfare is
prohibited. [IAC/NIAC]
Rule 54. Attacking, destroying, removing or rendering useless objects indispens-
able to the survival of the civilian population is prohibited. [IAC/NIAC]
Rule 55. The parties to the conflict must allow and facilitate rapid and unimpeded
passage of humanitarian relief for civilians in need, which is impartial in character
and conducted without any adverse distinction, subject to their right of control.
[IAC/NIAC]
Rule 56. The parties to the conflict must ensure the freedom of movement of au-
thorized humanitarian relief personnel essential to the exercise of their functions.
Only in case of imperative military necessity may their movements be temporarily
restricted. [IAC/NIAC]
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Deception
Rule 57. Ruses ofwar are not prohibited as long as they do not infringe a rule of in-
ternational humanitarian law. [IAC/NIAC]
Rule 58. The improper use of the white flag of truce is prohibited. [IAC/NIAC]
Rule 59. The improper use of the distinctive emblems of the Geneva Conventions
is prohibited. [IAC/NIAC]
Rule 60. The use of the United Nations emblem and uniform is prohibited, except
as authorized by the organization. [IAC/NIAC]
Rule 61. The improper use of other internationally recognized emblems is prohib-
ited. [IAC/NIAC]
Rule 62. Improper use of the flags or military emblems, insignia or uniforms of the
adversary is prohibited. [IAC/arguably NIAC]
Rule 63. Use of the flags or military emblems, insignia or uniforms of neutral or
other States not party to the conflict is prohibited. [IAC/arguably NIAC]
Rule 64. Concluding an agreement to suspend combat with the intention ofattack-
ing by surprise the enemy relying on that agreement is prohibited. [IAC/NIAC]
Rule 65. Killing, injuring or capturing an adversary by resort to perfidy is prohib-
ited. [IAC/NIAC]
Communication with the Enemy
Rule 66. Commanders may enter into non-hostile contact through any means of
communication. Such contact must be based on good faith. [IAC/NIAC]
Rule 67. Parlementaires are inviolable. [IAC/NIAC]
Rule 68. Commanders may take the necessary precautions to prevent the presence
of a parlementaire from being prejudicial. [IAC/NIAC]
Rule 69. Parlementaires taking advantage of their privileged position to commit an
act contrary to international law and detrimental to the adversary lose their invio-
lability. [IAC/NIAC]
Weapons
General Principles on the Use ofWeapons
Rule 70. The use of means and methods of warfare which are of a nature to cause
superfluous injury or unnecessary suffering is prohibited. [IAC/NIAC]





Rule 72. The use of poison or poisoned weapons is prohibited. [IAC/NIAC]
Biological Weapons
Rule 73. The use of biological weapons is prohibited. [IAC/NIAC]
Chemical Weapons
Rule 74. The use of chemical weapons is prohibited. [IAC/NIAC]
Rule 75. The use of riot-control agents as a method ofwarfare is prohibited. [IAC/
NIAC]
Rule 76. The use of herbicides as a method of warfare is prohibited if they:
a) are of a nature to be prohibited chemical weapons;
b) are of a nature to be prohibited biological weapons;
c) are aimed at vegetation that is not a military objective;
d) would cause incidental loss of civilian life, injury to civilians, damage to
civilian objects, or a combination thereof, which may be expected to be
excessive in relation to the concrete and direct military advantage anticipated;
or




Rule 77. The use ofbullets which expand or flatten easily in the human body is pro-
hibited. [IAC/NIAC]
Exploding Bullets
Rule 78. The anti-personnel use ofbullets which explode within the human body is
prohibited. [IAC/NIAC]
Weapons Primarily Injuring by Non-detectable Fragments
Rule 79. The use of weapons the primary effect of which is to injure by fragments
which are not detectable by X-rays in the human body is prohibited. [IAC/NIAC]
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Booby-traps
Rule 80. The use ofbooby-traps which are in anyway attached to or associated with
objects or persons entitled to special protection under international humanitarian
law or with objects that are likely to attract civilians is prohibited. [IAC/NIAC]
Landmines
Rule 81 . When landmines are used, particular care must be taken to minimize their
indiscriminate effects. [IAC/NIAC]
Rule 82. A party to the conflict using landmines must record their placement, as far
as possible. [IAC/arguably NIAC]
Rule 83. At the end of active hostilities, a party to the conflict which has used land-
mines must remove or otherwise render them harmless to civilians, or facilitate
their removal. [IAC/NIAC]
Incendiary Weapons
Rule 84. If incendiary weapons are used, particular care must be taken to avoid,
and in any event to minimize, incidental loss of civilian life, injury to civilians and
damage to civilian objects. [IAC/NIAC]
Rule 85. The anti-personnel use of incendiary weapons is prohibited, unless it is
not feasible to use a less harmful weapon to render a person hors de combat. [IAC/
NIAC]
Blinding Laser Weapons
Rule 86. The use of laser weapons that are specifically designed, as their sole com-
bat function or as one of their combat functions, to cause permanent blindness to
unenhanced vision is prohibited. [IAC/NIAC]
Treatment of Civilians and Persons Hors de Combat
Fundamental Guarantees
Rule 87. Civilians and persons hors de combat must be treated humanely. [IAC/
NIAC]
Rule 88. Adverse distinction in the application of international humanitarian law
based on race, color, sex, language, religion or belief, political or other opinion, na-
tional or social origin, wealth, birth or other status, or on any other similar criteria
is prohibited. [IAC/NIAC]
Rule 89. Murder is prohibited. [IAC/NIAC]
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Rule 90. Torture, cruel or inhuman treatment and outrages upon personal dignity,
in particular humiliating and degrading treatment, are prohibited. [IAC/NIAC]
Rule 91. Corporal punishment is prohibited. [IAC/NIAC]
Rule 92. Mutilation, medical or scientific experiments or any other medical proce-
dure not indicated by the state of health of the person concerned and not consis-
tent with generally accepted medical standards are prohibited. [IAC/NIAC]
Rule 93. Rape and other forms of sexual violence are prohibited. [IAC/NIAC]
Rule 94. Slavery and the slave trade in all their forms are prohibited. [IAC/NIAC]
Rule 95. Uncompensated or abusive forced labor is prohibited. [IAC/NIAC]
Rule 96. The taking of hostages is prohibited. [IAC/NIAC]
Rule 97. The use ofhuman shields is prohibited. [IAC/NIAC]
Rule 98. Enforced disappearance is prohibited. [IAC/NIAC]
Rule 99. Arbitrary deprivation of liberty is prohibited. [IAC/NIAC]
Rule 100. No one may be convicted or sentenced, except pursuant to a fair trial af-
fording all essential judicial guarantees. [IAC/NIAC]
Rule 101. No one maybe accused or convicted of a criminal offence on account of
any act or omission which did not constitute a criminal offence under national or
international law at the time it was committed; nor may a heavier penalty be im-
posed than that which was applicable at the time the criminal offence was commit-
ted. [IAC/NIAC]
Rule 102. No one may be convicted of an offence except on the basis of individual
criminal responsibility. [IAC/NIAC]
Rule 103. Collective punishments are prohibited. [IAC/NIAC]
Rule 104. The convictions and religious practices of civilians and persons hors de
combat must be respected. [IAC/NIAC]
Rule 105. Family life must be respected as far as possible. [IAC/NIAC]
Combatants and Prisoner-of-War Status
Rule 106. Combatants must distinguish themselves from the civilian population
while they are engaged in an attack or in a military operation preparatory to an at-
tack. Ifthey fail to do so, they do not have the right to prisoner-of-war status. [IAC]
Rule 107. Combatants who are captured while engaged in espionage do not have
the right to prisoner-of-war status. They may not be convicted or sentenced with-
out previous trial. [IAC]
73
Customary International Humanitarian Law Study
Rule 108. Mercenaries, as defined in Additional Protocol I, do not have the right to
combatant or prisoner-of-war status. They may not be convicted or sentenced
without previous trial. [IAC]
The Wounded, Sick and Shipwrecked
Rule 109. Whenever circumstances permit, and particularly after an engagement,
each party to the conflict must, without delay, take all possible measures to search
for, collect and evacuate the wounded, sick and shipwrecked without adverse dis-
tinction. [IAC/NIAC]
Rule 110. The wounded, sick and shipwrecked must receive, to the fullest extent
practicable and with the least possible delay, the medical care and attention re-
quired by their condition. No distinction may be made among them founded on
any grounds other than medical ones. [IAC/NIAC]
Rule 111. Each party to the conflict must take all possible measures to protect the
wounded, sick and shipwrecked against ill-treatment and against pillage of their
personal property. [IAC/NIAC]
The Dead
Rule 112. Whenever circumstances permit, and particularly after an engagement,
each party to the conflict must, without delay, take all possible measures to search
for, collect and evacuate the dead without adverse distinction. [IAC/NIAC]
Rule 113. Each party to the conflict must take all possible measures to prevent the
dead from being despoiled. Mutilation of dead bodies is prohibited. [IAC/NIAC]
Rule 114. Parties to the conflict must endeavour to facilitate the return of the re-
mains of the deceased upon request of the party to which they belong or upon the
request oftheir next ofkin. They must return their personal effects to them. [IAC]
Rule 115. The dead must be disposed of in a respectful manner and their graves re-
spected and properly maintained. [IAC/NIAC]
Rule 116. With a view to the identification of the dead, each party to the conflict
must record all available information prior to disposal and mark the location ofthe
graves. [IAC/NIAC]
Missing Persons
Rule 117. Each party to the conflict must take all feasible measures to account for
persons reported missing as a result ofarmed conflict and must provide their fam-
ily members with any information it has on their fate. [IAC/NIAC]
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Persons Deprived of their Liberty
Rule 118. Persons deprived of their liberty must be provided with adequate food,
water, clothing, shelter and medical attention. [IAC/NIAC]
Rule 119. Women who are deprived of their liberty must be held in quarters sepa-
rate from those of men, except where families are accommodated as family units,
and must be under the immediate supervision ofwomen. [IAC/NIAC]
Rule 120. Children who are deprived of their liberty must be held in quarters sepa-
rate from those of adults, except where families are accommodated as family units.
[IAC/NIAC]
Rule 121. Persons deprived of their liberty must be held in premises which are re-
moved from the combat zone and which safeguard their health and hygiene. [IAC/
NIAC]
Rule 122. Pillage of the personal belongings of persons deprived of their liberty is
prohibited. [IAC/NIAC]
Rule 123. The personal details of persons deprived of their liberty must be re-
corded. [IAC/NIAC]
Rule 124.
A. In international armed conflicts, the ICRC must be granted regular access
to all persons deprived of their liberty in order to verify the conditions of their
detention and to restore contacts between those persons and their families.
B. In non-international armed conflicts, the ICRC may offer its services to
the parties to the conflict with a view to visiting all persons deprived of their
liberty for reasons related to the conflict in order to verify the conditions of
their detention and to restore contacts between those persons and their
families.
[IAC(A)/NIAC(B)]
Rule 125. Persons deprived of their liberty must be allowed to correspond with
their families, subject to reasonable conditions relating to frequency and the need
for censorship by the authorities. [IAC/NIAC]
Rule 126. Civilian internees and persons deprived of their liberty in connection
with a non-international armed conflict must be allowed to receive visitors, espe-
cially near relatives, to the degree practicable. [IAC/NIAC]
Rule 127. The personal convictions and religious practices of persons deprived of
their liberty must be respected. [IAC/NIAC]
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Rule 128.
A. Prisoners ofwar must be released and repatriated without delay after the
cessation of active hostilities.
B. Civilian internees must be released as soon as the reasons which
necessitated internment no longer exist, but at the latest as soon as possible
after the close of active hostilities.
C. Persons deprived of their liberty in relation to a non-international armed
conflict must be released as soon as the reasons for the deprivation of their
liberty cease to exist.
The persons referred to may continue to be deprived of their liberty if penal pro-
ceedings are pending against them or if they are serving a sentence lawfully im-
posed. [IAC (A&B)/NIAC (C)]
Displacement and Displaced Persons
Rule 129.
A. Parties to an international armed conflict may not deport or forcibly
transfer the civilian population of an occupied territory, in whole or in part,
unless the security of the civilians involved or imperative military reasons so
demand.
B. Parties to a non-international armed conflict may not order the
displacement ofthe civilian population, in whole or in part, for reasons related
to the conflict, unless the security of the civilians involved or imperative
military reasons so demand.
[IAC (A)/NIAC (B)]
Rule 130. States may not deport or transfer parts of their own civilian population
into a territory they occupy. [IAC]
Rule 131. In case ofdisplacement, all possible measures must be taken in order that
the civilians concerned are received under satisfactory conditions of shelter, hy-
giene, health, safety and nutrition and that members of the same family are not
separated. [IAC/NIAC]
Rule 132. Displaced persons have a right to voluntary return in safety to their
homes or places of habitual residence as soon as the reasons for their displacement
cease to exist. [IAC/NIAC]
Rule 133. The property rights ofdisplaced persons must be respected. [IAC/NIAC]
76
Jean-Marie Henckaerts
Other Persons Afforded Specific Protection
Rule 134. The specific protection, health and assistance needs ofwomen affected
by armed conflict must be respected. [IAC/NIAC]
Rule 135. Children affected by armed conflict are entitled to special respect and
protection. [IAC/NIAC]
Rule 136. Children must not be recruited into armed forces or armed groups.
[IAC/NIAC]
Rule 137. Children must not be allowed to take part in hostilities. [IAC/NIAC]
Rule 138. The elderly, disabled and infirm affected by armed conflict are entitled to
special respect and protection. [IAC/NIAC]
Implementation
Compliance with International Humanitarian Law
Rule 139. Each party to the conflict must respect and ensure respect for interna-
tional humanitarian law by its armed forces and other persons or groups acting in
fact on its instructions, or under its direction or control. [IAC/NIAC]
Rule 140. The obligation to respect and ensure respect for international humani-
tarian law does not depend on reciprocity. [IAC/NIAC]
Rule 141. Each State must make legal advisers available, when necessary, to advise
military commanders at the appropriate level on the application of international
humanitarian law. [IAC/NIAC]
Rule 142. States and parties to the conflict must provide instruction in interna-
tional humanitarian law to their armed forces. [IAC/NIAC]
Rule 143. States must encourage the teaching of international humanitarian law to
the civilian population. [IAC/NIAC]
Enforcement of International Humanitarian Law
Rule 144. States may not encourage violations of international humanitarian law
by parties to an armed conflict. They must exert their influence, to the degree pos-
sible, to stop violations of international humanitarian law. [IAC/NIAC]
Rule 145. Where not prohibited by international law, belligerent reprisals are sub-
ject to stringent conditions. [IAC]
Rule 146. Belligerent reprisals against persons protected by the Geneva Conven-
tions are prohibited. [IAC]
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Rule 147. Reprisals against objects protected under the Geneva Conventions and
Hague Convention for the Protection of Cultural Property are prohibited. [IAC]
Rule 148. Parties to non-international armed conflicts do not have the right to re-
sort to belligerent reprisals. Other countermeasures against persons who do not or
who have ceased to take a direct part in hostilities are prohibited. [NIAC]
Responsibility and Reparation
Rule 149. A State is responsible for violations ofinternational humanitarian law at-
tributable to it, including:
(a) violations committed by its organs, including its armed forces;
(b) violations committed by persons or entities it empowered to exercise
elements of governmental authority;
(c) violations committed by persons or groups acting in fact on its
instructions, or under its direction or control; and
(d) violations committed by private persons or groups which it
acknowledges and adopts as its own conduct.
[IAC/NIAC]
Rule 150. A State responsible for violations ofinternational humanitarian law is re-
quired to make full reparation for the loss or injury caused. [IAC/NIAC]
Individual Responsibility
Rule 151. Individuals are criminally responsible for war crimes they commit. [IAC/
NIAC]
Rule 152. Commanders and other superiors are criminally responsible for war
crimes committed pursuant to their orders. [IAC/NIAC]
Rule 153. Commanders and other superiors are criminally responsible for war
crimes committed by their subordinates if they knew, or had reason to know, that
the subordinates were about to commit or were committing such crimes and did
not take all necessary and reasonable measures in their power to prevent their com-
mission, or if such crimes had been committed, to punish the persons responsible.
[IAC/NIAC]
Rule 154. Every combatant has a duty to disobey a manifestly unlawful order.
[IAC/NIAC]
Rule 155. Obeying a superior order does not relieve a subordinate of criminal re-
sponsibility if the subordinate knew that the act ordered was unlawful or should
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have known because of the manifestly unlawful nature of the act ordered. [IAC/
NIAC]
War Crimes
Rule 156. Serious violations of international humanitarian law constitute war
crimes. [IAC/NIAC]
Rule 157. States have the right to vest universal jurisdiction in their national courts
over war crimes. [IAC/NIAC]
Rule 158. States must investigate war crimes allegedly committed by their nationals
or armed forces, or on their territory, and, if appropriate, prosecute the suspects.
They must also investigate other war crimes over which they have jurisdiction and,
if appropriate, prosecute the suspects. [IAC/NIAC]
Rule 159. At the end of hostilities, the authorities in power must endeavour to
grant the broadest possible amnesty to persons who have participated in a non-
international armed conflict, or those deprived of their liberty for reasons related
to the armed conflict, with the exception ofpersons suspected of, accused ofor sen-
tenced for war crimes. [NIAC]
Rule 160. Statutes of limitation may not apply to war crimes. [IAC/NIAC]
Rule 161. States must make every effort to cooperate, to the extent possible, with
each other in order to facilitate the investigation ofwar crimes and the prosecution
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Introduction
It is a pleasure for me to be here to participate in this panel discussion on the In-
ternational Committee of the Red Cross's (ICRC's) Customary International
Humanitarian Law study (hereinafter the Study) for several reasons. I have great
respect for the Naval War College and its important contributions to the develop-
ment ofthe law ofarmed conflict (LOAC) over many years. This is the first oppor-
tunity I have had to travel to Newport to participate in the annual International
Law Conference and I am indebted to the Stockton Professor Charles Garraway
and to Professor Dennis Mandsager for their invitation to me to make the trip
from Down Under. I have also had a long association with the ICRC customary law
study and have been looking forward to the opportunity to engage with others in
response to the Study in a public forum such as this.
I also confess that Newport, Rhode Island has a reverential aura about it in the
hearts of Aussies like me. It was in this place in 1983 that Australia II with its infa-
mous winged keel came from three races down to wrest the "Auld Mug" from the
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New York Yacht Club—the fiercely competitive custodians of the America's Cup.
The Cup had never left American hands since it was won by America (hence the
Cup's name in honor of its inaugural winner) in the inaugural race against the
Royal Yacht Squadron around the Isle ofWight in 1851, until, after 132 years and
multiple unsuccessful challenges, the Aussies finally broke the US stranglehold. It
is fair, although nationally unpalatable, to concede that we were unable to match
anything like the US ability to successfully defend the Cup against successive chal-
lenges (24 in total). In 1987 Dennis Connor regained the Cup and returned it to the
United States—this time to the San Diego Yacht Club—before it was won by the
Kiwis and now the Swiss. The Aussies have never come close to retrieving it since.
All this to say that it is special to be here in Newport and I do not take the opportu-
nity for granted.
My intention is to briefly explain the nature of my involvement with the cus-
tomary law study before I move to more substantive observations. I want to offer
some thoughts on positive benefits of the Study—some potential and others al-
ready manifest—as a way of congratulating the ICRC on the publication of the
Study. Then I will add some ofmy own thoughts on reasons why the ICRC ought
not be surprised by the level of criticism of the Study which has already emerged
and which, in my view, will continue largely unabated.
Personal Involvement with the Study
As the incumbent of the Australian Red Cross Chair of International Humanitar-
ian Law, it is sometimes wrongly assumed that I am an official apologist for not
only the Australian Red Cross but also for the entire Red Cross Movement includ-
ing the ICRC. The assumption is wrong because my appointment is to the Univer-
sity ofMelbourne and not to the Australian Red Cross. It was agreed at the time the
Chair was established that the incumbent would exercise academic freedom as an
employee of the University and would not necessarily act as a spokesperson for the
Australian Red Cross. On many occasions I have participated in the Australian
public debate on international humanitarian law related issues on behalf of the
Australian Red Cross but it is also true that on other occasions I have had to dis-
tance myselfsomewhat—either because I disagree with the position ofthe national
society or, more commonly, because the decision to speak out publicly about cer-
tain issues conflicts with one or more of the Fundamental Principles of the Red
Cross Movement. I accept that the "wearing of different hats" invites confusion
and can be a recipe for misunderstanding but I am learning to live with those nega-
tives. I am a firm believer in the Red Cross Movement and not because ofthe Chair
I occupy. That belief does not translate automatically into support for every
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position the ICRC takes. When it comes to the customary law study I would char-
acterize myselfas cautiously supportive and I intend to explain what I mean by that
general characterization in due course.
I was responsible for the preparation of the Australian national report consti-
tuting one of the forty-seven such national reports forming the primary source of
evidence of State practice and expressions of opinio juris upon which the ICRC
has reached its conclusions. The process of searching for and identifying evidence
ofAustralian practice and national expressions of opinio juris in the areas of inter-
national humanitarian law covered by the Study was a novel one for Australia. I
will say more of my observations of the benefits of undertaking this national
study later. It is sufficient here to say that having worked hard to finalize the Aus-
tralian report and then having handed it over to the ICRC early in 1998, 1 antici-
pated the publication of the Study much sooner than 2005. It is obvious from the
sheer magnitude of the published Study just how massive an undertaking this
project really was. Now I can see that I was entirely unrealistic to have expected to
see the published version of the Study years earlier. Then though, as the years
slipped by post- 1998, 1 remember growing increasingly disappointed by the pas-
sage of time, particularly because of my acute awareness that so much more na-
tional Australian practice had occurred in the course of military operations in
East Timor, in Afghanistan, in Iraq, in Bougainville and in the Solomon Islands,
in inter-governmental fora around the world and in Canberra itself in the inter-
vening period since the Australian report had been submitted to the ICRC.
The ICRC worked hard to cover developments in State practice up to the cut-off
date of 2002 but I am convinced that their own staff could not have accessed the
same documentation as had been possible during the preparation of the national
reports. The authors of the Study make a concession to this effect in their "Intro-
duction" when they acknowledge that "the purpose of the additional research was
also to make sure that the study would be as up-to-date as possible and would, to the
extent possible^ take into account developments up to December 31, 2002" having
earlier acknowledged that "national sources are more easily accessible from within
a country." 1
Consequently, when Yves Sandoz speaks of a "still photograph of reality," 2 it
seems to me that the photo is from the late 1990s with some touching up in 2000-
2002 and that there has already been a prodigious amount of State practice and
many expressions of opinio juris since then which are not reflected in the Study. If
I am correct in that assessment it will very soon be a decade since the still photo-
graph was taken and questions will inevitably be raised about the currency of
the Study.
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Some Positive Observations
I do want to take this opportunity to congratulate the ICRC on the completion of
this enormous project. The more than 5,000 pages of the Study in three separate
volumes is so detailed and vast that there must have been many opportunities for
the individuals involved in the Project, as well as for the ICRC as an institution, to
seriously doubt whether the Study would ever be concluded and appear in print.
The fact that it has been published at all is testament to the commitment of the
ICRC, not only to grasp the initiative and to resource the project, but also to see it
through to its completion. I offer the following observations about some of the
positive contributions the Study has already made or is likely to make in the near
future.
Providing a Significant Australian National Catalyst
Yves Sandoz proposes his own test for the success of the Study by suggesting that
"this study will have achieved its goal only if it is considered not as an end of a pro-
cess but as a beginning." 3 It is my observation that the beginning of the process of
reflection, discussion and debate on both the content of customary international
humanitarian law, as well as on its more effective implementation, commenced
much earlier than at the moment of publication of the Study. In Australia's case,
the announcement by the ICRC of its decision to undertake the Study and the invi-
tation to Australia to prepare a national report on evidence ofState practice and ex-
pressions of opinio juris presented an unprecedented opportunity. There had never
been a comprehensive audit of Australia's approach to customary international
humanitarian law and this particular exercise resulted in a unique collaboration
between the key Australian Government Departments of Defence, Foreign Affairs
and Trade and the Attorney-General.
The preparation ofthe Australian study exposed examples of inconsistency and
inaccuracy on national approaches to aspects of international humanitarian law.
Two examples will help illustrate my meaning. Rule 70 of the ICRC Study is the
prohibition on the use ofweapons which are of a nature to cause unnecessary suf-
fering or superfluous injury.4 In Volume II ofthe Study the ICRC provides the sub-
stantiating State practice and opinio juris to support the articulation of the Rule in
Volume I. In the assessment of national support for the existence of customary
Rule 70 the editors of the Study cite, inter alia, the "Australian Military Manual,"5
which states in relevant part that "weapon use will be unlawful under LOAC when
it breaches the principle ofproportionality by causing unnecessary suffering or in-
jury." 6 On one reading of this sentence there is clear confusion between the rule of
proportionality and the rule on superfluous injury or unnecessary suffering. The
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rule ofproportionality is intended to protect the civilian population from the dele-
terious effects of armed conflict. The use of weapons violates the rule of propor-
tionality when the expected loss of civilian life and/or damage to civilian property
is excessive relative to the expected military advantage from an attack. 7 In contrast,
the rule on superfluous injury or unnecessary suffering is intended to benefit com-
batants by prohibiting the use ofweapons ofa nature to cause superfluous injury or
unnecessary suffering to those combatants who might otherwise be subjected to at-
tack from such weapons. It is also possible to read the offending sentence to mean
superfluous injury or unnecessary suffering to the civilian population, e.g., that the
expected loss ofcivilian life or damage to civilian property is excessive (superfluous
or unnecessary) relative to the expected military advantage to be gained. On the
first reading, the assertion is wrong in law and on the second reading, the choice of
terminology is confusing and unhelpful. On either interpretation, the preparation
of the Australian national report helped to flush out examples such as this which
can now be rectified and improved.
My second example also relates to the Rule ofProportionality—incorporated in
Rule 14 ofthe ICRC Study. Again in the assessment of State practice to substantiate
the existence ofthe customary law rule8 the authors cite, inter alia, the "Australian
Military Manual" that states in relevant part that:
Collateral damage may be the result of military attacks. This fact is recognised by
LOAC and, accordingly, it is not unlawful to cause such injury and damage. The
principle of proportionality dictates that the results of such action must not be
excessive in light of the military advantage anticipated from the attack.9
There is no ambiguity here. This particular articulation of the rule of proportion-
ality wrongly asserts that the test for proportionality is whether the actual loss of
civilian life and/or damage to civilian property is excessive in relation to the antic-
ipated military advantage. Articles 51(5)(b) and 57(2) (b) of Additional Protocol
I
10 both explicitly speak of the expected loss of civilian life and/or damage to civil-
ian property weighed against the anticipated concrete military advantage. The
Australian military has not suddenly altered its legal position on the test for pro-
portionality in attack. The official position of the Government is that the test at
treaty law (pursuant to the above-mentioned provisions of Additional Protocol I)
and at customary international law (as encapsulated in the ICRC's Rule 14) is in-
deed the expected loss of civilian life weighed against the anticipated military ad-
vantage and certainly not the actual loss of civilian life weighted against the
anticipated military advantage. The preparation of the Australian national report
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helped to expose this inaccuracy in the Australian military publication on the law
of armed conflict.
The preparation of the Australian national report involved the identification of
literally hundreds of government documents—many of them classified and re-
quiring official approval for release. As representatives from different government
departments poured over the documents identified by research teams, it became
increasingly obvious that many of the documents had never been retrieved from
files once those files had been stored. This process proved to be cathartic for those
involved as we read through statements ofAustralian Government positions taken
in various multilateral fora in the past. Now that the ICRC Study has been pub-
lished, Australia has the opportunity to revisit the preparation of its national report
and to measure the ICRC's articulation of customary rules against more recent
Australian State practice not covered by the Australian national report. This op-
portunity would not exist but for the ICRC initiative and, in my view, acknowl-
edgement ought to be made and gratitude expressed to the ICRC for it. I would be
surprised if at least some ofthe other 46 States which also prepared national reports
for the ICRC Study have not had similar experiences to the Australian one I have
described.
Creating a Rich Source of Comparative Primary Material
The prodigious effort of the ICRC and the Study's editors to complete the project
has resulted in over 4,400 pages (in the two volumes ofthe so-called "Practice" sec-
tion of the Study) of references to national (and, in some cases international) legis-
lation, case law, military manuals and statements of national government
representatives in relevant inter-governmental conferences. There is simply no re-
source like this in the field of international humanitarian law. The Yearbook ofIn-
ternational Humanitarian Law provides a helpful and detailed annual survey of
State practice which effectively supplements the ICRC Study. The Yearbook mate-
rial takes the form of "Country Reports" on State practice and developments
around the world in national approaches to international humanitarian law. 11
However, this annual report obviously only covers national developments within
the calendar year of each volume ofthe Yearbook and is sorted by country name in
English alphabetical order—certainly not by ICRC rule in the customary law
study. I am not suggesting that the Yearbook obviates the need for the ICRC to up-
date its own Study. Rather, I am suggesting that apart from the "Country Reports"
section of the Yearbook I know ofno other attempt to gather primary source mate-
rial from States and that reality places the ICRC Study in a unique position.
It is not difficult to conceive circumstances in which the comparative material
on State practice in the Study will be extremely useful. In my capacity as amicus
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curiae on international law issues in the trial of Slobodan Milosevic, for example, I
can imagine that the Study's two Practice volumes could provide an invaluable
source of references to a range of case law, legislation and military manuals on na-
tional approaches to the criminalization and prosecution ofthe war crimes ofmur-
der, willful killing, torture, willfully causing grave suffering, cruel treatment,
wanton destruction ofvillages and plunder ofpublic and private property. I am not
suggesting that the two Practice volumes would be the sole source of investigation,
but the fact that they exist and are structured on the basis of topic—corresponding
with the articulation ofthe customary law rules in Volume I ofthe Study—ensures
that these volumes will be consulted regularly.
I am surely not alone in this view. Others practicing in the area of international
criminal law
—
judges, prosecutors, defense lawyers and registry staff—are all regu-
larly referring to national case law and/or legislation to flesh out the substance of
this ever-emerging body of international law. It is undoubtedly the case that as the
international jurisprudence proliferates there is increasing reliance on interna-
tional sources. But, it is also the reality that practitioners in this field of interna-
tional law are often required to resort to national legislation and jurisprudence to
supplement international sources. The natural tendency has been to rely upon the
practitioner's own national sources because they are more familiar and accessible
and for want of entree into other national sources. I suspect that the ICRC Study
will provide a welcome starting point for comparative criminal law research.
Of course it is far too simplistic to suggest that only international criminal law-
yers will rely on the comparative material in the Study. Copies of this Study will be
routinely pulled off the shelves of government legal advisers in foreign ministries,
in defense establishments and in justice ministries. The sheer size of the Study will
ensure that the advice of those government lawyers who do take the time to famil-
iarize themselves with the contents of the Study will be eagerly sought.
Sparking a Global Discussion
The publication of the long-awaited Study has already spawned a succession of
conferences and seminars focused on the results of the Study and reactions to it.
Our own panel discussion here follows on from sessions at Chatham House, at the
Annual Meeting of the American Society of International Law, in The Hague and
precedes planned events in Bangkok, Brussels, Montreal, New Delhi, San Remo
and Warsaw. The rush to discuss, to analyze, to question and to criticize on every
continent in the world is all indicative ofthe intensity ofanticipation ofthe final ta-
bling of the Study and, perhaps more importantly for most observers, a keen desire
for clarification as to how the Study might be utilized, how it will be received and
the regard it will come to have in the future. It is in this sense that I entirely agree
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with Yves Sandoz's view that the publication of the Study is not the end but the be-
ginning of a process and the ICRC is right to ask for as much feedback, debate and
testing of its findings as it can receive.
The arrival of the Study also seems to have spawned a new debate on customary
international law itself—what it is, how it is formed, what sources should be relied
upon to determine its content, the identification of the precise relationship be-
tween treaty law and the development of custom. This debate is redolent, even if
smaller in scale, of the debate following the decision of the International Court of
Justice (ICJ) in the Nicaragua case. Now, of course, almost 20 years after that deci-
sion, there is a new generation ofinternational lawyers involved in the debate. That
is surely a healthy development and one for which the ICRC should be
congratulated.
The Inevitability ofCriticism for Articulating
Customary International Law Rules
Despite the many ways in which the Study will be utilized and relied upon, the
ICRC ought not be surprised either by the intensity of, or by the specific details of,
the criticism directed against the Study. The "notorious imprecision" ofcustomary
international law acknowledged by Judge Koroma of the International Court of
Justice in his "Foreword" to the Study 12 is a double-edged sword for the ICRC. The
Study represents a laudable attempt to clarify some ofthe inherent imprecision but
the reality of that imprecision emboldens others to challenge the ICRC's attempts
at clarification. The applicability of the adage "we know it when we see it but can-
not quite pin it down" to customary international humanitarian law may leave
many academic international lawyers dissatisfied while simultaneously providing a
sense ofconfidence to national government legal advisers. I am not suggesting that
such advisers can tell their governments that the content of customary interna-
tional law on a specific issue is whatever the government wants it be. Rather, one
attraction of the "notorious imprecision" is the slight ambiguity, the elasticity at
the edges ofthe specific detail ofa rule. Any attempt to introduce precision and cer-
tainty in the articulation of the specifics of the law will inevitably draw criticism as
interested parties, particularly States, will simply not agree with some of what has
been included and also with some of what has been omitted.
Irrespective of the Authority of the Articulating Organization
All those involved in the study and practice of international law in the latter half of
the 1980s are unlikely to forget the deluge of academic articles following the deliv-
ery of the Court's judgment in the Nicaragua case. It was as if the Judgment
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breached a dam wall unleashing a torrent of criticism and condemnation—some
of it focused on the Court's decision on jurisdiction and some of it on the merits,
but much of it directed at the Court's reasoning in relation to the formation ofcus-
tomary international law and on the process of identifying the content of custom-
ary rules on the use offeree by States. 13 Just the titles of some of the articles are
descriptive enough: "Icy Day at the ICJ"; 14 "Between a Rock and a Hard Place: The
United States, The International Court and the Nicaragua case"; 15 "Nicaragua and
International Law: The 'Academic' and the 'Real'"; 16 and "The International Court
of Justice at the Crossroads." 17
Hilary Charlesworth's criticisms are particularly pertinent to our present dis-
cussion and I reproduce some of them in detail. Charlesworth claimed that:
Generally, in Nicaragua, the Court appears to expand the category of activities that can
constitute state practice. Its analysis is not easy to follow for the discussion of state
practice and opiniojuris is often elided and it is sometimes uncertain whether the Court
regards a particular action as state practice, opinio juris, or as doing service to both. The
Court relies upon the acceptance of treaty obligations as state practice. While this is a
generally accepted source of state practice, the Court places special emphasis on the
fact that both Nicaragua and the United States have accepted particular treaty
obligations as evidence that they at least are firmlybound by such norms. Unlike jurists
such as D'Amato, who regard only actions which have physical consequences as state
practice, the Court accepts General Assembly resolutions and resolutions of other
international organisations, particularly those in which Nicaragua and the United
States participated, as forms of state practice. This approach accords with that ofmany
jurists. The Court, however, does not appear to discriminate between international
fora, nor does it discriminate between resolutions based on lex lata and lexferenda. The
Court places considerable reliance on the Declaration on Friendly Relations which is
couched in legislative language. But it also relies on other resolutions and agreements
whose language is not mandatory. 18
Even if the Court in Nicaragua had been more precise about its delimitation be-
tween evidence of State practice and expressions of opinio juris, it is likely that the
judgment would have been criticized by those who disagreed with the judges' assess-
ment of the material falling into either category. The criticism has been exacerbated
in substantial part by the Court's lack of clarity as to categorization, as well as by its
apparent failure to accord appropriate weight on the basis of a more nuanced and
discerning approach to the material it considered.
The key point here is that in its attempt to bring precision to the "notoriously
imprecise" customary international law, the ICJ was subjected to a barrage of criti-
cism. If the ICJ was subjected to such a formidable assault, the ICRC ought not
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expect to be immune from a similar intensity of opposition in relation to its meth-
odology, the material it seeks to rely upon and the conclusions it has reached.
Another example of criticism ofa body articulating customary international law
on a particular topic involved the drafting and subsequent adoption of the Statute
for the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY). The
UN Security Council had called for a report from the UN Secretary-General with a
Statute for the proposed Tribunal to be attached. 19 The Office of the Legal Adviser
to the UN prepared the Draft Statute on the basis of customary international law
explaining that:
The international tribunal should apply rules of International Humanitarian Law
which are beyond any doubt part ofcustomary law so that the problem ofadherence of
some but not all States to specific conventions does not arise. This would appear to be
particularly important in the context of an international tribunal prosecuting persons
responsible for serious violations of International Humanitarian Law.20
That stated rationale for the adopted approach could hardly be disputed. If the ju-
risdiction ratione personae of the ICTY was to extend to all persons allegedly re-
sponsible for violations of the Statute on the physical territory of the Former
Yugoslavia, it was essential that members of paramilitary organizations and other
non-State entities be covered. In any case, even for those members of State militar-
ies and police forces, State succession issues at the time of the dissolution of the
Former Federal Republic of Yugoslavia ensured some uncertainties as to the pre-
cise treaty obligations of the newly independent former Federal republics.
Understandably, the UN Office ofthe Legal Adviser took a cautious approach to
the definition ofthe crimes within the ICTY Statute. The principal criticism leveled
against the Draft Statute (which was, perhaps surprisingly, adopted without
amendment by the UN Security Council21 ) has been that it was too conservative in
its approach. The Appeals Chamber of the ICTY is the source of the best-known
criticism of the drafting of the Statute. In the course ofthe trial ofDusko Tadic the
Appeals Chamber had to decide whether or not to accept the challenge of the ac-
cused to the Tribunal's exercise ofjurisdiction over him. In relation to Article 5 of
the ICTY Statute defining Crimes Against Humanity, the Appeals Chamber stated
that:
It is by now a settled rule ofcustomary international law that crimes against humanity
do not require a connection to international armed conflict. Indeed, as the Prosecutor
points out, customary international law may not require a connection between crimes
against humanity and any conflict at all. Thus, by requiring that crimes against
humanity be committed in either internal or international armed conflict, the Security
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Council may have defined the crime in Article 5 more narrowly than necessary under
customary international law.22
Prima facie this criticism is tempered and relatively benign. Coming as it does,
though, from an international judicial body, the criticism was taken very seriously
indeed. At the negotiations for the Statute of the International Criminal Court in
Rome, for example, reference was made to both the text of the Statute of the Inter-
national Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, which omits a requisite nexus with armed
conflict in the definition of crimes against humanity, as well as the ICTY Appeals
Chamber decision in Tadic as bases for departing from the approach in Article 5 of
the ICTY Statute. 23
The drafting of the Statute for the ICTY and the criticism leveled against it was
clearly on a significantly smaller scale than the response to the ICJ decision in the
Nicaragua case. That is at least partly explicable on the basis that the ICJ made gen-
eral declarations on the nature of customary international law and how it is
formed—with significant implications for future cases before the Court as well as
more generally. In the case of the Statute of the ICTY, that instrument established
an important precedent for future international criminal tribunals but the custom-
ary international law implications were limited to the subject matter of interna-
tional criminal law.
The fact remains, however, that both the ICJ and the Office ofthe Legal Adviser
found themselves the subject of criticism in response to respective efforts to articu-
late the content ofcustomary international law in a particular area and, in the ICJ's
case, in response to the Court's articulation of the process for the development of
customary international law rules. Given that highly regarded institutions such as
these have been subjected to intense scrutiny and criticism, the ICRC should not
expect to be immune.
It is possible that my analysis is flawed. I have suggested that criticism is inevita-
ble regardless of the authority of the articulating organization. Perhaps that is in-
correct. An organization no one takes seriously might purport to articulate the
content ofcustomary law on a particular issue and receive no critical feedback pre-
cisely because of the lack of respect for the articulating institution. That is surely
not the case in relation to the ICRC. The publication of the customary law study
under the imprimatur of the ICRC ensures that the Study will be taken very seri-
ously indeed
—
precisely because of the international standing of the institution.
Had the Study been prepared by an academic institution, for example, or by a non-
governmental organization (quite apart from the obvious question of how any
such institution would have gathered the material from States as effectively as the
ICRC), it is much less likely that the Study would have attracted anything like the
91
Australian Perspective on the ICRC Customary Law Study
scrutiny it is receiving. But, since it is the ICRC that has published the Study, States
cannot act as the proverbial ostrich with their heads in the sand, simply ignoring
the Study in the pretence that it will have no effect or in the hope that it will conve-
niently disappear.
Irrespective of the Rigor of the Process Leading to the Articulation
Criticism of the Study is also inevitable despite the attempt by the ICRC to be as
rigorous as possible in its approach to the identification and compilation of rele-
vant State material and to its assessment and articulation ofthe content ofcustom-
ary international humanitarian law. The editors ofthe Study explain in some detail
the steps in the process ofpreparing the Study—the establishment and oversight of
the Study at all stages by the Steering Committee, the undertaking of 47 national
studies, the additional collection of material from relevant international organiza-
tions (including from the ICRC's own archives), the supplementary collection of
material from the countries the subject of national reports as well as from other
States not the subject of national reports and the establishment and work of the
Academic and Governmental Expert Advisory Group. 24 I am sure that many will
appreciate the efforts of the ICRC to undertake the Study on the basis of a clear,
transparent and defensible approach. Those efforts will undoubtedly translate into
greater weight and authority extended to the Study. But, those efforts, while admi-
rable, will not eliminate criticism of the Study.
Many examples of State practice are, in fact, the acts of individual advisers
within national delegations in the context of multilateralfora—with the blessing of
their national governments of course. Individual members of delegations regularly
act on the basis of agreed broad national parameters. National statements are usu-
ally carefully checked through an interagency process in national capitals but the
reality is that individual members of national delegations
—
particularly senior
members of delegations—have broad discretion in the pursuit of national priori-
ties. In particular, individuals within national delegations become involved in the
minutiae of multilateral negotiations and develop specialist knowledge about the
nuances of a negotiated text. In circumstances where such individuals become the
national experts in relation to particular issues in sustained multilateral negotia-
tions, those individuals often also assume the mantle of national institutional
memory. Those individuals know exactly what was meant by a particular interven-
tion, how an intervention was received by other States, the differences between
some States' articulated positions and their true intentions (or the failure to reveal
true intentions). The authors ofthe ICRC Study have had to make decisions about
the wording ofsome customary rules derived in part from treaty provisions. Some
individuals involved in the specific treaty negotiations have criticized the ICRC for
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misunderstanding the context of negotiations and for misrepresenting specific na-
tional acts to support the ICRC version of the customary rule.
One of the best examples, to my knowledge, of this phenomenon is the inter-
vention by Hays Parks at the Annual Meeting of the American Society of Interna-
tional Law in April 2005. Parks was on a panel to discuss the ICRC Study and,
having only received his personal copy a few days before, undertook what he char-
acterized as a "biopsy" on some ofthe conventional weapons issues he had been ex-
tensively involved with for almost two and half decades as a member of the US
delegation to the Certain Conventional Weapons Convention25 (CCW) negotia-
tions in Geneva. Parks looked first at incendiary weapons and expressed surprise to
see that the Study quotes a USSR Statement to the effect that Moscow was "in fa-
vour of the prohibition ofmeans ofwarfare which were particularly cruel, because
their use was incompatible with the norms of international law. One such means
was napalm."26 Parks asserts that the Study, at least on this issue, lacks a sense of
context in relying as it does upon the Soviet Statement as ifthat represented a state-
ment of State policy. The United States had changed its position late in the confer-
ence process and announced that it would support a protocol regulating the use of
incendiary weapons. Parks explains that that change of US policy threw the Soviet
delegation into disarray. The Soviet Ambassador, Victor Israelyen, conceded subse-
quently to Parks that the very statement which the ICRC Study relies upon in part to
support the emergence of a customary rule on incendiary weapons was in fact a
smokescreen. The Soviets assumed that the United States would not compromise
and accept a protocol on incendiary weapons and so were hiding behind the original
US position. The change of US policy exposed the real Soviet position and Parks
claims that "the Soviet Union had no intention of accepting a prohibition on incen-
diary weapons, as the Warsaw Pact had huge stocks it fully intended to employ."
Whether or not the Soviet Statement tips the balance one way or the other in
terms ofthe ICRC claiming the existence ofthe customary rule is hardly the critical
point here. What is at stake is the nature ofthe material the ICRC has relied upon in
order to assert the formulation of customary rules. The explicit reliance upon a
statement that, in fact, did not reflect either State practice or opinio juris to support
a customary rule will inevitably increase skepticism about what other materials
may have been relied upon in the Study. Parks claims that statements seem to take
priority over the actual practice of States in armed conflict. He questions why the
Study fails to refer to and discuss the North Vietnamese use of flamethrowers in its
1968 Tet offensive, for example, or the Soviet use of incendiaries in Afghanistan
and the Russian use of incendiaries in Chechnya. 27 Parks makes similar claims
about exploding bullets. The ICRC is uncomfortable about the widespread use of
the Raufoss 12.7 mm multipurpose round, which the institution claims can
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explode on impact with the human body. Parks, and other government lawyers,
dispute this finding. Parks asserts that the Study fails to mention that more than
two dozen States include the Raufoss 12.7 mm multipurpose round in their inven-
tories and that at least some of those States have communicated to the ICRC that
they have undertaken legal reviews of the round and believe that the continued use
of the round is compatible with existing legal obligations.28
These are serious criticisms and, in my view, more ofthem are likely to flow. As
those individuals, like Parks, who have been intimately involved in the develop-
ment of the law take the time to read the detail of the Study—not only the articula-
tion of the rules themselves but also the supporting material—the ICRC will
increasingly be subjected to criticism that it has overlooked, misinterpreted or mis-
represented the material it claims supports the assertion that "State practice estab-
lishes this rule as a norm of customary international law."
ParticularlyWhen Rules Are Articulated in Absolute Terms
I have referred a number of times to Yves Sandoz's claim that:
[T] he study will have achieved its goal only if it is considered not as the end ofa process
but as a beginning. It reveals what has been accomplished but also what remains
unclear and what remains to be done. ... [T]he study makes no claim to be the final
word.29
There is a welcome self-effacing here and no doubt Sandoz is absolutely genuine in
his request that the Study be read, be discussed and be commented upon. However,
it seems to me that there is a measure of incongruity in the claim that the Study re-
veals what is unclear and what remains to be done—that it does not represent the
last word on customary international humanitarian law—and the manner in
which the 161 Rules themselves are worded. All of them are written in absolute
terms followed by a summary statement which invariably includes an absolute
finding that State practice establishes this rule as a norm of customary interna-
tional law (either in international or non-international armed conflicts or in both).
Occasionally there is a reference to an issue which is not covered by the Study. Rule
155 on obedience to superior orders is an example. The Study specifically mentions
that other defenses, including the defense of duress, may apply but are not covered
by the Study,30 demonstrating that the Study does not purport to be exhaustive.
However, in relation to the issues which are covered by the Study, the language
used is absolute.
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Others have commented upon this aspect of the Study. Daniel Bethlehem, for
example, notes the proforma approach offollowing the formulation ofthe custom-
ary rule with a "summary":
which, almost without exception, asserts 'State practice establishes this rule as a norm
of customary international law. . . .' There are occasions in which this affirmation is
followed by a statement noting ambiguity or controversy in respect ofsome element of
the rule, but the affirmation of customary status stands fast.31
I imagine that it would have been unpalatable for the ICRC to formulate rules
of customary international humanitarian law other than in absolute terms. An
equivocal approach to formulation may have undermined the purpose of the
Study by creating a sense of uncertainty and ambiguity—something the ICRC as
an institution is rightly committed to avoiding. But in the existing approach to
formulation of the rules there seems little room for acknowledging dissent or op-
position to the emergence of a particular rule. I am unable to shake the sense that
the formulation of rules in the absolute terms that appear in the Study invites dis-
agreement and criticism rather than discussion and constructive comment. I hope
I am proved wrong.
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The publication in 2005 of an impressive Study of Customary International
Humanitarian Law (IHL) by the International Committee of the Red Cross
(ICRC) (hereinafter the Study) 1 is undoubtedly an important landmark. The
Study—done in two parts (Rules and Practice)—is bound to be scrutinized, cited
and debated for a long time to come. It will leave its imprints in the future both in
the case law and in the legal literature, and, whatever one's view is of the overall
success of the enterprise, no scholar or practitioner can afford to ignore it.
The mandate for the preparation of the Study came exactly ten years prior to its
publication (1995), from the 26th International Conference of the Red Cross and
Red Crescent. For an entire decade, the ICRC spared no effort to put the Study to-
gether. The project was based, inter alia> on extensive consultations with academic
and government experts; nearly fifty reports of individual States' practice, submitted
by national research teams; research on the practice of international organizations
produced by several additional teams; and further archival research pursued by the
ICRC itself. The resulting two volumes (for reasons of sheer size, Volume II (Prac-
tice) is published in two separately bound parts) comprise more than 5,000 printed
* Yanowicz Professor of Human Rights and Pro-President, Tel Aviv University (Israel). This
article was first published in volume 36 of the Israel Yearbook on Human Rights (2006) and is
reprinted with permission. © 2006 by Yoram Dinstein.
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pages (621 covering Rules and commentary thereon; and 4,41 1 encompassing Prac-
tice and appendices). The final product represents the largest scholarly undertak-
ing (on any theme) ever undertaken in the long history of the ICRC.
Since this article is an unadorned critique of the Study, I would like to empha-
size two important personal points. First, I was marginally involved in the enter-
prise: I am responsible for the Israeli country report; I have participated in
subsequent consultations convened by the ICRC; and I have been given ample op-
portunity—which I liberally used—to express reservations about earlier drafts of
Volume I (although I had not seen Volume II prior to publication). Secondly, and
even more significantly, I feel that the initiative was absolutely right, even if I do not
approve of some of the results. Indeed, I take credit for being probably the first to
have put on record the idea oflaunching a project with a view to examining the text
of Additional Protocol I2 of 1977 against the background of customary interna-
tional law. I first raised the proposal publicly in 1987, in a conference convened in
Geneva on the 10th anniversary of the conclusion of the two Additional Protocols
of 1977, where I said:
I happen to believe that it is very important to try to pinpoint those provisions of
Protocol I, which are either reflective ofexisting customary international law or at least
are non-controversial to such an extent that there is every reason to believe that they
will crystallize as customary international law in the near future.
A year later, in another International Colloquium held at Bad Homburg in 1988
(the proceedings of which have been published), I reiterated the argument:
The insertion of clauses like Article 44 in the Protocol is lamentable. All the same, these
clauses should not overshadow other provisions reflecting customary lex lata or widely
supported lex ferenda. To my mind, an attempt ought to be made to identify in an
authoritative way those sections of the Protocol which are declaratory or non-
controversial (I should hasten to add that, in my assessment, the great majority of the
norms of the Protocol - perhaps as many as 85% - qualify as declaratory or non-
controversial). Such an evaluation of the Protocol's text could be undertaken by
informal meetings of experts like the present one, and it will prove invaluable not only
to Israel but also to other countries - primarily, the United States - which are not
expected to become contracting parties in the foreseeable future.
I have broached this idea before, but have failed to persuade the ICRC representatives
that it has much merit. 3
In other words, my main concern was to bridge over what I like to call the "Great
Schism,"4 dividing Contracting from Non-Contracting Parties of Additional
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Protocol I because ofthe 15% or so ofthe text (such as Article 44, which will be ad-
verted to below) thoroughly rejected by the latter States. The ICRC in the late 1980s
was unenthusiastic; its apprehension being that such an exercise might undermine
the authority of Additional Protocol I as a treaty.
Admittedly, the Study goes in several different directions, compared to my own
idea. A critical segment of the Study relates to non-international armed conflicts
and Additional Protocol II5 (something that did not occur to me in the 1980s but I
find most useful today). There are also sections dealing with law of armed conflict
norms contained in treaties other than Additional Protocols I and II, particularly
those dealing with prohibited weapons (an addition which has merit, although it
has certainly complicated the process). Conversely, not every clause of Additional
Protocol I is dealt with (an omission that I find puzzling) and not much attention is
given to lexferenda stipulations that seem to be non-controversial (for instance,
those provisions dealing with civil defense).6 From the subjective angle ofmy origi-
nal idea, the entire project is upside down. Instead of systematically examining
Protocol I article by article, what is presented in the Study is a set of independent
Rules with only the commentary indicating the relationship (if any) to provisions
of Protocol I. Still, much as I may have wished the Study to be differently struc-
tured, the three volumes have to be taken as they are.
The Methodology
Let me start with some comments about Volume II (Practice). This is the method-
ological underpinning ofthe Rules plus commentary, and its size is not just daunt-
ing; it is overwhelming. However, when one tries to get into the thicket of literally
tens of thousands of cites, one begins to get underwhelmed for reasons that will
become apparent in the ensuing text of the present article. Indeed, to my mind,
Volume II is proof positive of the adage that sometimes more is less.
The preliminary question that must be addressed is: what is customary interna-
tional law? The classical definition of international custom is encapsulated in the
well-known formula ofArticle 38 ( l)(b) ofthe Statute ofthe International Court of
Justice: "international custom, as evidence of a general practice accepted as law/' 7
The font et origo of customary international law is, in essence, the general practice
of States. States are the main actors in the international arena, and it is their general
practice that constitutes the core ofcustom. Without State practice there is no gen-
eral customary international law.
What does State practice consist of? There is much scholarly debate over the
question of whether conduct constitutes the sole expression of custom-making
practice, and whether statements—at times referred to as mere "claims"8 or as
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"verbal (as distinct from "physical") acts" 9—count. I share the view of the authors
of the Study that "[b]oth physical and verbal acts of States constitute practice that
contributes to the creation ofcustomary international law." 10 Nevertheless, not ev-
ery statement counts: it all depends on who is making the statement, when, where
and in what circumstances. The Study has attached an import to statements in a
most comprehensive generic fashion. I strongly believe that this is going way too
far: the gamut of admissible statements—as grist to the mill of State practice
—
must be much more focused and filtered.
The Study includes much State practice but a lot besides. One cannot cavil that
the Study incorporates the practice of inter-governmental international organiza-
tions (IGOs). To some extent, this is due to the fact that IGOs may have an interna-
tional legal personality oftheir own, 11 but additionally it must not be forgotten that
IGOs are comprised of States. Member States of an IGO may therefore contribute
to State practice through their conduct and statements within the fold of the orga-
nization. As pronounced by the International Court of Justice in its Advisory
Opinion on Nuclear Weapons, UN General Assembly resolutions (not binding as
such) "can, in certain circumstances, provide evidence important for establishing
the existence of a rule or the emergence of an opinio juris." 12
In contradistinction to IGOs, the role of non-governmental organizations
(NGOs) in international law-making is confined to a consultative status, 13 not to
mention lobbying and other behind-the-scenes activities vis-a-vis States. NGOs,
whatever their standing, can never contribute directly through their own practice
to the creation of customary norms. This is true even of the most important—and
unique—NGO, the ICRC. Admittedly, the ICRC is assigned by IHL important
functions to carry out. 14 But that fact does not turn the ICRC into a State-like entity.
It is therefore surprising (and inappropriate) that the authors of the Study give a
lot of attention to the practice ofthe ICRC itself15 (and occasionally even to that of
other NGOs, such as Amnesty International 16 ). ICRC reports, communications,
press releases, statements and the like—recapitulated at some length in Volume II
of the Study—are simply not germane to customary international law, unless and
until they actually impact on State practice. It is true that "the official reactions
which ICRC statements elicit are State practice." 17 However, this is not ICRC
practice: this is State practice and it should be subsumed under the right heading.
The ICRC plays in such circumstances the role of a catalyst for the evolution of
State practice, but no more. One problem with the erroneous designation of such
practice is that when ICRC appeals exhorting States to action are registered as
ICRC practice, the gaze shifts from the actor to the catalyst. If the ICRC is success-
ful in eliciting a positive response from States, 18 no real harm is done. But what
happens when the ICRC's appeal evokes no response? 19 At best, the ICRC action
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proved itself to be irrelevant. At worst, it is an indication a contrario that States are
not willing to accept the position of the ICRC.
The ICRC practice at least deserves that designation, albeit it does not qualify in
the context of the term of art "practice" employed in the definition of customary
international law. But, in a manner bordering on the bizarre, the Study goes far be-
yond anything remotely resembling practice. How can one refer to resolutions of
the Institut de Droit International—weighty as they indisputably are—as "other
practice"?20 Whose practice? The same question arises, in an even starker way,
when the Restatement prepared under the aegis of the American Law Institute is
cited as "other practice,"21 and most egregiously when scholarly books (however
prestigious) get a similar classification. 22 When everything is categorized as prac-
tice, the reader cannot be blamed for a modicum of skepticism.
There is much reliance in the Study on a host of military manuals, especially
where it really counts, viz. in Volume I (Rules). Indeed, it appears that the authors
themselves—sharing perhaps some of the skepticism re the plethora of items col-
lated in Volume II (Practice)—opted, to be on the safe side, to predicate the Rules
more on legislative codes and military manuals than on any other single source of
practice. This editorial decision should be commended. Irrefutably, legislative
codes and military manuals (i.e., binding instructions to the armed forces) are in-
valuable sources of genuine State practice. However, are all the documents called
manuals in the Study authentic manuals?
From personal knowledge, I can attest that the so-called Israeli Manual on the
Laws ofWar of 199823—cited quite often throughout the Study—is not a genuine
manual. As I tried on several occasions to point out to the authors of the Study
prior to its publication—to no avail—this is merely a tool used to facilitate instruc-
tion and training, and it has no binding or even authoritative standing. The insis-
tence on regarding the text as a manual has led the authors of the Study to a
number of errors. Thus, in the context of Rule 65 (whereby "[kjilling, injuring or
capturing an adversary by resort to perfidy is prohibited"),24 I alerted them to the
fact that Israel does not accept the words "or capturing" as a reflection of custom-
ary international law. They refused to accept this, and, in the commentary on Rule
65, even singled out the so-called Israeli Manual as the "exception" among non-
Contracting Parties to Additional Protocol I: other manuals of these countries do
not mention "capturing"; the Israeli Manual does. 25 As it turns out, the cite given in
a footnote does not refer to the so-called manual at all, but to another booklet.26
When one checks out the matching material in the Practice volume, it turns out
that (a) the paragraph cited does quote the "Manual" (rather than the booklet) but
there is no mention of "capturing" at all; (b) a previous paragraph (not the one
cited) refers to capture, but the quote is from that other booklet (rather than the
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"Manual"), and, for that matter, it is based on a secondary source! 27 Thus, in decid-
ing that the "Manual" trumps any and all disclaimers, they went completely astray.
Since nobody can afford the time to go through every cite in a Study comprising
thousands of pages, I can only express the hope that this wild goose chase is the ex-
ception rather than the rule.
But is the Israeli "Manual" the only non-manual? I wonder. It should be men-
tioned that there are many references to a UK manual of 1 98 1 on the Law ofArmed
Conflict (listed separately and independently of the 1958 British Military Man-
ual).28 In reality, there have been only three UK manuals on the subject ofthe law of
armed conflict. The first one (written jointly by L. Oppenheim and Colonel JE
Edmonds) was a chapter of the Army Manual of Military Law published in 1914
and revised in 1936. The second (written by Hersch Lauterpacht with the assistance
of Colonel Gerald Draper), again a part of the Army Manual of Military Law, came
out in 1958. The third (written jointly by several authors), a completely new and
separate Manual of the Law ofArmed Conflict, was issued by the Ministry of De-
fence in 2004, not in time for inclusion in the Study. It is not clear what the 1981
text represents.
When the ICRC decided to look into its own (otherwise closed) archives to re-
search some 40 recent armed conflicts, the news was greeted with enthusiasm. Ev-
erybody hoped that the research would yield a trove of inaccessible State practice.
In the event, the results have been quite disappointing. First off, although the con-
flicts are specified in a general list,29 no identification of the State (or rebel group)
concerned is made in context. This already diminishes considerably from the
weight that one can attach to the practice concerned. Secondly, and even more sig-
nificantly, the "practice" cited is often ofno practical use. What value added to the
law of armed conflict in non-international armed conflicts can be derived, for in-
stance, from the following vignette: "The Head of Foreign Affairs of an armed op-
position group told the ICRC in 1995 that his group was conscious of the necessity
to respect and to spare the civilian population during an armed conflict"?30 This,
lamentably, is quite typical of the kind of statements that the Study distilled from
the archives. Even when more specificity is added, the result can be the following:
"In 1991, an official of a State rejected an ICRC request to protect the civilian pop-
ulation from pillage by government troops. He replied that as long as they pro-
vided a hiding place for rebels, the army would burn the fields if necessary.
However, this behaviour was not representative of the general opinion ofthe mili-
tary personnel met by the ICRC in this context." 31 If civilian fields are burnt, to
deny a hiding place to rebels, why is this legally deemed "pillage"?32 And, whatever
the juridical taxonomy, why does one statement by one unidentified organ of an
unknown State—inconsistent with other statements by other organs of the same
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State—shed any light on that State's practice? We are not told what actually hap-
pened or what the circumstances were; nor are we informed about the relative
ranks of the officials adverted to. And so it goes.
The Rules
Having focused so far on methodology, it is necessary to consider some of the
Rules—constituting the backbone of the Study—and the commentary thereon. I
do not take issue with many ofthe black-letter Rules and much ofthe commentary,
as presented in Volume I ofthe Study. But I believe that there are grave errors in the
formulation of some of the Rules, and part of the commentary, in ways that ad-
versely affect the ability of the Study to project an image of objective scholarship.
Rule 1 starts offwith an unassailable statement that
a
[t]he parties to the conflict
must at all times distinguish between civilians and combatants."33 But then, in Rule
5, the dichotomy changes from civilians/combatants to civilians/members of the
armed forces: " [c] ivilians are persons who are not members of the armed forces."34
Is that so? Rule 3 rightly states that, in fact, not all members ofthe armed forces are
combatants, since medical and religious personnel are excluded from that cate-
gory. 35 By the same token, not every person who is not a member of the armed
forces is a civilian. In particular, by directly (or actively) participating in hostilities,
a person who claims to be a civilian loses that protective mantle and becomes a
(perhaps unlawful) combatant. 36 Even Additional Protocol I, in its "Basic rule"
—
Article 4837—distinguishes between the civilian population and combatants; and
in its definition of civilians—Article 50 ( l) 38—prescribes that civilians are persons
who do not belong to certain categories ofpersons, including the category referred
to in Article 4A(2) of Geneva Convention (III) (covering irregular troops). 39 By
switching the dichotomy from civilians/combatants to civilians/members of the
armed forces, the Study lays the ground to loading the legal dice. If the antonym of
civilians under customary international law is members of the armed forces, it fol-
lows (as the ICRC believes) that civilians who directly (or actively) participate in
hostilities do not lose their classification as civilians. Conversely, if—as I think the
right approach is—the antonym of civilians is combatants, civilians who directly
(or actively) participate in hostilities may turn themselves into unlawful
combatants.
One of the cardinal causes for the "Great Schism"—sharply dividing Con-
tracting and non-Contracting Parties to Additional Protocol I—is the utter and
unqualified rejection by the latter countries of those provisions of the Protocol
that, to all intents and purposes, eliminate the status of unlawful combatants in all
cases except spies and mercenaries.40 The epicenter of the controversy lies in the
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combination of Articles 43 and 44.41 Rule 4 of the Study simply reiterates some of
the language of Article 43 ofAdditional Protocol I: "The armed forces of a party to
the conflict consist of all organized armed forces, groups and units which are under
a command responsible to that party for the conduct of its subordinates."42 The
commentary treats this definition as customary international law, trying to create
the impression that organization and discipline (rather than distinction from civil-
ians) are the gist of the matter; and—whereas the commentary briefly refers to the
other, cumulative, Hague and Geneva conditions of lawful combatancy (which
non-Contracting Parties to Additional Protocol I continue to regard as of es-
sence)—it makes short shrift of them and somehow manages to convey the mes-
sage that even Article 44 of the Protocol (one of the key sources of the "Great
Schism") hardly presents a real problem.43 This is plainly misleading.
In a written comment to the ICRC on an earlier (but not much different) ver-
sion of Rule 4, 1 stated:
Rule 4. The text and commentary are highly objectionable. Israel utterly and
unreservedly rejects Articles 43-44 of Additional Protocol I as a source of customary
international law. Israel adheres to the original texts of the Hague Regulations and the
Geneva Conventions and does not accept any and all changes that Articles 43-44 ofthe
Protocol purport to introduce. Allow me to add that the objections to Articles 43-44 lie
at the root of the refusal to ratify the Protocol. Should the ICRC attempt to gloss over
the fundamental differences of opinion re this crucial issue, the whole study will be
irremediably flawed.
The authors ofthe Study did not heed these cautioning words, nor did they choose
to allude to them in the commentary's footnotes. Instead, the commentary—in
trying to establish the case for the customary nature of Rule 4 and in attempting to
create the false impression that the customary definition is mainly concerned with
the discipline and organization of the armed forces
—
purports to rely even on the
practice ofnon-Contracting Parties to Additional Protocol I: a footnote relies spe-
cifically on the practice of the United States.44 The US text cited (appearing in The
Commander's Handbook on the Law of Naval Operations) is quoted in the Prac-
tice volume, but lo and behold: it does not confine itselfto discipline and organiza-
tion; it explicitly speaks about members of forces "who are under responsible
command and subject to internal military discipline, carry their arms openly, and
otherwise distinguish themselves clearly from the civilian population."45 These last
Hague/Geneva conditions are of course the crux of the issue. And, in the Anno-
tated Supplement to The Commander's Handbook, the text is followed by a foot-
note which mentions expressly the construct of unlawful combatants.46
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It must be added that when the emergence of customary international law sub-
sequent to a treaty (in this instance, Additional Protocol I) is examined, it is the
practice ofnon-Contracting Parties that carries the day. In the 1969 North Sea Con-
tinental Shelfcases, the International Court ofjustice made it amply clear that—in
analyzing the post-treaty practice of States, with a view to establishing whether a
new custom has been created in the wake ofthe treaty—it is required to leave aside
(and not to consider as a reliable guide) not only the practice ofContracting Parties
among themselves but even the practice among States that shortly would become
Contracting Parties, since they were all "acting actually or potentially in the appli-
cation ofthe Convention."47 The Court held that " [f]rom their action no inference
could legitimately be drawn as to the existence of a rule ofcustomary international
law" generated by the treaty.48 The Court therefore concentrated on the practice of
"those States . . . which were not, and have not become parties to the Convention,"
the goal being to find whether an "inference could justifiably be drawn that they
believed themselves to be applying a mandatory rule of customary international
law."49 The authors ofthe Study are fully aware ofthis ruling ofthe Court, although
they made a deliberate decision not to confine the Study to the practice of non-
Contracting Parties to Additional Protocol I. 50 On the central issue of unlawful
combatancy, that decision led them to an overt misreading of customary interna-
tional law.
There are manifold other issues. For instance, Rule 6 states, as a matter of cus-
tomary international law, that "[civilians are protected against attack unless and
for such time as they take a direct part in hostilities."51 Nobody would challenge
most of the sentence. However, the words "and for such time"—which are based
on Article 51(3) of Additional Protocol I52—are contested. The Study relies on
practice, including that of the United States, but when one takes a look at The
Commander's Handbook, which is explicitly cited more than once,53 it is striking
that the text omits the words "and for such time"! 54 Moreover, although in my
written comments to the ICRC, I had observed: "Rule 6. Israel does not accept the
qualifying phrase 'for such time', which—incidentally—has been removed from
Article 8 of the Rome Statute . .
.
," no account was taken in the Study's commentary
either of the remark itself or of the deletion of the words "and for such time" from
Article 8(2)(b)(i) of the 1998 Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court. 55
It is not proposed here to parse every Rule in the Study. However, it is notewor-
thy that Rule 35 sets forth that "[directing an attack against a zone established to
shelter the wounded, the sick and civilians from the effects of hostilities is prohib-
ited."56 As the commentary mentions, the idea is based on the provisions of Article
23 of Geneva Convention (I) 57 and Articles 14-15 of Geneva Convention (IV) 58
(dealing with hospital zones, safety zones and neutralized zones). But, as the ICRC
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Commentary on Geneva Convention (I) states categorically, "[t]he zones will not,
strictly speaking, have any legal existence, or enjoy protection under the Conven-
tion, until such time as they have been recognized by the adverse Party."59 The
same observation appears in the Commentary on Geneva Convention (IV).60
Where does the text of Rule 35 even imply that the establishment of a protected
zone cannot be effected without the prior consent of the other side?
It seems that the concept of consent is not an easy construct for the framers of
the Study. Thus, Rule 55 states tout court that "[t]he parties to the conflict must al-
low and facilitate rapid and unimpeded passage ofhumanitarian relief for civilians
in need, which is impartial in character and conducted without any adverse dis-
tinction, subject to their right ofcontrol."61 This obligation is based on Article 70 of
Additional Protocol I, except that Article 70 adds the pivotal caveat (missing from
Rule 55): "subject to the agreement of the Parties concerned in such relief ac-
tions."62 Even the ICRC Commentary on Additional Protocol I does not claim
more than that Article 70 may be construed as precluding refusal of agreement to
allow relief for arbitrary or capricious reasons.63 Surely, as I have argued elsewhere,
"[i]t is impossible to assert, at the present point, that a general right to humanitar-
ian assistance has actually crystallized in positive international law."64 This is a
prime example that the Study—instead oflooking for a compromise between Con-
tracting and non-Contracting Parties to Additional Protocol I—actually tran-
scends the Protocol (which is lex lata for the former States) and moves into the
realm of the lex ferenda (for both the former and the latter States). Curiously
enough, in the commentary on Rule 55, the requirement of consent in Additional
Protocol I and Additional Protocol II is explicitly mentioned, but there follows a
vague statement that "[m]ost of the practice collected does not mention this re-
quirement."65 Uncharacteristically, no footnote accompanies the proposition, and
it is not spelled out whose practice this is in reference to.
Rule 45 of the Study66 confirms the customary standing of the provisions ofAr-
ticles 35(3) and 55(1) ofAdditional Protocol I, which prohibit the use of methods
or means ofwarfare expected to cause widespread, long-term and severe damage to
the natural environment.67 The commentary on Rule 45 mentions objections by
France, the United Kingdom and the United States, adding:
[Tjhese three States are especially affected as far as possession of nuclear weapons is
concerned, and their objection to the application of this specific rule to such weapons
has been consistent since the adoption of this rule in treaty form in 1997. Therefore, if
the doctrine of "persistent objector" is possible in the context of humanitarian rules,




The extract reveals total confusion between two completely disparate concepts in
the modern analysis ofcustomary international law, namely, "persistent objector,"
on the one hand, and "States whose interests are specially affected," on the other.
The "persistent objector" doctrine (supported by most commentators) main-
tains that a State, which persistently and unequivocally objects from the outset to
the emergence of a new customary rule, cannot be held bound by that rule.69 A
timely "persistent objector" cannot be caught in the net of the new custom, but
otherwise that custom will bind the entire international community. In other
words, the custom will consolidate—notwithstanding the opposition—although it
will not affect the "persistent objector."
The construct of "States whose interests are specially affected" was developed by
the International Court of Justice, in the North Sea Continental Shelf cases. 70 These
are States with priority in contributing to the creation of customary international
law (the paradigmatic example being that of the chief maritime States where the
law ofthe sea is concerned). If several "States whose interests are specially affected"
object to the formation of a custom, no custom can emerge.
When three nuclear Powers—the United States, the United Kingdom and
France—have taken the position that Rule 45 does not reflect customary interna-
tional law, there is no doubt that they act as "States whose interests are specially af-
fected" (as conceded by the commentary quoted above). By arriving at the
conclusion that (at the most) the three Powers can only be viewed as "persistent
objectors"—and that, therefore, they will not be bound by the custom which has
emerged—the Study gets the law completely wrong. There is no question that,
when adopted in 1977, Articles 35(3) and 55( 1) were innovative in character. 71 The
question, consequently, is whether custom has developed thereafter, and it cannot
be denied that three leading members of the small and select "nuclear club" have
opposed it vocally since 1977. Surely, as "States whose interests are specially af-
fected," the three countries cannot be relegated to the status ofpersistent objection.
By repudiating the putative custom protecting the environment from all means of
warfare, the three nuclear States have not merely removed themselves from the
reach of such a custom: they in fact managed to successfully bar its formation (as a
minimum, with respect to the employment of nuclear weapons).
Finally, Rule 77 states that "[t]he use of bullets which expand or flatten easily in
the human body is prohibited."72 1 explicitly transmitted to the ICRC the official
position of Israel re the use of expanding bullets, namely, that it is permissible for
domestic law-enforcement purposes, as well as in the fight against terrorists and
"suicide bombers" (when every split-second counts and there is a vital need to pre-
vent the completion of their heinous attack). Once more, unfortunately, this is not
reflected in the commentary.
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Conclusion
In order not to further complicate the discussion, I did not get into specific issues
of non-international armed conflicts in this paper. This is not to suggest that the
Study is unassailable where such conflicts are concerned. But an examination of
the Study's provisions thereon raises different issues and deserves a separate paper.
On the whole, as regards international armed conflicts, I am afraid that the
Study clearly suffers from an unrealistic desire to show that controversial provi-
sions of API are declaratory of customary international law (not to mention the
occasional attempt to go even beyond API). By overreaching, I think that the
Study has failed in its primary mission. After all, there is no practical need to
persuade Contracting Parties to API that it is declaratory of customary interna-
tional law. Whether or not such is the case, Contracting Parties are bound by
API by virtue of their consent to ratify or accede to it. But there is a need to per-
suade non-Contracting Parties that they must comply with a large portion ofAPI:
not because it is a treaty but because it is general custom. I do not think that non-
Contracting Parties will be persuaded by the conclusions of the Study. Thus, the au-
thors missed a golden opportunity to bring Contracting and non-Contracting
Parties to API closer together. Indeed, at least on some central points, far from
bridging over the present abyss, the Study will only drive the two sides of the
"Great Schism" farther away from each other.
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LAW OF ARMED CONFLICT DISSEMINATION

VThe American Red Cross and International
Humanitarian Law Dissemination
Lucy Brown*
We heard aboutNuremburg—and stuffabout World War II in other classes in school,
but it didn't really mean anything . . . now I understand why ifs important.
Introduction
For well over a decade, the American Red Cross (ARC) has been telling the
United States civilian population that international humanitarian law (IHL)
is an important subject about which everyone needs to be knowledgeable. The
ARC outreach occurs primarily at a grassroots level, through our chapter network
around the country, and focuses on dissemination to the general public. It is our
hope, and a goal of our dissemination, that the majority of students—as well as
adults—in the United States will be able to say, as the high school student quoted
above did, that they know what IHL is and they understand why it's important.
IHL Dissemination in the US Context
Since the attacks of 9/1 1 and the US engagement in Afghanistan and Iraq there has
been a marked increase in organizations speaking to the American public about
IHL. I think this is very much a "good news/bad news" phenomenon. It is wonder-
ful that Americans are much more interested in a subject that not many found
* Senior Advisor, International Humanitarian Law, American Red Cross.
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relevant only a few years ago. What is unfortunate is the reason they find it rele-
vant—that armed conflict now affects many more people in this country.
The Role ofthe American Red Cross
We are often asked, especially by those in the military, why we say "international
humanitarian law" instead of "law of armed conflict" or "law of war." The answer
is that while we sometimes use the terms interchangeably, our perspective is the
humanitarian one and it is focused primarily on teaching the Geneva Conventions.
In our courses we situate IHL within the wider context of international law, includ-
ing Hague law. Our objective, however, is to increase protection for vulnerable
groups in armed conflict and facilitate humanitarian work by raising awareness
within the general public about the 1949 Geneva Conventions and their 1977 Pro-
tocols. While the content of our training overlaps with the military's law of war
training, the military understandably has an additional emphasis on Hague law, fo-
cusing on the means and methods of warfare.
In our dissemination we also explain the role of the Red Cross Movement
—
what it is and what it is not. We have learned that many people think the Red Cross
is a human rights organization, and that IHL is synonymous with human rights
law. We explain to them, for example, that while the Red Cross is not a human
rights organization as such, much of the work it does benefits people's human
rights.
Sometimes members ofthe public are surprised to discover the Red Cross is not
an organization whose primary purpose is to promote peace. However, we discuss
how a byproduct ofRed Cross efforts in conflict regions can help facilitate a return
to peace, and a byproduct of Red Cross principles being understood and acted on
can help promote peaceful coexistence among antagonistic groups.
Sometimes we have to correct the mistaken notion that the Red Cross is respon-
sible for enforcing the rules of IHL against those who commit violations. I think
people imagine some kind of international Red Cross police force and expect to see
Red Cross staffproviding testimony against war criminals. They do not realize how
impossible that would be for a Movement based on the principles ofhumanity, im-
partiality and neutrality—whose most powerful weapon may be its ability to be
present on both sides of a front line.
One of our challenges over the years is what to call our program. Just the term
"international humanitarian law" is a real mouthful and can be very off-putting.
That is why we settled on "Humanity in the Midst of War." That phrase comes
much closer to expressing the message we want to convey—that respect for IHL
116
Lucy Brown
helps ensure that the principle ofhumanity, and humanitarian actions themselves,
will continue to exist, even in the midst of war.
We let people in our classes know that they, as individuals, have an important
role to play in making this happen. Many people feel a profound sense of helpless-
ness when faced with the brutality and suffering of war. They would like nothing
more than to turn away. We tell them IHL makes a difference and that they them-
selves can make a difference—for humanity.
Why Is the ARC Involved in Dissemination?
Our responsibility for dissemination derives from the Geneva Conventions and
our role as an auxiliary to the US Government under our 1905 Congressional
Charter. The Statutes of the International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement
explicitly state that national Red Cross and Red Crescent societies are to "dissemi-
nate and assist their governments in disseminating international humanitarian
law; they take initiatives in this respect."
The American Red Cross began its dissemination program with a 1988 grant
from the US Institute ofPeace that enabled us to develop our educational materials
for the general public. Then in 1991 the International Services Department of the
American Red Cross received an internal grant to develop an instructor training
curriculum. Starting in 1993 we began a series of instructor training courses.
What Is the Message?
We focus on very basic messages that address protection and human dignity. Ex-
amples include:
• That those no longer taking an active part in hostilities—wounded, sick and
captured combatants, and civilians—must be protected from harm and treated
with respect regardless of what side they are on.
• That people in these protected groups are entitled to humane treatment. We
ask a class what rules they think should apply in armed conflict. Then we ask:
"How should a prisoner be treated if he has just killed your buddy?" and then
"What if the prisoner is your brother?"
• Another message is that governments have the primary responsibility for
enforcing IHL and that the Red Cross, the International Committee of the Red
Cross in particular, has a role in implementing it.
• We point out that the Geneva Conventions are treaties, agreements
negotiated by governments, and they therefore reflect a balance between
humanitarian protections and military objectives. This comes as a surprise to
some people, who wonder why IHL doesn't just outlaw war.
117
International Humanitarian Law Dissemination
• We stress the importance of the principle of distinction (combatant vs.
noncombatant), but also discuss how civilians can lose protections by
participating in the fighting.
• We talk about the US military's own training for soldiers and give examples
of how the provisions of the Geneva Conventions have been incorporated into
military operational training. We now show a portion ofa US Marine Corps law of
war training video in our classes and distribute a handout on the "Basic Principles
of the Law of War" as provided to Marines. We believe it is essential that the
American public understand how seriously the majority in our military takes this
body of law.
These are a few of the basic messages we think an informed public needs to
know.
Who Do We Want to Reach—What Target Groups?
Our dissemination program is designed primarily for the general public. It is the
audience we reach best, as anyone who is familiar with our first aid, CPR or water
safety classes, to name a few, understands. It is seen as part of our organization's
mission to help communities prevent, prepare for and respond to emergencies.
However, within the general public we have some priority audiences, including:
1) American Red Cross internal audiences and prospective instructor/dissem-
inators; 2) youth and educators; and 3) opinion leaders within the general public,
including in the media, academia, and in community leadership positions.
We do offer some programs for more specialized or expert audiences, but these
are fewer in number and are mostly dependent upon the level of expertise, motiva-
tion and opportunity of individual instructors.
How Do We Do It?
Our dissemination program is based on a national instructor training model
through which over 300 American Red Cross instructors have been trained in over
25 training sessions. Since 1993 these instructors have reached over 324,000 people
through introductory courses and presentations in communities around the coun-
try. These courses and presentations have been organized and coordinated by our
network of over 800 local chapters, although, of course, not all our chapters have
the capacity to offer IHL instruction. It is important to realize that for the most part
instructors are not legal experts, but act instead as facilitators to guide and stimu-
late discussion and learning.
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While the IHL courses tend to generate excitement and interest in those who
attend, we have had limited human and financial resources from the very begin-
ning of the dissemination effort and our reach has been much smaller than we
would like. We hope to change that. We recently streamlined our instructor train-
ing model and the IHL course itself to bring them more into alignment with other
American Red Cross training models, thereby hopefully expanding the number of
people we can reach.
Exploring Humanitarian Law and IHL Dissemination to Youth
A major part of our current strategy is to make IHL dissemination to youth
—
through a program called "Exploring Humanitarian Law"—a priority.
Why Focus on IHL Dissemination to Youth?
The advantage ofexposing young people to the Geneva Conventions at an early age
is obvious. As one military lawyer put it rather succinctly, "The last thing we want is
for young people to come into the military thinking it's okay to harm prisoners."
Exploring Humanitarian Law (EHL) is the best material I have ever seen for
teaching IHL to youth. To date, the feedback from teachers and students has been
overwhelmingly positive. As one student said:
It gives you a whole new perspective ... a bigger perspective. People don't think about
these things because we live in America and war seems so far away . . . but war isn't
really far away and all of this is a lot closer than people think. It changed the way I
think
EHL was developed by the ICRC working with the Educational Development
Corporation, based in Boston, and the American Red Cross was one ofthe original
pilot sites. It is a resource pack of materials designed to use with adolescents and
can be used alone or to enrich existing classroom materials.
EHL teaches students respect for human life and dignity, ethical judgment, life
skills, global citizenship, the protections ofthe Geneva Conventions and the role of
the Red Cross. Students learn by actively participating in a series of ethical explora-
tions that look at both historical and contemporary examples and that examine
concepts such as:
• Human dignity
• Obstacles to humanitarian behavior
• Dilemmas
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« The chain of consequences
• Multiple perspectives
Exploring Humanitarian Law is currently being implemented in 95 countries
through national Red Cross and Red Crescent societies and ministries of educa-
tion. In the United States, it has been aligned with the national standards for high
school social studies; but it is also used in other classes, including: psychology, his-
tory, anthropology, economics, global studies, geography and political science. Ex-
tracurricular groups have begun using the materials, including some Junior
Reserve Officer Training Course classes. These materials resonate at the deepest
level with both students and teachers.
The American Red Cross is currently seeking funding to expand the program to
reach thousands of teachers and millions of students. We are working on the devel-
opment of an EHL distance-learning course for teachers and exploring ways to in-
clude the study of IHL in the curriculum offered by American high schools. It is
not an easy task in a country with, in effect, 50 separate departments of education.
However, if we can expand EHL into many more classrooms, it will be a major
leap forward for IHL dissemination in the United States. We have shared these
materials with individuals at the Department of Defense, who have responded
very positively.
Conclusion
A few years ago when I was interviewed by MTV for an article they wrote for their
online news titled WhatAre the Geneva Conventions? I explained that whoever said
"All's fair in love and war" only got it half right. My remark was obviously designed
to draw the attention of a young audience to the fact that there are widely agreed
upon standards for humane treatment in war. Making these standards much more
widely known and accepted is a goal worthy of all our best efforts.
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Teaching the Law ofArmed Conflict to
Armed Forces: Personal Reflections
David Lloyd Roberts*
Introduction
The International Committee of the Red Cross' (ICRC) approach to training
the armed forces in the law ofarmed conflict, as well as some ofmy personal
approaches, will be addressed under the following subheadings:
• Problems that might be faced by armed forces in teaching and applying the law.
• The need to accept that training must be based on the realities and pressures
of combat.
• The approach to training soldiers, young officers and senior officers.
• Suggested gaps in the teaching of the law.
• Views on whether that training is accepted and implemented in battle.
The ICRC Approach
In terms of dissemination, the ICRC has a supporting role. Its aim is to assist the
military wherever possible in carrying out their responsibilities in relation to train-
ing and teaching the law of armed conflict. Its mandate stems directly from the
* Independent consultant and lecturer in the law ofarmed conflict and human rights law, as well
as humanitarian security issues. The views expressed in this article are the author's alone unless
reference is made to specific ICRC policy.
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Geneva Conventions of 1949 l and the Additional Protocols of 1977,2 as well as res-
olutions stemming from the Fourth Session of the 1974-1977 Diplomatic Confer-
ence on the Reaffirmation and Development of International Humanitarian Law
Applicable in Armed Conflicts. 3
How does the ICRC carry out this mandate? In its headquarters in Geneva, the
ICRC has a small department dealing with relations with armed and security
forces. Then throughout the world there are officers based on regional delegations.
These officers are known as "Delegates to the Armed Forces." All are retired and all
have seen some form of operational service with their own forces or with the
United Nations. Their task is to make contact with the armed forces ofthe region in
which they are working and to explain how and to what extent the ICRC can offer
assistance based on their particular requirements. The key is assistance and coop-
eration. It is certainly not the ICRC's mandate or intention to assume the full re-
sponsibility ofan armed force to train its own personnel in the law. Many countries
have their own system of dissemination in place while others have nothing.
The strategy is essentially one of encouraging armed forces to integrate the law
of armed conflict into their training and operations. This is based on initial confi-
dence building, e.g., meetings, briefings and introductory courses. This would be
followed by training courses for selected officers resulting in the actual training of
trainers. Thereafter, the ICRC might offer assistance in the drawing up of law syl-
labi so that the law is integrated into all levels oftraining and operational planning.
The ICRC Delegates to the Armed Forces can offer the following:
• A wide-ranging experience in combat and other military operations. These
new and different experiences can be shared with an armed force to broaden
knowledge.
• Access to good teaching material, produced by the ICRC in Geneva and
specifically tailored to the needs of the particular country. The ICRC's new
Teaching File for Armed Forces is a good example of this. Its purpose is to provide
instructors with the basic tools they require to conduct lessons in the law ofarmed
conflict. It consists of twelve lessons covering the whole subject, including human
rights law and standards applicable to the use of force in internal security
operations.4 It has been translated into a number of languages including French,
Russian, Chinese, Spanish, Mongolian and Amharic. In order to keep abreast of
new developments or simply for more detailed advice on particular issues, the
delegates also have access to the large legal department at the ICRC headquarters
in Geneva.
• The delegates bring to their instruction their operational experience, but
because they are also from the ICRC they are impartial and neutral in what they
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have to say. It is for the students and staff of colleges and academies to relate the
law to their own particular circumstances. It is definitely not the role of the ICRC
instructor.
• Because they have been soldiers and because they have sat through lectures
at their own military academies or staff colleges, they know how easy it is for
lecturers to send students to sleep, particularly when the topic is law. They try
therefore to inject realism and interest into their presentations and to motivate
their audience by a mix ofprogramming and training aids. Case studies using up-
to-date examples are a particularly valuable way of bringing the subject alive and
encouraging a cross flow of ideas and discussion. In addition to lectures and
courses, the instructors can offer assistance with seminars, training programs and
the provision of training booklets. Courses can be tailored to the specific needs of
army, navy, air force, paramilitary and police personnel. The human rights law
and standards applicable to lower levels of internal violence are more and more in
demand, particularly from the military.
• Finally, the ICRC can sponsor senior officers at courses either in Geneva, or
more regularly, at the International Institute of Humanitarian Law in San Remo,
Italy where they have the opportunity to interact with officers from a range of
countries.
Personal Approach
To teach the law you must believe in it. There is no way you could possibly bluff a
military audience ifyou did not. Based on my experiences of conflict, I believe that
the law is sound. It is useful when teaching the law to point out that it was born on
the battlefield. It is very much soldiers law molded by our ancestors' experiences of
battle. The law is rich in military tradition and custom; for example, ruses of war,
perfidy, and the truly customary white flag of truce. One of the principles ofwar is
simplicity of action. The law is also simple and straightforward. It is full of good
practical guidance. In no way does it hinder your actions on the battlefield or, as
some may think, tie one hand behind your back. In no area does it conflict with the
principles ofwar, such as maintenance ofmomentum, concentration of effort, sur-
prise and so on.
The law to which we're referring is today usually called either international hu-
manitarian law or the law of armed conflict. I still find, however, that soldiers re-
spond more readily to the subject ifwe refer to it as the "law ofwar," and that is the
term I will use in this article. Knowing the attitude of soldiers to the subject of the
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law, I like to begin lectures by putting them on the spot and making them think at
the very outset about the subject so I begin the very first lecture by saying to them:
I would like to take a guess at what you're thinking right now. Some probably think
that this is an ideal opportunity to catch up on some well-earned rest. You may be
saying to yourself "thank goodness I'm not on the assault course or on maneuvers.
This is absolutely marvelous. I can switch off and let this instructor ramble on for 45
minutes. I know all about the Geneva Conventions anyway—the law is part of my
culture and our military traditions. I really don't need to listen to all this legal mumbo-
jumbo."
The more skeptical and cynical might well be thinking along the lines of Cicero,
the very famous orator of ancient Rome, who stated, "Laws are silent amidst the
clash of arms." 5 In other words, war by its very nature is beyond the law. Wars
break out when the rule of law breaks down, so that there are no longer any rules.
It's like finding yourself in the middle of a football match without referees or um-
pires, so just go for it. The mentality becomes, "We have to win at any cost, so let's
forget the legal do-gooders."
Some may hold the view that consideration of the law, while of great interest to
lawyers, leaves most operational officers, and certainly every soldier, absolutely
cold. I am sure that the word "law" on military programs immediately brings to
mind dust-covered old books and instills feelings ofboredom or remoteness and,
to put it quite bluntly, irrelevance.
Some might actually think the law is important for any professional soldier, but
they are frightened by it. Becoming conversant with the law represents a massive
investment of time and effort. How, on top of all the other commitments, can one
be expected to come to grips with the subject?
At this stage, and if time allows, one can pose the question "where do you stand
on the issue?" Having heard what the students think and having involved them in
the subject from the outset, the time has come to gently point out that they might
not be quite as knowledgeable as they originally thought. This is done by running
over once again the differing attitudes described above and asking, "This question
is for those of you who know all about the Geneva Conventions. If you really do,
that is fine, but can you tell me exactly what these mean?" A picture of a soldier
holding a white flag appears on a PowerPoint slide, hands flash up and inevitably,
the class answer will be "It means I want to surrender." It is not the time to teach
just yet, so we put the class on hold with the reply, "Let's see later in our lessons if
you were right or wrong." We move on to the next slide and here few, if any, stu-
dents know what the symbol oflarge orange circles is designed to protect. 6 The les-
son continues in this vein. For example, we can then ask the class if they are sure
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about their exact duties in relation to the following categories of persons and ob-
jects: captured combatants, civilians, the Red Cross protective emblem, and the
wounded, both military and civilian.
To those who may be among the skeptics and believe that war must be fought
without rules, we ask:
Perhaps you would like to consider whether it would be useful to you in battle for some
provisions of the law to protect you, if you have been captured, from torture while
under interrogation, or from poisonous gas attacks from your opponent; or to protect
you ifyou are a civilian.
And to those who think the subject is dull and irrelevant, we can ask:
Are you absolutely sure what your legal responsibilities are when planning an attack?
Are you sure how and when you can use weapons such as booby traps and
flamethrowers? How does the law of war differ from the law applicable to internal
security operations? Are there any differences?
I end this introduction by saying, "I hope that this has allowed you to focus on
the relevance of the law of war—to you and to those under your command." By
now, most are fully awake and most are now fully aware of their shortcomings in
the subject and motivated to learn more.
It is important in this approach to training that the instructor has credibility
with his military audience. An instructor who has experienced conflict will have a
head start in getting the subject across to the audience. The rapport and under-
standing in both directions will be immediate and will make any teaching more rel-
evant and acceptable. Even the language and jargon used will be more digestible
and acceptable to the audience. This, as I mentioned earlier, is exactly the approach
used by the ICRC.
Problems Faced by Armed Forces in Teaching and Applying the Law
In training armed forces, one must accept that there are certain problems that have
to be taken into account. Even in the very best ofarmed forces there will always be
constraints on training time. At a military academy or a staff college, the comman-
dant will always be pulled in numerous directions to include more of this or that in
the syllabus. It is a brave commandant who insists on maintaining a module on the
law of war. Yet it is in these very institutions that a nation's future high command
must be instructed in the provisions of the law that are one day likely to influence
them and their decisions as commanders. Ignorance ofthe law in light of a nation's
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obligation under the Geneva Conventions to teach the law is inexcusable. It is in
peacetime that we have time to consider the law; once the balloon goes up it is then
too late.
Commanders must believe in the law and demonstrate by their interest and em-
phasis on training in peacetime, and, of course, by their behavior in battle that they
respect the law. Commanders must be trained to know the law and their responsi-
bilities within it. Setting a bad example or giving unclear, ambiguous orders has
certainly caused problems in the past and has been a principal root cause of grave
breaches of the law.
Once when teaching a bunch ofyoung cadets we came to the coffee break. We
were sitting with the commandant and his senior officers, separated, thankfully,
from the cadets. "What you are saying David is all very well but at the end ofthe day
I have found that the only way to get information out of a terrorist is to break his
legs!" I could see and tell from the reaction ofmy students that they were interested
and receptive. However, with this sort of barracks room attitude or culture, my
message would soon be adjusted—"OK, forget what you have just been told. This is
the way we do it here!"
Another real problem is that there is indeed a great deal of skepticism and cyni-
cism out there at the coalface ofthe law ofwar. Most audiences will say, "We accept
what you are telling us. It's all very well us abiding by the law, which of course we
do. But what about our opponents? They continually break the law and get away
with it." That is the old "eye for an eye, tooth for a tooth" argument. They ask,
"Have you been to teach in countryXYZ (a potential opposing belligerent) as well?
Why don't you, the ICRC, or the UN do something about those who abuse the
law?" Sometimes it is very difficult to accept that in the long run it is better to adopt
the high moral ground when you know that today your opponent has a policy of
using suicide bombers and a "no quarter" policy!
Following on from this is the general feeling that the law is toothless. When, as is
so often the case, it is abused, the chances of any international body such as the
United Nations putting an end to it are slim. The powerful can get away with viola-
tions. There is not a great deal of faith in the United Nations. Often audiences will
refer to UN resolutions, which are ignored or circumvented. There is also much
cynicism surrounding the International Criminal Court. No doubt, this will di-
minish as the court finds its feet and produces results; for the present, however, this
cynicism remains.
At a course in Africa, I came face to face with this general feeling of cynicism. It
was at the end of a two-week session for a very bright group of officers. A senior
commander arrived from the Ministry of Defense for the farewell speech. We
spoke a little beforehand and I had told him what I had been doing with the ICRC.
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In front of the assembled officers, he thanked me very much for my lectures and
noted that I had spent many years teaching armed forces in Third World countries.
He said, "Of course we know all about the law of war and have always applied the
rules in our fighting with our neighbors. May I suggest that the ICRC's time would
be better spent educating the more civilized nations in this subject who it would
seem need it more than us!" My course coincided with the disclosures in the writ-
ten press and television of the alleged abuses of prisoners in Abu Ghraib.
Training Must Be Based on the Realities and Pressures ofCombat
It is important in training to accept that there are sometimes severe difficulties and
pressures placed upon a soldier in battle that might incline them to disregard the
rules they are supposed to obey. There may be fear, tiredness, frustration, anger,
hunger and stress. There may be the need to overcome the inclination for revenge
or retribution. This must be controlled by good training, and good clear orders
which are enforced by good commanders at all levels.
Let us take a look at some of the pressures. We know that every member of the
armed forces, whatever his or her rank, has a personal responsibility to comply
with the law and to ensure that it is complied with by others and to take action in
the event ofviolations. 7 Ifyou break the rules, you can be tried, and not just by your
own courts. 8
It is no defense to a war crime to say that the act was committed in compliance
with a superior order. A soldier who carries out an order that is illegal under the law
of war is guilty of a war crime, provided that he or she was aware of the circum-
stances which made that order unlawful or could reasonably have been expected to
be aware of them.9
This point is of great significance to any soldier. It is a simple point to make but
much more difficult for soldiers to carry out in the field. It means they must refuse
a command if they believe it to be plainly unlawful. Surely unflinching loyalty and
obedience to superior commanders are fundamental to any armed force. This is
true, but there is clearly a higher loyalty, to your State and its laws. The duty of all
soldiers not to comply with unlawful orders is quite clearly established in interna-
tional law. During the Nuremberg and Tokyo trials that followed the Second
World War, the defense of superior orders, while considered a mitigating factor in
relation to sentencing, in no way excused law breakers. The principle has been reaf-
firmed in modern tribunals such as those set up to deal with war crimes committed
in the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda. Ifan order is plainly unlawful, a soldier has a
duty not to carry it out. Superior orders might be used in mitigation of an offense,
and might result in reduced punishment, but not as an excuse for an offense.
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Let's take a look at some other pressures. How about dealing with prisoners of
war (POW) or other categories of captured persons? Whether they have surren-
dered or not, theybecome protected persons under the law the instant they fall into
the power of the adverse party. The law clearly states that it is forbidden to kill or
mistreat a combatant who has been taken prisoner or who is hors de combat. That's
fine on paper but how does it translate onto the battlefield? During and immedi-
ately after combat, soldiers are still hyped up; the adrenaline is running very high.
One minute they may be required to kill the enemy and the next they have to treat
him with kid gloves even though he might well have killed or wounded some of
their comrades.
This is obviously a difficult situation, but professional soldiers must cope. The
best way is to put yourself in the prisoners' position. "Do unto others as you would
have others do unto you." How would you like to be treated if you had been cap-
tured? As professional soldiers who now have the upper hand, the time has come to
show humanity and respect for your opponents.
The POWs are no doubt tired, disorientated and very frightened. No good sol-
dier or commander should take advantage of their plight or vulnerability. Bullying
or mistreatment ofPOWs is a real problem immediately after capture. Anger and
frustration might result in this being vented against the prisoner.
Misguided attempts by unprofessional soldiers to gain information can lead to
problems. The law is quite clear on this. No coercion whatsoever may be used to
force a prisoner to give information. Torture, both physical and mental, inhumane
or degrading treatment or punishment is absolutely prohibited. 10
The argument of military necessity can never be used to justify torture. For ex-
ample, we can never say that we needed to torture someone because we knew they
had vital information that might save the lives of others (sometimes referred to as
the "ticking bomb scenario"). In combat, torture is not only illegal; it serves little
military purpose except perhaps to vent anger. It is far more sensible to send a sus-
pect to the rear where trained interrogators can use their skills within the law to
gain information. Battlefield interrogation, or as it is sometimes called "tactical
questioning" can waste valuable time and in most cases will be futile. A well-
trained and motivated soldier will tell you nothing or, even worse, try to mislead
you. A frightened prisoner might tell you anything just to ease his plight; so again
the information is unreliable. Anyway, who will do the questioning? Are they
qualified interrogators? Do they know what they are doing? Is the information you
gain reliable?
Prisoners must therefore be moved as soon as possible to the rear and must not
be unnecessarily exposed to danger in the meantime. They must not be compelled
to engage in activities of a military character, for example clearing the way through
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a minefield. They must be protected against acts of violence, intimidation, insults
or public curiosity. For example, television crews may take pictures ofthe group as
a whole, but only on condition that no prisoner ofwar is individually identifiable.
This has not been the case in recent history, with those on both sides flouting the law.
Training Methodology
Soldiers
For soldiers to understand and implement the law it must be presented in a credi-
ble and digestible way. It is in peacetime that we have time to consider the law, to
teach and to train. Once the fighting has started, it is too late. For soldiers, the law
needs to be a part ofnormal behavior in action. Just as they are taught to fire weap-
ons, to employ camouflage and concealment, etc., as a matter of routine, they
should also be taught the basics ofthe law so that it becomes second nature, a reflex
action. In battle, a soldier cannot be overburdened with complicated legal jargon
or rules. He needs simple and understandable guidelines, especially if he is to re-
spect the law in a combat environment. The KISS approach (Keep It Simple Stu-
pid) is certainly the best. Long lectures will not be appreciated. The best approach is
one based on short practical exercises or demonstrations to bring out points and
then making sure they are repeated in training. Ambush drills, section attacks, and
fighting in built-up areas exercises can all have a small element of law ofwar train-
ing incorporated into them. The scope is simply dependent on the interest and en-
thusiasm of the instructor. For example, exercises could easily include capture
drills; correct treatment of prisoners of war; treatment and evacuation of the
wounded (yours and the enemy's); and respect for the civilian population and pro-
tected property. Drills for dealing with the white flag of truce and dealing with hu-
manitarian aid convoys are further examples. All of these scenarios can be built
into field exercises without too much difficulty; indeed, they tend to make field
training much more interesting.
In this way, tactics and law of war issues are seen to be part and parcel of the
same subject. They become accepted routine procedures, i.e., a matter of normal
behavior in action. Classroom instruction for soldiers should be kept to the mini-
mum. Some lectures will be necessary to set the scene. Perhaps one or two periods
as a maximum, any more and they are likely to prove counterproductive. Here the
use of playlets to demonstrate a point is particularly useful, for example, the right
and wrong way to deal with a captured combatant. In addition, up-to-date exam-
ples of law of war issues, pictures of real events, video clips—sometimes from war
movies—and so on are important in maintaining interest. Many nations have
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produced their own law ofwar training videos; they find them particularly useful
in getting key messages on the law across to soldiers.
Junior Officers
Training ofjunior officers is, in my view, probably the most important aspect of all.
These future commanders must be given the opportunity to learn and reflect on
the subject from the outset. The time spent on this training need not be long. If
done properly a young officer can be taught all the law of war lessons he really
needs to know for the whole of his career. Eight to ten periods covering will give
them the background knowledge they need. There is a need to set the scene and ex-
plain the background to the law—how it originated, its status today, its aims and
when the law applies. The principles of the law, in particular those relating to dis-
tinction, military necessity, proportionality and limitation are very important and
if taught to junior officers will act as a foundation for all future training, planning
and operations. There must be a period on command responsibility. Commanders
must be trained in the law and their responsibilities within it. The law in relation to
the conduct ofoperations is ofcourse ofparamount importance. Periods on weap-
ons and the law and logistics and rear areas, including prisoner of war camps,
should be included. Today, the law of belligerent occupation might be quite im-
portant. Perhaps the law applicable to lower levels of violence should be included
so that the differences in approach and in the rules are known from the outset. In-
ternal security operations, post-conflict situations of restoring law and order or
UN peacekeeping (as opposed to peace enforcement) operations come to mind.
Field exercises and model room exercises can incorporate law ofwar aspects to re-
inforce this teaching. Case studies and military history can also be used to draw out
lessons on the law as the course progresses. I think it is also very important that ju-
nior officers are left in no doubt as to their responsibilities to teach the law to their
subordinates and perhaps to give them some ideas and tools to do that.
Senior Officers and Staff Officers
Staff colleges and war colleges are ideal places to reinforce the lessons learned as a
cadet and junior officer and to consider broader issues of the law. The officers at
these places oflearning will be filling important posts in the future and some will be
destined for high command. Case studies of recent conflicts can be used to high-
light not only tactical or strategic issues but also law ofwar concerns. Topics could
include command responsibility. Indeed, there are a number of useful case studies
in this area resulting from recent experiences in Iraq and in the former Yugoslavia.
Targeting and the law would be another important topic, in particular recent les-
sons relating to the principle of proportionality and distinction, the avoidance of
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collateral damage, the problems caused to planners and commanders by dual-use
targets, and the need for good intelligence on which to base targeting decisions.
There are a number ofgood case studies resulting from the conflicts in Kosovo, Af-
ghanistan and Iraq. Logistic implications ofthe law are areas worthy ofstudy at this
higher level. For example, the treatment, handling and back loading ofprisoners of
war or casualties. Then there are UN operations/coalition operations and the law.
There is plenty to cover.
Gaps in Teaching the Law
Do armed forces actually pay the required attention to the law? How much training
actually takes place? Will they apply it in battle? All these are hard to assess. How
many armed forces insist on a formal qualification in the law from their soldiers?
Almost all countries require everyone to pass a written and practical test in the law
before he or she can drive a car. How many soldiers that we send into combat have
to pass a test on the laws of war? We know that States have undertaken to respect
and to ensure respect for the Geneva Conventions in all circumstances, but how
many actually do?
To a very large extent the international community relies on the ICRC to dis-
seminate the law to armed forces. They do a good job but with some 20 delegates
devoted to the task, and a few "on call" consultants, their impact on armies that in
some cases exceed one million persons might be considered a pinprick. Some in the
United Nations and large non-governmental organizations may believe that as
"guardians" ofthe Geneva Conventions, the law ofwar is very much the ICRC's re-
sponsibility and that they should not interfere. Ifwe are to rely exclusively on the
ICRC then their efforts and staff devoted to this particular task must be greatly in-
creased. Of course, we should not rely on them entirely. It is a nation's responsibil-
ity to ensure their armed forces are fully aware of their legal responsibilities in
combat. It is a national responsibility to enforce and ensure respect for the law.
I have found a thirst for knowledge of the law that applies to the levels of con-
flict below the threshold for the application of the international law ofwar. It is in
these lower levels of conflict that domestic law and international human rights law
and standards come into play. There is, in my view, a definite gap here that must
be filled. Many nations are facing situations of internal violence and disturbances,
or as the military terms them, internal security situations. Many are interested in
the law applicable to peacekeeping and post-conflict situations, i.e., where re-
straint and minimum force are required, the opposite ofwhat is required of a sol-
dier in conventional warfare. Although such situations will, in the main, be the
responsibility of the police, there are occasions when the armed forces might be
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called upon to assist, or in some cases take over completely until law and order can
be restored. This is occurring more and more frequently. If the armed forces are
deployed into these situations with no knowledge of the law, with inadequate
training and without the equipment necessary to produce a graduated response,
then mistakes are likely which might well make the situation worse.
Acceptance and Implementation of the Law
Finally, I think it is important to consider whether and how well the law is actually
being accepted and implemented by soldiers in battle even if training is perfect and
the gaps are all filled. The cynical and skeptical might, as mentioned at the outset,
agree with Cicero that in the reality of the recent conflicts in Afghanistan, Iraq and
the ongoing "war on terror" the rules are indeed very often "Silent midst the clash
of arms."
Is the situation that bad? Based on my experience, when it comes to practical
law ofwar issues such as prisoner of war treatment, prohibition of torture, guide-
lines for attack, use ofweapons, etc., I never had anyone arguing the toss 11 with the
content of the law, which says a great deal about its practicality and common
sense. Superior orders sometimes cause problems and I have covered that.
We mostly only hear the bad things. As someone once said, "Ifa dog bites a man,
it's hardly news. On the other hand, if a man bites a dog, then it's going to be exten-
sively reported." There have indeed been numerous reports ofviolations ofthe law,
but very rarely are reports made on how well it is being applied, on how much ef-
fort is being put into target planning to avoid collateral damage, or on efforts to
spare and protect the civilian population.
Perhaps from a cynical standpoint one could point out that the armed forces
and civilian political leaders are now much more aware oftheir responsibilities and
the dangers of breaking the law because ofthe CNN, BBC or "Al Jazeera" factor. It
can make a commander's eyes water as he sees his promotion prospects disappear-
ing when having to explain a mistake to CNN's Christiana Amanpour or BBC's
John Simpson.
We cannot rest on our laurels, the gaps must be closed and we must make con-
tinued and indeed greater efforts to teach and ensure all combatants understand
the law and apply it on operations. Offenders must be brought to justice, punished
and be seen to be punished. At the end of the day, if soldiers in tight situations
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MODERN WEAPONRY AND WARFARE
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War, Technology and the Law ofArmed
Conflict
Michael N. Schmitt*
War, technology, and the norms governing warfare have influenced
each other dramatically since the beginning of organized conflict. 1
Technology determines how wars can be fought. When the resulting hostilities run
counter to prevailing values or interests, law and other prescriptive strictures often
emerge to restrain them. 2 This occurs either through treaties or as the result ofpol-
icy decisions by belligerents (generally States) to conduct themselves in a particu-
lar manner. In the latter case, the practice matures into customary international
law when it becomes "general" (widespread) and "accepted as law" by States. 3
Finally, as the norms governing war become outdated, law is reinterpreted, ig-
nored, or discarded.
In the 21st century, the pace of technological change in warfare has quickened.
This article asks how war and law are likely to react to, and upon, one another in the
near future. It begins with a brief survey of the normative architecture governing
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methods (tactics) and means (weapon systems) of warfare. Technology is then re-
viewed, with particular emphasis on current weapons development programs and
overall trends. The article concludes with an analysis of how this technology may
influence the application and interpretation of the law of armed conflict.
The Law Relevant to Technology
In 1996, the International Court of Justice (ICJ) recognized the law of armed
conflict's two "cardinal" principles in Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear
Weapons.4 Distinction, the first, provides that "States must never make civilians the
object of attack and must consequently never use weapons that are incapable of
distinguishing between civilian and military targets." In other words, weapons
must be both capable of discrimination and used discriminately. The second disal-
lows weapons that cause combatants unnecessary suffering. Nearly all law of
armed conflict prohibitions related to the conduct of hostilities, whether treaty-
based or customary, find their genesis in these principles.
The 1868 St. Petersburg Declaration, which dealt with explosive projectiles,
ushered in the modern era oflimitations on methods and means ofwarfare with its
pronouncement:
That the only legitimate object which States should endeavour to accomplish during
war is to weaken the military forces of the enemy;
That for this purpose it is sufficient to disable the greatest possible number of men;
That this object would be exceeded by the employment of arms which uselessly
aggravate the sufferings of disabled men, or render their death inevitable;
That the employment of such arms would, therefore, be contrary to the laws of
humanity. . . . 5
Other efforts to restrict military technology followed6—projectiles and explo-
sives dropped from balloons (1899 and 1907); gas and chemicals (1899, 1925,
1993); expanding bullets (1899); submarine mines (1907); biological weapons
(1972); environmental modification techniques (1976); non-detectable fragments
(1980); mines & booby traps (1980, 1996, and 1997); incendiary weapons (1980);
and blinding lasers ( 1995). 7
Undoubtedly, further attempts to regulate weaponry will be launched. Possible
topics include depleted uranium shells, cluster munitions, computer network at-
tacks, non-lethal weapons, and space-based offensive operations. 8 The prospect of
States agreeing to accept limits on their weaponry depends on variables ranging
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from whether they possess or are likely to be attacked with them, to the degree of
international and domestic concern about their impact on the civilian population.
The international community also regulates methods and means of warfare
through non-weapon specific law of armed conflict principles. Two early compila-
tions were the Regulations annexed to the 1899 and 1907 Hague Conventions on the
Laws and Customs ofWar on Land. 9 These regulations set forth the most basic limi-
tation on the conduct ofhostilities, that " [t]he right ofbelligerents to adopt means of
injuring the enemy is not unlimited." 10 Other relevant provisions include a ban on
poison 11 and "arms, projectiles, or material calculated to cause unnecessary suffer-
ing"; 12 acceptance of ruse; 13 and a requirement to take "all necessary steps" to "spare,
as far as possible, buildings dedicated to religion, art, science, or charitable purposes,
historic monuments, hospitals, and places where the sick and wounded are collected,
provided they are not being used at the time for military purposes." 14
The most comprehensive codification governing methods and means of war-
fare is the 1977 Protocol Additional to the 1949 Geneva Conventions (Additional
Protocol I) which governs international armed conflict. 15 Although key States
such as Israel, India, and the United States are not party to the instrument, they
recognize many of the Protocol's provisions as reflective of the customary law of
armed conflict. 16
Article 35 restates the basic Hague principles that there are limits on methods
and means ofwarfare and that weapons causing superfluous injury or unnecessary
suffering are banned. 17 More significant, is Article 48, which sets forth the core law
ofarmed conflict principle, distinction: "In order to ensure respect for and protec-
tion ofthe civilian population and civilian objects, the Parties to the conflict shall at
all times distinguish between the civilian population and combatants and between
civilian objects and military objectives and accordingly shall direct their operations
only against military objectives." Articles 51 and 52 build on this requirement.
Article 51: (2) The civilian population as such, as well as individual civilians, shall not be
the object of attack. Acts or threats of violence the primary purpose of which is to
spread terror among the civilian population are prohibited.
(3) Civilians shall enjoy the protection afforded by this Section, unless and for such
time as they take a direct part in hostilities.
Article 52: (1) Civilian objects shall not be the object of attack or of reprisals. Civilian
objects are all objects which are not military objectives as defined in paragraph 2.
(2) Attacks shall be limited strictly to military objectives. In so far as objects are
concerned, military objectives are limited to those objects which by their nature,
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location, purpose or use make an effective contribution to military action and whose
total or partial destruction, capture or neutralization, in the circumstances ruling at the
time, offers a definite military advantage.
In a related prohibition, Article 51.4 bans "indiscriminate" attacks on civilians,
defining them as:
(a) those which are not directed at a specific military objective;
(b) those which employ a method or means ofcombat which cannot be directed at a
specific military objective; or
(c) those which employ a method or means ofcombat the effects ofwhich cannot be
limited as required by this Protocol; and consequently, in each such case, are of a
nature to strike military objectives and civilians or civilian objects without
distinction.
Subpart (a) of the article contemplates the indiscriminate use of a weapon sys-
tem capable of being aimed or otherwise controlled, i.e., one that is by nature dis-
criminate. Iraq's launch ofSCUD missiles against Israeli population centers during
the 1990-91 GulfWar constitutes the textbook example. 18 The remaining subparts
address indiscriminate weapons, the use ofwhich is prohibited altogether. Subpart
(b) deals with weapon systems incapable of being aimed directly at a military ob-
jective. A long-range missile with a guidance system so rudimentary or unreliable
that its chances of striking a military objective are almost happenstance illustrates
this category. 19 By contrast, subpart (c) outlaws use of aimable weapons that pro-
duce uncontrollable effects. A biological contagion that spreads uncontrollably
through a civilian population, albeit initially targeted against combatants, epito-
mizes such weapons. 20
Even if an attack is directed at a combatant or other military objective, and the
weapon system employed is both discriminate by nature and used discriminately, it
must be proportionate. Codified in Article 51.5(b), the principle of proportionality
prohibits attacks which "may be expected to cause incidental loss of civilian life, in-
jury to civilians, damage to civilian objects, or a combination thereof, which would
be excessive in relation to the concrete and direct military advantage anticipated."21
The law of armed conflict styles injury or death of civilians as "incidental injury,"
whereas damage or destruction of civilian property is labeled "collateral damage."
Finally, attackers must take "precautions in attack" to minimize harmful effects
on civilians and civilian objects caused during an otherwise lawful strike. Article 57
sets out the requirements, the bulk of which represent customary law of armed
conflict. 22 The principle requires "those who plan or decide upon an attack" to do
"everything feasible" to ensure they are not attacking civilians, civilian objects, or
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items or individuals who enjoy special protection; to "take all feasible precautions"
when choosing weapons and tactics in order to minimize incidental injury and col-
lateral damage; and to select that military objective from among those yielding a
"similar military advantage" that "may be expected to cause the least danger to ci-
vilian lives and to civilian objects."
Beyond the general principles, Additional Protocol I extends special protection
to specified objects, most notably medical establishments, cultural objects, places
of worship, objects indispensable to the civilian population, the natural environ-
ment, and works and installations containing dangerous forces.23 Also proving in-
creasingly significant is the prohibition on perfidy. Perfidy occurs when one party
feigns protected status to kill, injure, or capture the enemy.24 Examples include
feigning: an intent to negotiate under a flag of truce or surrender; civilian status;
being sick or wounded; and protected status (indicated by uniform or emblem) of
the United Nations or a State not party to the conflict.25
In addition to treaty law, the customary law of armed conflict imposes certain
restrictions on methods and means ofwarfare. Given the fact that the applicability
provisions found in law ofarmed conflict treaties preclude their operation in many
conflicts, customary law provides the key constraints on warfare. 26 In this regard,
recall the Martens Clause, the contemporary formulation ofwhich is found in Arti-
cle 1.2 of Additional Protocol I: "In cases not covered by this Protocol or by other
international agreements, civilians and combatants remain under the protection
and authority of the principles of international law derived from established cus-
tom, from the principles of humanity and from dictates of public conscience."27
The dilemma with customary law lies in determining its content. The Interna-
tional Committee of the Red Cross recently released its Customary International
Humanitarian Law study. Based on extensive surveys of State practice and pro-
nouncements, the study attempts to capture the current customary law of armed
conflict in writing. 28 Although somewhat controversial, it represents the only com-
prehensive attempt to do so in any systematic, internationally vetted fashion.
The study reiterates most norms described above, drawing heavily on the text of
Additional Protocol I. Chapter 21 restates the ban on the use ofmethods or means
"of a nature to cause superfluous injury or unnecessary suffering" and on indis-
criminate weapons. 29 The subsequent chapters prohibit poison, biological weap-
ons, chemical weapons, riot-control agents as a method of warfare, certain uses of
herbicides, expanding bullets, exploding anti-personnel bullets, weapons with
non-detectable fragments, specified uses of booby-traps, and laser weapons de-
signed to cause blindness. 30
Part I of the study sets out the broad law ofarmed conflict prohibitions: attack-
ing or terrorizing civilians (unless directly participating in hostilities); 31 attacking
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other than military objectives;32 perfidy;33 and indiscriminate attacks, including
the use of indiscriminate weapons, using discriminate weapons indiscriminately,
and treating distinct military objectives in a concentration of civilians or civilian
objects as a single target. 34 It further contains the principles of proportionality35
and precautions in attack. 36 Rules governing medical, religious, humanitarian re-
lief, and peacekeeping personnel and objects; journalists; protected zones; cultural
property; works and installations containing dangerous forces; and the natural en-
vironment are found in Part II. 37
The aforementioned instruments and principles represent the core normative
boundaries applicable to methods and means ofwarfare . . . and which they will in-
fluence. Before turning to these dynamics, it is useful to consider 21st-century mil-
itary technology.
The Technology Relevant to Law
Too often, thinking about war focuses on weaponry. Yet, weapons are simply one
component of a "weapon system," i.e., "a combination of one or more weapons
with all related equipment, materials, services, personnel, and means of delivery
and deployment (if applicable) required for self-sufficiency." 38 It is the weapon
system, often incorporating technology more complex than the weapon itself,
which determines success or failure. For instance, in an air-to-ground engagement
against a fleeting target, the intelligence assets that allow the target to be identified
and the communications, command, and control networks that make rapid attack
possible are as essential to mission success as the aircraft and the bomb it drops.
Simply put, fully understanding combat operations requires consideration of all
the technologies having a direct causal relationship to weapons employment.
Therefore, this article adopts an inclusive approach to the technology of future
war, looking first at specific development programs and then at general trends.
Specific Programs: Since the United States armed forces enjoys a technological
edge over every other military in the world (a gap that will certainly widen), the
best indicator of technology's vector lies in US military research and development
programs. 39 Within the Department of Defense, the Defense Advanced Research
Projects Agency (DARPA) oversees future technologies.40 DARPA's current re-
search centers around eight "strategic thrusts."41 Because they provide a feel for the
technology likely to be fielded on the 21st-century battlefield, it is useful to briefly
review each category.
1 ) Detection, Precision Identification, Tracking, and Destruction of Elusive
Surface Targets. Today, weapons fielded by advanced militaries are highly accu-
rate. However, target detection, identification, and tracking continue to present
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major hurdles to even the best-equipped forces. The unsuccessful decapitation
campaign against Iraqi leadership during Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) offers a
classic illustration. US air forces conducted 50 highly accurate strikes, yet failed to
kill even a single targeted individual.42 The problem lay both in the unreliability of
some intelligence and the inability to leverage reliable information quickly enough.
In response to such challenges, DARPA hopes to find ways to collapse the cur-
rent sequential targeting process (find, fix, track, target, engage, and assess results)
into an uninterrupted and continuous one that adapts to battlefield events.43 For
instance, new technologies will blur the traditional distinction between intelligence
(gather and process information), plans (determine what to do in response to that
information), and operations (execute the plan). Platforms that carry both sensors
and weapons, like the Predator, are merely the tip of the iceberg. 44 In the near
future, systems will operate without human input; in other words, a single plat-
form will search for, identify, and destroy targets autonomously.45
Networking represents the other thread in this strategic thrust. DARPA envis-
ages developing systems that will first "connect more and more sensors, platforms,
and weapons with a variety of communications links," and later permit "comput-
ers and commanders" to "take advantage of the massive amounts of data available
to increase the speed, accuracy, agility, and capability" ofcombat forces.46 In a sim-
ple illustration, a Predator might use video to track a target. When it enters an area
ofheavy foliage, the networked system would automatically switch to foliage pene-
trating radar. In response to the radar returns, 3D LADAR (laser detection and
ranging) sensors would produce a detailed three-dimensional image which can be
compared to computerized geometric models to accurately identify the target.
Technology will have seamlessly linked sensors to sensors to shooters.
2) Robust, secure self-forming tactical networks. Although this strategic thrust
supports the previous one, it is not limited to target destruction. "Network centric"
operations "turn information superiority into combat power so that the United
States and its allies have better information and can plan and conduct operations
far more quickly and effectively than any adversary."47 Doing so depends on highly
advanced command, control, communications, computers, intelligence, surveil-
lance, and reconnaissance (C4ISR) systems integrated into a single network.48 The
goal is an ability to rapidly gather, process, and react to information about an op-
ponent, while hindering its efforts to do the same. In military terms, this is known
as "getting inside the enemy's observe-orient-decide-act (OODA) loop."49 Once
inside, you control the flow, pace, and direction of battle. Eventually, disorienta-
tion paralyzes your adversary. 50
DARPA is pursuing a number of systems along these lines. For instance, it has
developed prototype self-forming, self-healing networks, such as the Small Unit
143
War, Technology and the Law ofArmed Conflict
Operations Situational Awareness System (SUO SAS). SUO SAS will be used at the
squad level to allow soldiers in complex physical environments such as cities and
jungles to securely communicate with each other and monitor the location of fel-
low squad members.
3) Networked manned and unmanned systems. This thrust teams manned and
unmanned systems to leverage the unique qualities each offers. An example is the
backpack portable Micro Air Vehicle, which will perform intelligence, surveillance,
and reconnaissance functions for small units. Another is the Unmanned Ground
Combat Vehicle, a system providing fire support missions for ground forces. 51 Un-
manned systems are especially useful in high threat environments or where the al-
ternative (e.g., manned aerial reconnaissance) is labor intensive, costly, or in short
supply. 52
4) Urban Area Operations. Because of the advantages US forces enjoy on the
open battlefield, adversaries increasingly confront them in urban areas where they
can take advantage ofclutter and proximity to civilians and civilian objects to mask
their location or shield their activities. Events in Iraq have shaped the direction of
research in this area. Present studies include systems to detect enemy forces, ex-
plosives (including suicide bombers and improvised explosive devices), and
weapons ofmass destruction (WMD); distinguish combatants from civilians and
threats from civilian objects in crowded areas; "tag" a potential target (individual
or object) to allow it to be monitored; employ weapons of variable effectiveness
(non-lethal to lethal) to minimize collateral damage; and make individual soldiers
and unmanned systems vertically mobile. An illustrative example is the Boomer-
ang shooter detection system, which calculates the direction from which shots have
been fired at a moving vehicle to enable effective return fire. Another is the Com-
mand Post of the Future (CPOF). Presently, command and control (C2) is exer-
cised from a distinct physical location—a command post. CPOF creates a virtual,
mobile, distributed, collaborative C2 system in which key participants operate
from different locations, but still collaborate effectively in real time.
5) Detection, Characterization, and Assessment ofUnderground Structures. In
light ofUS capabilities to accurately target aboveground structures, adversaries are
using underground facilities for such purposes as hiding weapons (including
WMD), protecting leadership, C2, and mustering forces. They range from the
caves used by the Taliban and al Qaeda to the huge underground bunkers found in
Iraq. 53
DARPA has responded with the Counter-Underground Facility program. The
program will develop ground and airborne seismic, acoustic, electromagnetic, op-
tical, and chemical sensors that locate underground facilities; analyze their
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construction, layout, and vulnerabilities; and conduct post-attack battle damage
assessment to determine the need for reattack.
6) Assured Use of Space. Operations like those taking place in Afghanistan and
Iraq would be unimaginable without space-based communications, navigation,
surveillance, reconnaissance, and weather systems. From satellite imagery to hand-
held global positioning system locators, space is integral to every facet ofhigh-tech
warfare. To leverage space, and deny enemies the same opportunity, DARPA has
focused efforts in five areas: rapid and affordable space access; situational aware-
ness in space (what is there and what is it doing); protecting US spaced-based as-
sets; preventing adversaries from using space-based assets; and using space in
support of earth-based operations.
Numerous programs are underway. Orbital Express involves automated space-
craft to refuel, upgrade, and maintain other spacecraft. The Space Surveillance
Telescope is a ground-based telescope with the capability to search space for small
objects. Perhaps most significant is the Falcon program's Hypersonic Cruise Vehi-
cle, which will traverse space to speed travel.
7) Cognitive Computing. Cognitive computing reverses the process whereby
computer users adapt to computers by creating computers that adapt to users.
Such computers "learn" from their experiences and adjust their activities accord-
ingly. For instance, they can be used in operations centers to deal with fast-paced,
complex situations by using past experiences to filter and prioritize information
and craft responses thereto. When this occurs, the possibility of surprise dimin-
ishes significantly. An example is the Personalized Assistant that Learns (PAL).
PAL will anticipate an individual's (e.g., decision-makers or intelligence analysts)
needs based on previous experiences and prepare materials for them before being
tasked to do so.
8) The Bio-revolution. This DARPA strategic thrust envisions technologies that
either work with the human body or imitate nature. Examples of the former in-
clude programs that maintain physical and mental performance despite stress, en-
vironmental conditions like heat or altitude, lack of sleep, or insufficient nutrients.
"Legged" robots able to traverse rough terrain better than wheeled vehicles (in one
case modeled on a cockroach), optics based on the eye, and sensors inspired by in-
sects that calculate room temperature exemplify the latter.
9) Miscellaneous Programs. DARPA works in areas other than its strategic
thrusts. Three merit particular mention. The first is materials. 54 One current effort
is the Structural Amorphous Metals program, which studies materials with amor-
phous microstructures that yield hardness and strength previously unattainable.
Such materials might be of use, for example, in replacing the depleted uranium
shells that have generated so much controversy. Other possibilities include an
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unobtrusive external skeleton for soldiers carrying heavy backpacks and
"morphing" aircraft structures that change shape while airborne to vary the flight
envelope (much as the body of a bird does).
Microsystems comprise a second area of interest, one that gives the United
States much of its current technological edge. In particular, microtechnology dra-
matically increases the functions performable by computer chips, thereby enhanc-
ing the processing capabilities of military systems. Similarly, smaller weapon
systems on aircraft or vehicles yield greater range, mobility, and carrying capacity.
This allows striking more targets with fewer platforms.
The third area is information technology. Present projects include peta-scale
computing,55 autonomous vehicle navigation, and collaboration between humans
and robots or robots and robots. The High Productivity Computing Systems pro-
gram is improving computer efficacy in activities such as cryptanalysis and weather
forecasting by a factor of 10 to 40. Also noteworthy is the Improving Warfighter In-
formation Intake under Stress program, which non-invasively monitors human
cognitive load so information provided to the warfighter does not overload
thought processes.
General trends: The aforementioned programs offer a real-world glimpse into
the technology of future war. Some are understandable reactions to current chal-
lenges, such as the urban warfare and underground facility programs, while others
reflect weaponry trends already underway. Since the characteristics ofweapon sys-
tems, not individual systems, determine conflict's character, it is useful to summa-
rize those trends most likely to persist.
1) Precision. Precision must be distinguished from accuracy. Accuracy is the
ability of a weapon to strike a specified location, known as the aimpoint. 56 Preci-
sion, by contrast, involves identifying targets in a timely fashion and striking them
accurately.
Many weapons are highly accurate, with circular error probable (CEP) calcula-
tions now measured in feet. 57 Accuracy lessens the risk ofcausing collateral damage
and incidental injury, not only because weapons hit closer to their intended
aimpoints, but also because the more accurate they are, the less explosive charge
needed to achieve the desired probability of damage (PD). 58 While we can expect
CEPs to progressively improve, the unfortunate reality is that few States can afford
the "precision guided munitions" and associated launch platforms necessary to
conduct truly accurate operations. 59 This being so, the task for research and devel-
opment is affordable accuracy.60
A more prevalent trend in precision warfare is improved ability to locate, iden-
tify, and track targets—transparency ofthe battlefield. Today's warfighters benefit
from an array of information sources: imagery intelligence (IMINT); human
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intelligence (HUMINT); signals intelligence (SIGINT); measurement and signa-
ture intelligence (MASINT); open-source intelligence (OSINT); technical intelli-
gence (TECHINT); and counterintelligence (CI).61 Moreover, aircraft such as the
AWACs, JSTARS, and UAVs offer transparency in real-time,62 while equipment
like night vision goggles allow soldiers and airmen to locate and target the enemy in
adverse conditions like darkness and poor weather. All indicators point to contin-
ued improvements in this area.
2) Coordination, command, and control. Another discernable trend is im-
proved coordination horizontally and better command and control vertically.
DARPA's work in network centric warfare is illustrative, for it demonstrates that
future high-tech militaries will fight as networked entities, rather than hierarchical
organizations.
Networking permits quicker collection, fusion, analysis, and dissemination of
critical information (such as the location of a fleeting target); better decisions
about the platforms able to respond most effectively to it; greater control over an
ongoing operation; increased ability to coordinate operations in real-time with
other friendly forces; enhanced responsiveness to unanticipated events that arise as
the operation unfolds; less risk of friendly operations interfering with each other;
and greater ability to deal with enemy threats. Taken together, networking is one of
two keys to operating within the enemy's OODA loop.
An example is Blue-Force Tracker, a satellite-based tracking and communica-
tion system that allows computerized data integration and dissemination to troops
in the field. With Blue-Force Tracker, all echelons ofcommand and staffcan follow
a battle and provide combat support. Using a combination of computer maps,
real-time automated data updates (on friendly and enemy locations, as well as
other battlefield information), and chat room coordination, troops engaging the
enemy no longer have to rely on preplanned support or that which happens to be
"on-station" (in the vicinity). Instead, they can draw on the full range oftheater as-
sets, near simultaneously.63 Blue-Force tracker, currently fielded in Afghanistan
and Iraq, is merely the tip ofthe iceberg in terms ofthe networking likely to charac-
terize tomorrow's battlefield.64
3) Transparency. As mentioned, transparency is the current focus of efforts to
improve precision attack. But transparency also allows warfighters to anticipate
enemy actions and proactively counter them. It is the second key to getting inside
an adversary's OODA loop. Equipped with improved command and control,
transparency, precision, and the ability to operate at night and in all-weather con-
ditions, the high-tech military can sculpt the course ofmost ongoing battles against
lesser-equipped foes.
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Space enjoys particular importance in this regard, not only as the ultimate "high
ground" from which to observe the enemy, but also as a medium through which
information may be transmitted (e.g., by communications and navigation satel-
lites); hence the centrality of space in US development programs. Transparency
also undergirds efforts to link sensors for persistent battlefield coverage, as well as
the fielding of unmanned systems to maintain coverage in high threat
environments.
4) Soldier effectiveness. Several of the programs described earlier will dramati-
cally improve the effectiveness of individual soldiers relative to their opponents.
The bio-revolution and cognitive computing thrusts are illustrative, with potential
further gains from research in tactical networking, manned-unmanned collabora-
tion, materials, and microsystems. These programs cap a long-record of providing
individual soldiers competitive advantages over their foes, represented by such
currently fielded systems as night-vision goggles, light weight body armor, global
positioning systems, individual weapons equipped with advanced sighting, and
hand-free communications capability. The relative effectiveness and survivability
of the individual soldier in militaries capable of acquiring such technology will
only increase over time.
5) Unmanned and man-out-of-the-loop systems. Unmanned systems have be-
come common on the modern battlefield (and off in the global war on terror). Al-
though early systems provided rudimentary battlefield surveillance and
reconnaissance,65 UAVs are evolving into weapons platforms. A variant of the
Predator, the MQ-1, is now armed with two Hellfire missiles, allowing it to directly
engage targets it locates, as in the CIA-controlled strike on a car carrying Qaed
Senyan al-Harthi, al Qaeda's senior operative in Yemen, in 2002.66 It is only a mat-
ter oftime before UAVs and other unmanned systems conduct attacks without the
involvement of a human decision-maker.
6) Variable lethality and destructiveness. As noted, DARPA is assessing weapons
of variable lethality for use in urban areas. This effort builds on the extensive non-
lethal systems (more accurately labeled less-than-lethal) research done to date. 67
The difference is that in the past such systems were viewed primarily as useful in
crowd control and other low-intensity situations. However, urban combat in Iraq
has demonstrated the utility of weapons with differing destructiveness and
lethality even in relatively intensive combat. This is particularly true when civilians
and civilian objects are used as shields. Thus, field commanders are actively seeking
ways to effectively attack the enemy in an urban setting while limiting collateral
damage and incidental injury.
7) Other significant trends. As warfare becomes more complex, technology may
outpace the ability ofuniformed personnel to develop and maintain proficiency in
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its operation. Some technologies, such as computer network or space operations,
require education that the average member ofthe armed forces lacks. Or, given the
limited numbers of a particular system in the inventory, it may be cost prohibitive
to develop training programs for military personnel. Whatever the case, techno-
logical complexity suggests a greater civilianization of the battlefield and a closer
nexus between civilians and the conduct of hostilities.
Future battlefields will also be less cluttered with military personnel and equip-
ment. Simple cost calculations put massive inventories of equipment beyond the
reach of most countries, as does the per item cost of advanced weapon systems. A
B-2 bomber, for instance, has a life cycle cost of 2.5 billion dollars. 68 At this price,
only the United States can field the aircraft in sufficient numbers to make risking it
in combat reasonable. And high-tech weapons are much more effective than their
low-tech counterparts, thereby requiring the use of fewer weapons platforms to
achieve a given objective.
At the same time, militaries throughout the world are downsizing, usually for
political and economic reasons. Compensatory technology has also made reduc-
tions possible. Unmanned systems are but one example. Additionally, the more
technology allows penetration of an enemy's OODA loop, the less important raw
troop strength is to effective combat operations.
Finally, although not a specific DARPA focus, future weapons will be employ-
able from ever-greater distances and altitudes. Current systems are frequently
launched beyond visual range (BVR).69 For instance, during Operation Iraqi Free-
dom, naval vessels launched 802 Tomahawk Land Attack Missiles (BGM-109),
which have a range of690 miles. US forces also launched, inter alia, over 900 AGM-
65 Maverick air-to-ground missiles, with a range of over 17 miles, and 408 AGM-
88 HARM (high speed anti-radiation missile), with a 30-mile range. 70 The fre-
quency of BVR engagements will only increase as those with long-range precision
systems leverage them to stay outside the enemy's threat envelope.
Range, the ability to locate and fix distant enemies, and penetrable enemy de-
fenses,71 have made battlefields four dimensional (land, sea, air/space, and
cyberspace) and spatially unlimited. War is no longer necessarily linear, i.e., fought
along fixed lines of troops; instead, it may encompass the opponent's entire terri-
tory—from day one. Battlefields have been replaced by "battlespaces."
The Impact of Technology on Law
The technologies described above are dramatically influencing the application and
interpretation of the law ofarmed conflict. They will continue to do so in the future.
First and foremost, such technologies exacerbate the asymmetry that already
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challenges certain key law ofarmed conflict principles. Second, they complicate ef-
forts to distinguish combatants and other military objectives from civilians and ci-
vilian objects. Third, and somewhat paradoxically, modern technology empowers
militaries to avoid collateral damage, incidental injuries, and mistaken attacks. As
it does so, however, troubling expectations regarding casualties are surfacing, ex-
pectations that endanger current understandings of the law of armed conflict.
Asymmetry: The technologies ofwar already on the battlefield, and development
programs like those described above, will create a degree ofasymmetry between the
high and low-tech forces that has seldom been observed in military history.72 High-
tech forces locate their enemies more easily; observe their actions with better un-
derstanding; anticipatorily react to those actions with greater speed, coordination,
and effectiveness; field weapons systems and soldiers that are infinitely more sur-
vivable and better able to neutralize enemy defenses; employ weapons that strike
their aimpoint with a degree of force precisely metered to achieve the desired level
of destruction; and assess the results oftheir actions, and readjust if necessary, very
quickly and with a high degree of reliability. And, as first demonstrated during
Operation Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan, technology has reached the point
where these tasks can be performed around-the-clock. 73
Even numerically superior low-tech militaries with positional advantage cannot
prevail against such forces in conventional combat. At the start of the recent con-
flict, Iraq fielded a ground force of nearly 400,000. 74 It was defeated in six weeks by
one less than half its size. 75 Further demonstrating the impact of asymmetry, the
Iraqi air force never even left the ground. Meanwhile Coalition aircraft flew 20,733
fighter/bomber sorties over territory with an air defense system that was robust by
contemporary standards. Only one fixed wing aircraft, an A- 10 Warthog, was lost
to hostile fire. 76 And in its most inhospitable environment, the urban battlefield,
technology prevailed. For instance, during the battle for Fallujah, US Marines
killed nearly 1,200 insurgents while suffering only 50 casualties.77
Cynics will point out that weapons advances historically either find their way to
the enemy or soon fall victim to effective countermeasures. 78 As an example, Iraqi
insurgents are using mobile phones to rapidly coordinate attacks on Coalition
forces and detonate roadside bombs. Similarly, complex US Department of De-
fense systems are regularly the target of cyberattacks. But the prospects of disad-
vantaged forces turning the tables on their high-tech opponents in the near term
remain slight.
Low-tech forces face two basic challenges in modern warfare: 1 ) how to perform
the most basic function in combat, survival; and 2) how to engage the enemy, ei-




Consider survival. Facing an adversary armed with advanced C4ISR and imme-
diately available precision weaponry, the best survival option is to avoid being
spotted in the first place. Lawful methods to avoid discovery include, inter alia,
camouflage, ruses, jamming, and spoofing. 79 As demonstrated during the unsuc-
cessful Coalition decapitation strikes, simply staying on the move can frustrate ad-
vanced detection systems. 80 And militaries have always used physical features such
as jungle canopy, mountainous areas, caves, underground bunkers and tunnels,
and urban areas, as well as night and weather, to mask their presence.
But, as noted, research is underway on systems to counter each of these tactics,
from jam resistant networked information networks to chemicals capable ofmap-
ping caves. So how does the out-teched side survive? Increasingly, it does so by
blurring or even discarding law of armed conflict principles. Iraq is the paradig-
matic example. During the first GulfWar, Coalition forces slaughtered Iraqi mili-
tary units wherever they met in open battle. 81 By 2003, the technology available to
US forces had radically improved, while the Iraqi military had not recovered from
its earlier defeat and the ensuing sanctions regime. Wisely, then, the Iraqi army
avoided open confrontations.
To keep the Coalition troops from identifying them, many Iraqi soldiers
promptly discarded their uniforms. 82 The tactic has no dejure relationship to the
prohibition on attacking civilians, but it endangered them in the sense that Coali-
tion soldiers were less certain about who posed a threat, thereby heightening the
risk of mistaken uses of force against innocents. Because such mistakes of fact are
more reasonable than would be the case where civilians and combatants are clearly
distinguishable, the law of armed conflict's deterrent effect was effectively
weakened.
In fairness, members of the military who merely wear civilian clothes do not vi-
olate the law of armed conflict. Rather, they lose combatant status because they
lack the prerequisites thereof set forth in Article 4 of the Third Geneva Conven-
tion. 83 Article 4A(1) provides that members of the armed forces enjoy combatant
status. Article 4A(2) sets forth four cumulative conditions which members of a
militia not forming part of the armed forces (and members of other volunteers
corps, including resistance fighter) must meet to be lawful combatants. Because
these conditions are inherent in the meaning of"armed forces," they apply equally
to those encompassed in Article 4A(1). 84 The relevant criterion in this context is
"having a fixed distinctive sign recognizable at a distance," one typically met
through uniform wear.
Two consequences attach to the loss of this status. First, those captured do not
qualify as prisoners of war. 85 Second, because only combatants have the right to
"directly participate" in hostilities,86 others enjoy no combatant immunity for
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their actions during the hostilities. While it is not a war crime to attack the enemy,
doing so may amount to a criminal offense (e.g., murder) under the national law of
capturing forces. Lacking immunity, they may be prosecuted in the courts of any
State with subject matter over the offense and personal jurisdiction over the of-
fender. 87
Another technique for avoiding identification is feigning specially protected
status. Iraqi regular and irregular forces did so, for instance, by misusing protective
emblems. One recurring tactic was to seize ambulances and use them as scout vehi-
cles. Iraqi militia forces also marked the Ba'ath Party building in Basra with the em-
blem of the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC). Party buildings
were regularly used as military supply depots and mustering points.88 The law of
armed conflict expressly prohibits the display of the distinctive emblems of medi-
cal and religious personnel, transports, and units, or the personnel, property, and
activities of the International Movement of the Red Cross and Red Crescent, for
other than their intended purposes. 89
Sometimes one cannot avoid being identified by the enemy. When that is the
case, an increasingly common survival tactic is "counter-targeting," i.e., the use of
civilians and civilian objects as shields. 90 Shields may serve voluntarily or involun-
tarily, an important distinction vis-a-vis the law of armed conflict.
The war in Iraq is illustrative. Iraqi forces, especially the paramilitary Fedayeen,
frequently forced humans, includingwomen and children, to shield their activities.
For instance, in one common tactic, they drove their vehicles next to those of civil-
ians whenever they observed Coalition helicopters in the area.91
Article 51(7) of Additional Protocol I forbids the use of "[t]he presence or
movements of the civilian population or individual civilians ... to render certain
points or areas immune from military operations, in particular in attempts to
shield military objectives from attacks or to shield, favor or impede military opera-
tions,"92 a prohibition that is unquestionably customary. 93 Violation of this norm
by one side does not impose an absolute obligation on the other to refrain from at-
tacking the shielded object or persons, but neither does it release the attacker from
its own obligations.94 Therefore, the principle of proportionality applies to attacks
on shielded targets; if the likely injuries to (or death of) the shields, together with
any other incidental injury or collateral damage caused, is excessive in relation to
the resulting concrete and direct military advantage, attack is prohibited. 95 Volun-
tary shields are an exception, for they lose their law of armed conflict immunity
from attack by "directly participating" in hostilities.96 Obviously, since direct par-
ticipants may be attacked, it would be incongruent to suggest they should never-
theless count in proportionality calculations.97
152
Michael N. Schmitt
Civilian objects are also useful in counter-targeting. Iraqi forces often located
military equipment and troops in or near civilian buildings, including specially
protected locations. For instance, as Coalition forces moved north the Fedayeen
used such protected locations as al-Nasiriyya Surgical Hospital, the Baghdad Red
Crescent Maternity Hospital, the Imam Ali mosque in al-Najaf, and the Abu
Hanifa mosque as bases for operations.98 Later, during the battle for Fallujah, 60 of
the city's 100 mosques and three medical facilities were so used."
Although no express provision on using civilian objects as shields exists in the
law of armed conflict, such actions violate Additional Protocol I's Article 58 obli-
gations to "endeavour to remove the civilian population, individual civilians and
civilian objects under their control from the vicinity of military objects; avoid
locating military objectives within or near densely populated areas; [and] take the
other necessary precautions to protect the civilian population, individual civilians
and civilian objects under their control against the dangers resulting from military
operations," albeit only "to the maximum extent feasible." 100 It is always "feasible"
to refrain from intentionally placing military equipment and personnel in or near
civilian objects in order to keep the former from being attacked.
Even more clearly a law of armed conflict violation is misuse of specially pro-
tected objects to compensate for technological disadvantage. The First Geneva
Convention provides in Article 19 that "responsible authorities shall ensure that . .
.
medical establishments and units are, as far as possible, situated in such a manner
that attacks against military objectives cannot imperil their safety." Additional
Protocol I is plainer still: "Under no circumstances shall medical units be used in
an attempt to shield military objectives from attack." 101 Further, "historic monu-
ments, works of art or places of worship which constitute the cultural or spiritual
heritage of peoples" receive analogous protections under the Protocol. 102 The
Iman Ali and Abu Hanifa Mosques, mentioned above, qualify, for they are impor-
tant Shia and Sunni shrines respectively. 103
Absent special protection, civilian objects can become military objectives due to
their militarily significant location, through use for military actions, or when their
future purpose is military. 104 Moreover, each treaty granting specially protected sta-
tus withdraws it upon misuse. 105 Thus, as a matter of law, shielding with civilian
objects has little effect aside from influencing proportionality calculations.
Assuming the technologically weaker forces survive, they still need to attack the
enemy. One logical, albeit unlawful, tactic for doing so is perfidy. Iraqi forces
adopted a number of other perfidious tactics to offset the Coalition's technological
superiority. Recall that Iraqi forces regularly fought in civilian clothes, a perfidious
act ifdone as an element ofan attack tactic. Of course, this is precisely why soldiers
usually don civilian clothes. Additionally, they feigned surrender and used stolen
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ambulances to approach Coalition forces, hoping their opponents would make
themselves more vulnerable by lowering their guard. 106
Another tactic adopted in Iraq is suicide bombing. The increasing frequency of
bombings attests either to the success of the tactic against superior forces or the
relative lack of alternatives in the face of such superiority. 107 Although lawful if
directed against combatants and military objectives, 108 when the bomber feigns
protected status to approach targets, as is the norm, the attack is perfidious.
Typically, though, civilians (unlawful combatants) carry out suicide attacks. Their
mens rea determines whether doing so constitutes perfidy. If merely attacking,
their actions comprise direct participation in hostilities. On the other hand, if the
wearing of civilian clothing forms an integral part of their attack tactics, they have
committed perfidy. 109
Eventually, the technologically disadvantaged side may conclude that it is un-
likely to prevail and reframe the conflict by shifting attention towards a center of
gravity other than the military. 110 As Clausewitz recognized, war is the continua-
tion of politics by other means. This being so, when facing overwhelming odds, it is
quite rational to abandon the principle of distinction altogether and attack civil-
ians as a center of gravity.
Both practicalities and objectives compel adoption of such a strategy. From a
practical perspective, it is impossible to protect the civilian population effectively,
no matter how robust one's technological wherewithal. Crippled by technology in
a classic fight, the disadvantaged side responds asymmetrically by attacking its op-
ponent's vulnerabilities.
Attacking civilians is also appealing when the objective is to take the fight out of
an enemy without defeating it militarily. For instance, the goal may be to rupture a
coalition, as in Iraqi targeting of Israeli cities in 1991. 111 Attacking civilians may
also be intended to affect non-governmental and intergovernmental organiza-
tions. In Iraq, for instance, insurgents attacked the UN and ICRC headquarters in
an effort to force their withdrawal. Similarly, civilian targeting can make the con-
flict appear too costly to belligerent States and citizens. The kidnapping and mur-
der of foreign hostages in Iraq is designed to convince US partners to leave Iraq;
such crimes are proving effective. Or, the "target" population might be the at-
tacker's own. One goal ofthe attacks against Iraqi civilians is to convince the popu-
lation it will be safer without Coalition forces. More directly, attacks against
civilian politicians, judicial officials, and law enforcement personnel are designed
to deter cooperation with the Coalition. Whatever the motivation, attacking civil-




Beyond unlawful methods, the technologically weaker side may resort to com-
pensatory means ofwarfare. Two at the center of discussion are computer network
attack (CNA) 112 and weapons of mass destruction.
CNA represents "war on the cheap" for an otherwise technology starved bellig-
erent, for cost is limited to acquisition of off-the-shelf computers and exploitation
software, access to the target network, and computer expertise. Moreover, the
higher-tech an opponent, the more vulnerable it is to such attacks. Terrorist
groups are already effectively using websites to conduct information campaigns,
the broadcast of beheadings representing the extreme example. Concerted, orga-
nized offensive use of information technology will soon follow.
There is nothing unlawful per se about cyberattacks. On the contrary, when
computer network attack assets are readily available, the law of armed conflict's
precautions in attack requirements may sometimes mandate their use because
CNA usually risks less collateral damage and incidental injury than kinetic weap-
ons. 113 That said, the proportionality principle applies to CNA, as it does in all at-
tacks. This is a particularly meaningful limitation on CNA because civilian systems
are often linked to military networks (thereby risking the spread of viruses and
other computer contagions), 114 and because many potential CNA targets are dual-
use entities (e.g., power grids). 115
As suggested by DARPA's programs, high-tech militaries have recognized this
threat and are developing robust defenses. This may have the ironic effect of turn-
ing attention towards more penetrable civilian networks. In a networked world,
the consequences of such attacks could be disastrous. Imagine cyberattacks against
global financial networks, air traffic control systems, water treatment and distribu-
tion facilities, nuclear power plants, oil refineries and pipelines, or medical data
systems.
The issue ofwhether attacks on civilian networks violate the law of armed con-
flict has generated an interesting debate. Some experts argue that all CNA opera-
tions against civilian networks violate the principle of distinction. 116 The better
view is that the law of armed conflict only prohibits those rising to the level of an
"attack." Although Article 48 of Additional Protocol I requires Parties to "direct
their operations only against military objectives," every other relevant Protocol
prohibition cites "attack" as its operative criterion. 117 "Attack" is a term of art de-
fined in Article 49 as "acts of violence against the adversary, whether in offence or
in defence."
Given advances in military technology, it would be unreasonable to further in-
terpret the term "attacks" as being limited to those conducted through kinetic
means. Indeed, universal consensus exists that non-kinetic biological, chemical,
and radiological operations qualify as attacks. But at the same time, the express
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reference to violence can only be interpreted as implying violent consequences , 118
Thus, a military operation causing injury to humans (or severe mental suffering)
or physical damage to property is an attack. 119 Mere inconvenience would not suf-
fice. Universal acceptance ofthe proportionality principle as considering "inciden-
tal loss of civilian life, injury to civilians [and] damage to civilian objects" supports
this interpretation.
In addition to exploiting the cyber-vulnerabilities of technology dependent
societies, disadvantaged foes may fight asymmetrically with WMD. A number of
States are acquiring WMD ostensibly to deter attack by technologically advan-
taged militaries, most notably North Korea. 120 Doing so is a predictable response
on the part of those facing militarily dominant rivals.
The law of armed conflict outlaws chemical and biological weapons use for
States party to the various instruments cited above. Arguably, customary law does
the same for the rest. 121 That States do not have great confidence in these normative
prohibitions is attested to by the extensive efforts they take to be able to operate in
contaminated environments. This is understandable, for biological and chemical
weapons are relatively low-tech, cheap, accessible, and easily deployable. 122
Yet, it is not battlefield use that generates the greatest concern. The dynamic of
asymmetry operates in the biological and chemical context in much the same way
it does vis-a-vis CNA. Facing militaries equipped to withstand biological and
chemical attacks, opponents may decide civilians pose the more attractive target.
Thus, beyond the general prohibition on use, violation of the distinction principle
logically (albeit not lawfully) results from severe disadvantage in conventional
weapons systems.
The case of nuclear weapons is more complicated. In its 1996 advisory opinion
on The Threat or Use ofNuclear Weapons, the International Court ofJustice opined
that their use "would generally be contrary to the rules ofinternational law applica-
ble in armed conflict, and in particular the principles and rules of humanitarian
law." However, it added the caveat that it could not "conclude definitively whether
the threat or use ofnuclear weapons would be lawful or unlawful in an extreme cir-
cumstance of self-defence, in which the very survival of a State would be at
stake." 123
These conclusions demonstrate a relative misunderstanding of nuclear war-
fare. 124 Clearly, there are circumstances in which the use of such weapons would
comply with the principle of distinction, including proportionality. 125 That there
are probably nine nuclear powers, including all five of the permanent members of
the Security Council, further draws the Court's conclusions into question. 126 For
these and related reasons, the Customary International Humanitarian Law study
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wisely refrained from asserting that the use of nuclear (in contrast to chemical and
biological) weapons violates the customary law of armed conflict. 127
But the days of imaging nuclear warflghting generally faded away with the Cold
War. Today, a limited number ofnuclear weapons would not be decisive in a battle
against determined high-tech forces like those of the United States. Therefore, be-
yond deterrent saber-rattling, the most likely nuclear scenario in the early 2 1st cen-
tury is use of a small, low-yield, unsophisticated weapon against a population
center, for holding the population at risk (or attacking it) offers the greatest lever-
age over an opponent. The perverse logic of technological asymmetry yet again
leads, at least in theory, the disadvantaged belligerent towards extreme measures
violating the law of armed conflict.
Each of the dynamics ofasymmetry sketched out thus far centers on technology
possessed by one side impelling its lesser-equipped opponent beyond the bound-
aries ofthe law ofarmed conflict. But the effect oftechnological asymmetry may be
subtler, resulting in shifting interpretations of the law, rather than outright viola-
tion. Most significantly, the scope of military objectives and the principle of pro-
portionality are likely to be so affected.
Recall that the principle of distinction limits attacks to combatants and military
objectives. 128 Military objectives are objects that "make an effective contribution to
military action," the attack on which will yield a "definite military advantage."
Typically, the concept is interpreted narrowly, requiring a relatively direct nexus
between the object attacked and the conduct of hostilities. 129 But to the extent mili-
tary assets are difficult to attack due to an adversary's technological edge, an incen-
tive exists to characterize entities with a weaker nexus to combat, but which are
more vulnerable, as military objectives. Thus, for instance, while all would agree
that a munitions factory qualifies, a disadvantaged side might argue that other in-
dustries providing income to finance the war effort do as well.
In fact, the United States may have inadvertently strengthened the position of
those who would so argue by adopting a broad interpretation of military objectives
in the Navy, Marine Corps and Coast Guard's The Commander s Handbook on the
Law ofNaval Warfare. In that manual, military objectives are described as objects
contributing to the enemy's warflghting or war-sustaining capability. The Hand-
book goes on to note that "[e]conomic targets of the enemy that indirectly but ef-
fectively support and sustain the enemy's war-fighting capability may also be
attacked." In light ofthis interpretation, which is labeled customary, it is difficult to
contest adoption of a similar approach by a technologically weaker opponent de-
termined to impose costs on its superior enemy. 130
Paradoxically, militaries that outclass their adversaries may also see merit in a
broad interpretation ofthe concept of military objectives. Technology, particularly
157
War, Technology and the Law ofArmed Conflict
when not possessed by an opponent, makes possible strategies that otherwise
might not be viable. Most notable in this regard are coercive strategies, which seek
not to defeat the enemy militarily, but rather to coerce it into engaging in a particu-
lar course of conduct (or desisting from one) through imposition of unacceptable
costs. The archetypal example is Operation Allied Force, NATO's 1999 air cam-
paign to force the Federal Republic ofYugoslavia to quit killing Kosovar Albanians
and negotiate a political settlement on the basis of the Rambouillet Accords. 131
NATO never harbored a desire to defeat Yugoslavia militarily. On the contrary,
President Clinton famously announced that NATO had no intention of sending in
ground forces. 132 Instead, the aim was to employ force to alter the cost-benefit cal-
culations of the Yugoslavian leadership, particularly Slobodan Milosevic.
From a law of armed conflict perspective, the predicament with coercive cam-
paigns is that destruction of military targets may not affect the enemy leadership as
much as holding its political power base, the civilian population, or personal finan-
cial assets {inter alia) at risk. This being so, there is an incentive to define military
objectives as encompassing attractive coercion targets. Indeed, one distinguished
commentator has gone so far as to suggest that elements of the principle of distinc-
tion should be abandoned altogether to permit targeting along these lines. 133
The adoption of effects-based operations (EBO)—a targeting approach that re-
places attrition strategies that progressively destroy enemy forces with surgical
strikes designed to achieve particular well-defined effects—coincided with the rise
ofthinking about coercive strategies. 134 Advanced technology, especially precision,
stealth, and C4ISR, has rendered effects-based operations feasible by making it
possible to reliably deconstruct enemy systems, identify those aspects thereof that
can yield a defined effect, and penetrate enemy territory to conduct precision
strikes. 135
Inevitably, concentrating on effects will lead to strategies aimed at achieving
them without necessarily destroying the enemy's military as the means ofdoing so.
As discussed, there are already suggestions along these lines with overtly coercive
campaigns. A closely related doctrine with the potential for operationalizing this
tendency is axiological targeting. Made possible by advanced technologies,
axiological operations distinguish between utility and value targets. 136 Utility is the
future usefulness of a prospective target to the enemy, whereas value constitutes its
relative worth. In utility targeting, the attacker seeks to deny enemy forces what
they need to operate by striking military objects such as airfields, vehicles, troops,
headquarters, and command and control. 137 By contrast, axiological operations
(although including utility targets) focus on objects the enemy leadership values,
prioritizing targets based on the extent to which their destruction (or neutraliza-
tion) is likely to affect decision-making. 138
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Although affecting cost-benefits calculations is often one mission planning goal,
axiological operations elevate it to the central purpose. As with coercive strategies,
viewing military operations in this manner drives one towards interpreting the
concept ofmilitary objectives very liberally or, perhaps, even ignoring the principle
of distinction.
Application of the proportionality principle may also be affected in subtle ways
by technological disadvantage. Understandably, the technologically weaker side
tends to view all victories over its superior opponent as momentous. To some ex-
tent they may be, for even minor successes by the weaker side embolden one's own
troops and can demoralize an adversary. As a result, the weaker side might over-
value military advantage when determining whether incidental injury and collat-
eral damage are excessive. Conversely, facing defeat, the weaker side may
undervalue collateral damage and incidental injury, for risk to enemy civilians is
unlikely to resonate as forcefully given its own dire straits.
The technologically superior side is liable to reverse these tendencies. Nearly
certain of ultimate victory, the importance of any one military success will weigh
less heavily in the proportionality calculation. Casualty aversion on the part of
dominant forces reflects this dynamic in a slightly different context; the greater the
likelihood ofvictory, the less willing the prevailing side is to place its forces at risk.
Similarly, the advantaged belligerent may attribute considerable value to enemy
collateral damage and incidental injury because it has more leeway to avoid them
without jeopardizing its pending victory. This is particularly true given the media's
ability to globally report civilian losses in near real time.
Of course, it is impossible to objectively relate the value of military advantage to
collateral damage and incidental injury; they are dissimilar values that cannot be
compared meaningfully except in the extreme cases. Be that as it may, the propor-
tionality principle does cause warfighters pause when planning and executing at-
tacks. The degree to which it does so depends in part on the extent of one's combat
wherewithal relative to the enemy.
Finally, as we have seen in Iraq and as recognized by DARPA, technological dis-
advantage drives one from the open battlefield into either terrain that masks loca-
tion or urban areas. In the case of the former, such as jungle or mountainous
terrain, there is seldom risk to civilians, for it is the very remoteness ofthe areas that
appeals to the vulnerable side. But as noted, DARPA is working hard to develop
systems that deny the enemy the protection of jungle canopies, caves, etc. As this
occurs, disadvantaged forces will be pushed into urban areas where, despite emerg-
ing urban warfare technology, the proximity to civilians and the difficulty in distin-
guishing combatants (who will often wear civilian attire) from civilians will offer
greater hope of survival.
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It is apparent that technological asymmetry creates faultlines in international
humanitarian law. Yet, advanced technology will affect the interpretation and ap-
plication of the law of armed conflict in ways wholly distinct from asymmetrical
warfare.
Hindering Distinction: Technology complicates application of the principle of
distinction, but not always as advertised. Much is often made of the fact that many
weapons are launched BVR. Further, as described above, systems are now being
developed in which an attack occurs without direct involvement ofhumans. There
is a persistent tendency to characterize both BVR and "man-out-of-the-loop"
technologies as weakening the ability to distinguish. Their use, so the argument
goes, violates the precautions in attack requirements to "do everything feasible to
verify that the objectives to be attacked are neither civilians nor civilian objects and
are not subject to special protection" and to "take all feasible precautions in the
choice of means and methods of attack with a view to avoiding, and in any event
minimizing, incidental loss of civilian life, injury to civilians and damage to civilian
objects." 139 For instance, some have claimed that an accidental attack on an Alba-
nian refugee column during Operation Allied Force and the bombing of marked
ICRC warehouses during Operation Enduring Freedom could have been averted
had the pilots flown low enough to see the targets. 140
While it may be true in individual cases that human involvement enhances tar-
get identification and verification and lowers the probability of collateral damage
and incidental injury, this is not always the case. Most significantly, getting close
enough to actually see the enemy brings with it vulnerability to enemy fire. This
fact alone affects one's ability to perceive accurately. So too does taking the eva-
sive maneuvers necessary to avoid being hit, for some precision weapons require
a stable launch platform and sufficient time to acquire and lock onto a target.
Further, certain precision weapons become more accurate with distance and alti-
tude because there is greater opportunity for the weapon to guide to the target.
Finally, there is no scientific basis for concluding that human perception and
judgment is necessarily more acute or reliable than that of machines. Even if there
was, it is appropriate to consider the safety of one's own forces when assessing the
propriety of a strike. Force protection cannot alone outweigh any degree of collat-
eral damage and incidental injury, but it is certainly a proper consideration for
the attacker. 141
A greater obstacle to application of the distinction principle is the growing
proximity of military objectives to civilians and civilian objects, a phenomenon
caused in part by technology. Perhaps most significantly, the range and precision
of weapons, the transparency of the battlefield made possible by advanced ISR,
and the ability to generate attacks very quickly using networked C4 have
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transformed traditional battlefields, on which forces typically engaged along a
relatively identifiable line know as the FEBA (forward edge of the battle area).
Linearity allowed civilians to distance themselves from the hostilities to some ex-
tent, although the advent of airpower dramatically limited their ability to do so.
As noted, current technologies have transformed the linear battlefield into a
battlespace, with combat operations often occurring simultaneously on the
ground and high seas, in air and space, and through cyberspace. 142 And distance is
no longer an obstacle; hi-tech militaries such as those of the United States can
mount attacks very quickly almost anywhere they wish. During Operation Iraqi
Freedom, for instance, there was no part of the country that the Coalition could
not monitor and attack.
The distinction implications are momentous. Because hostilities can take place
everywhere, a location to which civilians flee may itselfbecome the site of attacks.
In particular, precision has made strikes against targets within populated areas via-
ble. Imprecision ironically protected civilians, for many attacks, especially in urban
areas, could not be mounted due to the potential for unacceptable impact on the
civilian population. With modern weaponry, this de facto protection disappears
since strikes against military objectives near civilians and civilian objects are often
possible without causing "excessive" collateral damage and incidental injury. Yet,
even with high-tech weaponry, it remains impossible to avoid all collateral damage
and incidental injury. Therefore, by opening populated areas to military opera-
tions, precision denies civilians risk-free sanctuary therein.
Other aspects of modern weaponry increase the presence of civilians or civilian
objects near combat operations. For instance, there are more civilian employees and
contractors on the modern battlefield. Downsizing, cost-cutting measures, and un-
anticipated demands for troops are partially responsible. But advanced technology
also drives civilianization. In some cases, there may not be sufficient numbers of
advanced systems in the inventory for the military to develop training programs
for its own personnel. Thus, weapon systems contracts often include maintenance
and operations personnel. Or the systems may simply be so complex that few in the
military have the background necessary to be trained to handle them.
Additionally, because of the prohibitive cost of developing high-tech systems,
armed forces are turning to "off-the-shelf (civilian) equipment. Thus, a factory
producing items used by the military is a valid target despite its civilian produc-
tion, unless a strike thereon would violate the principle of proportionality. The
same applies to locations where the items are stored. Militaries also increasingly
use civilian facilities and functions (such as airfields, electrical generation, civilian
transport, communications assets) for their military needs. All such objects and
dual-use locations are military objectives by the "use" criterion. To the extent they
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are planned for use, they become military objectives by virtue of "purpose." In all
these cases, attacks will by definition result in collateral damage, and, in many
cases, incidental injury to civilians. 143
Enhancing Distinction: At the same time, technology often fosters distinction. In
the first place, collateral damage and incidental injury are typically caused by: in-
complete knowledge about what is being attacked; a lack of understanding ofhow
civilians will be affected; inaccuracy; an inability to precisely meter the force ap-
plied to ensure no more than necessary is used; and restriking a target because one
is unsure whether the desired level of destruction or neutralization has been
achieved. The advanced technologies described above, as well as the general trends
noted, will counteract these causal factors to varying degrees. Transparency will
provide a greater quantity of information about the target and its environs, and it
will be increasingly reliable. Similarly, post-strike battle damage assessment will
give commanders a more complete picture of when they need to restrike a target,
thereby avoiding unnecessary additional attacks that place the civilian population
at risk. Improvements in accuracy will steadily reduce the circular error probable
and allow the use of smaller charges to achieve the desired level of damage.
Moreover, technological advances are making possible non-kinetic (or non-
lethal) alternatives to destructive kinetic attacks. For instance, rather than destroy-
ing components of an electrical grid, which may be located near civilians or upon
which they depend for power, it is now possible to drop carbon-fiber filaments on
power lines to interrupt electricity to a particular military objective, such as a
command and control facility. Offering even greater possibilities is computer net-
work attack. Using CNA, power to the target could simply be shut off. It might
even be possible to exert some control over enemy command and control (rather
than merely disrupting it) by altering, adding, or deleting select information
within the system. Doing so might be more advantageous than simply turning off
power, for it could create a false picture of the battlespace such that the enemy ac-
tually places itself at risk. Obviously, CNA and other technological alternatives to
attack with kinetically destructive weapons present the possibility of dramatically
limiting collateral damage and incidental injury, while attaining the same or
greater military advantage.
Finally, as noted, technology can compensate for numbers in warfare. During
World War II, the circular error probable (CEP) of a B- 17 dropping gravity bombs
was roughly 3,300 feet. This required 1,500 sorties dropping 9,000 bombs before
achieving a high probability of damage against a point target. 144 An F-117 armed
with laser-guided munitions, by contrast, can now strike its target with an unclassi-
fied CEP of approximately 10 feet, good enough for one-bomb, one-target tactics.
Obviously, the impact on civilians produced by hundreds of sorties dwarfs that
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caused by one. Moreover, because technology decreases the number oftroops nec-
essary to conduct combat operations, there is less intermingling with the civilian
population, and less opportunity for collateral damage and incidental injury.
Technology's ability to enable one to operate within the enemy's OODA loop is
also generating positive effects. By controlling the course of battle, the advantaged
side can avoid engagements that slow the pace of operations. This is exactly what
happened in Iraq. The Coalition, operating within the Iraqi OODA loop, was able
to quickly speed north, bypassing urban areas where fighting would have both
bogged it down and endangered the civilian population. 145 Since the best way to
minimize the impact ofcombat on civilians is to limit its duration, the technology
that makes speedy defeat possible enhances the protections of civilians and other
protected persons and objects. 146
The greatest impact oftechnology on the law ofarmed conflict lies in the area of
precautions in attack. Recall that those who plan or decide on an attack have to do
everything feasible to verify targets are military objectives, choose methods and
means ofwarfare with an eye towards minimizing collateral damage and incidental
injury, provide a warning if the circumstances permit, and select that target from
among those yielding a similar military advantage that causes the least collateral
damage and incidental injury. As discussed, technology is expanding the opportu-
nities for militaries equipped with state of the art equipment to avoid collateral
damage and incidental injury by complying with these requirements. They possess
more robust systems for reliably locating and tracking military objectives and dis-
tinguishing them from civilians and civilian objects, have a greater variety ofweap-
ons systems with which to strike the target, can choose from a larger set of possible
targets (in part because they have a greater ability to penetrate enemy defenses),
and will often have more opportunity to warn because, given their superiority, sur-
prise is not as valuable a commodity to them as it is to their lower-tech adversaries.
But as the technological gap widens, the precautions in attack requirements op-
erate on the belligerents in an increasingly disparate manner. After all, the stan-
dards are subjective, not objective; a belligerent is only required to do what is
feasible, and feasibility depends on the available technology. The result is norma-
tive relativism—the high tech belligerent is held to higher standards vis-a-vis pre-
cautions in attack than its opponent. It is, ofcourse, normative relativism by choice
because States are under no legal obligation to acquire assets that will permit them
to better distinguish between military objectives and the civilian population.
The problem with normative relativism is that States comply with the law of
armed conflict in part due to reciprocity, i.e., they agree to be bound because their
opponents shoulder identical obligations. The obligations may not impose equiva-
lent burdens in practice, but at least as a matter of law the parties are on equal
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footing. With precautions in attack, however, the law itself, interpreted in a com-
pletely neutral manner, imposes dissimilar duties. This reality creates resentment;
the greater the disparity, the greater the dissatisfaction of the belligerent bearing
the greater burden of the legal obligation.
Complicating matters are exaggerated expectations on the part ofmany as to the
ability of high-tech forces to avoid either mistakes or collateral damage and inci-
dental injury. Advanced militaries bear part of the responsibility for creating such
expectations. Since at least Operation Desert Storm, they have mounted aggressive
public affairs campaigns designed to convince the domestic and international pub-
lic that they are doing everything possible to avoid harming civilians and their
property. In the process, they have created the impression that high-tech militaries
have an endless supply of precision munitions, when in fact the inventories remain
limited. 147
Moreover, they also inadvertently caused an impression that weapons are flaw-
less. Yet, even when working perfectly, they are not perfectly accurate. The most
commonly employed precision munitions used in Iraq (and most accurate) were
laser guided. Among these, the most frequently dropped was the GBU-12 Paveway
II, which has a circular error probable of nine meters. 148 Although such accuracy is
extraordinary, it is far from perfect.
At the same time, tales of satellite photos of individuals taken from space and
eavesdropping on cell phone conversations from aircraft circling overhead cause
many to believe the battlespace transparency enjoyed by high-tech militaries is
comprehensive and fully accurate. Although it is true that transparency is at a level
unimaginable even a decade ago (and improving rapidly), it is equally true that it
is not absolute, a fact demonstrated by incidents ranging from the attack on the
Chinese Embassy in Belgrade, to two strikes against an ICRC warehouse in Af-
ghanistan, to the attack on a wedding party in Iraq.
Critics of recent campaigns, who tend to overrate the ability ofhigh-tech forces,
often overlook the fog of war. Increasingly, they view collateral damage and inci-
dental injury (or mistaken attacks) as prima facie evidence of a failure to take pre-
cautions in attack. After all, given the high-tech systems at the disposal ofadvanced
militaries, civilian loss "must" have been caused by either a failure to take the nec-
essary precautions or outright recklessness. A rebuttable presumption of negli-
gence in serious collateral damage/incidental injury incidents seems to be
emerging vis-a-vis attacks conducted by high-tech attackers, who increasingly bear
the burden of persuasion as to having taken appropriate precautions. 149
Consider the reports written on the air campaigns during Operations Allied
Force and Iraqi Freedom. 150 While occasionally questioning attacks on the basis of
whether the target was a military objective (most notably media facilities), the bulk
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of the criticism alleged failure to take adequate precautions in attack. For instance,
with regard to Allied Force, Human Rights Watch (HRW) expressed uneasiness
over "whether every feasible precaution was taken to accurately distinguish civil-
ians from combatants" and felt there were "questions regarding the decisions to at-
tack on the basis of incomplete and/or seriously flawed information." 151
Commenting on the Dubrava Prison incident, in which 20 prisoners died during
NATO attacks on nearby military facilities, HRW argued that "NATO did not ap-
ply adequate precautions in executing its airstrikes on nearby military objectives,
and therefore must be held accountable for the civilian deaths that occurred as a di-
rect result of those attacks." But the organization failed to cite those precautions
the attackers should have taken, beyond a general comment earlier in the report
about bombing from altitude.
The same tact was taken vis-a-vis Iraqi Freedom. HRW opined that continuing
the decapitation campaign despite the lack of success "can be seen as a failure to
take 'all feasible precautions' in choice ofmeans and methods ofwarfare in order to
minimize civilian losses as required by international humanitarian law." 152 Yet, the
organization offered no alternatives to those precautions taken, other than not
striking at all. This suggestion misstates the law, for the precautions in attack prin-
ciple only applies to an attack that is otherwise lawful. The central issue is whether
the attacker could have done something differently that would have lessened harm
to the civilian population without forfeiting military advantage.
Many have been so captured by the wizardry of modern weaponry and so ex-
posed to the horror of civilian suffering through the media that entire campaigns
now become tainted by individual incidents. Indeed, scholarly, NGO, and journal-
istic comment often focuses on specific incidents, such as the Grdelica Gorge
Bridge attack in Yugoslavia or the wedding party incident in Iraq, forgetting in the
process that overall high-tech warfare is yielding campaigns that are ever-more dis-
criminate. 153 Recall, that the number ofweapons dropped during Operation Iraqi
Freedom exceeded 10,000 and Allied Force involved the employment ofmore than
20,000. Yet, Human Rights Watch labeled its report on the former Off Target and
the latter Civilian Deaths in the NATO Air Campaign.
Thus, technology not only actually heightens the legal standards to which high-
tech forces must conform, but it creates expectations which, albeit initially without
legal valence, create de facto standards which States operating under the media mi-
croscope can ill-afford to ignore. Very subtly, these de facto standards will influ-
ence application and interpretation of de jure standards as to what is and is not
lawful collateral damage and incidental injury, the nature of the duty of care re-
quired ofthose planning and executing attacks, and the reasonableness ofmistakes
ofwar.
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Conclusions
What is striking about the relationship between the technology, warfare, and the
law ofarmed conflict is that all the news is not good. One would expect technology
to increasingly limit the impact of warfare on the civilian population. It certainly
does so to an extent, and a number of the technologies described will further dis-
tance war from civilians.
Yet, the technology has a negative face as well. Although almost never a purpose
of technology, the weapons of war are increasingly placing the principles under-
pinning the law of armed conflict at risk. In great part, this is the result of an ever-
widening divide between the technological "haves" and "have-nots." Faced with
near certain defeat, "have-nots" are understandably (albeit inexcusably) rejecting
the law of armed conflict as they compensate for their asymmetrical weakness.
When one side operates in repeated violation of the law, adherence by the other
usually deteriorates in lock-step.
Even the technology itself weakens the ability to safeguard the civilian popula-
tion and other protected individuals and entities during armed conflict. Whether
because it has broken the traditional spatial limitations of conflict or simply placed
more civilians on the battlefield, technology has proven it is no panacea.
And sadly, technology has confused many observers ofwarfare, causing them to
adopt unrealistic expectations that seem to be morphing into normative bound-
aries. Inevitably, militaries will react negatively to this trend, for it places limita-
tions on their activities that were not the product of the careful balancing between
military necessity and humanitarian concerns that typically characterize the for-
mation of the law ofarmed conflict. This division does not bode well for either the
military or those who seek to limit its use.
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In the realm of military affairs and national security, asymmetry is acting, organizing,
and thinking differently than opponents in order to maximize one's own advantages,
exploit an opponent's weaknesses, attain the initiative, or gain greater freedom of
action. It can be political-strategic, military strategic, or a combination of these. It can
entail different methods, technologies, values, organizations, time perspectives, or
some combination ofthese. It can be short-term or long-term. It can be deliberate or by
default. It can be discrete or pursued in combination with symmetric approaches. It can
have both psychological and physical dimensions.
Steven Metz & Douglas V. Johnson II, ASYMMETRY AND U.S. MILITARY STRATEGY: DEFINITION,
Background, and Strategic Concepts (US Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute,
Jan. 2001). The instant article limits discussion to technological asymmetry. Other useful
material on asymmetry includes Stephen J. Blank, RETHINKING ASYMMETRIC THREATS, (US
Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute, Sept. 2003); Ivan Arrequin-Toft, How the Weak
Win Wars: A Theory ofAsymmetric Conflict, INTERNATIONAL SECURITY, Summer 2001, at 19;
Steven J. Lambakis, ReconsideringAsymmetric Warfare, JOINT FORCE QUARTERLY, Dec. 2004, at
102; Montgomery C. Meigs, Unorthodox Thoughts about Asymmetric Warfare, PARAMETERS,
Summer 2003, at 4; R.V. Gusentine, Asymmetric Warfare—On Our Terms, PROCEEDINGS OF
the United States Naval Institute, Aug. 2002, at 58.
73. Norman Friedman, Terrorism, Afghanistan, and America's New Way of War 166
(2004).
74. International Institute for Strategic Studies, THE MILITARY BALANCE 2002-2003, at 97
(2003).
75. 183,000. BOB WOODWARD, PLAN OF ATTACK 401 (2004).
76. By the Numbers, supra note 60, at 3, 7-8. Losses also included four Apache and two Cobra
helicopters. Id. Iraqi air defenses had been degraded by Operations Northern Watch and
Southern Watch air strikes prior to commencement of Operation Iraqi Freedom. These
operations monitored the no-fly zones in northern and southern Iraq.
77. November 2004. Estimates of casualties vary somewhat. See, e.g., Anthony Shadid, Baghdad
Suffers a Day ofAttacks, WASHINGTON POST, Nov. 21, 2004, at A30; US Casualties Surge in Iraq,
but Public Impact is Muffled, AGENCE FRANCE PRESSE, Nov. 30, 2004; Iraq Coalition Casualty
Count, icasualties.org/oif/Stats.aspx (filter by place and month).
78. The United States specifically noted this possibility in its 2004 National Military Strategy.
Dual-use civilian technologies, especially information technologies, high-resolution
imagery and global positioning systems are widely available. These relatively low cost,
commercially available technologies will improve the disruptive and destructive
capabilities of a wide range of state and non-state actors. Advances in automation and
information processing will allow some adversaries to locate and attack targets both
overseas and in the United States. Software tools for network-attack, intrusion and
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disruption are globally available over the Internet, providing almost any interested
adversary a basic computer network exploitation or attack capability.
National Military Strategy, supra note 50, at 6.
79. Jamming impedes the enemy's use of the electromagnetic spectrum. Spoofing involves
creating signals that imitate those of the enemy or others.
80. In this case, intercepting mobile phone signals.
81. See generally US Department of Defense, Final Report to Congress: Conduct of the Persian
GulfWar (1992).
82. Human Rights Watch, Off Target: The Conduct of the War and Civilian Casualties in Iraq
78-79 (Dec. 2003), available at www.hrw.org/reports/2003/usal203/. Since the denial of
combatant status to Taliban fighters and publication of photos of US Special Forces soldiers
attired in indigenous clothing during Operation Enduring Freedom, the "requirement" to wear
uniforms has evoked much discussion. See, e.g., Michelle Kelly & Morten Rostrup, Identify
Yourselves: Coalition Soldiers in Afghanistan are EndangeringAir Workers, GUARDIAN (London),
Feb. 1, 2002, at 19. For a comprehensive legal analysis of the subject, see W. Hays Parks, Special
Forces' Wear of Non-Standard Uniforms, 4 CHICAGO JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 493
(2003).
83. The relevant provisions of Article 4 exclude the following from civilian status:
( 1
)
Members of the armed forces of a Party to the conflict, as well as members of
militias or volunteer corps forming part of such armed forces.
(2) Members of other militias and members of other volunteer corps, including those
of organized resistance movements, belonging to a Party to the conflict and operating
in or outside their own territory, even if this territory is occupied, provided that such
militias or volunteer corps, including such organized resistance movements, fulfill the
following conditions:
(a) that of being commanded by a person responsible for his subordinates;
(b) that of having a fixed distinctive sign recognizable at a distance;
(c) that of carrying arms openly;
(d) that ofconducting their operations in accordance with the laws and customs of
war.
Geneva Convention III, supra note 27. On the wear of "distinctive" attire, see also Hague IV
Regulations, supra note 9, art. 1.2; Geneva Convention I, supra note 27, art. 13(2)(b); Geneva
Convention II, supra note 27, art. 13(2)(b). Article 44.3 of Additional Protocol I relaxes the
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deemed, by the 1874 Brussels Conference and the 1899 and 1907 Hague Peace Conferences,
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supra note 22, at 15. Case law is supportive. See, e.g., Mohammed Ali et al. v. Public Prosecutor
(1968), [1969] AC 430, 449; Ex parte Quirinetal., 317 U.S. 1 (1942). For a superb analysis of the
subject, see Kenneth Watkin, WARRIORS WITHOUT RIGHTS? COMBATANTS, UNPRIVILEGED
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85. This point is reflected in Customary Law Study, supra note 22, Rule 106.
86. "Members of the armed forces of a party to a conflict (other than medical personnel and
chaplains covered by Article 33 of the Third Convention) are combatants, that is to say, they
have the right to participate directly in hostilities." Additional Protocol I, supra note 13, art. 43.2.
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Spies, Guerrillas and Saboteurs, 1952 BRITISH YEARBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 323, reprinted
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issue of direct participation, see Michael N. Schmitt, Humanitarian Law and Direct Participation
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INTERNATIONAL LAW 511 (2005); Michael N. Schmitt, "Direct Participation in Hostilities" and
21st Century Armed Conflict, in CRISIS MANAGEMENT AND HUMANITARIAN PROTECTION:
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Regulations; 1906, 1929, and 1949 Geneva Conventions; and Additional Protocol I. General
Order No. 100, US Department of Army, Instructions for the Government of Armies of the
United States in the Field (Lieber Code), art. 117, reprinted in THE LAWS OF ARMED CONFLICT,
supra note 5, at 3; Hague II Regulations, supra note 9, art. 23(f); Hague IV Regulations, supra
note 9, art. 23(f); Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded in Armies
in the Field, arts. 27-28, July 6, 1906, reprinted in THE LAWS OF ARMED CONFLICT, supra note 5,
at 385; Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded in Armies in the
Field, arts. 24 & 28, July 27, 1929, reprinted in THE LAWS OF ARMED CONFLICT, supra note 5, at
409; Geneva Convention I, supra note 27, arts. 39, 44, 53, 54; Geneva Convention II, supra note
27, arts. 41, 44, 45; Additional Protocol I, supra note 13, art. 38.1. See also the military manuals of
many nations. E.g., Commander's Handbook, supra note 22, para. 11.9.6; UK Ministry of
Defence, The Manual of the Law of Armed Conflict, para. 5.10(a) (2004). Permitted purposes
are set forth in Geneva Convention I, supra note 27, arts. 24-27, 38-44; Geneva Convention II,
supra note 27, arts. 22, 24-25, 27, 36-39, 41-44; Geneva Convention IV, supra note 27, arts. 18-
22; Additional Protocol I, supra note 13, arts. 8, 18, 22-23. The prohibition is self-evidently
customary in nature today. See, e.g., Customary Law Study, supra note 22, Rule 59. When the
purpose of the misuse goes beyond merely "hiding" from the enemy to the use of the emblem to
treacherously attack, the separate violation ofperfidy occurs. See, e.g., Commander's Handbook,
supra note 22, para. 12.2.; Federal Ministry ofDefence (Germany), Humanitarian Law in Armed
Conflicts Manual, sec. 640 (1992).
90. Counter-targeting is "preventing or degrading detection, characterization, destruction, and
post-strike assessment." Defense Intelligence Agency, Saddam's Use of Human Shields and
Deceptive Sanctuaries: Special Briefing for the Pentagon Press Corps, Feb. 26, 2003, available at
www.defenselink.mil/news/Feb2003/g030226-D-9085M.html.
91. Todd S. Purdum, Night Time Ambush in Iraqi City, NEW YORK TIMES, Apr. 5, 2003, at 1;
Dexter Filkins, In the Field Choosing Targets: Iraqi Fighters Or Civilians? Hard Decision for
Copters, NEW YORK TIMES, Mar. 31, 2003, at 5.
92. This prescription tracks that found in the 1949 Fourth Geneva Convention, Article 28: "The
presence of a protected person may not be used to render certain points or areas immune from
military operations." The prohibition only applies vis-a-vis those who "find themselves ... in the
hands ofa Party to the conflict or Occupying Party ofwhich they are not nationals." It would not
apply to Iraqi forces using Iraqis as shields. Geneva Convention IV, supra note 27, art. 4.
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93. Customary Law Study, supra note 22, Rule 97. See also Commander's Handbook, supra note
22, para. 11.2; Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (Rome Statute), art.
8.2(b) (xxiii), July 17, 1998, reprinted in THE LAWS OF ARMED CONFLICT, supra note 5, at 1309.
The customary nature is further evidenced by the widespread condemnation that results
whenever shields are used. The UN General Assembly labeled Iraq's use ofhuman shields during
the first GulfWar as a "most grave and blatant violation of Iraq's obligations under international
law" GA Res. 46/134 (Dec. 17, 1991). In May 1995, Bosnian Serbs seized United Nations
Protection Force (UNPROFOR) peacekeepers and used them as human shields against NATO
air strikes. In response, the UN condemned the action, demanded release, and authorized the
creation of a rapid reaction force to handle such situations. SC Res. 998 (June 16, 1995).
94. A principle enshrined in Article 51.8 of Additional Protocol I: "Any violation of these
prohibitions [includes the prohibition on shielding] shall not release the Parties to the conflict
from their legal obligations with respect to the civilian population and civilians. ..."
95
.
Those taking the opposite stance on involuntary shields reasonably and accurately point out
that it creates an incentive for the use of shields because an opponent can effectively render a
military objective immune from attack simply by placing enough civilians at risk (by virtue of
operation of the proportionality principle). A.P.V. Rogers has argued that:
[A] tribunal considering whether a grave breach has been committed [a
disproportionate attack] would be able to take into account when considering the rule
of proportionality the extent to which the defenders had flouted their obligation to
separate military objectives from civilian objects and to take precautions to protect the
civilian population . . . the proportionality approach taken by the tribunals should help
to redress the balance which would otherwise be tilted in favour of the unscrupulous.
A.P.V. ROGERS, LAW ON THE BATTLEFIELD 129 (2d ed. 2004). See also W. Hays Parks, Air War
and the Law of War, 32 AIR FORCE LAW REVIEW 1, 163 ( 1992).
96. As noted in Article 51.3 of Additional Protocol I, "[civilians shall enjoy the protection
afforded by this Section, unless andfor such time as they take a directpart in hostilities. " The Rome
Statute adopts this standard by making it a war crime to intentionally attack civilians unless they
are "taking direct part in hostilities." Supra note 93, art. 8.2(b)(i). The United States correctly
takes the position that as direct participants, they become targetable (although there will seldom
be any reason to directly attack them) and, more important, are excluded in the estimation of
incidental injury when assessing proportionality.
And then, the other target category that is a challenge for us is where the human shields
that we've talked of before might be used. And you really have two types of human
shields. You have people who volunteer to go and stand on a bridge or a power plant or
a water works facility, and you have people that are placed in those areas not of their
own free will. In the case ofsome of the previous use ofhuman shields in Iraq, Saddam
placed hostages, if you will, on sensitive sites in order to show that these were human
shields, but, in fact, they were not there of their own free will. Two separate problems to
deal with that, and it requires that we work very carefully with the intelligence
community to determine what that situation might be at a particular location.
US Department of Defense, Background Briefing on Targeting, Mar. 5, 2003, available at
www.defenselink.mil/news/Mar2003/t03052003_t305targ.html. Human Rights Watch takes
the opposite position. Human Rights Watch, International Humanitarian Law Issues in a
Potential War in Iraq, Feb. 20, 2002, available at www.hrw.org/backgrounder/arms/
iraq0202003.htm#l. Children legally lack the mental capacity to form the intent to voluntarily shield
military objectives. Israeli forces do not use live ammunition against children. Justus R. Weiner,
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Cooperation Pursuant to the Interim Peace Agreements, 26 BROOKLYN JOURNAL OF
International Law 591 n.407 (2000).
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98. Off Target, supra note 82, at 72-73.
99. Marine Expeditionary Force 8c Multi-National Corps-Iraq, Telling the Fallujah Story to the
World, Briefing Slides, Nov. 20, 2004 (on file with author).
100. See also Customary Law Study, supra note 22, ch. 6.
101. Additional Protocol I, supra note 13, art. 12.4.
102. Id., art. 53(b). See also Hague IV Regulations, supra note 9, art. 27.
103. Off Target, supra note 82, at 72-73. On misuse of religious locations, see also Regime Shows
Disregardfor Historical, Religious Sites in Holy City, US Central Command News Release No. 03-
04-28, Apr. 2, 2003; Regime Use ofBaghdad Mosques And Hospitals, US Central Command News
Release No. 03-04-65, Apr. 6, 2003.
104. Additional Protocol I, supra note 13, art. 52.2. According to the ICRC Commentary on the
definition ofmilitary objective, " [t]he criterion ofpurpose is concerned with the intended future
use ofan object, while that ofuse is concerned with its present function." COMMENTARY ON THE
Additional Protocols of 8 June 1977 to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949,
at para. 2022 (Yves Sandoz, Christophe Swinarski & Bruno Zimmerman eds., 1987). For instance,
an apartment building's use as a unit headquarters transforms it into an attackable military
facility. Any collateral damage or incidental injury that might be caused during an attack thereon
would be governed by the principle of proportionality.
105. See also Rome Statute, supra note 93, art. 8.2(b) (ix).
106. See, e.g., Glenn Collins, Allied Advances, Tougher Iraqi Resistance, and a Hunt in the Tigris,
NEW YORK TIMES, Mar. 24, 2003, at 1; Brian Knowlton, Bush Tells ofVood Progress' But Says
War has Just Begun, INTERNATIONAL HERALD TRIBUNE, Mar. 24, 2003, at 6. The prohibition is
set forth in Article 37.1(a), Additional Protocol I. See also Lieber Code, supra, note 89, art. 71;
Project of an International Declaration Concerning the Laws and Customs of War (1874
Brussels Declaration), art. 13, reprinted in THE LAWS OF ARMED CONFLICT, supra note 5, at 21;
The Laws of War on Land (1880 Oxford Manual), at 9(b), reprinted in THE LAWS OF ARMED
CONFLICT, supra note 5, at 29; Hague II Regulations, supra note 9, art. 23(c); Hague IV
Regulations, supra note 9, art. 23(c); Additional Protocol I, supra note 13, art. 41.2(b). Violation
is a grave breach pursuant to Additional Protocol I, Article 85.3(e). A flag is not the sole means of
communicating intent to surrender; any technique that so informs the enemy suffices.
Surrendering forces are hors de combat and entitled to immunity from attack.
107. On the increasing use of suicide bombings in Iraq, see Robert A. Pape, Blowing Up an
Assumption, INTERNATIONAL HERALD TRIBUNE, May 19, 2005, at 8. See also ROBERT A. PAPE,
Dying to Win: The Strategic Logic of Suicide Terrorism (2005). Pape looked at 315
suicide bombings, concluding that suicide bombers are seldom religious fanatics. On the
contrary, the majority of bombings are conducted as part of a political or military campaign,
often intended to motivate democracies to leave territory that the bombers consider their
homeland. See also Dan Eggen 8c Scott Wilson, Suicide Bombs Potent Tools of Terrorist,
Washington Post, July 17, 2005, at Ai.
108. As illustrated by the kamikaze in the Second World War. See Yoram Dinstein, Jus in Bello
Issues Arising in the Hostilities in Iraq in 2003, 34 ISRAEL YEARBOOK ON HUMAN RIGHTS 1, 4-5
(2004), for a discussion of the legal issues in the context of the war in Iraq.
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110. Centers of gravity consist of" [t]hose characteristics, capabilities, or sources ofpower from
which a military force derives its freedom of action, physical strength, or will to fight." DoD
Dictionary, supra note 38.
111. To draw Israel into the conflict, thereby disrupting the Coalition, which included Arab
States such as Syria.
112. CNA consists of " [operations to disrupt, deny, degrade, or destroy information resident in
computers and computer networks, or the computers and networks themselves. . . . CNA relies
on the data stream to execute the attack. ..." An example is "sending a code or instruction to a
central processing unit that causes the computer to short out the power supply." DoD
Dictionary, supra note 38. On computer network attack, see COMPUTER NETWORK ATTACK
AND INTERNATIONAL LAW (Michael N. Schmitt & Brian O'Donnell eds., 2002) (Vol. 76, US
Naval War College International Law Studies); Michael N. Schmitt, Wired Warfare: Computer
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in Bello: An Introduction, in INTERNATIONAL EXPERTS CONFERENCE ON COMPUTER NETWORK
Attack and the Applicability of International Humanitarian Law: Proceedings 10
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(Karin Brystrom ed., 2005).
113. Recall that Article 57.2(a)(ii) of Additional Protocol I requires those who plan or decide
upon an attack to "take all feasible precautions in the choice of means and methods of attack
with a view to avoiding, and in any event to minimizing, incidental loss of civilian life, injury to
civilians and damage to civilian objects."
114. Ifthe computer contagions are designed to spread randomly in a way that may cause injury
to civilians or damage to civilian objects, they constitute prohibited indiscriminate weapon.
115. Dual-use objects are those used for both military and civilian purposes.
116. See, e.g., Knut Dormann, Applicability of the Additional Protocols to Computer Network
Attack, in INTERNATIONAL EXPERTS CONFERENCE, supra note 112, at 139, 145.
117. For instance, "the civilian population as such, as well as individual civilians, shall not be the
object ofattack" (51.2); "civilian objects shall not be the object of attack" (52.1); "indiscriminate
attacks are forbidden" (5 1 .4); "attacks shall be limited strictly to military objectives" (52.2); etc.
118. This position is consistent with other aspects ofAdditional Protocol I. For instance, Article
51, which provides that the "civilian population and individual civilians shall enjoy general
protection against dangers arising from military operations," and which prohibits "acts or
threats of violence the primary purpose of which is to spread terror among the civilian
population," as well as the commentary to Article 48, which notes that "the word 'operation'
should be understood in the context of the whole of the Section; it refers to military operations
during which violence is used." Additional Protocol I, supra note 13, art. 51.1-2; COMMENTARY,
supra note 104, para. 1875.
119. A point supported by the prohibition on attacks intended to terrorize the civilian
population in Additional Protocol I, art. 51.2.
120. See, e.g., James Brooke, North Koreans Claim to Extract Weapons Grade Fuelfor Bombs, NEW
YORK TIMES, May 12, 2005, at 1.
121. This is the position taken by the Customary Law Study, supra note 22.
122. For a threat analysis of biological weapons, see Milton Leitenberg, Biological Weapons and
"Bioterrorism" in the First Years of the 21st Century, 21:2 POLITICS AND THE LIFE SCIENCES 3
(2002).
123. Nuclear Weapons, supra note 4, para. 105E.
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Weapons, NAVAL WAR COLLEGE REVIEW, Spring 1998, at 91, reprinted in 7 JOURNAL OF LEGAL
STUDIES 57 (1997).
125. For instance, use of nuclear mines in remote areas of the high seas against enemy ballistic
missile submarines or low-yield battlefield nuclear weapons employed against armor forces in
remote parts ofthe desert when there is no wind. The situations are rare, but not unimaginable.
126. Additional States include Israel, Pakistan, India, and North Korea.
127. See Customary Law Study, supra note 22, ch. 22.
128. The term extends to members of the armed forces. It is not limited to objects.
COMMENTARY, supra note 104, at para. 2017.
129. The official ICRC COMMENTARY, discussing the term "definite military advantage," states
"it is not legitimate to launch an attack which offers only potential or indeterminate advantages."
COMMENTARY, supra note 104, para. 2024.
130. Commander's Handbook, supra note 22, para. 8.1.1. This assertion is labeled a "statement
of customary international law." The Handbook cites General Counsel, Department of Defense,
Letter of September 22, 1972, reprinted in 67 AMERICAN JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 123
(1973), as the basis for this characterization. US joint doctrine reinforces this approach by
providing that "[civilian objects consist of all civilian property and activities other than those
used to support or sustain the adversary's warfighting capability." Joint Publication 3-60, supra
note 56, at A-2. The term "war sustaining" also appears in the Instructions for the US Military
Commission at Guantanamo. Department of Defense, Military Commission Instruction No. 2,
Crimes and Elements for Trials by Military Commission, Apr. 30, 2003, para. 5D.
131. NATO's demands were set forth in a Statement of the Extraordinary Meeting of the North
Atlantic Council on April 12, 1999, and reaffirmed by the Heads of State and Government at
Washington on April 23. They included a cessation of military action, as well as ending violence
and repression of the Kosovar Albanians; withdrawal from Kosovo of military, police, and
paramilitary forces; an international military presence in Kosovo; safe return of refugees and
displaced persons and unhindered access to them by humanitarian aid organizations; and the
establishment of a political framework agreement on the basis ofthe Rambouillet Accords. Press
Release M-NAC-1(99)51, Apr. 12, 1999, available at www.nato.int/docu/pr/1999/p99-
051e.htm; Press Release S- 1(99)62, Apr. 23, 1999, available at www.nato.int/docu/pr/1999/p99-
062e.htm.
132. Christopher Marquis, In Wartime, Some Argue, Commanders in ChiefDo Best When They
Really Command, NEW YORK TIMES, Feb. 10, 2004, at 18.
133. See, e.g., Charles J. Dunlap, Jr., The End ofInnocence: RethinkingNoncombatancy in the Post-
Kosovo Era, Strategic Review 14 (Summer 2000).
134. Effects based operations are "[a]ctions taken against enemy systems designed to achieve
specific effects that contribute directly to desired military and political outcomes." US Air Force,
Air Force Glossary (AF Doctrine Document 1-2) 26 (Aug. 24, 2004). Consider electrical power.
Command and control usually relies to some degree on the civilian electrical grid. Therefore, in
the past, neutralizing C2 often led to strikes against power substations and generating plants.
However, the effect sought was not destruction of the electrical grid, but merely interference
with command and control. An effects-based analysis would deconstruct the electrical grid to
identify that discrete component thereof depriving C2, and little more, of electricity. Only that
component would be attacked. A focus on effects has now been included in the National Military
Strategy: "Force application focuses more on generating the right effects to achieve objectives
than on generating overwhelming numbers of forces." National Military Strategy, supra note 50,
at 15.
135. On effects-based operations, see DAVID A. DEPTULA, EFFECTS-BASED OPERATIONS:
CHANGE IN THE NATURE OF WAR (2001); Department of Defense, Effects-based Operations
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Briefing, Mar. 19, 2003, available afwww.defenselink.mil/news/Mar2003/g030318-D-9085.html.
On EBO and law, see Michael N. Schmitt, Aerial Effects-Based Operations and the Law ofArmed
Conflict, paper presented at a conference to mark the launch of the UK Manual of the Law of
Armed Conflict, Oxford University, July 2004. The articles presented at the conference will
appear in a compilation to be edited by Steven Haines.
136. See generally PeterW.W. Wijninga & Richard Szafranski, Beyond Utility Targeting: Towards
Axiological Operations, AEROSPACE POWER JOURNAL, Winter 2000, at 45.
137. Proponents of axiological operations cite Colonel John Warden's model, in which the
enemy is attacked as a system consisting of five concentric circles (leadership, organic or system
essentials, infrastructure, population, and fielded forces), as an example of sophisticated utility
targeting. In Warden's approach, the intent is to cause the system to malfunction such that
paralysis sets in. On Warden's theory, see JOHN A. WARDEN III, THE AIR CAMPAIGN: PLANNING
FOR COMBAT (Brassey's rev. ed., 1998).
138. Recall the comments by NATO air commander, Lieutenant General Michael Short,
regarding Operation Allied Force air attacks against Belgrade: "I felt that on the first night the
power should have gone off, and major bridges around Belgrade should have gone into the
Danube, and the water should be cut off so the next morning the leading citizens of Belgrade
would have got up and asked 'Why are we doing this?' and asked Milosevic the same question."
Short realized that Milosevic most feared losing the support of the population, and thereby
political power; in axiological operations terms, popular support for the regime was the value to
be attacked to most effectively create the effects sought—incentivizing compliance with NATO
demands. C.R. Whitney, The Commander; Air Wars Wont Stay Risk-Free, General Says, NEW
YORK TIMES, June 18, 1999, at Al.
139. Additional Protocol I, supra note 13, art. 57.2.
140. For example, Human Rights Watch specifically discussed the Djakovica Road incident in its
report on Operation Allied Freedom, concluding that because "higher altitude seems to have
impeded a pilot from adequately identifying a target" . . . "inadequate precautions were taken to
avoid civilian casualties." Human Rights Watch, Civilian Deaths in the NATO Air Campaign,
Feb. 2000, available at www.hrw.org/reports/2000/nato/index.htm#TopOfPag.
141. As noted by Michael Bothe et al., "[t]he term military advantage involves a variety of
considerations, including the security of the attacking force." BOTHE ET AL., supra note 84, para.
2.4.4. See also, A.P.V. Rogers, Zero-Casualty Warfare, 82 INTERNATIONAL REVIEW OF THE RED
CROSS 165 (2000).
142. The term "battlespace" has been formally adopted in the National Military Strategy, supra
note 50, at 16.
143. Some argue (albeit contentiously) that even future potential use meets the purpose
criterion, although the better position is that there must be a reasonable belief that such use is
highly likely before an object or location may be characterized as a military objective and
attacked.
144. Effects-based Operations Briefing, supra note 135. To take another example, during
Operation Cobra, the breakout from Normandy, US air forces dropped 14,600 500-pound
bombs on one German division, destroying 66 tanks and 1 1 heavy guns. During Desert Storm,
the US dropped 9,800 precision guided munitions, destroying 2,500 tanks, heavy artillery pieces,
and armored personnel carriers—a ratio of bombs to equipment destroyed 50 times that of
Operation Cobra. Robert A. Pape, Hit or Miss: What Precision Air Weapons do Precisely, FOREIGN
AFFAIRS, Sept./Oct. 2004, at 160, 163.
145. For general discussions ofthe conduct ofthe war in Iraq, see JOHN KEEGAN, THE IRAQ WAR
(2004); Anthony H. Cordesman, The War In Iraq: Strategy, Tactics, and Military
Lessons (2003); Williamson Murray & Robert H. Scales, Jr., The Iraq war: A Military
History (2003).
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VIII
Modern Weaponry and Warfare:
The Application ofArticle 36 ofAdditional
Protocol I by Governments
Marie Jacobsson*
Introduction
The basic rules directly addressing the use of weapons as reflected in Addi-
tional Protocol I to the 1949 Geneva Conventions are found in Articles 35
and 36. 1 Needless to say, there are other articles in the Protocol (primarily those re-
lating to targeting) and, of course, other conventions that also address matters re-
lating to the use of weapons. Regulating and restricting the use of weapons is not
only a matter that is dealt with in the context of international humanitarian law,
disarmament law and human rights law are also relevant.
Neither the 1949 Geneva Conventions nor the 1977 Additional Protocols prohibit
a specific, easily identifiable weapon. This conclusion is by no means controversial.
On the contrary, the International Committee ofthe Red Cross's (ICRC's) Commen-
tary to the Additional Protocol I clearly concluded that " [t]he Protocol does not im-
pose a specific prohibition on any specific weapon. The prohibitions are those of
customary law, or are contained in other international agreements." 2 The ICRC's
Customary International Humanitarian Law3 study draws the same conclusion.
* Principal Legal Adviser on International Law to the Swedish Ministry for Foreign Affairs. The
ideas presented in this paper do not necessarily reflect the views of the Swedish Government.
© 2006 by Marie Jaobbson.
Article 36 ofAdditional Protocol I
In many States, soldiers are taught that it is prohibited to use certain types of
weapons.4 A section on prohibited weapons also has a natural part in any decent
presentation to the public ofthe contents of international humanitarian law. 5 As a
result ofsuch education, as well as media coverage, many people are aware that cer-
tain weapons are prohibited, such as gas, dum-dum bullets and anti-personnel
land mines. In short, the general public has the perception (however vague it might
be) that the laws ofwarfare prohibit and restrict the use ofweapons. Or perhaps it
would be better to say that the prohibitions and restrictions are nothing but a re-
flection of "the laws of humanity and the dictates of the public conscience."6
However, when a lawyer, or for that matter, any interested person, attempts to
list prohibited weapons, the result may be described in two diametrical ways. It is
either possible to conclude that the list is depressingly short, or to conclude that it is
impressively long; it all depends on the perspective. When viewed from that ofhu-
manitarian law, the list can be characterized as depressingly short; from that of in-
ternational disarmament law, the list can be characterized as impressively long.
Although the ICRC Commentary is clear (and the Customary International
Humanitarian Law study somewhat less clear) 7 when it concludes that Additional
Protocol I does not impose a specific prohibition on any specific weapon, the sec-
ond paragraph of Article 35 of the Protocol declares that "It is prohibited to em-
ploy weapons, projectiles and material and methods ofwarfare of a nature to cause
superfluous injury or unnecessary suffering." This is nothing short of a clear-cut
prohibition on certain types of means of warfare (weapons, projectiles and mate-
rial), as well as a clear-cut prohibition of certain methods ofwarfare.
It is well known that the language of this article catches the essence of the long-
standing prohibition under international law that certain weapons are unaccept-
able (to phrase it in ethical and moral terms) and hence such weapons are prohib-
ited (to phrase it in normative and legal terms).
However, the Geneva Conventions and the Additional Protocols do not offer
much practical guidance as to which particular weapons are prohibited. These
conventions leave it to the States themselves to identify the weapons that fall under
the prohibition. Attempts by individual States and individual nongovernmental
organizations to propose an independent "international scrutinizing mechanism"
have never met with support. What was left from the Diplomatic Conference in the
1970s was the obligation imposed on States to determine whether the employment
of a particular weapon "would, in some or all circumstances, be prohibited by this
Protocol or by any other rule of international law." 8
In fact, even that provision must be regarded as a diplomatic success, given the
resistance on the part of some States to include such a provision in the Protocol.
Unfortunately, very few States undertake such an examination before employing
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new means and methods of warfare, despite the fact that the obligation relates to
the initial stages, i.e., the "study" and "development" of a new weapon.
The ICRC has attempted to assist States—and put pressure on States—to estab-
lish evaluation procedures to meet the obligation in Article 36. The first attempt
was made through the so-called SIrUS project. 9 That was not very successful.
More successful was the initiative taken at the 28th International Conference of
the Red Cross and Red Crescent in 2003. The Conference invited States that have
review procedures in place to cooperate with the ICRC with a view to facilitating
the voluntary exchange of experience on review procedures. 10 The purpose of the
"exchange of experience" is to disseminate knowledge of, and information about,
how Article 36 is implemented, with the goal that more and more States would es-
tablish Article 36 procedures. Such processes of informal exchanges of experience
have already commenced, including several meetings and workshops. 11
The Swedish Delegation for International Law Monitoring ofArms Projects
The Swedish Delegation for International Law Monitoring of Arms Projects was
set up by the Government in 1974 to meet the requirements of international hu-
manitarian law concerning the potential effects of conventional (mainly anti-per-
sonnel) weapons for unnecessary suffering and indiscriminate use. Sweden and the
United States were the first States to set up such a mechanism.
The reason the Delegation was set up should be seen against the efforts made by
Sweden, particularly during the early 1970s, as regards restrictions and use of cer-
tain excessively inhumane weapons. It was noted that the Swedish efforts were met
by growing international response. It was therefore considered that future Swedish
requisition of arms for the military defense needed to be judged and scrutinized
from the perspective of international law (hence, not only humanitarian law). It
was deemed that such examination was best undertaken in conjunction with the
then existing technical-economical examination. It was therefore decided that the
Delegation should consist of experts on international and national law, military
and technical experts, experts on arms technology and scientists. The Delegation is
today an independent "authority." It is not subordinated to the Swedish Defence
Forces or any other authority or ministry.
The Delegation monitors planned purchases or modifications of military weap-
ons or applications ofmeans and methods ofwarfare to assess whether they would
be dubious from the point of view of international law (primarily humanitarian
law), human rights law and disarmament law.
After monitoring, the Delegation makes either approval or non-approval deci-
sion. The Delegation may combine a negative decision with a request that
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modifications of the construction of the weapon or ammunition be made, or that
the applicant consider an alternative weapon system or restrict the operational use
of the weapon in order to meet the requirements of international law. The deci-
sions can be appealed to the Government.
The mandate of the Delegation developed over time. It has become more and
more precise—but also wider. It was clear from the outset that the Delegation
should not only look at what was already forbidden under international law, but
also on international discussions that could lead to further prohibitions. Hence,
the mandate(s) has/have clearly reflected not only de lege lata requirements, but
also de legeferenda tendencies.
For example, the year after the establishment ofthe Delegation, in 1975, follow-
ing the Lucerne and Lugano conferences that preceded the negotiations on the Ad-
ditional Protocols, the Ministry of Defence amended the instructions for the
Delegation with regard to projected means of warfare to direct that it should par-
ticularly examine whether they could result in unnecessary suffering or have indis-
criminate effects.
Some features ofthe mandate have been particularly noteworthy. Among those
is the requirement that the Delegation, in examining weapons projects, should not
only take into account existing law, but also international treaties that had not yet
entered into force, but which Sweden had signed or ratified.
Consideration should also be given to proposals that Sweden had put forward at
international conferences.
In addition, attention should also be given to the limited resources ofSweden as
regards weapons acquisition. The Delegation should make sure that the possibility
ofSweden to be part of the development in weapons technology was not impeded.
The Delegation had, particularly in the 1980s, contacts with the Swedish weapon
industry.
The present mandate of the Delegation is formulated under a separate ordi-
nance that stems from 1994. In that year, the Delegation became an independent
authority under the Ministry of Defence. According to the ordinance, all Swedish
authorities (e.g., the Swedish Armed Forces, the Coast Guard and the Swedish Po-
lice Authority) that intend to purchase weapons must report their intended pur-
chases to the Delegation, which then monitors the project. As a result, the
Delegation has examined the acquisition of so-called pepper spray and certain am-
munition to be used by the Swedish police, the Swedish Coast Guard, and the
Swedish Prison and Probation Service.
Finally, it should be mentioned that the Delegation has a right to initiate moni-
toring even ifthe Swedish authorities have not reported planned purchases or use.
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What Kind ofComments Has the Delegation Made?
The Delegation often requests more information or requires more tests to be made
if it believes that the test results either do not meet scientific criteria or are difficult
to interpret. Moreover, it often sets out conditions for the use of a certain weapon,
for example, that a certain projectile must be used only for anti-materiel purposes;
that development of a weapon may continue only if certain conditions are met; or
that only a described combination of a weapon and ammunition is allowed, and if
changes are made, a new application must be submitted.
The analysis comprises both primary and secondary effects, possible indiscrimi-
nate effects, whether Sweden (or any other State) has put forward a proposal that
could lead to a prohibition, and implications of allowing civil authorities such as
the Swedish police or the Coast Guard, but not military personnel, to use a specific
weapon.
Since the Delegation primarily focuses on anti-personnel weapons or weapons
that can have anti-personnel effects, the two notions ofsuperfluous injury and un-
necessary suffering are of particular interest. The Delegation has not established
specific criteria of its own, but evaluates the weapons much along the lines that are
described in the Customary International Humanitarian Law study. 12
The extended mandate ofthe Delegation has been both a challenging and mean-
ingful exercise. It is challenging because the traditional ethical norms transformed
into international humanitarian law rules do not correspond with the norms ex-
pressed in human rights law. Tear gas and pepper spray are clearly prohibited un-
der disarmament law and international humanitarian law as means and methods
of warfare, but perfectly acceptable in a police enforcement situation.
Although the mandate has been extended, it does not cover export control. It is
the Swedish Inspectorate ofStrategic Products that is entrusted with the task ofen-
suring that the export of weapons is in conformity with Swedish laws and regula-
tions. However, it does not fall under the competence of the Inspectorate to
examine whether or not a weapon would contravene humanitarian law rules.
This has raised some concern. The Swedish Government, together with the
Swedish Red Cross, and the other Nordic States, therefore issued a Pledge at the
28th International Conference of the Red Cross and Red Crescent in 2003 to
undertake a review of national legislation and policies on arms transfer, in order to
explore the possibilities to take international humanitarian law into consideration as
one of the criteria on which arms transfer decisions are made and to examine
appropriate ways of assessing an arms recipient's likely respect for international
humanitarian law. 13
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The Nordic States also pledged "to use the result of the review as a basis in order
to explore the possibilities to develop a model for the incorporation of interna-
tional humanitarian law criteria in national arms transfer decision-making." 14
Sweden has commenced working to achieve the goals set out in the Pledge.
There are various references to "Swedish needs" in relation to the mandate of
the Delegation. This might be surprising to those who believe the illusion that Swe-
den has taken advocated strong positions in all weapons contexts (disarmament, as
well as international humanitarian law) on the ground that Sweden did not have a
national security interest to protect. Such an assumption is incorrect.
On the contrary, Sweden, in the 1970s aiming at proclaimed neutrality in war
time, had all the more reason to ensure that it could secure its own weapon produc-
tion and, as a consequence, that the industry was strong enough to export its prod-
ucts and survive. At the same time, Sweden had at long-standing ideological record
in the context ofdisarmament, humanitarian law and human rights values. Instead
of disconnecting what on the surface appear to be contradictory policies, all Swed-
ish Governments attempted to combine them—and still do. Faced with a relatively
new political context (judged from the perspective of a history of nearly 200 years
of almost uninterrupted neutrality in wartime), namely, the fall of the Berlin Wall
and new political requirements, including its membership in the European Union,
Sweden has started to take a new and fresh look at the weapons issues.
To limit the rights of combatants to use certain new weapons is often inter-
preted as "telling the industry" not to develop certain types ofweapons. That is to
cast an obligation in the negative. Instead, it gives the producers an opportunity to
interpret the prohibition in a positive manner, i.e., develop weapons that fall into
the framework ofArticle 36! This can be part ofthe producers' policy on corporate
responsibility.
But it is not enough that the Governments and the producers are collaborating.
Weapons technology is still developing at an impressive speed. The manufacturers
quickly respond to the demands of the market, irrespective ofwhether the market
consists of States, organizations or individuals. Indeed, this is yet another area
where the market economy has proven to be "successful." At the same time, States
focus their discussions on existing weapons and remnants of weapons that cause
problems today. Oftomorrow's weapons we hear nothing—at least not in the con-
text of discussing their legality or legitimacy. The real challenge is to get States to
focus on "new weapons" and "methods of warfare."
All weapons need to be reviewed from a humanitarian perspective. The diffi-
cult challenge is whether or not the same norms should apply when considering a
weapon used by one combatant against another combatant, as when we consider
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a weapon or ammunition to be used by a police enforcement official against a
civilian.
Previously, it seemed easy to argue that there is a built-in distinction between a
combatant-to-combatant situation (a traditional armed conflict) and a police en-
forcement situation. In the first situation, the combatant is simply not allowed to
attack a civilian. In the second, the entire rationale for the police operation is to re-
store civil order and security for individuals by, albeit as a last resort, the use of
force. The objective of the military operation is to weaken the enemy by disabling
his combatants. Today such a distinction is more difficult to uphold, for example,
the UN operation maybe exclusively one ofpeacekeeping or one that contains ele-
ments of both peacekeeping and police enforcement or even an Operation Other
Than War (OOTW).
In this context, it is interesting to note that, despite the almost daily reports on
the development and employment of so-called non-lethal (or less lethal) weapons,
virtually no discussion on the political and legal implications of these weapons has
been held on a State-to-State basis, either at a civil or military level. It is worrying
that the legally shallow argument, "it is always better to be wounded than dead," is
resurfacing in the discussion on less lethal weapons.
There are a number of critical issues that need to be addressed at an interna-
tional level. These include high-power microwaves, millimeter waves, thermobaric
devices and improvised explosive devices. Addressing them does not imply that the
weapons should be prohibited. But given the obligation imposed on all States to
evaluate the legality of the weapons used, it is reasonable to discuss the matter in a
multilateral context.
Conclusion
I would like to encourage States to:
• Set up Article 36 mechanisms;
• Get medical, military, technical, industry experts, lawyers and scientists
involved;
• Establish a transparent view;
• Be prepared to review the mandate;
• Cooperate with other States—not only with allies.
Finally, be a step ahead. Look not just at existing weapons and methods of warfare
but at the new weapons and new warfighting methods that rapidly evolving tech-
nological capabilities are now and will continue to produce. International
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humanitarian law and the "dictates of public conscience" require that these weap-
ons and methods ofwarfare be examined to ensure they are consistent with the law
and do not unnecessarily add to the suffering inherent in war.
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Chemical Agents and "Expanding55 Bullets:




Modern armed conflict has entered a particularly dangerous, and in many
ways, chaotic phase. The post-September 11, 2001 period has witnessed
significant debate concerning the ability of existing humanitarian norms to regu-
late 21st-century warfare, and in particular the "war on terror." 1 In an interna-
tional system of "order" based on the nation-State much of today's conflict is
taking place on the fringes of what Clausewitz might have viewed as war between
"civilized peoples." 2
Certainly as the 2003 Iraq campaign demonstrated, traditional conflict between
States is still a reality. Here, the "black and white" treaty law provides a well estab-
lished, if not perfect, normative structure known as the law ofarmed conflict or in-
ternational humanitarian law. 3 Customary international law also sets out the
obligations of States in international armed conflict. Determination of the exact
scope of this second body oflaw is more challenging as is evidenced in the continu-
ing dialogue over which of the provisions ofAdditional Protocol I are to be viewed
* Brigadier General, Canadian Forces. The opinions expressed in this article are those of the
author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Government of Canada, the Canadian
Forces, or the Office of the Judge Advocate General.
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as customary international law.4 However, notwithstanding this dialogue, there is a
significant commonality in the understanding of the obligations on States during
the conduct of hostilities. 5
However, much of contemporary conflict is occurring in what can be termed a
"gray" zone. There are four situations where the military forces of the State are re-
quired to conduct operations at the interface between warfare and policing: occu-
pation, non-international armed conflict, peace support operations and the
international campaign against terrorism. Consistent with the term "gray zone,"
the determination of the normative framework to be applied is not always clear.
While there is often a common theme ofviolence being applied between State and
non-State actors, the lack of clarity as to what rules should be followed occurs in
two ways. First, there is the question of the degree to which the law of armed con-
flict, designed for inter-State conflict, can or should regulate violence between
State and non-State actors. Secondly, there is the inevitable interface between the
law ofarmed conflict and human rights norms. In simpler terms: the rules govern-
ing armed conflict versus those applying to law enforcement.
Resolving the question ofwhich normative framework applies is extremely im-
portant. For the personnel involved, identification of the correct normative
framework governing the decision to use force can be literally a matter of life and
death. Complying with that framework means military personnel are not only act-
ing "legally," but also in accordance with the value system demanded by modern
States of its "warriors."6 The importance for soldiers, sailors and airmen to act ac-
cording to the standards of society, both broader society as well as military society,
cannot be overstated.
In dealing with this challenge of applying the law, military and civilian govern-
ment legal advisors can take some solace from the fact that they are not alone in
their struggle to do the right thing in the complex security situations confronting
States. Non-governmental organizations and other humanitarian groups are also
wrestling with what law or norms should be applied to 21st-century conflict. 7 Just
as military forces are changing their understanding and approaches towards armed
conflict, human rights and humanitarian groups are being confronted with having
to apply long-cherished norms in an uncertain operational environment. One
scholar from the humanitarian law community has written "[i]t is debatable
whether the challenges ofasymmetrical war can be met with the current law ofwar.
Ifwar between States is on the way out, perhaps the norms ofinternational law that
were devised for them are becoming obsolete as well."8 This observation provides
an indication that the ability of existing codified law to meet the challenges of 21st-
century warfare is being opened up to considerable debate.
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The purpose of this article is to look at two discrete areas of weapons usage
—
chemical agents and "expanding" bullets—in order to identify some of the chal-
lenges presented in determining the law governing their use during complex secu-
rity operations. Such operations often straddle the armed conflict and law
enforcement paradigms. In this analysis, particular reference will be made to the
2005 International Committee ofthe Red Cross Customary International Humani-
tarian Law study (hereinafter the Study). 9 This ambitious Study seeks to outline
customary international law rules for both international and non-international
armed conflict, as well as provide an important compendium of State practice. In
seeking to clarify the customary law ofarmed conflict rules that apply to non-inter-
national armed conflict, the Study represents the most fulsome attempt to date to
do something that the courts, academics and the militaries themselves have in-
creasingly attempted to do over the past few decades. 10 That being said, the Study
offers a starting point for discussion rather than the definitive word on what con-
stitutes customary international humanitarian law. The ultimate test for such
statements of customary international law, and particularly those dealing with the
law of armed conflict, may be whether they can be practically applied by govern-
ments and the military forces who act on their behalf.
This exploration of the law surrounding the use of chemical agents and "ex-
panding" bullets in contemporary conflict is divided into four parts. The first part
outlines the law of armed conflict governing the use of these weapons. Particular
emphasis is placed on identifying the restrictions on their use set out in treaty law.
However, as will be noted, those prohibitions are not absolute as both chemical
agents and "expanding" bullets are permitted in law enforcement situations. The
second part identifies two approaches to analyzing contemporary armed conflict.
The first more formal approach sets out distinct categories of conflicts such as in-
ternational armed conflict, non-international armed conflict and domestic distur-
bances that are often analyzed independently ofone another. However, the second
approach notes armed conflict is increasingly being viewed in a less structured
manner, thereby recognizing greater potential for overlap between the law of
armed conflict and human rights normative regimes.
This then leads to the third area of analysis: the challenge of applying the law of
armed conflict rules governing chemical agents and "expanding" bullets in con-
temporary conflict. The final part outlines State practice in applying the "spirit and
principle" ofthe law ofarmed conflict rather than the formal rules governing large-
scale inter-State conflict. In effect, there is a more flexible application of the law
than a rule-based system of international armed conflict otherwise provides. In the
final analysis, it is suggested the complex 21st-century security environment may
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require a re-analysis of rules governing the use of less lethal weapons such as riot
control agents and "expanding" bullets.
Broad Prohibitions?
In dealing with chemical weapons and "expanding" bullets across the broad spec-
trum of conflict, it will be helpful to first review the provisions ofthe law as they ap-
ply to international armed conflict.
Chemical Weapons
As is noted in the Study, there is a broad treaty prohibition against the use ofchemical
weapons in international armed conflict, including: the 1899 Hague Declaration Con-
cerning Asphyxiating Gases, 11 the 1925 Geneva Gas Protocol, 12 the 1993 Chemical
Weapons Convention 13 and the 1998 Statute of the International Criminal
Court. 14 For example, there are only 13 States that are not a "party to either the
Geneva Gas Protocol or the Chemical Weapons Convention." 15 Strong support for
suggesting that such a ban is customary is found in domestic legislation, military
manuals and the statements of governments and national case law. 16
Similarly, in respect of non-international armed conflict, the Chemical
Weapons Convention, Article I broad prohibition framed as "under any circum-
stances" reflects a more general trend "towards reducing the distinction between
international and non-international armed conflicts for the purposes of the rules
governing the conduct of hostilities." 17 Many of the contemporary abuses, per-
haps most infamously the use of chemical weapons by Saddam Hussein against
the Kurds in 1988, 18 have occurred in non-international armed conflict. In terms
of a normative prohibition there appears to be a broad consensus, including a
strong statement by the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugosla-
via Appeal Chamber in the Tadic decision against the use of such weapons in non-
international armed conflict. 19
However, not all military use of "chemicals" is prohibited. It is, after all, a
"weapons" convention involving "toxic chemicals and their precursors."20 As a
result, military purposes "not connected with the use of chemical weapons and
not dependent upon the use ofthe toxic properties of chemicals as method ofwar-
fare" are not prohibited.21 This is not the end of the discussion. The use of "chemi-
cal agents" is not absolutely forbidden for all purposes by States seeking to control
violence. There is a significant exception regarding the use of such agents. Among
the purposes not prohibited under the Convention is "[l]aw enforcement includ-
ing domestic riot control purposes."22 However, "riot control agents" will not be
used as a method of warfare. 23 A rationale provided for the prohibition of what is
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otherwise an effective, less-lethal means of warfare, and one particularly suited to
certain activities such as forcing an enemy out of caves, bunkers and confined
spaces, is "the fact that use of tear gas . . . 'runs the danger of provoking the use of
other more dangerous chemicals' . . . since a party 'may think it is being attacked
by deadly chemicals and resort to the use of chemical weapons.'"24
Riot control agents have traditionally been associated with CS and CN gases as
well as vomiting agents. 25 The clarification over the use of chemical agents for law
enforcement found in the Chemical Weapons Convention ended long-standing
controversy over the scope of the 1925 Gas Protocol. The Study indicates the vast
majority of States were of the view the Protocol did apply to riot control agents;
however, there were notable exceptions.26 The United States took the view that the
Gas Protocol did not apply to agents with temporary effects and used such agents
during the Vietnam conflict. 27 The United Kingdom clarified its position in 1970
to indicate "CS and other such gases accordingly as being outside the scope of the
Geneva Protocol."28
The exception regarding the use of chemical agents for law enforcement pur-
poses is reflected, perhaps too narrowly, in the Study in Rule 75 which states "[t]he
use of riot-control agents as a method ofwarfare is prohibited." It should be noted
that under the Chemical Weapons Convention "law enforcement" is a broader
concept than "riot control."29 These provisions reflect State practice where certain
chemical agents are used against citizens for law enforcement purposes, primarily
as a less lethal alternative to using deadly force. 30 Not all such agents are used as
"riot control agents" as chemical substances such as "pepper spray" may be used
for self-defense and for subduing of violent suspects. 31
In addition to riot control agents, chemical incapacitants can include
malodorants32 and calmatives. 33 The use of the latter led to tragic consequences
during the 2002 Moscow Theatre hostage rescue operation when Russian security
forces attempted to incapacitate Chechen terrorists with gas.34
"Expanding" Bullets
The second area where the law ofarmed conflict and law enforcement can interface
is in respect of the prohibition against using "bullets which expand or flatten easily
in the human body."35 This prohibition is linked to the 1899 Hague Declaration36
and Additional Protocol I, Article 35(2) in that it is prohibited "to employ weap-
ons, projectiles and material and methods ofwarfare of a nature to cause superflu-
ous injury or unnecessary suffering."37 The use ofbullets "which expand or flatten
easily in the human body, such as bullets with a hard envelope which does not en-
tirely cover the core or is pierced with incisions" is listed as a "war crime" in the
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1998 Rome Statute ofthe International Criminal Court (ICC Statute) in respect of
international armed conflicts. 38
The question of whether "expanding" bullets may be used in non-interna-
tional armed conflict is a more interesting one. In respect of the Study it is noted
that the prohibition against the use of "expanding" bullets "in any armed conflict
is set out in several military manuals"39 and that "[n]o official contrary practice
was found with respect to either international armed conflict or non-interna-
tional armed conflict."40
Since Canada was one ofthe countries whose manual was identified as support-
ing this principle, it is important to note that the Canadian manual approaches the
application of the law of armed conflict to internal armed conflict situations in a
much more nuanced fashion than the Study suggests. The Canadian manual does
not make a broad statement suggesting that "expanding" bullets are prohibited as a
matter of law in non-international armed conflict situations. The Law ofArmed
Conflict at the Operational and Tactical Level does state that expanding bullets are
prohibited weapons under the law ofarmed conflict. 41 However, the application of
the law of armed conflict to non-international armed conflict is specifically dis-
cussed in terms ofcommon Article 342 and Additional Protocol II.43 As the Cana-
dian manual indicates, "[t]oday a significant number of armed conflicts in which
the CF maybe involved are non-international in nature. As stated, the law applica-
ble to such conflicts is limited. It is CF policy, however, that the CF will, as a mini-
mum, apply the spirit and principles ofthe LOAC during all operations other than
domestic operations."44
This is not to suggest that "expanding" bullets are permitted as a means ofwar-
fare in non-international armed conflict. However, the rules of the law of armed
conflict may have a far more nuanced application in complex security situations
where a significant part of the duties of military forces may also involve law en-
forcement and other public security duties. In this regard, it must be noted that the
Appeals Chamber in the Tadic decision warned that two limitations would apply to
the application of humanitarian law rules to non-international armed conflict.
Those limitations were "(i) only a number of rules and principles governing inter-
national armed conflicts have gradually been extended to apply to internal con-
flicts; and (ii) this extension has not taken place in the form of a full and
mechanical transplant of those rules to internal conflicts; rather, the general es-
sence ofthose rules, and not the detailed regulation they may contain, has become
applicable to internal conflicts."45
There is also a further indication that the broad extension of the law of armed
conflict to non-international conflict found in the Study may not fully reflect the
contemporary consensus of States. In this respect, unlike the provision making the
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use of"expanding" bullets a war crime during international armed conflict, there is
no similar provision in the ICC statute in respect of "conflicts not ofan international
character."46 As with the use of chemical agents, it is also notable that there is a "law
enforcement" exception regarding the use of"expanding" bullets. While this excep-
tion is not written in any treaty, it is specifically referred to in the Study.47 Unfortu-
nately, in the Study it is phrased in terms of "several" States having decided to use
such ammunition for domestic law enforcement purposes. There seems to be a sig-
nificantly broader practice than this wording suggests, extending even to the devel-
opment of "fragible" ammunition. "Expanding" ammunition appears to be used
by security forces in Canada, the United States and the United Kingdom primarily
for reasons related to the ammunition being "less susceptible to ricochet and the
concomitant creation of unintended collateral casualties."48
Law Enforcement Operations
It is these exceptions to the prohibitions of chemical agents and "expanding" bul-
lets that raise some of the most significant challenges to the contemporary law of
armed conflict. Both chemical agents and "expanding" bullets options are em-
ployed in law enforcement operations with humanitarian goals in mind. For
chemical agents, it is the opportunity to apply less lethal means. Regarding the use
of "expanding" ammunition, sometimes, but far too inclusively, referred to as
"hollow point" bullets, it is concerns over collateral damage and injury that favor
their use. When these means are not allowed, particularly where armed conflicts
and law enforcement responsibilities interface, a situation can be created where a
less "humane" option is imposed on combatants. As a result, uninvolved civilians
maybe exposed to greater risk ofdeath or injury because ofthe application ofrules
that are approximately a century old in their genesis and which were designed spe-
cifically for State versus State conflict. The circumstances under which these moral
and legal challenges arise are particularly evident is the complex operational envi-
ronment of contemporary conflict. In that respect, the analysis will now turn to
looking at how modern conflict is impacting on the application of normative re-
gimes governing the use of these less lethal weapons.
"Paper Worlds" and the Categorization ofConflict
The application of the law ofwar is dependent upon the categorization of conflict.
While Michael Walzer has noted "lawyers have created a paper world which fails at
crucial points to correspond to the world the rest of us live in,"49 the establishment
of law and order is ultimately dependent upon the drawing of jurisdictional lines.
199
Chemical Agents and "Expanding" Bullets
However, the determination ofwhen and how the law ofwar applies is impacted by
two often divergent perspectives.
One more traditional approach sees conflict divided into three formal catego-
ries of: international armed conflict, non-international armed conflict and "situa-
tions of internal disturbances and tensions." 50 International armed conflict is
governed by the extensive treaty and customary law regime of the law ofwar, while
the last category is controlled by a law enforcement/human rights regime. The
boundaries of each of these two categories are fairly well prescribed. International
armed conflict is largely defined by inter-State conflict, while non-international
armed conflict is usually separated from normal law enforcement by the require-
ment for the conflict to be between "organized armed groups" controlling territory
and exercising a semblance of governance. It should also be noted Additional Pro-
tocol I provides recognition that international armed conflict can occur between
States and non-State actors. 51 However, there is a generally recognized view that
most non-State groups will not be able to avail themselves of its provisions. 52
Under a traditional interpretation of the law, the law ofarmed conflict operates
during international armed conflict as a lex specialis to the exclusion of human
rights norms. 53 Even though there is a growing body of case law and opinion that
places the law of war in a more tightly woven relationship with human rights
norms, even during international armed conflict,54 in many instances this idea of
overlap continues to be rejected particularly where it is suggested that human
rights treaties have extra-territorial application. 55
Finally, in respect of non-international armed conflict, it is the provisions of
common Article 3 to the 1949 Geneva Conventions56 and Additional Protocol II57
which are applied. The scope of internal armed conflict can be quite broad ranging
from civil war to conflict just outside the scope ofpurely criminal activity. 58 A par-
ticular challenge has been identifying the limits to the application ofcommon Arti-
cle 3 which does not have the territorial control; organized armed forces with a
responsible command; or "sustained and concerted military operations" criteria of
Additional Protocol II. 59 While neither of these law ofarmed conflict codifications
provides as extensive a list of legal provisions as the law applicable to inter-State
conflict, they inject basic standards of humanity into conflicts where States still
view their non-State opponents as "criminals."60
The second perspective on the application of the law of war appears to be nei-
ther as definitive nor exclusionary as the first, more formal, model. Here, as is re-
flected in the more general wording of common Article 3 to the 1949 Geneva
Conventions, the dividing lines between the categories of armed conflict are less
well defined. Particularly, among humanitarian and human rights groups there is a
reluctance to clearly identify when common Article 3 applies either by associating
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it with Additional Protocol II, or definitively outlining how it interfaces with the
lower standard of "internal disturbances and tensions." 61 It is these groups which
have also pressed to have international human rights standards apply concurrently
with the law of armed conflict. In addition, the existence of an armed conflict can
be viewed as having a quite limited temporal existence. For example, in Juan Carlos
Abella v. Argentina, the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights appeared
to view the "armed conflict," the retaking of a military barracks from rebels, as be-
ing limited in time to the actual operation.62
This second, less well defined, delineation of armed conflict has been signifi-
cantly influenced in the post Cold War construct ofarmed conflict. The breakup of
Yugoslavia forced the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia
(ICTY) to address the interface between international and non-international
armed conflict resulting in a ruling in the Tadic case that the law of armed conflict
applied to non-international conflicts.63 The impetus for this change was a shift
from a sovereignty based approach to one placing emphasis on "human beings."64
The reality is that some aspects of contemporary armed conflict have changed.
The events of 9/ 1 1 have highlighted the often complex interface between armed
conflict and normal policing. The categorization of the post-9/1 1 events included
assessments that the conflict was international, non-international or internation-
alized non-international armed conflict.65 Another category known as "transna-
tional armed conflict" has been suggested primarily, it would appear, to avoid
admitting international armed conflict can occur between States and non-State ac-
tors.66 Some scholars have seen the attacks as only being amenable to a law enforce-
ment response.67 However, it is possible to conclude that "[i]n many respects,
global terrorism seems to straddle the law enforcement and armed conflict para-
digms. Engagement in criminal activity by terrorist groups, warlords, and other
non-State actors to finance their operations adds significantly to the perception of
an overlap between law enforcement and the conduct of hostilities."68
The current emphasis on extending the laws ofarmed conflict to non-international
armed conflict, while seeking to expand the application of human rights norms,
sets the scene for a conflict of normative regimes. This could have significant and
quite unintended results in the effort to expand humanitarian and human rights
protection. The extension ofthe law ofarmed conflict not only brings with it a le-
gal regime designed to protect uninvolved civilians, it also expands on the level of
violence that can be used by the State to counter an insurgency threat. At the
same time, the interface with the human rights-based regime extends the poten-
tial for the application of chemical agents and "expanding" bullets in the context
of law enforcement.
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Perhaps the most graphic example of this potential blurring of law of armed
conflict and human rights norms can be found in the United Nations Secretary-
General's Bulletin Observance by United Nations Forces of International Humani-
tarian Law.69 The Bulletin states that the "fundamental principles and rules of in-
ternational humanitarian law" are applicable in situations ofarmed conflict, which
are stated to include "enforcement actions, or in peacekeeping operations when
the use of force is permitted in self-defence."70 It appears that the use of force dur-
ing a United Nations operation, even in self-defense, is equated to "combat." How-
ever, it is not clear that would always be the case, nor is it evident that the level of
violence confronted during a peace support operation would necessarily rise to
that of an armed conflict.
While the use of "weapons or methods of combat of a nature to cause unneces-
sary suffering" is prohibited under the Secretary-General's Bulletin, it is equally
evident that the use of riot-control agents for law enforcement purposes is con-
templated during United Nations operations. A 2002 Chemical and Biological
Weapons (CBW) Conventions Bulletin, "Law Enforcement" and the CWQ71 rec-
ognizes law enforcement under the Chemical Weapons Convention72 would in-
clude United Nations operations. These law enforcement operations are defined
as actions within the scope of a nation's jurisdiction to enforce its national laws
and as authorized by the United Nations. In respect of actions that are "taken in
the context of law enforcement or riot control functions under the authority of
the United Nation, they must be specifically authorized by that organization. No
act is one of 'law enforcement' if it otherwise would be prohibited as a 'method of
warfare'. . . ."73
Similarly, another analysis has concluded "peacekeeping operations authorized
by the receiving state, including peacekeeping operations pursuant to Chapter VI
of the UN Charter; and . . . peacekeeping operations where force is authorized by
the UN Security Council under Chapter VII of the UN Charter " are operations
falling within the context of "law enforcement."74 This very broad concept of law
enforcement increases the likelihood of an awkward interface between the two
normative regimes governing the use of chemical agents.
Operating in the "Gray Zone"
Having established the increasing overlap and sometimes unclear interface be-
tween normative regimes, the question remains as to how the different norms gov-
erning the use of riot control agents and "expanding" bullets are applied in
practice. The answer in part can be found in the reality that operating in an opera-
tional "gray zone" has long been a part of military operations.
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However, it should be noted that the problem ofviewing armed conflict as being
limited to inter-State conflict is not unique to the legal community. Military forces
themselves often look at "war" primarily through the lens of conventional combat
between the armed forces of nation States. Preference for "traditional" armed con-
flict impacts on doctrine, equipment acquisition, training, and, ultimately, the ca-
pabilities of the armed forces. Generally, less time is spent on "low intensity
conflict" and the range of operations which require consideration of law enforce-
ment activities.
However, "warfare" has always included a range of conflict significantly
broader than battles between the armed forces of a State. Such conflict has been
termed, somewhat inaccurately, as "small wars" since they are not necessarily
"small" in scope. 75 As Max Boot has stated "[t]hese days social scientists and sol-
diers usually call them either 'low intensity conflicts' or—a related category
—
'military operations other than war.'" 76 In 19th-century terms, they were identi-
fied as "campaigns undertaken to suppress rebellions and guerrilla warfare in all
parts of the world where organized armies are struggling against opponents who
will not meet them in the open field." 77 In those campaigns, beating a hostile army
is not necessarily the main object. They may involve the subjugation of insurrec-
tion, the repression of lawlessness, or the pacification of territory. These operations
"involve [d] struggles against guerrillas and banditti."78 While 19th-century warfare
was not necessarily sensitive to issues of "law," it is clear that governance and "law
enforcement" type activities have been an integral part of operations at this end of
the conflict spectrum.
Military involvement in law enforcement includes operations in times of occu-
pation, non-international armed conflict and the campaign against terrorism. Fur-
ther, a broad range of peace support operations can be added to this list. Such
operations may not be dependent upon traditional sources of authorization such
as a United Nations Security Council resolution, but could also involve a request
from the governing authority of the territory involved. Military involvement can
arise in a number ofways. The absence of police and other security forces in failed
and failing States, or the responsibility to govern occupied territory, can result in
the military performing a law enforcement role. 79 Even where local security forces
exist, operations maybe conducted in support ofthose forces in order to mentor or
augment their capability. Such operations are evident in Afghanistan and Iraq. 80 In
addition, law enforcement and military forces may conduct joint operations when
the threat is one like global terrorism which contains elements ofboth criminal ac-
tivity and armed conflict.81
The new complex operational environment is perhaps best articulated in the
United States Marine Corps doctrine of the "three block war."82 This doctrine has
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been integrated into Canada's 2005 International Policy Statement and has been
described as " [o] ur military could be engaged in combat against well-armed militia
in one city block, stabilization operations in the next block, and humanitarian re-
lief and reconstruction two blocks over."83 The doctrine recognizes the significant
potential for military forces to be engaged in combat with armed groups while at
the same time potentially being confronted with interfacing and controlling civil-
ian populations. The latter responsibility can quickly take on the attributes of a po-
licing function. Finally, military involvement in law enforcement is not restricted
to international operations. Many nations regularly use military forces in a domes-
tic law enforcement role including participation in hostage rescue. 84
The interface with law enforcement means that military forces may themselves
be conducting law enforcement operations, or may be conducting operations with
security forces performing that function. This could mean participation in joint
patrols with local security forces in a policing role under circumstances where the
military and police forces both become involved in an engagement with organized
insurgents. 85 The question immediately arises as to whether those security forces
should be barred from carrying riot control or other chemical agents because ofthe
potential to be engaged in armed conflict with insurgents. In this regard, it has been
suggested the use of such agents would be permissible as part of law enforcement
operations of an occupying power or in "non-traditional military operations such
as peacekeeping operations, recognized as legitimate under international law." 86 It
has also been acknowledged that "non-traditional military operations" may also
apply to non-combatant evacuation and rescue missions. 87
The question of whether riot control agents or "expanding" bullets should
be applied in military operations is not limited to operations normally associ-
ated with law enforcement. For example, cramped, confined spaces on mer-
chant vessels and the crewing of those vessels by diverse multi-national crews
provide ample practical reasons to seek out less-lethal means to detain or act in
self-defense while conducting visit and search or maritime interdiction opera-
tions. 88 The latter operations are normally authorized pursuant to a Security
Council resolution. However, a strong argument can also be made that less-lethal
law enforcement tools should be equally applicable to law ofarmed conflict-based
visit and search operations when it is not anticipated there would be a confronta-
tion with enemy forces.
Similarly, "expanding" bullets are the ammunition of choice for hostage rescue
units in many States. At the same time, kidnapping, both criminal and insurgent
based, appears common in many failed or re-building States. 89 It raises interesting
moral issues to suggest the civilians of a State such as Afghanistan or Iraq should be
exposed to greater risk of injury in a law enforcement operation because there also
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happens to be an armed conflict occurring in parts of the nation with insurgent
forces. All of this points to a broader use of riot control agents and potentially "ex-
panding" bullets than the concept of law enforcement might ordinarily imply.
State Practice
While many States and their legal advisors acknowledge the delineation of conflict
into the various traditional categories, there is at some point a requirement to set
out the legal framework to be used for operations in the "gray zone." The solution
to this challenge is reflected in the approaches already referred to in the Canadian
manual and the United Nations Secretary-General's Bulletin. The law of armed
conflict is applied as a matter of policy in situations where it technically may not
apply as a matter of law. The United States approach is articulated as all heads of
Department ofDefense Components who are required to "[e]nsure that the mem-
bers of their DoD Components comply with the law ofwar during all armed con-
flicts, however such conflicts are characterized, and with the principles and spirit of
the law ofwar during all other operations."90
In practical terms, States approach the use of law enforcement tools such as
chemical agents and "expanding" bullets in different ways. The United States
permits the use of riot control agents in a variety of circumstances, both during
armed conflict and lower intensity peace support operations. That policy is set
out in Executive Order 11850 which "allows their use in defensive military
modes to save lives. Since riot control agents in this capacity are not being used
against combatants, they are not being used as a 'method of warfare.'"91 Autho-
rized use includes the following situations: controlling riots in areas under
United States military control; the rioting of prisoners of war; escaping prison-
ers ofwar in remotely controlled areas; dispersing civilians when they are used
to mask an attack; rescue missions for downed pilots; and for police actions in
rear areas. 92 The United States military has used both rubber bullets and tear gas
in dealing with violent detainee disturbances in Iraq. 93 The US Navy's Annotated
Supplement to The Commander's Handbook on the Law ofNaval Operations notes
that the United States prohibits the use of riot control agents as a form of warfare
in both international and internal armed conflicts; however, it goes on to state
"that it does not apply in normal peacekeeping operations, law enforcement op-
erations, humanitarian and disaster relief operations, counter-terrorist and hos-
tage rescue operations, and non-combatant rescue operations conducted outside
of such conflicts."94
Australian Air Force doctrine outlines a non-exhaustive list where riot control
agents can be used. These situations include: rioting prisoners of war; rescue
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missions involving downed aircrew or escaped prisoners of war; the protection of
supply depots, military convoys and rear echelon areas from civil disturbances and
terrorist activities; civil disturbance when acting in aid to the civil power; and dur-
ing humanitarian evacuations involving Australian or foreign nations.95 Under
Canadian doctrine, "the use ofCS gas or pepper spray is lawful and may be used for
crowd control purposes, but their use as a means ofwarfare is illegal."96 The United
Kingdom, at least in respect ofoperations in Iraq, appears to have placed a total ban
on the use of riot control agents in armed conflict. Defence Minister Hoon was re-
ported to have stated that riot control agents "would not be used by the United
Kingdom in any military operations or on any battlefield."97 However, riot control
agents appear to be permitted for riot control.98
The use of riot control agents in situations involving civilians used to mask or
screen attacks; for rescue missions of downed aircrew; and to capture escaping
prisoners of war has been criticized. 99 However, there has also been an acknowl-
edgment that an "argument can be made that use of a RCA against an escaping
prisoner of war in an isolated area might be legitimate. . . ." 10° This concession
would not be extended to the use of chemical agents against enemy combatants
seeking to capture a downed pilot because such use "more resembles a method of
warfare than a law enforcement purpose." 101
However, this viewpoint appears to assume such use would only be directed
towards "enemy combatants." Regarding the rescue of downed aircrew it does
not take into account the use of riot control agents to ensure local civilians do
not attempt to attack the aircrew. If civilians were to attempt to capture and kill
that aircrew those civilians might be considered to be taking a direct part in hos-
tilities and therefore be liable to attack. 102 In any event, civilians capturing and
causing the death or injury of downed aircrew would be the commission of a
criminal act. 103
Denying the ability to use riot control agents in such circumstances could be
seen as an overly formalistic approach to a difficult moral situation. It would indeed
be incongruous to end up with a "humanitarian" interpretation that those threaten-
ing to attack downed aircrew would have to be subjected to deadly force when mili-
tary personnel would prefer to use riot control agents to spare the civilians.
Similarly, contemplating the use of riot control agents in situations where civil-
ians are being used as human shields places military personnel in an extremely dif-
ficult moral and legal situation. Such chemical agents are not to be used as a
"method ofwarfare," but they may offer the only viable alternative to killing inno-
cent women and children. Interestingly, it has been suggested that riot control
agents might be appropriate in some crowd situations during ongoing armed con-
flict. During an incident in Fallujah, Iraq on April 30, 2003, US military personnel
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fired on a crowd of demonstrators from which they believed insurgents were en-
gaging them. This incident attracted the criticism ofHuman Rights Watch. 104 That
non-governmental organization noted that the troops "had no teargas or other
forms of non-lethal crowd control" 105 and among the recommendations was that
"U.S. troops in Iraq be equipped with adequate crowd control devices to avoid a re-
sort to lethal force." 106
A recommendation that law enforcement means be used against rioting civil-
ians is an appropriate one in most circumstances. However, the challenge is apply-
ing it during an armed conflict with an ongoing insurgency when armed members
ofarmed opposition groups maybe in the crowd. In that circumstance "the separa-
tion between a law enforcement role and operations in armed conflict may not
lend itself to being neatly drawn as the occupying power struggles to bring order
out ofchaos." 107 However, to the extent the use of riot control means provides a vi-
able alternative in situations like those presented in Fallujah, it becomes difficult to
argue they should also not be applied to limit casualties to human shields being set
up by similar armed groups.
Similar challenges arise in respect of military operations in failed or failing
States where it may not be possible to easily separate the civilians from the oppos-
ing forces, or those forces from ordinary criminals. Here it may be helpful to con-
sider the reason why the ban on the use of riot control agents as a means ofwarfare
was imposed, namely, to avoid a misunderstanding as to whether a Party to the
conflict is being attacked by chemical weapons. 108 If, however, that rationale does
not apply to the operational situation and the use of riot control agents involving
civilians more closely approximates situations of domestic law enforcement, it
would be much more difficult to suggest that the use of riot control agents does not
provide an appropriate response. Further, the opportunity for misunderstanding
could be reduced by the use ofan information operations campaign explaining the
circumstances under which such chemical agents are going to be used for riot con-
trol or other forms oflaw enforcement. Of course, many of these situations will be
fact dependant. However, the challenge is to ensure rules are not applied overly
formally at the expense of employing more humane options.
Regarding the use of "expanding" bullets, there appears to have been less overt
reference to State practice. Identifying a consistent interpretation of the test for
what constitutes "unnecessary suffering" and "superfluous injury" is itself prob-
lematic. One approach has been to see the terms as synonymous, 109 while others
have viewed the expression to cover "both measurable—objective (mostly physi-
cal) injury and subjective
—
psychological suffering and pain." 110 In addition, as
Yoram Dinstein has noted "[s]ome scholars speak about proportionality between
injury or suffering and the military advantage anticipated" although he is not in
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agreement with that approach. 111 This lack of consensus nearly 140 years after the
development of the 1868 St. Petersburg Declaration 112 highlights the challenges in
applying this area of law.
The Study does indicate that the prohibition on the use of"expanding" bullets is
set forth in numerous military manuals and states that "no State has asserted that it
would be lawful to use such ammunition." 113 However, it also indicates the United
States has taken an "ambiguous" position regarding the use of "expanding" am-
munition if there is "a clear showing of military necessity for its use." 114 The Study
reaches a similar conclusion regarding non-international armed conflict. 115 How-
ever, the Study deals only tentatively with the question of the use of "expanding"
bullets for law enforcement and relies heavily on references to domestic law en-
forcement. It is here that the issue of State practice needs to be further explored. It
is likely more than the "several states" alluded to in the Study permit the use of "ex-
panding" bullets for law enforcement purposes. It is a common practice in North
America.
The Study describes the two most common reasons for using such ammunition
in a domestic law enforcement context: avoiding over-penetration and the stop-
ping power of such ammunition. Then, in a somewhat ambiguous fashion of its
own, the Study notes "expanding bullets commonly used by police in situations
other than armed conflict are fired from a pistol and therefore deposit much less
energy than a normal rifle bullet, or a rifle bullet which expands or flattens eas-
ily." 116 It could be argued that this statement is problematic for those supporting a
complete ban on hollow point ammunition. If the effect of hollow point or "ex-
panding" bullets fired by a pistol has a less damaging effect than a normal rifle bul-
let, an argument might be made that the ammunition causes neither unnecessary
suffering nor superfluous injury. If that is the case, then it would be difficult to see
why it should not be permitted in armed conflict situations as well. However, it is
not apparent this was the intention of the authors of the Study.
A more fundamental question is why ammunition that is viewed as causing
unacceptable injury and suffering under international law is viewed as lawful un-
der a human rights-based law enforcement regime governing domestic law en-
forcement. This issue becomes even more complex when the humanitarian factor
of limiting collateral damage to uninvolved civilians, including those of the op-
posing State, through the use of "hollow point" ammunition is considered. For
example, in the same way that "law enforcement" has been interpreted to permit
the use of riot control agents during many international operations, a convincing
argument can be made that "expanding" ammunition would also be permitted




In respect of the use of chemical agents and "expanding" bullets, the increasing
influence that human rights norms are having on both military operations and
the law of armed conflict may very well require a re-assessment of long held be-
liefs regarding the use of law enforcement means during armed conflict. In many
respects, the spotlight turned on the "law enforcement" role performed by States in
complex security environments is already having that effect, although it is a role
that has long been performed by military forces on international operations.
On a practical level, many military lawyers advising commanders are placed in
an awkward situation of explaining why riot control agents or "expanding" bullets
can be used domestically (i.e., against your own citizens) and even internationally
in a law enforcement role, but cannot be used against an enemy. This is a discus-
sion that becomes even more challenging as military forces are forced to confront
the reality of conducting operations in "three block wars" or performing law en-
forcement duties in failed or failing States.
It is not suggested that the long held and important prohibitions under the law
ofarmed conflict with respect to the use of riot control agents as a "method ofwar-
fare," or using "expanding" bullets, be removed. However, there is considerable
merit to the argument that the underlying rationale for these prohibitions, created
more than a century ago, be critically analyzed. The interpretation ofhow the cus-
tomary law of armed conflict rules apply to complex security situations requires
careful consideration of the more flexible application of law traditionally applied
by many States. The law ofarmed conflict has not been rigidly or formally applied
to those situations, but rather the "spirit and principles" of those laws have been
followed. Given the continuing complexity of 21st-century conflict, the need to be
flexible and to search out humane approaches to applying force, remains an im-
portant goal.
The extension oflaw ofarmed conflict norms to internal conflicts highlights this
need for a flexible approach. As Lindsay Moir has noted, many States that would be
"happy to see an increase in the level ofhumanitarian protection and regulation for
internal conflicts are unlikely to agree to the wholesale adoption in such cases ofthe
rules for international armed conflicts." There remains a broad acceptance
throughout the international community that internal and international armed
conflicts are fundamentally different in character." 118 A similar challenge arises in
attempting to apply law of armed conflict rules to other complex security situa-
tions such as occupation and the war on terror.
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In the words of Thomas Franck:
There has always been a large measure of agreement that terrorism poses a new
challenge to the rule of law. Now that it seems clear that the rule of law—in both its
domestic and its international configurations—still applies, the next task is to make it
more responsive to the onerous new circumstances in which it must operate. 119
This ultimately will require all the parties who have an interest in the law of
armed conflict, or international humanitarian law, however it is termed, to re-
think some long held views on the conduct of operations, particularly when mili-
tary forces are required to also perform law enforcement functions. Included
among the areas for analysis should be the use ofless-lethal means such as chemical
agents and "expanding" bullets in order to ensure the protection for uninvolved ci-
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XLegal Issues in Coalition Warfare:
A US Perspective
Charles Dunlap *
With increasing frequency, a growing number of nations find themselves
engaged in operations with US forces. I hope to give you some perspec-
tive on how the United States views the legal obligations and challenges of opera-
tions within coalitions.
A nation's participation as a member of a coalition is more than just a synchro-
nization of military plans and objectives; it is also a synchronization of legal issues.
Interpreting and applying the law are rarely easy tasks with coalitions comprised of
nations with widely differing political, cultural, and historical influences on their
legal systems. The precise legal context is becoming increasingly technical, yet vi-
tally important—and hardly intuitive. Indeed, legal issues and the differing ap-
proaches amongst coalition partners make the legal aspects of conflict a strategic
issue that must be addressed. As General James L. Jones observes:
It used to be a simple thing to fight a battle. ... In a perfect world, a general would get
up and say, "Follow me, men," and everybody would say, "Aye, sir" and run off. But
that's not the world anymore. . . . [Now] you have to have a lawyer or a dozen. It's
become very legalistic and very complex. 1
* Brigadier General, US Air Force. The views and opinions expressed by the author are his alone
and do not necessarily reflect those of the US Government or any of its components.
Legal Issues in Coalition Warfare: A US Perspective
Ofcourse, even when lawyers are there to advise, a variety oflegal challenges will
still affect coalition operations. Each one will be discussed in more detail, but here
are the big issues: interpreting and applying international law in coalition warfare;
domestic law and policy limitations on the different coalition partners (including
the United States); and how coalition partners provide legal support within the op-
erational area. I will close with a challenge that faces military forces of every demo-
cratic nation: the enemy's abuse of law as a tool of asymmetrical warfare.
With all of these issues, often the biggest question is "which law governs?" On
one hand, national commanders in the field and leaders back at home ask, "How
does my nation's interpretation and application oflaw affect my ability to conduct
operations with coalition partners?" On the other hand, the coalition commander
must overcome these same legal issues to effectively employ national forces in co-
alition operations.
International Law: The Challenge ofApplying the Law ofArmed Conflict
in Coalition Warfare
International law in coalition operations may appear, at first glance, to be a matter
of interpreting and applying established rules to the coalition as a whole. Much of
international law related to coalition operations is fairly settled, for example, law of
the sea and diplomatic relations law. However, difficulties arise as to whether a par-
ticular international law is recognized by each nation participating in the coalition
and as to widely different interpretations ofseemingly fundamental rules. In the end,
a nation's domestic law and policy will shape its application of international law.
The law ofarmed conflict (LOAC) is international law that everyone agrees cov-
ers coalition warfare. 2 Yet, the interpretation and application of armed conflict
laws differ, sometimes significantly, between coalition partners. Which law gov-
erns? To illustrate this thorny question from a US point ofview, we'll look at exam-
ples from customary international law and international agreements.
Some LOAC is based in customary international law. These are rules that na-
tions have historically followed because ofa sense oflegal obligation to do so. How-
ever, how each nation views them can vary widely. For example, depleted uranium
(DU) is a common element used in making armor piercing rounds for a variety of
ammunition, including the A- 10's 30 mm cannon. 3 The United States views DU as
a legal weapon that can be used. However, some other nations consider it unlawful
because of the potential dangers of exposure from the resulting debris.4
International agreements, or treaties, are arguably more robust international
law than customary law because nations agree to be bound by the terms of treaties
to which they are parties. The bulk ofLOAC has been established and defined by
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widely accepted international agreements. 5 Treaties that most individuals associate
with LOAC are the Geneva Conventions and its Protocols. 6 However, not all coali-
tion partners are parties to the same treaties. For instance, the United States has not
ratified Protocol I, yet it still follows the principles as part of customary law. 7 An-
other example is the Ottawa Convention on anti-personnel mines.8 The United
States is not a party to this while most coalition partners are.
Even if coalition partners are all parties to the same treaties, various domestic
implementation laws affect how and when each nation follows the treaties. This
can be seen in the different interpretation and application of the Geneva Conven-
tions in the war on terror by long-time allies and coalition partners.
One area that created a legal debate and a flurry of press coverage is the Interna-
tional Criminal Court (ICC).9 Although the United States was an original signer of
the treaty that created the ICC, it was never ratified by the Senate. Thus, the United
States is not a party to the treaty. Among other things, the US government has con-
cerns about politicized prosecutions by individuals or entities who seek to use the
process not to redress legitimately made allegations, but merely to disrupt US op-
erations. In fact, the United States routinely asks other nations to sign "Article 98"
agreements 10 which would operate to protect US service members from being sent
to the ICC for trial. This has not stopped other individuals from filing suit in other
nations' courts alleging that US leaders were committing war crimes. 11 In any
event, as a matter of policy the United States prefers to handle allegations of mis-
conduct in American courts, and seeks to avoid subjecting its military personnel to
the jurisdiction of foreign courts.
Even when nations agree on the law, the application to individual cases can vary
widely. For example, radio and television stations are seen by the United States as
potential military targets. During the Kosovo operations, US aircraft participating
in aNATO operation bombed a Serb radio and television facility. Many considered
this an unlawful attack on a civilian target, despite the military use of the air-
waves. 12 This also very nearly became an issue during Operation Iraqi Freedom
(OIF) when the United States, as part of coalition operations, considered attacking
Iraqi television and radio stations. In this case, the Iraqis themselves made it clear
that these were valid military targets under LOAC. Even though the television is
traditionally thought of as a civilian medium, the Iraqis used it to rally troops and
provide military direction. The news reports were even read by individuals wearing
uniforms of the Iraqi army. Nevertheless, this is an area where there will be contro-
versy in future conflicts. Coalition commanders will have to address this on a case-
by-case basis.
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Domestic Law, Policy, and Regulation: Limits on National Commanders
As we have seen, international law affecting coalition warfare is viewed through the
lenses of nations taking part in a coalition. Domestic law further shapes, and often
limits, nations' ability to work as coalition partners. National commanders and
their forces must comply with their domestic laws, policies, and regulations, fur-
ther complicating the legal aspects of coalition operations.
US domestic law, policies, and regulations have the potential to significantly im-
pact US forces' conduct in coalitions. For US forces, domestic law is another aspect
of LOAC. Our policy is to apply LOAC principles to any conflict, no matter how
characterized. 13 Going even further, US forces normally operate within rules ofen-
gagement (ROE) for a particular operation. Using LOAC as a foundation, civilian
and military leadership develops ROE based on domestic law and policy consider-
ations, in addition to LOAC. Common ROE for coalition forces is highly desirable.
However, even ROE for coalition forces can be different as a result ofeach partner's
own domestic laws and policy. The United States works with coalition partners to
develop and abide by common ROE in coalition operations; however, US forces al-
ways retain the right to "use necessary and proportional force for unit and individ-
ual self-defense." 14
As with other aspects of law, ROE are not immune from differing interpreta-
tions. US ROE typically permit units and individuals to use force in self-defense in
situations where someone or some group displays hostile intent and capability.
This is the "threat of imminent use of force against ... US forces" or the use of the
threat of force to "impede the mission and/or duties ofUS forces." 15 Each coalition
partner defines hostile intent differently and may even limit the ability of their
forces to engage in self-defense in these types of situations. This becomes an even
more interesting determination when dealing with air operations. What represents
"hostile intent" to an aircraft?
Domestic law can create challenges for US commanders in areas other than
LOAC. Commanders must abide by those international agreements to which the
United States is a party, which may limit their authority. Furthermore, under US law
American commanders usually cannot provide logistic support to coalition part-
ners without some type ofgovernment-to-government agreement covering the ex-
change of goods and services—and often having a reimbursement requirement. 16
Command and control issues are also very important. The US Constitution and
domestic law place limits on the ability of US forces to serve under foreign com-
mand. Typically, operational control or tactical control is not a problem as long as
there is ultimately a US commander who exercises actual command.
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Discipline is at the core of every successful military operation, including coali-
tion operations. Historically, each coalition partner is responsible for disciplining
its troops in accordance with domestic military and criminal law. This authority
does not rest with the coalition commander, but with the national commanders of
the coalition partners. However, every coalition commander has a strong interest
in unit welfare and discipline, and should make sure that discipline is carried out
to avoid adverse operational effects. As General Sanchez learned during the Abu
Ghraib abuse scandal, a failure of discipline can be just as bad as a defeat on the
battlefield. 17
Applying domestic law to disciplinary matters creates challenges for all coalition
commanders, especially with respect to situations that arise during specific opera-
tions. Since Operation Desert Shield in 1990, US forces deployed for a contingency
operation generally operate with some form of "General Order #1" applicable to
all components of the American contingent. 18 Such orders are typically issued at
the beginning of an operation and may limit the actions of troops for policy rea-
sons. They limit, for example, the ability oftroops to consume alcohol in certain lo-
cations. While US troops often are prohibited from drinking alcohol, other troops
may be free to do so. A US soldier is likely to be punished for drinking, while her
British friend might not. It is just another area where coalition partners may differ
and may present complications for US commanders.
The US illustrations, above, highlight some of the international and domestic
law challenges faced by coalition commanders and their legal teams when tackling
the question of "which law governs?" We now move to the individuals who can as-
sist commanders to effectively accomplish the coalition mission within the com-
pass of the law.
Legal Support to Commanders: The Role ofLawyers in the Coalition
The types of legal support commanders receive vary greatly between the coalition
members. Although General Jones would not go to war without a dozen or so law-
yers, many coalition partners do not have judge advocates (JAG) 19 or do not train
them on the various aspects of operational law. In many cases, their legal advisors
are not even deployed forward with the troops they service. For operations law,
many coalition partners have to rely on civilian attorneys back in their nation's
capital for advice on complex and ever-changing operational issues. However,
when coalition JAGs do deploy together, great things can happen.
Bright Star 99/00—a biannual exercise held in Egypt20—was a perfect example
of coalition JAGs working together. The 1999/2000 exercise brought together mili-
tary lawyers from the United States and Britain into a coalition warfare setting. The
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coalition JAGs bring their knowledge of their nations' domestic law and policy to
the table and help educate other JAGs on why they cannot engage in certain opera-
tions or use certain weapons. This is a reason we like to see robust, international
JAG participation in coalition operations.
In the United States, and for coalition partners as well, JAGs must have more
and more knowledge about areas beside the law. JAGs need to know the weapon
systems that are being used, how they are being used, and the overall strategy for a
particular operation. They also need to understand the complex and intricate com-
mand and control environment in which they operate.
How do US JAGs cope with the issues they face in operations, especially serving
in Coalition Air Operations Centers (CAOC)? All JAGs that deploy to CAOC posi-
tions are required to attend a six-week-long training program on the computer sys-
tems and methodologies used to run a CAOC. This is not a JAG-specific course,
but one attended by all specialties who serve in the CAOC. It enables them to learn
how things are done and what attributes each career field brings to the fight.
In contrast to the increased training and resources available for US JAGs, many
coalition partners do not have the access to high-tech systems found in the CAOC
to enable them to provide effective oversight to operations. Nor do all coalition
lawyers receive training in the complex and fast-paced conduct ofmodern warfare.
Unfortunately, this may be leading to a tech and training gap between US JAGs and
our coalition partners that will need to be addressed.
What about friendly fire cases? As the United States saw with the Tarnak Farms
"friendly fire" case, this can cause both political and operational problems. Tarnak
Farms was an incident in Afghanistan where US aircraft mistakenlybombed Cana-
dian ground forces. Canadian and US military lawyers were deeply involved in in-
vestigating and advising commanders after this unfortunate incident. Legal issues
ranged from LOAC to discipline to release ofinformation. These are difficult ques-
tions that still need more thoughtful study.
Another challenge facing the United States is how to respond to allegations of
LOAC violations. Unfortunately, in conflicts innocent civilians will be harmed.
The United States must maintain a transparent approach to its targeting especially
in the media-intense world. US targeting philosophies and the lengths we go to in
order to avoid unnecessary casualties need to be highlighted and available to the
media. When incidents occur, reports should be made available for the media and
the general public so nothing is hidden. In addition to being an integral part ofthe
targeting process, JAGs must be prepared to advise commanders and military
spokespersons on alleged LOAC violations.
What roles to JAGs play in modern conflict? Michael Sirak in Janes Defence
Weekly suggests that JAGs are the ones who determine what weapons are built, the
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bombs, and their targets. 21 The reality for US forces is that JAGs are advisors—
commanders make the decisions about weapons and targets. 22 Effective legal sup-
port to coalition forces is critical in this age of complex legal challenges, but law-
yers should not and cannot displace commanders as decision-makers.
Lawfare: An Asymmetrical Threat to Coalitions
Besides being a foundation for how we operate, the law is being used as a weapon
by our adversaries. As Rivken and Casey said in 2001, "international law may be-
come one of the most potent weapons ever deployed against the United States." 23
Our enemies, as William Eckhardt said, are now attacking our military plans as
being illegal and immoral. Our laws have become a new Clausewitzean "center of
gravity."24
This is a new form ofasymmetrical warfare I call "lawfare."25 As more and more
adversaries learn they cannot go up against our coalition forces on the battlefield,
they have moved to attack us through the law to achieve their operational objec-
tives. However, not all lawfare is "bad" and the United States applies it when neces-
sary, like controlling the cameras on commercial satellites with coverage areas over
Operation Iraqi Freedom/Operation Enduring Freedom bases. Such control is
achieved through the use of law, not the use of force. Lawfare, as I use this term, is
an operational methodology that can be used for "good" or "bad" purposes.
Our adversaries often employ an abusive form oflawfare aimed at undermining
the kind of public support democracies need to conduct military operations. It
very much has a Clausewitzean basis. When we talk about Clausewitz, we are talk-
ing about the "remarkable trinity" that coalesces to create warfighting potential:
the government, the people, and the military. America's typical approach to con-
flict is to focus its energy and effort against the military capability of the enemy.
Using lawfare, adversaries are not trying to defeat the United States militarily; they
seek to separate the people from the trinity and erode their will for the conflict.
How do they erode the will of the people?
One way is to use actual or perceived LOAC violations. By repeatedly character-
izing military actions as illegal and immoral, for example declaring LOAC viola-
tions, the enemy's objective is to cause the people to grow weary of war and begin
to question the military and government's conduct. Increasingly, organizations
and forums are facilitating these messages so the enemy has a variety of ways to
spread the word. As technology continues to develop in the 21st century, so too do
new means of spreading information. Our adversaries have been quick to utilize
the Internet and the power of the globalized media to spread their message.
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Another strategy that we have seen is actually goading coalition forces into com-
mitting LOAC incidents that would have strategic impact on our operations. For
example, bin Laden has attempted to exploit the fact that women and children
were victims of collateral damage in an effort to ensnare the United States into a
larger East-West conflict, further inflaming Muslim opinion against the United
States and other friendly nations, including those in the Persian Gulf.26 Our ene-
mies know that the secret to any democratic society is to get their message to the
people and the people will respond.
We have also seen Iraqi forces that feigned surrender and then turned to at-
tack. 27 These incidents occurred frequently, causing coalition and civilian casual-
ties. The enemy's perfidy created an environment in which US troops have been
known to shoot first and ask questions later when they encounter surrendering in-
dividuals. However, the television-viewing public sees only the US conduct. The
more we see incidents like this, the more people believe the war is being wrongly
fought. Professors W. Michael Reisman and Chris T. Antoniou explain:
In modern popular democracies, even a limited armed conflict requires a substantial
base ofpublic support. That support can erode or even reverse itself rapidly, no matter
how worthy the political objective, if people believe that the war is being conducted in
an unfair, inhumane, or iniquitous way. 28
However, this does not mean that democracies are at a disadvantage in future
wars. In fact, history proves that those nations that comply with the accepted
norms ofbehavior in warfare are more successful than those nations that wage war
against civilians.
Coalitions must develop strategies to counter lawfare; just as they must be pre-
pared to fight any asymmetrical attack. Foremost, every coalition partner must be
committed to complying with the law. Participating nations should strive to har-
monize their interpretation and application ofLOAC, despite the legal and politi-
cal challenges of doing so. Many of these issues are for the civilian leadership to
tackle. Yet, commanders, with their lawyers, can emphasize common ground
among coalition forces and be ready to respond to lawfare through transparency
and prompt public response.
Coalition Warfare: A Synchronization ofLegal Issues
Nations with a stunningly broad range of operational capabilities and legal sys-
tems have joined the United States in a number of military operations. Integrating
these diverse forces into an effective coalition requires more than coordination of
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military plans, objectives, and logistics. It requires orchestration of each nation's
interpretation and application of law.
I have tried to present a US perspective on some of the legal challenges faced by
modern coalitions. Far from being secondary, domestic law and policy are at the
heart of different legal perspectives, from LOAC to the legal services provided by a
nation to its commanders. The United States views its legal obligations and chal-
lenges through this lens, which neither discounts nor minimizes the importance of
international law. In addition to confronting legal issues between coalition part-
ners, the coalition must be prepared to counter the enemy's lawfare. In the highly
complex environment of coalition warfare, synchronization of legal issues is criti-
cal to operational success.
Notes
1. Lyric Wallwork Winik, A Marine's Toughest Mission (Gen. James L. Jones), PARADE
MAGAZINE, Jan. 19, 2003. General Jones is the Supreme Allied Commander, Europe.
2. Compliance with the Law ofArmed Conflict, Air Force Policy Directive 51-4 (Apr. 26, 1993).
Paragraph 6.4, defines LOAC as "All international law which concerns the conduct of hostilities
during armed conflict and is binding on the United States or US citizens. It includes
international treaties and agreements to which the United States is a party as well as customary
international law. These treaties include the 1949 Geneva Conventions and the 1907 Hague
Conventions and Regulations, among others."
3. For information about the A- 10 aircraft, see http://www.af.mil/factsheets/factsheet.asp
?fsID=70.
4. See generally, Depleted Uranium Education Project, http://www.iacenter.org/depleted/
du.htm (last visited July 14, 2006); contra, see Jim Garamone, Study Finds Little Risk From
Depleted- Uranium Particles, Armed Forces Information Service, Oct. 19, 2004, available at http:/
/www.defenselink.mil/news/Oct2004/nl0192004_2004101903.html (last visited July 14, 2006).
5. At least 15 significant LOAC treaties have come into force since 1948. See DOCUMENTS ON
THE LAWS OF WAR (Adam Roberts & Richard Guelff eds., 3d ed. 2000).
6. The four Geneva Conventions of August 12, 1949, are the Geneva Convention for the
Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in Armed Forces in the Field (Geneva
Convention I), 75 U.N.T.S. 31; Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of
Wounded, Sick and Shipwrecked Members ofArmed Forces at Sea (Geneva Convention II), 75
U.N.T.S. 85; Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War (Geneva
Convention III), 75 U.N.T.S. 135; and Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian
Persons in Time ofWar (Geneva Convention IV), 75 U.N.T.S. 287. All reprinted in DOCUMENTS
ON THE LAWS OF WAR, supra note 5, at 197, 222, 244 and 301, respectively. The two Protocols
Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 1949 are the 1977 Additional Protocol to the Geneva
Conventions of 1949, and Relating to the Protection ofVictims ofInternational Armed Conflicts
(Additional Protocol I), June 8, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 3, reprinted in id. at 422; and the 1977
Additional Protocol to the Geneva Conventions of 1949, and Relating to the Protection of
Victims of Non-International Armed Conflicts (Additional Protocol II), June 8, 1977, 1125
U.N.T.S. 609, reprinted in id. at 483.
229
Legal Issues in Coalition Warfare: A US Perspective
7. The United States is not a party to the Additional Protocols; however, to the extent that
certain provisions of the Protocols reflect customary international law or existing law under the
Geneva Conventions of 1949, the United States adheres to those provisions. For a discussion on
the US views concerning the Additional Protocols, see Michael J. Matheson, The United States
Position on the Relation of Customary International Law to the 1977 Protocols Additional to the
1949 Geneva Conventions, 2 AMERICAN UNIVERSITY JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW &
POLICY 419 (1987).
8. The technical title of the Ottawa Convention is the Convention on the Prohibition of the
Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-personnel Mines and on their Destruction,
Sept. 18, 1997, 36 INTERNATIONAL LEGAL MATERIALS 1507, reprinted in DOCUMENTS ON THE
LAWS OF WAR, supra note 5, at 648, available at http://www.icrc.org/ihl (last visited Mar. 1,
2006).
9. For information about the ICC, see http://www.icc-cpi.int/about.html (last visited Mar. 1,
2006).
10. For information about Article 98, see http://www.state.gOv/t/pm/art98/ (last visited July 14,
2006).
11. See e.g., Rumsfeld Sued for War Crimes in Germany, DEUTSCHE WELLE, Nov. 30, 2004,
available at http://www.globalresearch.ca/index.php?context=viewArticle&code=20041 130
&articleld=269 (last visited Mar. 1, 2006).
12. Human Rights Watch, Civilian Deaths in the NATO Air Campaign (Feb. 2000), available at
http://www.hrw.Org/reports/2000/nato/index.htm#TopOfPage (last visited Jul. 5, 2006).
13. Office of the General Counsel, Department of Defense, DoD Law of War Program, DoD
Directive 5100.77 (Dec. 9, 1998). Paragraph 4.1 states "The law ofwar obligations of the United
States are observed and enforced by the DoD Components."
14. Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction 3 1 2 1 .0 1A, Standing Rules of Engagement
for U.S. Forces, Encl. A, para, l.c(l) at A-l (Jan. 15, 2000), available at http://www.fas.org/man/
dod-101/dod/docs/cjcs_sroe.pdf (last visited July 14, 2006).
15. Id., para. 5.h, at A-5.
16. For a brief discussion of sale, disposal, and transfer of defense articles and services, see US
Air Force Judge Advocate General's Department, Air Force Operations & the Law: A Guide for
Air & Space Forces, Ch. 48 (2002), available at http://www.au.af.mil/au/cpd/jagschool/press/
iodb/index.htm (last visited July 14, 2006).
1 7. Tom Brokaw, National Broadcasting Corporation Nightly News, June 30, 2004, available at
http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/5333895 (last visited March 3, 2006).
18. For an example of a General Order #1, see US Central Command, General Order Number
1A, Prohibited Activities for U.S. Department of Defense Personnel Present Within the United
States Central Command (USCENTCOM) AOR, December 19, 2000, available at http://
www.mnf-iraq.com/archive/regulations/gola.pdf (last visited July 14, 2006).
19. In US usage, the term "judge advocate" refers to a legal advisor on the staff of a military
commander. The United States designates the senior uniformed lawyer of each military Service
as "Judge Advocate General," thus the common use of "JAG" to identify military lawyers. See
Black's Law Dictionary 976 (4th ed. 1968).
20. See US Department of Defense, Memorandum for Correspondents, No. 143-M, Sept. 14,
1999, available at http://www.defenselink.mil/news/Sepl999/m09141999_ml43-99.html (last
visited July 14, 2006).
21. Michael Sirak, Fighting by the Rules: Debating the Laws of War on the Unconventional
Battlefield, JANE'S DEFENCE WEEKLY, Jan. 14, 2004.
230
Charles Dunlap
22. This has been codified in Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction 58 10. IB,
Implementation of the DOD Law of War Program (Mar. 22, 2002), available at http://
www.dtic.mil/cjcs_directives/cdata/unlimit/5810_01.pdf, which mandates that JAGs provide
advice to commanders at all operational levels.
23. David Rivkin & Lee Casey, The Rocky Shoals ofInternational Law, THE NATIONAL INTEREST,
Winter 2000/2001, at 35, extract available at http://ontology.buffalo.edU/smith//courses01/rrtw/
Rivkin.htm (last visited July 14, 2006).
24. William G. Eckhardt, Lawyering for Uncle Sam When He Draws His Sword, 4 CHICAGO
Journal of International Law 431 (2003).
25. See Charles J. Dunlap, Jr., Law and Military Interventions, Working Papers, Carr Center for
Human Rights Policy, Harvard University, Nov. 29, 2001 available at http://
www.ksg.harvard.edu/cchrp/Web%20Working%20Papers/Use%20of%20Force/
Dunlap2001.pdf (last visited July 14, 2006).
26. Lisa Beyer, Osama 's Endgame; His aims are clear—to expel the U. S. from the Islamic world and
unite Muslims in one empire, TIME, Oct. 15, 2001, at 17.
27. Ron Harris, Surprise attacks by Iraqis who "surrendered" turn military's mood mean, ST.
LOUIS POST-DISPATCH (Missouri), Mar. 25, 2003, at Al.





"England Does Not Love Coalitions"
Does Anything Change?
Charles Garraway*
My title comes from a quote from Benjamin Disraeli, speaking in the HouseofCommons on December 16, 1852. 1 In 1852, Victoria was on the throne
of England and Abbott Lawrence was the United States Ambassador to the Court
of St. James. Lawrence was born at Groton, Massachusetts, not too far from the
Naval War College, and is the founder ofLawrence, Massachusetts and ofthe Law-
rence Scientific School at Harvard. The British Empire was at its height in 1852 and
on it the sun never set. Livingstone was setting out on his journeys into the African
hinterland. This was two years before the start of the Crimean War; British forces
were fighting in Burma; the Punjab had just been annexed and gold had been dis-
covered in a remote prison colony called Australia. Disraeli was not yet Prime
Minister—that was yet to come. He was Chancellor of the Exchequer—Treasury
Secretary in US terms.
But what did Disraeli mean by "coalition"? I have not been able to find an 1852
English dictionary and I therefore take my definition from my old copy ofthe Con-
cise Oxford Dictionary (which still bears my school particulars in the front cover!).
This reads: "Coalition, n. Union, fusion; (Pol.) temporary combination for special
ends between parties that retain distinctive principles." 2
* Visiting Professor at King's College, London and an Associate Fellow of Chatham House.
"England Does Not Love Coalitions" - Does Anything Change?
Why, therefore, did England not love coalitions? I would suggest that the problem
is similar to that facing the United States today. Britain at that time did not need co-
alitions—except, as it soon found out in the Crimea, in Europe. In the rest of the
world, it was supreme and could act as it liked. A coalition, by my definition, is a
"temporary combination for special ends between parties that retain distinctive prin-
ciples." The problem is not so much in the "temporary combination" as in the "dis-
tinctive principles." For a coalition to work, those "distinctive principles" must be at
least similar. If there is no "coalescing" there, there can be no "coalition." In Europe,
coalitions came and went as principles coalesced in certain fields and then parted
again. The Crimean War itselfwas a classic example where British and French inter-
ests in stopping Russian expansion led to a temporary coalition between countries
that less than half a century before had been locked in bloody conflict.
Modern history is full of talk of coalitions. The most relevant here is that of the
"United Nations"—not the modern entity, but the group of countries that came to-
gether in the 1940s to stand up to tyranny and fascism. That metamorphosed into the
North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) alliance where the need to hold the
Communist bear in check outweighed the "distinctive principles" of the different
countries involved. The collapse of the Soviet Union and the end ofthe Cold War has
led to the balance shifting and more emphasis now being on the "distinctive princi-
ples" rather than the common purpose. It is the new World Superpower that now
states that it has no love for coalitions. Joseph Fitchett of the International Herald
Tribune writing in 2002 in European Affairs, talks of "[t]he dismissive attitudes that
have recently seemed to prevail in Washington toward NATO, ranging from benign
neglect during the Afghan campaign to forthright dislike for coalition warfare in the
comments of some Pentagon officials." 3
Yet, as the British found less than two years after Disraeli's dismissive comment,
coalitions are a necessary evil when the interests of the differing parties combine suf-
ficiently to outweigh the differences in the principles. But does that mean that the dif-
ferences are removed or set aside? No. The distinctiveness of each coalition partner
remains and ways are found of working around the differences without prejudicing
the position of any of the partners. That is difficult and requires compromise on all
sides. It is that need for compromise that superpowers—whether Great Britain in the
mid- 19th century or the United States in the 21st century—find so difficult.
What I would like to examine is the way that we have reached the current state of
affairs and then look at two specific areas of apparent disagreement between the
United States and some of its major Allies. I will also try to see whether these "dis-
tinctive principles" are in fact distinctive and, if so, whether they can be worked




Ambassador James B. Cunningham, United States Deputy Permanent Represen-
tative to the United Nations, speaking in the Security Council on September 24, 2003
on Justice and the Rule ofLaw in International Affairs, stated:
The United States ofAmerica is a nation founded, not upon ethnicity or cultural custom
or territory, but upon law enshrined in our Constitution. As a consequence, establishing
and maintaining the rule of law has been an enduring theme ofAmerican foreign policy
for over two centuries. Notably, the U.S. Constitution specifically provides that treaties
shall be the supreme law of the land. We therefore do not enter into treaties lightly
because we believe the importance of the rule of law to a successful system of peace
cannot be overstated. Democracy, justice, economic prosperity, human rights,
combating terrorism, and lasting peace all depend on the rule of law. The rule of law is
essential to fulfill the ideas behind the UN Charter we are all pledged to support. 5
I make this point right at the start because it is often overlooked. The United States
is a country founded on and believing in the rule of law. The very fact that debate to-
day in political circles often centers on that phrase is an illustration of how funda-
mental it is to the American psyche. The United States does not only recognize the
validity of the rule of law in the domestic sphere but also in the international sphere
as Ambassador Cunningham makes plain. It is therefore of vital importance to those
who work with and alongside the United States to understand where, in the opinion
of the United States, that law exists and what it is. However, what is good for the
goose is also good for the gander and it is just as vital that the United States under-
stands the laws that govern the activities of their Allies. It would not be appropriate
for the United States to demand that their Allies act outside the law that binds them,
even if that law is not binding on the United States. Such a demand would make a
mockery of the rule of law as a concept.
This was recognized by the United States in the early 1990s, and in particular in
Operation Desert Storm. Although Additional Protocol I did not apply as a matter of
treaty law because Iraq was not a party (nor at the time were the United States, the
United Kingdom or France), it was recognized by the United States that many of the
provisions of that Protocol were seen as binding law by some of the Coalition forces.
Indeed, the Final Report to Congress on the Conduct ofthe Persian GulfWar ofApril
1992, in Appendix O, The Role of the Law ofWar, discusses Additional Protocol I at
some length, confirming that parts are "generally regarded as a codification of the
customary practice of nations, and therefore binding on all."6 However, the Report
also confirms the US view that parts of the Protocol are not such a codification and
seeks to identify specific "deficiencies" therein. 7
There are frequent approving references to specific articles of Additional Proto-
col I throughout Annex O and, under "Observations," the remark is made that
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"Adherence to the law of war impeded neither Coalition planning nor execution;
Iraqi violations of the law provided Iraq no advantage." 8
This very practical approach mirrored that taken by President Reagan in his Letter
of Transmittal of Additional Protocol II (Non-International Armed Conflict) to the
Senate on January 29, 1987,9 when he announced that he would not seek Senate ad-
vice and consent to Additional Protocol I, describing it as "fundamentally and irrec-
oncilably flawed." 10 However, he referred to the Protocol as containing "certain
sound elements" and to "the positive provisions of Protocol I that could be of real
humanitarian benefit if generally observed by parties to international armed con-
flicts." He went on to state:
We are therefore in the process of consulting with our allies to develop appropriate
methods for incorporating these positive provisions into the rules that govern our
military operations, and as customary international law. I will advise the Senate of the
results of this initiative as soon as it is possible to do so. 11
In fact, that initiative had been under way since the adoption of the Protocols,
with a NATO working group looking at possible agreed reservations which would
enable the Alliance to adopt a united front. Unfortunately, that process seemed to go
on for too long for some European States, who broke ranks and ratified Protocol I
while negotiations were still continuing, adopting some—but not all—of the NATO
working group reservations. For example, and I am not seeking to isolate any partic-
ular State, Belgium, who ratified in 1986, prior to the Reagan transmittal, made "in-
terpretative declarations" on Article 44 and Article 1(4), the two areas of particular
concern identified by the United States. While the former was in accordance with the
NATO formula, that on Article 1(4) was in less stringent terms. 12 The statements
made by the United Kingdom on its ratification in 1998 probably bear the closest re-
semblance to the almost-agreed NATO position. 13
Unfortunately, the failure of the NATO initiative seemed to bring an end to nego-
tiation on a formal level though there was continuous contact among military law-
yers, particularly those tasked with the drafting of military manuals. There were a
series of meetings in various countries at which such issues were discussed and at-
tempts were made to strike a common balance. In addition, Michael Matheson, then
the Deputy Legal Adviser at the US Department of State, in a presentation made in
1987 at the Washington College ofLaw, 14 provided a comparatively detailed analysis
of Protocol I indicating those areas which the United States found acceptable and
those that it did not.
Although, as we have seen, Additional Protocol I was considered and tested dur-
ing Desert Storm, the tide in the United States was already beginning to turn against
236
Charles Garraway
the treaty. There had always been a strong element within the United States that op-
posed any compromise, illustrated by Douglas Feith's writing in 1985. 15 On the other
hand, the military, who actually had to work in the field, were seeking to adopt the
Reagan approach and to develop "appropriate methods for incorporating these posi-
tive provisions into the rules that govern our military operations." The problem that
the military faced was in identifying those "positive provisions" in the absence ofany
clear government position. The military inevitably turned to the only guidance that
they could find, namely the Matheson article, and this found its way into military
manuals of all the Services. There are frequent references to parts ofAdditional Pro-
tocol I, such as in the Annotated Supplement to The Commander's Handbook on the
Law ofNaval Operations (NWP 1-14M), 16 usually citing Matheson as the authority.
For example, in referring to Article 54( 1 ) ofAdditional Protocol I creating a new pro-
hibition on the starvation of civilians as a method ofwarfare, NWP 1-14M states that
this is a prohibition that "the United States believes should be observed and in due
course recognized as customary law," citing Matheson. 17 The Operational Law
Handbook ofthe Army Judge Advocate General's Corps 18 went further, publishing in
detail a list ofthe articles which "the U.S. views ... as either legally binding as custom-
ary international law or acceptable practice though not legally binding." 19 This type
of detail appeared in the Handbook from 2000 to 2003 but was omitted in 2004. It re-
appeared in 2005,20 only to be overtaken by an Errata note stating that the entry
should be "disregarded." This note went on to state that "Information was taken
from an Article written by Michael Matheson in 1986. It takes an overly broad view of
the U.S. position and as a result may cause some confusion as to U.S. Policy." 21 This
followed an article by Hays Parks in 2003 in which in a footnote he had stated that
Michael Matheson had expressed "his personal opinion that 'certain provisions of
Protocol I reflect customary international law or are positive new developments
which should. . . become part of that law'."22 In fact, the full text of that paragraph of
Matheson's article reads:
The executive branch is well aware of the need to make decisions and to take action on
these issues. We know from our conversations with our allies that there is a shared
perception, particularly among North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) countries,
of a strong military need for common rules to govern allied operations and a political
need for common principles to demonstrate our mutual commitment to humanitarian
values. We recognize that certain provisions ofProtocol I reflect customary international
law or are positive new developments which should in time become part of that law.23
This should be read together with his opening statement that: "I appreciate the
opportunity to offer this distinguished group a presentation on the United States po-
sition concerning the relationship of customary international law to the 1977
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Protocols Additional to the 1949 Geneva Conventions."24 It is hard to see this as re-
flecting a personal statement. The Royal "we" went out in American English at the
time of George III!
So where are we now? It appears that the Matheson analysis is no longer consid-
ered "authoritative." It is interesting in reading the so-called "Torture Memos,"25 to
find the almost complete lack of reference to Additional Protocol I. It is as if it has
been wiped out of the memory bank. It is no longer even clear whether the United
States accepts such key provisions as Article 75 on Fundamental Guarantees, of
which Matheson had said: "We support in particular the fundamental guarantees
contained in article 75. . . ."26
This lack oflegal clarity causes acute problems for Allies seeking to work alongside
the United States. Quite apart from the issues arising from targeting decisions—what
is the US definition of a military objective?—serious issues arise over detainee han-
dling. Ifthe United States is not prepared even to accept the fundamental guarantees
ofArticle 75, it is hard to see how allies can hand over detainees to the custody of the
United States. This is before one takes into account the presidential decision that
Common Article 3 to the Geneva Conventions does not apply outside non-interna-
tional armed conflict.27 While this may be correct as a matter of treaty law, it is now
generally accepted that, in the words of the International Court of Justice, "there is
no doubt that, in the event of international armed conflicts, these rules [Common
Article 3] also constitute a minimum yardstick. . . ."28
My point here is not to criticize the United States decision not to ratify Additional
Protocol I. That is an acceptable position. However, the existence of the Protocol
cannot be ignored, nor the fact that the majority of the United States' traditional al-
lies are parties to it, including the United Kingdom, Japan and Australia. 29 You will
note that I have omitted other parts of "Old Europe" such as France and Germany30
though in fact almost all the NATO States are indeed parties. 31 We need to know
what the United States position is and uncertainty simply undermines the trust that
is vital for coalition operations. I appreciate that the role of customary international
law—and even its very existence—is sometimes questioned within the US govern-
ment.32 However, it should still be possible for the Administration to publish in an
authoritative form its stance on the provisions ofAdditional Protocol I which at least
will allow a baseline from which others can work. It is to be hoped that the planned
law ofwar manual under preparation in the Office of General Counsel of the US De-
partment of Defense will in fact do exactly that and for that reason, if for no other, I
would urge its early completion. As Michael Matheson noted, "The United States
[must] give some alternative clear indication ofwhich rules they consider binding or
otherwise propose to observe." 33 Indeed he went on to put it even more clearly: "It is
important for both the United States government and the United States scholarly
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community to devote attention to determining which elements in Protocol I deserve
recognition as customary international law, either now or in the future." 34 That was
true in 1987 and remains true today. IfMatheson saw his effort as "work in progress,"
it needs to be completed.
My second point is the increasing role ofhuman rights law. Again there is a grow-
ing divide between the United States and, in particular, Europe—and not just "Old
Europe." The European Convention for the Protection ofHuman Rights35 has prob-
ably the most effective enforcement mechanism ofany human rights organization in
the world. The European Court of Human Rights passes binding judgments and
presents a progressive interpretation of human rights law. Whether one agrees with
that approach or not, it is a fact.
The Convention requires parties to "secure to everyone within their jurisdiction
the rights and freedoms" contained in the Convention. 36 Jurisdiction has been inter-
preted widely and it has been ruled that although the application ofthe Convention is
primarily territorial, extraterritorial jurisdiction is not ruled out, inter alia, "when the
respondent State, through the effective control ofthe relevant territory and its inhab-
itants abroad as a consequence ofmilitary occupation or through the consent, invita-
tion or acquiescence of the Government of that territory, exercises all or some ofthe
public powers normally to be exercised by that Government."37 The United King-
dom courts have interpreted that as allowing the application of the Convention to
some activities in Iraq. 38
There is a difference here from the wording ofthe International Covenant on Civil
and Political Rights which requires States to grant rights to "all individuals within its
territory and subject to its jurisdiction."39 This clearly seems to lay down a two-part
test which is lacking in the text ofthe European Convention where jurisdiction alone
is the standard. However, this has been interpreted as "those within its territory and
those otherwise subject to its jurisdiction."40 This interpretation was confirmed by
the United Nations Human Rights Committee in General Comment 31, adopted
March 29, 2004, when it stated, "A State Party must respect and ensure the rights laid
down in the Covenant to anyone within the power or effective control of that State
Party, even if not situated within the territory of the State Party."41
The United States position, however, appears to be to adopt the literal reading of
the text and to limit the application of the Covenant to United States territory. This
position is confirmed by the Working Group Report on Detainee Interrogations in
the Global War on Terrorism which stated, "The United States has maintained con-
sistently that the Covenant does not apply outside the United States or its special
maritime and territorial jurisdiction, and that it does not apply to operations of the
military during an international armed conflict."42
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It is interesting to note that the American Convention on Human Rights, signed
but not ratified by the United States, in Article 1, also refers to the obligation to en-
sure rights "to all persons subject to their jurisdiction," thus equating to the language
of the European Convention.43
Thus the first divergence of opinion is to the territorial applicability of human
rights law. The United States considers that it is not bound in law to grant rights to
persons within its jurisdiction ifthey do not meet the territoriality test. The Europeans
—
and many others—consider that, while territoriality is a key factor, it is not the sole
governing factor and that they are therefore obliged as a matter of law to extend cer-
tain rights outside their own territory.
But the quote from the Working Party also reveals another divergence. The
United States view appears to be that in time of international armed conflict, human
rights law is inapplicable and is replaced by the law ofarmed conflict. This was indeed
an accepted view among many in the past and seemed to reflect the classic divide be-
tween the law ofpeace and the law ofwar. But in the same way that the boundary be-
tween peace and war itself has become blurred, so an analysis of the treaties
themselves no longer supports the purist view. Article 4 of the International Cove-
nant deals with derogations and provides for such "in time of public emergency
which threatens the life of the nation and the existence of which is officially pro-
claimed." Even then, there are certain rights that are non-derogable.
The European Convention is even more specific referring in Article 1 5 to "in time
ofwar or other public emergency threatening the life of the nation." In Article 15(2),
it specifically states: "No derogation from Article 2 [the right to life] , except in respect
of deaths resulting from lawful acts ofwar . . . shall be made under this provision." It
is clearly not open to the European States to argue that the Convention does not ap-
ply in time ofwar as it specifically caters for that eventuality. It is therefore necessary
for them to examine how the two bodies of law mesh together in time of conflict.
For purposes of completeness, the American Convention refers, in its derogation
clause, to "war, public danger, or other emergency that threatens the independence
or security of a State Party."44
The International Court ofJustice has addressed this issue in a number ofcases in-
cluding the Nuclear Weapons case45 and, most recently, the "Barrier" case involving
the so-called "Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory."46
In the Nuclear Weapons case, the Court observed:
[Tjhat the protection ofthe International Covenant of Civil and Political Rights does not
cease in times of war, except by operation of Article 4 of the Covenant whereby certain
provisions may be derogated from in a time of national emergency. Respect for the right
to life is not, however, such a provision. In principle, the right not arbitrarily to be
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deprived ofone's life applies also in hostilities. The test ofwhat is an arbitrary deprivation
of life, however, then falls to be determined by the applicable lex specialise namely, the law
applicable in armed conflict which is designed to regulate the conduct of hostilities. Thus
whether a particular loss of life, through the use of a certain weapon in warfare, is to be
considered an arbitrary deprivation of life contrary to Article 6 ofthe Covenant can only
be decided by reference to the law applicable in armed conflict and not deduced from the
terms of the Covenant itself.47
In the ''Barrier' case, the Court quoted from the Nuclear Weapons case and
continued:
More generally, the Court considers that the protection offered by human rights
conventions does not cease in case ofarmed conflict, save through the effect ofprovisions
for derogation ofthe kind to be found in Article 4 of the International Covenant on Civil
and Political Rights. As regards the relationship between international humanitarian law
and human rights law, there are thus three possible situations: some rights may be
exclusively matters of international humanitarian law; others may be exclusively matters
of human rights law; yet others may be matters of both these branches of international
law. In order to answer the question put to it, the Court will have to take into
consideration both these branches of international law, namely human rights law and, as
lex specialise international humanitarian law.48
Lawyers operating with Allied countries have no choice but to wrestle with this
complex interaction and find it difficult to understand the United States objections,
particularly ifthey lead to presidential statements such as, "Of course, our values as a
Nation, values that we share with many nations in the world, call for us to treat de-
tainees humanely, including those who are not legally entitled to such treatment."49
(Emphasis added.)
Is the president seriously suggesting that there are people who are not legally enti-
tled to "humane treatment"? Indeed, this sits oddly with the words of the same presi-
dent on his second inauguration when he said: "From the day of our Founding, we
have proclaimed that every man and woman on this earth has rights, and dignity, and
matchless value."50 I agree with these words and the president is right, not least be-
cause this is indeed the exact opposite ofthe doctrine preached by our terrorist oppo-
nents. The United States has stood as a bastion for human rights since its founding. It
was the United States that led the human rights movement in the early days and the
Universal Declaration ofHuman Rights51 itself had Eleanor Roosevelt as its guiding
force. It was the United States who during the Cold War stood as a beacon of light of-
fering a different vision to oppressed people. It is therefore unfortunate that the view
being given to the world now is that only Americans have rights—the rest of the
world has them only at the will of the United States! That is not the message of the
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Founding Fathers, nor is it the message of the president but "[i]f the trumpet give an
uncertain sound, who shall prepare himself to the battle?"52
In the same way as there is confusion about the status ofAdditional Protocol I in
the United States, so there is confusion on the applicability of human rights law to
military operations. Whether we like it or not, the world is moving on and the United
States is part—a big part—of that world. However, it is not so big that it can ignore
what is going on in the rest of the world. Those of us who are wrestling with these
knotty legal problems need the help and expertise that the United States can bring.
Furthermore, ifthe United States wants to shape the legal landscape, it can only do so
by a position of active involvement. There are many who are concerned with the
manner in which human rights law is being used to reinterpret accepted principles of
the law of armed conflict. The law of armed conflict reflects the realities of war in a
way that human rights law does not—and was never designed to do.
I come back to my definition of coalition: "temporary combination for special
ends between parties that retain distinctive principles."
The United States has distinctive principles but so do all its friends and allies. If a
coalition is to work, all parties need to retain those distinctive principles. The fact
that they exist—and are distinctive—cannot be ignored. If the United States wishes
to impose its own distinctive principles on others, that is not a "coalition." Nor can
we—or should we
—
, as allies, impose our own principles on the United States. How-
ever, in recognizing that we do have differences, we need to work together to find
ways of channeling those distinctive principles so that we move forward together.
Our purpose is the same.
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Dale G. Stephens -k
When planning for coalition warfare, the military lawyer is concerned with
achieving effective interoperability under applicable international and
domestic law. In the modern context of "coalitions of the willing," this essentially
means achieving a harmonization of rules of engagement (ROE) with the lead na-
tion, having regard to the specific taskings and missions the coalition partners have
assumed. Usually (but not always) the lead nation in conducting serious global op-
erations in the contemporary environment is the United States. As is well known,
the United States has asserted formally that it is not prepared to sign and ratify a
number oftreaties applicable in the context ofarmed conflict 1 and has been consis-
tently critical of the "progressive" nature of a number of assertive statements of
customary law heralded by some. 2 Therein lays the obvious, but "ostensible" chal-
lenge, for coalition military partners in trying to ensure operational effectiveness
when operating under potentially divergent legal regimes. The word "ostensible" is
emphasized, because at the working officer level of coalition warfare, there is much
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Coalition Warfare: Challenges and Opportunities
more commonality of approach than what one might expect notwithstanding the
stridency of statements sometimes made as to national divergence under the law.
It is a theme of this article that coalition operations are frequently successful
due to the pragmatic approach taken to interpreting the law by coalition partners.
This is not to suggest any subversion ofthe law, but rather reflects choices made by
coalition partners to intelligently accommodate differing legal approaches among
them for the common good. This success is also due to the nature of the law itself,
which is generally cast in terms of "standards" as opposed to "bright line" rules
and thus is more usually predicated upon the invocation of "values" by the mili-
tary decision-maker. Within this interdependent world, such values are more con-
vergent and synonymous with those of society at large than what many outside of
the military may think.
Modes ofAnalysis—Formalism
There are, of course, a number of ways in which to assess the issue of coalition
interoperability under the law. At the immediate or formalist level, one can merely
compare treaties ratified by coalition partners and statements of customary law
made by such partners to determine who is able to do what in the course of a cam-
paign and to orchestrate missions accordingly. Of course, this assumes the absence
ofa single consensus standard to which all will comply, which in terms ofcoalitions
of the willing, is a relatively safe assumption. 3
From this formalist position, we are faced with some obvious direct inconsis-
tency issues under international law. The Ottawa Land Mines Convention4 is the
classic example of such inconsistency, especially Article 1(c) which provides that
"Each State Party undertakes never under any circumstances: to assist, encourage
or induce, in any way, anyone to engage in any activity prohibited to a State Party
under this Convention." 5 US allies such as Australia, Canada, Germany, Japan,
New Zealand and the United Kingdom6 have all signed and ratified this treaty.
Having regard to the literal wording of the obligations imposed, mission taskings
by such signatories could not, for example, contemplate the tactical level carriage
ofUS forces or refueling ofUS assets where such forces or assets are carrying and/
or contemplate the use of anti-personnel landmines. 7 Additionally, a number of
US allies have assumed obligations under the International Criminal Court
Statute8 and under the 1980 Conventional Weapons Convention and its five Pro-
tocols. 9 The United States is not a party to the International Criminal Court treaty
nor to two ofthe five Conventional Weapons Convention Protocols. 10 Again, these
disparities have their own dynamics regarding tactical level mission taskings.
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Such dissonance is also found in differing interpretations ofcustomary interna-
tional law. The potential dichotomy between the definitions "war sustaining" un-
der the US Commander's Handbook on the Law of Naval Operations 11 and
"effective contribution to direct military action" under the San Remo Manual on
International Law Applicable to Armed Conflicts at Sea 12 is one such obvious area.
Similarly, those who have ratified Additional Protocol I 13 are bound by a num-
ber ofprovisions that the United States is not. For example, Article 56 with its prohi-
bition on attacking dams, dikes and nuclear electrical generating stations is one
where the United States has stressed its opposition as a ground for non-ratification. 14
Similarly divisive is the issue ofbelligerent reprisal. Article 51(6) ofAdditional Pro-
tocol I expressly prohibits attacks on civilians. Such a constraint does not, however,
apply to US forces under US formulations as to the residual scope of this right pur-
suant to customary international law. 15 Such differences in obligation are real and
are necessarily reflected in default statements of national ROE and "red card" di-
rectives to coalition commanders. 16
Under the formalist paradigm, all of this would seem to render the chance of ef-
fective interoperability very difficult, if not impossible. But of course this has not
been the case. In recent years, coalition forces have participated with the United
States in numerous operations without any serious compromise to mission effec-
tiveness. Coalition operations during Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm,
during operations in Somalia, in East Timor, in Afghanistan and during Operation
Iraqi Freedom are, in fact, a testament to coalition effectiveness under the law.
Why is this so? The answer to this question lies not in a formalist paradigm of the
law, but rather resides in a realist critique of formalism.
Realist Critique
The theme of this essay is that effective legal interoperability is possible, indeed
very common, despite the impression of grave differences of view. This is not a
unique observation. Colonel David Graham, JAGC, US Army (Ret.) has previously
addressed this theme 17 and has put forward a number of explanations for why this
may be so. Firstly, he offered the proposition that while US allies had ratified these
treaties, they had submitted a number ofagreed-upon reservations or declarations
that effectively achieved a common understanding of application. 18 Secondly, Col-
onel Graham highlighted the extensive consultation and sharing of military law
manuals that has happened in more recent times, which have prompted a greater
socialization of concepts. 19 Finally, he stressed the operational significance ofmul-
tilateral ROE development on operations occurring since 1977, which has driven a
convergence of legal principle. 20
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The insightful observations of Colonel Graham are fully supported in this arti-
cle. It is the third ground in particular which, it is submitted, has been decisive in
forging successful legal compatibility. The investigation of this phenomenon is the
principal focus of this article. Firstly, however, it is useful to examine the initial
ground proffered by Colonel Graham, namely the issue of collective reservations/
declarations. There is no doubt that the language used in such reservations/decla-
rations by many nations when ratifying Additional Protocol I is very similar, if not
identical. A cursory review of the tenor of declarations made to operative provisions
ofthe Protocol does evidence a certain symmetry oflanguage and intent with respect
to issues like the definition ofmilitary advantage concerning attacks to be assessed as
a "whole,"21 to the incorporation of the lives of one's own military members in the
proportionality equation,22 and to the definition of "deployment" for ascertaining
combatant status.23 This necessarily allows for a common understanding and confi-
dence when applying potentially ambiguous operative provisions in the specific con-
texts contemplated in the course of combined/coalition operations.
The second ground put forward relates to the increasing declassification and
sharing of military manuals, such publication having had the effect ofengendering
a convergence ofthinking. There is ample normative evidence that official publica-
tions which distill national interpretations of the law do have significant impact
upon international thinking. The US Commanders Handbook on The Law ofNa-
val Operations24 and public release of Standing ROE for US Forces in the mid-
1990s,25 have had a tremendous proselytizing effect on the development ofmanu-
als and ROE doctrine in other countries. Partly because ofthe simple availability of
such resources, and partly because of the accomplished line of reasoning em-
ployed, the tenor and substance of the positions reached in these sources has con-
sciously and subconsciously influenced the operational legal thinking of others.
Indeed, the very phrases of the US ROE are repeated in numerous iterations of co-
alition ROE that have been relied upon and have even found their way into the UN
Model ROE for Peacekeeping Forces. 26
Finally, it is in the last category ofColonel Graham's three grounds, the question
of ROE development through multilateral operations, where the most effective
tool for convergence of legal principle is found.
The Psychology ofMission Accomplishment
The psychology of coalition ROE development in active, combined operations is
something that is little explored in the literature.27 As a normative experience, it is
evident that this process is one that engenders an irresistible quality of intellectual
facilitation. The methodology of coalition ROE harmonization appeals to the
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pragmatic, mission accomplishment goals of the military psyche. The process of
intense consultation between military partners generates a compulsive mindset
and fosters cooperative and creative legal engagement to achieve nationally agreed-
upon strategic outcomes. Obvious legal prohibitions, such as those contained in the
Ottawa Convention concerning anti-personnel land mines for example, plainly con-
stitute "show stoppers," but the law is not commonly that stark. The modern law of
armed conflict is generally more concerned with attaining specific standards, than
imposing bright line rules. Thus, the perennial issues of deciding upon questions of
"military advantage"28 and quantifying "proportionality"29 anticipate a calibrated
discretion, which in turn allows for realistic acuity between coalition force ROE.
The issue of "law choice" theory is not new. Answering international relations
school critics of international law's alleged "legalistic-moralistic" inertia in the
early 1950s, the well known international lawyer, Myres McDougal, emphasized
the dynamic nature of international law and spoke of a choice between "effective
and ineffective" law. 30 He observed that:
The process of decision-making is indeed, as every lawyer knows, one of continual
redefinition of doctrine in its application to ever-changing facts and claims. A
conception of law which focuses upon doctrine to the exclusion of the pattern of
practices by which it is given meaning and made effective, is therefore, not the most
conducive to understanding.31
McDougal concluded that "A realistic conception of law, must, accordingly,
conjoin formal authority and effective control and include not only doctrine but
also the pattern of practices of both formal and effective decision makers."32 This
thesis of "effective law" shares much with the subsequent Hammerskjold approach
to innovative and pragmatic legal resolution33 and is anchored very heavily within
a defined societal value set.
This thinking also draws on the concept of the law of armed conflict as "soft
power," a process articulated masterfully by Professor Schmitt. 34 Professor Schmitt
examined the decision-making calculus resident within US attitudes concerning
treaty ratification and offered a number of hypotheses concerning law as a policy
choice. Professor Schmitt sought to identify the causative impact ofAmerican de-
cision making, both with respect to those treaties that are ratified, and more in-
triguingly, those that are not. Hence, he made the significant point that:
Law can even shape war for those not party to a particular normative standard. For
instance, Additional Protocol I, which the United States has not ratified, prohibits
most attacks on dams, dikes, and nuclear electrical generating stations. Despite U.S.
opposition to this particular provision, there have been no U.S. attacks on any of these
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target sets since the Vietnam War; should it conduct such an attack it would be
condemned. . . . Apprehension over condemnation certainly influences the policy
choice ofwhether to engage in such strikes [I]t would be hard to imagine . . . U.S.
forces in a coalition intentionally conducting an operation that would violate Protocol
I ... if any significant coalition partners were parties to the treaty. The realities of
coalition-building and maintenance would simply not allow it.35
The point artfully made by Professor Schmitt discloses two underlying precepts.
The first is that US views on the scope ofaction legally available as a consequence of
not ratifying Additional Protocol I is often contextualized in an operational envi-
ronment in a manner that accommodates coalition harmony. Just because the
United States retains the full legal capacity to attack the types of objects prohibited
by the Protocol to others does not mean that it will necessarily undertake such at-
tacks. Policy imperatives regarding coalition cohesion plainly inform decisions
concerning attack profiles.
Secondly, the assessment made by Professor Schmitt acknowledges the role of
"values" when assessing the relative cost exchange for attacking particular targets
or deciding upon requisite levels of collateral damage or incidental injury. The law
ofarmed conflict requires that a military commander exercise his/her judgment as
to whether the significance of attacking a particular military objective is worth the
"cost." There is actually a wide level of discretion available to the commander un-
der the law provided that such judgments are "reasonable and made in good faith."
In the modern context of volunteer military and naval forces, it is likely that mili-
tary commanders will reflect the very values ofthe population at large when assess-
ing amorphous standards like "concrete and direct military advantage
anticipated." One is often struck with how civilian audiences will go through a target
evaluation process and arrive at strikingly similar legal solutions concerning the
proportionality equation as would a seasoned military audience. Indeed, the politi-
cal ramifications of such methodologies tend to be more prescient within military
decision-making evolutions than that found within civilian thinking.
It is also evident that within professional military audiences of different na-
tions there tends to be a broad consensus as to the values placed upon the mili-
tary significance of certain targets and the costs deemed acceptable in terms of
incidental civilian injury and collateral damage to property when attacking (or
not) those targets. This has been a product of the increasing frequency of multi-
lateral coalition operations over recent years, in conjunction with the dramatic
increase ofUN peace operations that have operated under common sets of ROE.
Similarly, it is also the product of the increasing socialization process brought
about by international professional military education. Venues such as the US
Naval War College have been hosting officers from around the world for almost
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50 years and have been inculcating the teaching program with the promotion of
democratic liberal values. These values find precise expression in the targeting de-
cisions made by senior commanders who are driven by both the goals of mission
achievement under extant ROE and the increasingly homogenous cultural imper-
atives of modern societies.
Challenges to Coalition Warfare
While there is much greater commonality to ROE development than what one may
imagine, that isn't to deny the very real challenges that pervade this process. At the
tactical level, it is self-evidently difficult to frame appropriate ROE in circum-
stances where government policy as to the existing law is either unarticulated or
has been subject to several reversals. While governments may prefer the policy flex-
ibility of leaving their options open as to what they perceive to be customary inter-
national law, this has an obviously deleterious consequence for planning for both
the subject nation and coalition partners.
The other challenge to coalition interoperability is overt political intervention
in the ROE process by governments. Although to be fair, unlike the Vietnam era,
the contemporary practice ofgovernments has been to allow the military full reign
for the execution of the campaign under the law and to interject political involve-
ment once calculations concerning compliance with the law have been under-
taken. Hence, approval may be required for an attack even though it fulfills the
proportionality test, but nonetheless anticipates a significant loss of life. Such "in-
tervention" is plainly appropriate and reflects the realities of the political dimen-
sion of undertaking modern armed conflict. 36
Ironically, the greatest potential challenge to coalition operations may come
from the application ofdomestic law to the ROE process. It is somewhat of a para-
dox that military lawyers ofdifferent countries can speak easily about applicable legal
concepts and yet when those same lawyers speak to national legal colleagues of
other government departments who may have a stake in ROE development, such
conversations are at cross-purposes.
The Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court37 has also brought into
focus the challenge of aligning criminal law standards reflected in that treaty with
more traditional standards contained within domestic law. Issues such as "intent"
and "recklessness" and their translation into an operational context are obvious
points of potential difficulty. Similarly, the use of lethal force to protect mission es-
sential property and the application of domestic law self-defense criteria to opera-
tions against deadly enemies in the jungles and deserts of the world where military
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forces operate in the twilight zone between war and peace are two other areas
where there is potential for dichotomous answers.
The issue ofdealing with domestic legal conundrums when striving for coalition
interoperability is not unique. It may be time to revisit the concept of "transna-
tional law" that was originally championed by those such as Professor Jessup in the
1920s as a more reliable way to advance international law's reforming promise. 38 It
is a theme that, in a modified way, has been picked up more recently by Anne-Marie
Slaughter and her liberalist, international relations critique of the modern legal
method and may well be a profitable avenue of focus for those of us keen to recon-
cile public international law rights and responsibilities with domestic law. 39 Profes-
sor Slaughter advocates a recasting of international law to assimilate public and
private law, across and between territorial boundaries of liberal States, to conceive
of a more effective body of resulting law that is defined not by "subject or source
but rather in terms of purpose and effect."40
Conclusion
Professor Louis Henkin famously observed that "Almost all nations observe almost
all principles of international law and almost all of their obligations almost all of
the time."41 It remains a trite but powerfully correct statement. Despite some clear
differences of opinion on some aspects of the law of armed conflict, and despite
some very real challenges under both domestic and international law, the process
of ensuring legal interoperability for ROE development and mission fulfillment
between coalition partners is not as grave as one might imagine. It is incumbent
upon professional military lawyers to continue to use their best creative endeavors
to seek solutions to otherwise intractable legal problems. This is essential not only
to ensure the success of the mission, which is always the paramount obligation, but
to also instill greater strength into the intricate mosaic that is international law.
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Toward 2015, Challenges for a Medium Navy:
An Australian Perspective
Raydon Gates*
The purpose of this article is to provide an operator's assessment of future
challenges for a medium sized Navy from an Australian perspective. I am
going to range quite widely across warfighting and organizational issues and sug-
gest a few areas where I might be able to generate some work for our judge advocate
colleagues. I will conclude with a short scenario that I hope will set people thinking
about the legal issues associated with future combat operations, enabled by net-
work centric warfare in a coalition setting.
Let me begin by addressing what I see as the most important future warfighting
trends. I am sure that they will not be a surprise to most ofyou. The Royal Austra-
lian Navy's (RAN) job is to protect the sovereignty of Australia, Australia's inter-
ests and Australian citizens. Australia's interests are global, our national security
strategy is maritime in nature and our government's approach to global security is-
sues reflects these facts. Therefore, the first enduring trend is a requirement for our
Navy to be able to project maritime power at home and offshore, wherever Austra-
lia's interests may lie. This trend is accompanied by a requirement to deliver com-
bat power across the spectrum of conflict, whether that be in support of coalition
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alone and do not necessarily represent the views of the Australian Government, the Australian
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combat operations in the war on terror, providing a secure environment in a failed
State or delivering humanitarian support to regional neighbors. That being said,
the Australian Defence Force (ADF) acquires capabilities in support ofcombat op-
erations and adapts those capabilities, along with our tactics, techniques and pro-
cedures, to deliver options to the Government across the remainder of the mission
space. We do not, as a general rule, acquire major capabilities that only have appli-
cations in operations other than combat. We simply can't afford it.
Earlier, I perhaps over-emphasized that the RAN is in the business oflooking af-
ter Australia's national interest to make a point. Often in the coalition context we
hear about the notion ofcommon national interests. I would argue that this notion
is generally a fallacy. In coalitions, compatible national interests are and certainly
must be present, but compatible interests are not necessarily common interests.
Even in the tightest of alliances or coalitions we will see divergences in the handling
of certain issues. The fact that coalition partners are signatories, or not signatories,
to a range of international treaties is a direct reflection of political divergence.
Noting the observations of Clausewitz—that war is a continuance of the political
discourse by other means—it follows that within the coalition force we immedi-
ately have the potential for a number of different military objectives, reflecting dif-
fering national political objectives. A tension is thus created within coalition
structures; in my view that tension is an enduring feature of coalitions and there-
fore of the future war fighting landscape. It is up to military commanders to ac-
count for and manage national divergences so that unity of effort is maintained,
within national constraints and in accordance with national priorities.
Military lawyers play a large part in harmonizing, where practicable, national
rules of engagement (ROE) and establishing procedures within coalitions to ac-
count for political divergences. I would offer that these issues need to be addressed
very early in the planning process as they have the potential to affect the very es-
sence ofan operation; from targeting to operating areas, from rules ofengagement
to task group disposition. Before I leave this subject I would not want to leave you
with the impression that political divergence always offers problems, in fact it often
offers opportunities. It may be possible for a coalition commander to use the forces
of another nation to undertake a task with more freedom ofmaneuver than would
be available to their own forces. For example, I experienced this in the Red Sea in
1992/93 where Australian ROE gave our units greater freedom of action, in certain
areas, when conducting maritime interception operations with coalition partners.
This was an advantage to the US commander, who subsequently employed RAN
units closest to the Straits of Tiran at the mouth of the Gulf ofAqaba to intercept
"inspection runners" when required.
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A trend in all Western armed services is that warfighting is being undertaken via
the application of joint effects. In Australia, we are a relatively small defense force
and enjoy a close relationship between the Services. Yet we have still learned les-
sons about operating as a joint force in recent times. The joint application ofcom-
bat power will be an enduring feature of the future warfighting landscape. Even
simple issues such as terminology can mean different things to people from differ-
ent Services from the same nation. Maritime forces are also increasingly being
required to provide support to the joint force ashore. I will have more to say on
this issue a little later on.
In the Australian context, we are also seeing responses to security issues in-
creasingly being approached from a whole-of-government perspective. The mili-
tary must work with other government, and importantly non-government,
agencies to achieve the mission at hand. In some circumstances, perhaps most, it
could be argued that the activities of other, non-military government agencies are
the war winners. In these circumstances, the military's role becomes one of pro-
viding a secure environment so they can get on with their job; this is probably now
the case in Iraq.
Australia's recent lead role in the Regional Assistance Mission to the Solomon
Islands is another example. This was a Department ofForeign Affairs and Trade led
mission in close partnership with the Australian Federal Police, the ADF and others.
The ADF contributed its weight and presence to the equation, creating a secure en-
vironment so police and other government agencies could assist the Solomon Island
authorities to regain control of their community and system of government. As a
result of this whole-of-government trend, we are seeing increased numbers ofnon-
military personnel legitimately in combat zones. This has advantages and chal-
lenges. Obviously, some adversaries often fail to make any distinction between a
combatant and a noncombatant in this regard; they simply fight by a different set
of rules or lack thereof. This poses interesting force protection and ROE quanda-
ries for the modern day and future commander.
The future maritime warfighting environment is characterized by lethality no
matter what mission you are conducting, whether it is peace operations, assisting
with law enforcement in territorial waters or delivering humanitarian aid. The
asymmetric threat of non-State players, including disaffected people and elements
of transnational crime, enabled by the proliferation of weapon technologies and
unrestrained by an obligation to comply with the law of armed conflict, has di-
minished warning time for a potential engagement and has further blurred the
distinction between combatants and noncombatants. Lethal effects can be deliv-
ered by individuals or small groups on an increasingly devastating scale. A humani-
tarian aid mission in an area frequented by terrorist groups can be as lethal as
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combat operations in a State-on-State scenario. It is only the duration, magnitude
and potential warning time of the lethal engagement that varies, not whether
lethality is present or not.
As a result of the global trend of urbanization, particularly in coastal regions,
and the importance ofthe sea for global trade, I think it is fair to say that the major-
ity of the world's future security issues will have an element either on, or within in-
fluence of, the sea. Accordingly, we conclude that future maritime force operations
will be dominated by the littoral; a parallel development to the increasing impor-
tance ofurban terrain to the land force. Littoral environments mean an increase in
the density of noncombatants, complications from terrain and the environment,
and the increased presence of sea mine and land-based threats. Combine this with
asymmetric tactics, the blurring of combatants and non-combatants, reduced
warning times and increased lethality and we have significant ROE, target identifi-
cation, threat response time and force protection challenges.
Another trend from recent conflicts that we see continuing is the problem of ac-
cess, basing and overflight rights. In Australia's region, this is particularly relevant.
From my observations, it is not the culture ofAsian nations to get involved in what
they consider each other's internal business—a fair enough stance. The recent
Southeast Asian regional non-aggression pact proposal is probably a reflection of
this position. Combine this trend with the littoral emphasis of future operations
and the response is to develop sea basing concepts. The RAN's Future Maritime
Operating Concept also looks to leverage the freedoms and maneuver space of the
sea. Those freedoms are embedded in the United Nations Convention on Law of
the Sea (1982 LOS Convention). 1 Australia has signed and ratified this treaty.
Archipelagic sea lanes, international straits and complex maritime boundary inter-
pretations abound in Australia's potential mission space. Our lines ofcommunica-
tion lay across and through all of these maritime areas. The 1982 LOS Convention
remains a key convention in a globalized world where seaborne trade accounts for
the vast majority ofglobal commerce and is crucial to energy flows. Freedom ofthe
sea is obviously key to the freedom of maneuver of coalition navies.
On the technology side ofwarfare, we are seeing the increased use ofunmanned
vehicles for surveillance and for offensive and defensive purposes. With the future
development and confluence of miniaturization, propulsion technologies and fuel
cells, nanotechnology, communications and computing technologies we will see
the capabilities and presence of unmanned platforms increase in all warfighting
domains. Potential legal issues abound here.
Missile technologies are proliferating at an accelerated rate; their speed and in
particular their ranges are rapidly increasing. These missiles are now fire-and-forget,
but I am sure we will see increasing levels of artificial intelligence in missiles. For
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example, on arrival at a target area a missile may reassign itself ifthe target appears
to have moved or seems absent. How does this sit with ROE and identification cri-
teria? There is also the potential for land forces to reassign the missile in flight
should a target be destroyed while the missile is inbound. Again, take the situation
of forces from one nation reassigning a missile from another with the firing unit
having little say in the process. Vexing legal problems arise that must be overcome
so that warfighters can leverage advances in technology. Sea mines are in the in-
ventories ofmany maritime nations and it would be reasonable to expect that non-
State actors could acquire these technologies without too much trouble, should
they so desire. Of course, submarines are entering service with many nations, par-
ticularly in Australia's area of interest. They are a great weapon ifyou are trying to
leverage an asymmetric advantage or are simply outgunned on or above the sur-
face of the ocean.
To top it all off, the future maritime battlespace will be wrapped in a network,
linking sensors to shooters and, in theory, facilitating a pervasive situational
awareness that will synchronize forces and provide subordinate commanders with
the information they need to act independently to implement the senior com-
mander's intent. Decision cycles will be compressed and fires delivered faster to
deal with elusive and mobile targets. Network enabled operations will be a feature
of the future.
As you are well aware, the United States leads the world in military technology
in most areas and in particular in implementing a network centric approach. The
cost of technology is generally very high and for some, possibly our own Navy, the
full implementation of network centric warfare (NCW) may simply be unafford-
able. Australia uses technology to generate a fighting edge. Importantly, this also
includes the smarter application oftechnology as proliferation ofmodern weapons
and sensors narrows the gap between others and ourselves. Let me say at this junc-
ture, there is no quandary in the mind of Australia's military leaders when we ex-
amine where we might need to be technologically; we use interoperability with the
United States as a benchmark. However, we must strike a balance that ensures we
remain interoperable with both technically advanced allies and those not as techni-
cally advanced, but no less important, regional and coalition partners. Australia
successfully led the UN effort in East Timor because it had the ability to flex its
command and control systems, technology, tactics, techniques and procedures in
both directions to accommodate coalition partners across a range of technological
capabilities. We must continue to achieve this balance within a tight budget. This
will challenge our ingenuity and, I suspect at times, our patience!
Let me move on to organizational challenges. Recently, my Chief of Navy re-
leased his strategic guidance for the Future Navy known as Plan Blue. This
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document examined the future Navy we need to be and the challenges that will face
us. I would like to touch on but a few of those issues.
I think it is fair to say that our two largest concerns will be people and budgets.
Western populations are aging and stagnating, yet our economies continue to
grow. This places an enormous strain on our all volunteer Navy's traditional re-
cruiting base. Competition with industry for the right people will sharpen mark-
edly over the coming decades. Engineering and technical skills will be in particular
demand. In our view, the RAN will probably become incrementally smaller with
time, yet it must deliver the same—if not a greater—warfighting punch. Careful
management and preservation of our most precious resource, people, will be re-
quired to manage workloads, ensure the Service is an attractive career option and,
once people are part of our Service, ensure we retain them. As you are all well
aware, uniformed people are a rare and very expensive asset in which the armed
services make a substantial investment. Regardless oftechnological prowess, war is
a clash ofwills, it is a human endeavor and, at the end ofthe day, the fighting effec-
tiveness of militaries is all about the quality of their people.
An aging population and infrastructure reinvestment requirements will gener-
ate increasing fiscal demand within the budgetary structure of a decreasing per-
sonal tax base. By our Government's own analysis, post-2017 Australia will not be
able to fund its governance without incurring budget deficits. Obviously, struc-
tural changes to taxation and spending patterns will be required to address this
challenge. I think the impact on a medium navy is obvious; an expectation of real
funding increases in the longer term, while possible, is not likely, barring a major
discontinuity in the world's security situation. So it is a pretty simple problem to
articulate; do our business better with fewer people and fewer resources.
These two critical factors, along with the warfighting trends addressed above,
will generate a range of other future issues. I will touch on but a few. Within our
ships we will see increasing automation to decrease the requirement for people and
help manage the workload of smaller ships' companies. There will be an increasing
number of human-machine interfaces and eventually machine-machine inter-
faces. Decision support systems may be required to implement decisions pro-
grammed into them without a human in the loop. Ships will have to stay at sea
longer in order to maximize greater reliability and availability, but somehow we
must balance workloads and retain our people. In the future, our ships will con-
tinue to have to comply with international treaties to which our governments may
be party. Environmental law and occupational health and safety will play an in-
creasing role in ship design, maintenance and operation. As some will be aware, the
RAN has recently purchased the double hulled merchant tanker Delos, soon to be
commissioned asHMAS Sirius, so that we comply with the International Maritime
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Organization's (IMO) pollution from ships requirements for the transportation of
fuels at sea, 2 just as an example.
The eternal drive for fiscal efficiency will see the greater use of contracted sup-
port both on and off board our ships. Contractors will have to be integrated into
the way we do our business rather than being seen as simply delivering services. We
may find that the armed services and defense industry effectively share people as
the workforce skill base decreases in proportion to demand. The legal aspect of
contracted support to deployed operations is an area we could talk about for hours.
Are contractors in providing direct support to the force combatants or noncomba-
tants, and from whose perspective? In this case are they under military command
or are they not? Are they subject to the Defence Force Discipline Act (or the Uni-
form Code of Military Justice (UCMJ) for the United States)? What if a contractor
refuses to deliver services into a combat zone despite the usual fiscal enticements
and contractual requirements? Can we compel a contractor to put civilians in
harm's way and subject to the constant presence of lethal force? The status of con-
tractors vis-a-vis host nations who provide logistic support also raises issues as, for
example, in the application of local health, safety and insurance laws and regula-
tions. With regard to the protection of host nation contractors, do they become
designated persons under our rules ofengagement or not? Not to mention status of
forces agreements or arrangements or memorandums of understanding, or what-
ever the flavor ofthe month happens to be. These are issues that we have had to ad-
dress during recent operations and must continue to address in the future.
There are numerous other issues to consider, such as the competition for mari-
time practice areas with commercial interests and environmental concerns. The is-
sue of whales and sonar has recently been of contention both in the United States
and in Australia. Increasing commercial traffic and access to ports, security ofwar-
ships in ports and the application of security zones around warships are but a few
of the contentious issues with which we must wrestle.
Let me conclude with a very brief scenario that encapsulates some interesting
contemporary and future warfighting and international law issues.
The year is 2015 and His Majesty's Australian Ship Adelaide lays 20 miles off-
shore on the boundary ofthe new territorial sea limit. It would be better ifshe were
in at 12 miles like the old days. The combat system is up, the decision support soft-
ware filters information, delivering only, as the system has been programmed, as-
sessments that a person can consume. A hypersonic, autonomous, fire-and-forget
missile is on the rails. The ship is waiting for the call for fire. There are boats every-
where; whether friend or foe it is hard to tell. Are they hostile intelligence collectors
or fishermen? They are all traveling fast and can't all be stopped, boarded and
checked out. They seem to be avoiding the 500-meter warship exclusion zone
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though. (Legal or not, the zone seems to be having its desired effect and that's all
that counts.)
Ashore Purpleland special forces have identified the target. The E-message
streaks through the ether to the Orangeland commanded coalition headquarters.
This is a time sensitive target. Just one shot, no time to mess around. The E-message
is permitted to auto-progress from the sensor network to the shooter grid for fires
allocation. Onboard Adelaide the missile launcher bell sounds and almost immedi-
ately the familiar sound of a missile streaking landward breaks the silence. The
Combat Information Center (CIC) duty officer watches on his heads up, virtual 3D
display. He sees the target position and terrain, observes the correct protocols and
thinks nothing more of it. There are plenty of time sensitive targets that arise in
these war on terror operations. No need to tell the Captain, she was on the bridge
and saw the bird go. Adelaide sets off for a port visit, a job well done.
Upon arrival, a defense contractor climbs the mast to replace an aerial; he is
from the contractor support unit based in the Fleet Forward Operating base. A
Captain's worst nightmare unfolds; a sniper has just shot the contractor, and one
of her sailors has shot a local who he believes was the assailant. The sailor had no
time to think, he had to make a decision. One moment the assailant was bunkering
the ship from the wharf, the next minute he was a sniper. No time to ask permis-
sion. The ROE talked about this situation, but he never fully understood what he
was really meant to do.
The Captain's day is not going to get any better. She has been advised that the
missile Adelaide fired struck its target. She has also been advised that the target was
a local politician. He was visiting a community center; 50 people have been killed.
How could this happen? That politician wasn't a combatant within the Australian
ROE. His targeting was not consistent with our international obligations! A com-
munity center is not an approved target for Australian units and the death of 50
noncombatants is outside national collateral damage/incidental injury limits. The
NCW system was meant to be programmed, there were meant to be safeguards in
place. What could she have done from sea with the system in automatic? There was
no time to confirm the target in any event. It was time sensitive.
Purpleland and Orangeland commanders seem to be notably absent; all the locals
know is that the round that killed the apparent sniper came from an Australian
ship, as did the missile that hit the community center. In both cases Australia ap-
plied the lethal force. These are Australian problems. The Captain sits down and
decides to have a drink; you can do that on Australian ships. Common versus com-
patible national interests, divergent international legal obligations, status of forces
agreements, it's all networked, it's all automated and it's all too much for a simple
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The Current State ofThe Law ofNaval Warfare:
A Fresh Look at the San Remo Manual
Wolff Heintschel von Heinegg*
Introduction
The 1994 San Remo Manual 1 has met widespread approval as a contemporary
restatement of the principles and rules of international law applicable to
armed conflicts at sea. In view ofthe fact that many of its provisions are but a com-
promise between the differing views within the group of international lawyers and
naval experts who drafted it, some of its provisions may be far from perfection.
Still, this has not prevented a considerable number of States from adopting most of
the San Remo rules in their respective manuals or instructions for their naval
armed forces. 2 Against that background it is somewhat surprising that there are an
increasing number ofboth operators and lawyers criticizing parts of the San Remo
Manual as outdated and as an unreasonable obstacle to the success of their oper-
ational or strategic goals. They, inter alia, refer to the provisions on measures
short of attack and on methods and means of naval warfare, especially on block-
ade and operational zones. In their view, those provisions meet neither the neces-
sities of modern operations, e.g., maritime interception operations (MIO) nor
non-military enforcement measures decided upon by the UN Security Council,
nor do they offer operable solutions to the naval commander. 3
* Professor of International Law at Europe-University in Frankfurt (Oder), Germany. This
article was first published in volume 36 of the Israel Yearbook on Human Rights (2006) and is
reprinted with permission. © 2006 by Wolff Heintschel von Heinegg.
A Fresh Look at the San Remo Manual
Of course, the San Remo Manual does not prioritize military or operational ne-
cessity. Rather it imposes legal restrictions on naval commanders that may prove
inconvenient in view ofthe means available and in view ofthe task ofthe respective
mission. The said criticism, however, goes beyond such general complaints about
legal rules. It is based upon the belief that whenever it comes to other States' ship-
ping, interference would be permissible only if it is in accordance with the law of
naval warfare, i.e., with the provisions of the San Remo Manual. If so, it would be
difficult, indeed, to maintain that certain missions, e.g., MIO, conducted within
the framework of the Global War on Terror are legal. It would be similarly difficult
to explain the legality ofmeasures enforcing an embargo ifthey had to be judged in
the light of the law of blockade alone.
However, the said criticism is based upon an erroneous understanding of the
law of naval warfare, of its scope of applicability and, thus, of the San Remo Manual.
Maritime interception operations aimed at combating transnational terrorism4 or
the proliferation ofweapons ofmass destruction5 and related components do have
a legal basis that is independent from the law ofnaval warfare. The same holds true
with regard to enforcing an embargo—either with or without the authorization of
the UN Security Council.6 Therefore, neither the law of naval warfare nor the San
Remo Manual as its most recent restatement pose an insurmountable obstacle to
such operations. The San Remo Manual's provisions apply exclusively to situations
of international armed conflicts. 7 MIO and other maritime operations have to be
based upon that body of law only if they occur in the course of an armed conflict
between two or more States.
However, the said criticism does not seem to be absolutely unjustified insofar as
the San Remo Manual may indeed no longer properly reflect contemporary State
practice or meet the realities ofmodern maritime and naval operations. Moreover,
some of its provisions seem to be quite ambiguous and, thus, may be misinter-
preted. This lack of legal clarity could ultimately render obsolete the great progress
achieved by the San Remo Manual.
Therefore, it is time to take a fresh look at the San Remo Manual. The task this
author has been entrusted with is to identify those provisions that ought to be re-
considered or modified8 and to evaluate the persuasiveness of some of the critical
arguments that have been put forward.
Definitions
At first glance, the list of definitions in paragraph 13 of the Manual seems to be
comprehensive and reflective of customary law. The latter is certainly true in
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principle.9 Still, this does not necessarily mean that all the definitions continue to
reflect contemporary State practice.
Civilian Mariners and Private Contractors on Board Warships
There is a tendency in contemporary State practice to crew warships with civilians
or at least to make use of civilian contractors who work on board warships. 10 In
many cases, the contribution of civilian contractors is essential for the operation of
the ship or of its weapons systems. Hence, the question arises whether the presence
of civilian mariners or civilian contractors affects the legal status of the ship con-
cerned. The ability to exercise belligerent rights remains reserved for warships. 11
Warships are authorized to engage in offensive military activities, including visit
and search, blockade, interdiction and convoy escort operations. Auxiliary vessels
are expressly prohibited from exercising belligerent rights. 12 There are convincing
arguments according to which civilians on board warships should perform neither
crew functions nor other functions related to the operation of the ship and its
weapons or electronic systems. Such activities should indeed remain reserved for
the armed forces personnel who have traditionally performed them.
It should be noted, however, that the definition ofwarships in paragraph 13 (g)
and in customary international law does not necessarily rule out the use of civilian
mariners and of civilian contractors. According to that definition the warships
must be manned by "a crew that is under regular armed forces discipline." In con-
trast, the 1907 Hague Convention VII Relating to the Conversion of Merchant
Ships into Warships, 13 in Article 4, provides that "the crew" of a converted mer-
chant ship "must be subject to military discipline." While the use of the definite
article in Hague Convention VII rules out the (further) use of civilian mariners, the
indefinite article in the definition ofwarships justifies the conclusion that not nec-
essarily all crew members must be under regular armed forces discipline. Leaving
aside the ensuing question of the permissible proportion of civilian mariners (or
private contractors) in comparison to sailors and officers proper, it, thus, becomes
clear that the manning of warships with civilian mariners does not affect the legal
status of the ship as long as the other criteria are met and as long as a certain por-
tion of the crew remains under regular armed forces discipline. Of course, these
findings are without prejudice to the legal status of civilian mariners and of civilian
contractors. If captured they could, with good reasons, be considered unlawful
combatants and prosecuted for direct participation in hostilities. The latter prob-
lem could be solved by conferring a special legal status on civilian mariners and pri-
vate contractors. Still, it would certainly contribute to legal clarity if paragraph 13
(g) were supplemented by an explanatory statement with regard to the presence of
civilians on board warships.
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Unmanned Vehicles
Paragraph 13 lacks a definition of unmanned—aerial or underwater—vehicles. 14
This issue is raised here because their legal status may well be of importance with
regard to the rights and duties of neutral States. An unmanned vehicle is either an
integral part of a warship's weapons systems or otherwise controlled from a mili-
tary platform. If that military platform is a warship or a military aircraft, the un-
manned aerial vehicle (UAV), unmanned combat air vehicle (UCAV), or
unmanned underwater vehicle (UUV), according to the position taken here, nec-
essarily shares the legal status of that platform and it, thus, enjoys sovereign immu-
nity as long as it is operated in high seas areas or in international airspace.
Accordingly, neutral States would under no circumstances be allowed to interfere
with them.
Regions ofOperations
The provisions ofthe San Remo Manual on the Regions ofOperations are evidently
influenced by the 1982 UN Convention on the Law of the Sea. 15 The adaptation of
the rules on the regions of operations to the contemporary law of the sea is by all
means a realistic, and the only operable, approach to reconcile the interests ofbellig-
erent and neutral States. Of course, this delicate compromise is continuously chal-
lenged by excessive maritime claims. 16 Creeping jurisdiction may unsettle that
compromise and may, ultimately, render obsolete that part ofthe San Remo Manual.
Therefore, States should take all necessary measures to preserve the achievements of
both the Law of the Sea Convention and of the San Remo Manual. 17 Still, the provi-
sions of the San Remo Manual on the regions of operations are far from perfect.
Those provisions reflect the approach underlying the Law of the Sea Conven-
tion not only with regard to the determination of neutral waters," 18 but also with
regard to the obligations of belligerents at sea to pay due regard to the legitimate
rights of coastal States, when operating within their EEZ, and of third States,
when operating in high seas areas. 19 The author is aware that during the drafting
process of the San Remo Manual there was a controversy about the exact meaning
of the due regard principle and that its inclusion in the manual was a compromise
decision. 20 Nevertheless, there should be a little further guidance as to its exact
meaning. Unless specified, the due regard principle will only be paid lip service
or, even worse, it will be abused by coastal States in order to camouflage acts of
unneutral service.
The same holds true with regard to paragraph 15 oftheManual which states that
"within and over neutral waters . . . hostile actions by belligerent forces are forbid-
den." Paragraph 16 contains a non-exhaustive list of activities that are covered by
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the term "hostile actions." This enumeration predominantly refers to traditional
naval operations during armed conflict. Of course, the term "hostile action," as
well as one of the activities listed
—
"use as a base of operations"—would be broad
enough to also cover other activities, e.g., the use of means for electronic warfare
(EW), target acquisition, or reconnaissance purposes. Such an interpretation
would, it is maintained here, certainly be in accordance with customary interna-
tional law. However, the examples following that term could cast doubt on
whether such activities would also be covered by the prohibition of using neutral
waters and neutral airspace as a base of operations. One way ofavoiding such cases
ofdoubt would be the deletion of all examples. In order to contribute to legal clar-
ity, however, it seems preferable to add to the examples listed a formulation similar
to that of Article 47 of the 1923 Hague Rules21 which provides:
A neutral state is bound to take such steps as the means at its disposal permit to prevent
within its jurisdiction aerial observations of the movements, operations or defenses of
one belligerent, with the intention of informing the other belligerent.
This provision applies equally to a belligerent military aircraft on board a vessel ofwar.
Such a clarification also seems appropriate with regard to combat rescue opera-
tions in neutral territory. Such rescue operations are not specially protected under
the law ofarmed conflict. Rather, they are to be considered military operations that
would also fall into the category of "hostile action."
The Aerial Element—Underestimated
Modern naval operations are no longer conducted in a purely maritime environ-
ment. Naval battles proper, as traditionally envisioned, belong more or less to the
past. Today naval forces operate jointly with other forces, especially with air
forces. 22 As an integral part of these joint operations, naval forces can no longer be
considered bound by only one set of rules specifically and exclusively designed for
them. Moreover, even if naval operations were confined to the maritime environ-
ment, they would always imply the use of aircraft and of missiles because these as-
sets are among the most effective weapons against enemy naval forces.
Of course, the San Remo Manual does not follow the limited approach of the
treaties of 190723 or of 1936. 24 Its provisions are not limited to naval platforms, but
also relate to military aircraft, civil aircraft, and to missiles. 25 Thus, the Manual has
broadened—or at least clarified—the scope of the term "law of naval warfare" to
cover not only ship-to-ship, but also ship-to-air and air-to-ship operations,
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including the use of missiles; as well as "prize measures," and the protection ofves-
sels, aircraft, objects and persons at sea, on land, and in the air.
While the San Remo Manual addresses many of the issues arising from the inter-
action of naval and air warfare, its provisions sometimes give reason to assume that
naval warfare still has been regarded in isolation. At least one cannot entirely escape
the impression that the aerial element of maritime operations, as well as the possi-
ble impact of aircraft on naval operations, has been dealt with only marginally.
With paragraph 45 stating that "surface ships, submarines and aircraft are
bound by the same principles and rules," the San Remo Manual starts from the
premise that when it comes to methods and means of naval warfare there is no
need to distinguish between the vehicles or platforms employed. Since the basic
principles of the law of armed conflict apply to all methods and means of warfare,
this approach seems to be logical and cogent. Still, the question remains whether
this approach will lead to operable and viable provisions for the conduct ofmodern
maritime operations. For example, the Manual's rules on mine warfare and on
blockade do not seem to meet that test. The same holds true with regard to those
rules dealing with enemy and neutral aircraft.
Aerial Threats
Aircraft have always posed, and continue to pose, a considerable threat—a threat
not limited only to naval platforms. Accordingly, particularly the conditions that
render civil aircraft legitimate military objectives need to be reconsidered. An air-
craft approaching naval surface forces can inflict damage to a warship by the use of
comparatively inexpensive and non-sophisticated means. Moreover, it may gain
and transmit information that is vital to the success of the military operation in
question. The drafters ofthe 1923 Hague Rules26 understood this and, accordingly,
agreed upon Articles 33, 34, and 3527 that would have enabled belligerents to deal
with those threats adequately.
Spaight, who is hesitant to accept the 1923 Hague Rules relating to the treatment
of civil aircraft as suitable for adoption,28 doubts whether Article 34 would prove
operable in practice for the following reasons:29
Item ( 1 ) ofthe Article contemplates a contingency which is improbable; enemy non-
military aircraft are hardly likely to venture into the jaws of the enemy's jurisdiction.
The term 'operations' in item (3) of the same Article is unduly restricted. If a
belligerent warship saw an enemy private aircraft suddenly approaching at high
speed, surely it would be entitled to repel the aircraft by gunfire even ifno operations
were in progress in the locality? The reference to the 'immediate vicinity' of a
'jurisdiction'—a new test in international law—may lead to difficulties in
interpretation; it will not be an easy test for the officers concerned to apply in practice.
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The framing ofboth Articles in a positive, instead of the usual prohibitory, sense leads
to lack ofprecision. The quite unchallengeable right of a belligerent to fire upon a non-
military aircraft which disobeys his signal or order to stand offor change its course does
not seem to be safeguarded, at any rate in the open sea when 'operations' are not in
progress.
Spaight therefore suggests replacing Articles 30, 33, and 34 with the following for-
mulation:30
A non-military aircraft may not be fired upon in flight, unless
( 1
)
It disobeys a belligerent's signals or orders; or
(2) It enters an area notified by him as one of military activity in which aircraft
circulate at their peril and are liable to be fired upon without warning.
Spaight's criticism is not necessarily valid today. On the one hand, it is not im-
probable that civil aircraft continue to fly within the jurisdiction of the respective
enemy. On the other hand, the term "immediate vicinity of operations" has obvi-
ously gained some support and, moreover, has to be distinguished from self-
defense situations obviously (also) envisaged by Spaight. While we will return to
these concepts, it needs to be emphasized here that Spaight, despite his criticism,
agrees that aircraft—enemy or neutral
—
pose a considerable risk and that the
belligerents are entitled to counter that risk if necessary by the use ofarmed force.
Unlike Spaight and the 1923 Hague Rules, 31 the San Remo Manual obviously
underestimates that threat and imposes upon belligerents obligations of absten-
tion that will hardly meet the test of reality. Accordingly, therefore paragraph 63 (f)
is too restricted. Pursuant to that provision, an enemy civil aircraft is a legitimate
military objective if it, inter alia, is "armed with air-to-air or air-to-surface weap-
ons." This excludes, as emphasized in the explanations, "light individual weapons
for defence of the crew, and equipment that deflects an attacking weapon or warns
of an attack."32 But it remains an open question of what weapons can be qualified
as coming within the categories of paragraph 63 (f). Moreover, this formulation
leaves out ofconsideration the possibility that the aircraft itself is used as a weapon.
The way modern warships are constructed would not enable them to sustain a hit
by an aircraft. In this context, one should not think of"Kamikaze" aircraft used as a
pattern of an unsuccessful military tactic or strategy. What needs to be considered
are scenarios similar to that of the USS Cole incident. 33
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Mine Warfare
One consequence of equating warships and aircraft is that the latter would also be
obliged to "record the locations where they have laid mines." 34 States possessing
advanced military equipment may be in a position to comply with that obligation,
e.g., by equipping air delivered mines with a system that would transmit their loca-
tion without the enemy belligerent profiting from the signals. The majority of
States will, however, hardly be in a position to acquire such systems. As the practice
ofWorld War II demonstrated, the recording ofminefields laid by aircraft is a most
difficult undertaking35 and an obligation to do so does not seem to reflect custom-
ary international law. 36 Closely related is the problem—at least for a considerable
number of States—ofhow to provide "safe alternative routes for shipping of neu-
tral States"37 in case the mining is executed by military aircraft. The minelaying bel-
ligerent will, in many cases, only be in a position to identify the mine area as such
but not routes through the minefield that would be sufficiently safe. No consider-
able difficulties arise with regard to the obligation laid down in paragraph 85 of the
San Remo Manual?* For example, the United States, when mining Haiphong har-
bor, made it possible for merchant vessels lying there to leave the harbor by day-
light. The mines delivered by aircraft were activated three days after their
delivery.39
Blockade
It is true that in the past blockades were a method ofeconomic warfare at sea; how-
ever, today a blockade will regularly be an integral part of a genuinely military op-
eration. Therefore, the lack of a definition of the concept of blockade in the San
Remo Manual could give rise to some unnecessary misunderstandings.40 Such a
definition could read as follows: "Blockade is a method of naval warfare by which a
belligerent prevents vessels and/or aircraft of all nations from entering or exiting
specified ports, airfields, or coastal areas belonging to, occupied by, or under the
control of an enemy nation."
The purpose of establishing a blockade is to deny the enemy the use of enemy
and neutral vessels or aircraft to transport personnel and goods to or from enemy
territory. It should be emphasized that a blockade is the only method ofnaval war-
fare by which belligerents may interfere with enemy exports.
But even if exclusively directed against the enemy's economy, there will always
be a strategic element because the enemy's capabilities of resistance will necessar-
ily be weakened. 41 Regardless of the distinction between economic and strategic
blockades there is today general agreement that a blockade need not be enforced
exclusively against seagoing vessels but that it may also be enforced against air-
craft.42 Moreover, and in view of the importance of aerial reconnaissance, a
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blockade may be maintained and enforced "by a combination of legitimate meth-
ods and means of warfare,"43 including military aircraft.44
The San Remo ManuaTs provisions on blockade, however, lack any express ref-
erence to aircraft. Of course, an interpretation ofparagraphs 9645 and 9746 justifies
the conclusion that a blockade may also be enforced and maintained by military
aircraft. In most cases, these aircraft will operate from a warship that serves as their
base.47 It is also possible, however, that the aircraft entrusted with the enforcement
ofa blockade are deployed on airfields on land. Still, while there seems to be general
agreement on the lawfulness of the enforcement of a blockade by military aircraft,
two questions remain unanswered. ( 1 ) Is the presence of a warship or its opera-
tional control ofthe military aircraft necessary for a blockade to be lawful or may a
blockade be enforced by aircraft (and mines) alone? (2) What criteria have to be
met in order for the blockade to be effective if it is maintained and enforced by
aircraft?
In most cases, the aircraft entrusted with the enforcement of a blockade need
not be dependent upon a warship, i.e., they are not necessarily under the opera-
tional control ofa warship. However, the answer to the first question becomes a lit-
tle complicated if one takes into consideration the following scenario: A merchant
vessel or a neutral warship may be damaged or in another distress situation. There-
fore, it will have to access the blockaded coast or port but the blockade is main-
tained by mines and aircraft only. How will the blockading power be able to
comply with its obligation to allow ships in distress entry into the blockaded coast-
line if no warship is in the near vicinity?48 Accordingly, there is at least one argu-
ment against the legality of a blockade that is enforced and maintained without a
surface warship present in, or in the vicinity of, the blockaded area.
As regards the second question, one may be inclined to point to the well-established
rule according to which the "question whether a blockade is effective is a question
of fact."49 While it is clear that "effectiveness" can no longer be judged in the light
of the state of technology of the 19th century50 and, while the view is widely held
that effectiveness continues to be a constitutive element of a legal blockade,51 it
must be recognized that there are no criteria that would make possible an abstract
determination of the effectiveness of all blockades. In this context, Castren
postulates:
Aircraft in the blockaded area may leave the area when there are other aircraft on patrol
duty so that the blockade remains in force the whole time. The activities ofaircraft even
in connexion with a naval blockade are effective only to the extent that they do in fact
dominate the air.52
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It is maintained here that this position is correct. In any event, aircraft will be used
tor the enforcement of a blockade only if the respective belligerent has gained air
superiority. Otherwise, the use of aircraft would be too dangerous.
A further aspect regarding blockade, as dealt with in the San Remo Manual, is
whether this method of naval warfare is necessarily restricted to vessels or whether
it may also be enforced vis-a-vis aircraft. Again, the provisions of the San Remo
Manual are silent on this issue. The "explanations" reveal that the legal and naval
experts, in the context of the effectiveness of a blockade, considered that question
only indirectly.53 While it may be correct that a (purely) naval blockade may not be
considered to have lost its effectiveness for the sole reason that a considerable small
number of aircraft continue to land within the blockaded area, this is but one as-
pect. Although traditionally blockades have been viewed as a method of naval war-
fare proper, there is no reason why it may not be extended (or even restricted) to
aircraft. 54 In this context, the argument that "transport by air only constitutes a
very small percentage ofbulk traffic"55 is not absolutely convincing. The blockaded
belligerent State, either alone or together with its allies, may have a considerable air
fleet at its disposal. As the example of the "blockade of Berlin" shows—although
the cargoes only served humanitarian purposes—a considerable percentage of
bulk traffic can be transported by air over a considerable period of time.
Methods and Means ofNaval Warfare
Despite the lack of a definition and despite the disregard of the aerial elements, the
provisions of the San Remo Manual on blockade certainly reflect customary inter-
national law.56 Whether this also holds true with regard to the provisions on
zones57 is far from settled. Of course, it seems that, in principle, zones have become
a recognized method of naval warfare58—and it is quite probable that the Manual
has contributed to that development. Still, as already stated elsewhere,59 the San
Remo Manual's provisions on zones remain rather obscure, particularly with re-
gard to the purpose such zones may serve. This, however, is not the only criticism
of the Manual's provisions on methods and means of naval warfare.
Precautions in Attack
The Manual's rules on precautions in attack are directly taken from the 1977 Addi-
tional Protocol I.60 In principle, this does not necessarily pose problems—even
though Additional Protocol I is far from being recognized by all States ofthe world.
It would be futile to reopen the famous dispute between Meyrowitz61 and Rauch62
on whether and to what extent the provisions ofAdditional Protocol I apply to na-
val warfare at all. It is maintained here that, according to Article 49(3) of the
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Protocol I, a special body of rules applies to ship-to-ship, ship-to-air, and to air-to-
ship attacks as long as such attacks do not affect civilians or civilian objects on land.
That is also clear from a reading ofArticle 49(4 ).63 Accordingly, Articles 58 and 59
of Additional Protocol I are inapplicable to naval warfare as treaty law. Whether
and to what extent they are customary in character is not quite settled. 64 Moreover,
it is far from clear whether paragraph 46 of the San Remo Manual offers operable
solutions for the conduct of hostilities at sea. The use of the concept of "feasibility"
certainly mitigates some of the difficulties. Still, if naval operations are conducted
in sea areas with dense maritime traffic, like in the Persian Gulf, it could become
nearly impossible to determine "whether or not objects which are not military ob-
jectives are present in an area of attack."65 The USS Vincennes incident may be in-
dicative ofthe difficulties involved.66 Legal rules that are merely paid lip service will
certainly not pass the test of practice.
Naval Bombardment
Attacks against targets on land (naval bombardment) are not dealt with explicitly
in the San Remo Manual. This is partly due to the fact that the participants regarded
this subject as already covered by the respective provisions of Additional Protocol
I.
67 It should be kept in mind, however, that not all States are bound by the Proto-
col. Then the question arises whether the provisions of the 1907 Hague Conven-
tion IX68 constitute customary international law.
Even if that question is answered in the affirmative,69 it remains unsettled how
to deal with aircraft launched from warships attacking targets on land. According
to Article XLI of the 1923 Hague Rules "aircraft on board vessels ofwar, including
aircraft-carriers, shall be regarded as part ofsuch vessels." This could imply that the
rules applicable to warships engaged in naval bombardment also apply to aircraft
launched from them. Then, however, such aircraft would be allowed to attack mili-
tary objectives in non-defended localities. 70 While Additional Protocol I, Article
59, paragraph 1
,
prohibits attacks on such localities "by any means whatsoever,"
i.e., including aircraft, such attacks would not be prohibited under Articles 1 and 2
of Hague Convention IX. Castren takes the position that Hague Convention IX
"must probably be understood to concern warships only, and not aircraft even
when collaborating with them."71 If, however, Article XLI ofthe 1923 Hague Rules
is a correct statement of customary law, warships and military aircraft launched
from warships would be bound by the same rules.
Apart from the wording of these provisions, a further argument in favor of the
view that land attacks by aircraft operating from warships should be governed by
Additional Protocol I is the ability of modern aircraft to discriminate and to con-
duct surgical strikes by means of high-precision ammunition.
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Still, it must be remembered that for a locality to be entitled to protection
against attacks, Article 59(2) of Additional Protocol I, and the probably corre-
sponding rule of customary law, provides that four conditions must be met:
(a) all combatants, as well as mobile weapons and mobile military
equipment must have been evacuated;
(b) no hostile use shall be made of fixed military installations or
establishments;
(c) no acts of hostility shall be committed by the authorities or by the
population; and
(d) no activities in support of military operations shall be undertaken.
Accordingly, even if fixed military installations or establishments remain in the re-
spective port or town this would not justify an attack "by any means whatsoever" if
no hostile use is made ofthem. Then, regardless of the binding force ofAdditional
Protocol I, an attack would probably be contrary to the law of armed conflict be-
cause the object in question would not make an effective contribution to military
action and its neutralization would not offer a definite military advantage. Be that
as it may, a clarification of the rules applicable to naval bombardment, including
the use of aircraft and missiles launched from warships, should be taken into
consideration.
Deception (and Surrender)
The San Remo Manual's rules on deception are too vague and, thus, do not provide
the necessary guidance for naval commanders. On the one hand, it is rather diffi-
cult to distinguish "active simulation"72 from "passive simulation." The capabili-
ties of modern technologies could open a vast grey area and, consequently, could
render the provision obsolete. On the other hand, there should be a definition of
legitimate ruses amended by a non-exhaustive list of permitted ruses that should
be drafted with a view to modern technologies. The traditional examples given for
permissible ruses of naval—especially Count Luckner and the Cruiser Emden—
have a romantic charm but they certainly are too remote from the realities ofmod-
ern naval operations. 73
In a highly electronic environment and with over-the-horizon or beyond-
visual-range capabilities, the hoisting of the true flag prior to an attack no longer
seems to make much sense. However, ruses remain an important pattern ofmod-
ern naval warfare. Therefore, there is a growing need for specific rules enabling
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naval commanders to distinguish between permissible ruses and prohibited acts of
perfidy. While perfidy has been clarified in the San Remo Manual, ruses are not ad-
equately addressed. It needs to be emphasized in this context that it is not always
sufficient to draw the necessary conclusions from the prohibition of perfidy. For
example, actively feigning the status of a protected vessel is prohibited by para-
graph 1 10 of the Manual and the corresponding customary law. 74 This rule, how-
ever, is without prejudice to a decision to feign neutral status by the use of civilian
radars or other electronic equipment. According to the position taken here, the use
of civilian navigational radars (thus taking advantage of the respective emissions)
is to be considered a permissible ruse of naval warfare if the radar is switched off
immediately prior to the launching of an attack. It may well be, however, that this
position is not shared by all. It should be recalled that, in 1983, the World Adminis-
trative Conference for the Mobile Services adopted Resolution No. 1875 on the
identification of vessels and aircraft of States not participating in an international
armed conflict, recommending the use of adequate transponders and that:
The frequencies specified in No. 3021 of the Radio Regulations may be used by ships
and aircraft of States not parties to an armed conflict for self-identification and
establishing communications. The transmission will consist of the urgency or safety
signals, as appropriate, described in Article 40 followed by the addition of the single
group 'NNN' in radiotelegraphy and by the addition of the single word 'NEUTRAL'
pronounced as in French 'neutral' in radiotelephony. As soon as practicable,
communications shall be transferred to an appropriate working frequency. . .
.
It would, ofcourse, be a considerable progress ifthe protection ofneutral vessels
were enhanced. However, that proposal is not suited for achieving that aim. As
Fenrick has rightly pointed out, the resolution:
appears to have been issued by a forum unfamiliar with law of armed conflict issues
and without consultation with national officials responsible for such matters. Ships
and aircraft using such procedures may assume they are entitled to protection when in
fact they are not. The fact that a ship or aircraft is registered in a state not party to the
conflict does not, in and of itself, mean that it is not a legitimate military objective.76
Therefore, it would certainly add to legal clarity and legal certainty if the rules on
permissible ruses were amended by a non-exhaustive list of examples.
A problem closely related, but not limited, to ruses and perfidy is the surrender
of warships and military aircraft. The provision of the San Remo Manual referring
to the surrender ofwarships77 certainly reflects customary international law. 78 Still,
in a modern battlefield environment, visual identification is rather the exception
than the rule. Therefore, an effort should be undertaken to specify the different
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possibilities ofhow warships and military aircraft can surrender at all. The more so
since the San Remo Manual lacks a provision on enemy aircraft exempt from attack
which have surrendered. It may, indeed, be difficult to verify whether a military
aircraft has surrendered. 79 If, however, surrender has been offered bonafidey an at-
tack on it would be contrary to basic rules of the law of armed conflict.
Maritime Neutrality
Probably, the law of neutrality is one of the most disputed aspects of public inter-
national law. The diversity ofviews on the subject makes it almost impossible to es-
tablish the continuing validity of that body of law, its scope of applicability, and its
content. The drafters ofthe San Remo Manual have been heavily criticized for hav-
ing adopted a rather traditional approach to the law of maritime neutrality.80 It is
maintained here, however, that this criticism is unfounded.
Obsolete by Desuetude or Irrelevant under the Jus ad Bellum7.
Although the said uncertainties persist, there is general agreement that there is a
need to protect States not taking part in an international armed conflict, as well as
their nationals, the vessels flying their flags and the aircraft bearing their mark-
ings. 81 Moreover, there is similar agreement on the need for there to be obligations
on neutral States, their nationals and their merchant shipping and civil aviation
with a view to effectively prevent the escalation ofan ongoing international armed
conflict.82 However, there is no consensus on how these objectives ought to be
pursued.
According to a widely held view, the traditional law ofneutrality is incompatible
with the jus ad bellum. 83 The proponents of that view claim that the traditional
rules have been extensively modified by the UN Charter. Therefore, they maintain,
States not parties to an ongoing international armed conflict are entitled to take a
position of "benevolent" neutrality if one party to the conflict has violated the jus
ad bellum. 84 Indeed, under the right of collective self-defense, States are entitled to
participate in an international armed conflict on the side of the victim of aggres-
sion. If they may assist the victim militarily then, a fortiori, they must be entitled to
discriminate against the aggressor and to assist the victim State by any means short
ofwar. In theory, this is certainly correct. However, the concept ofbenevolent neu-
trality is operable only if the Security Council has authoritatively determined the
aggressor. This is expressly recognized in paragraphs 7 and 8 ofthe San Remo Man-
ual. 85 If, however, the Security Council is unable or unwilling to act under Chapter
VII, the benevolent neutral's right will compete with the right ofthe aggrieved bel-
ligerent to take appropriate counter measures in order to induce the neutral State
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to comply with the traditional rules. The better view is, therefore, to apply the laws
ofneutrality to such situations because only by so doing can the object and purpose
agreed upon
—
protection of neutrals and prevention ofan escalation of the armed
conflict—be achieved.
Moreover, the concept ofbenevolent neutrality has no foundation in State prac-
tice. The proponents ofthat view ignore the fact that, since 1945, third States assist-
ing one belligerent to the disadvantage of the other never referred to the right of
collective self-defense.86 Rather, they either advanced contractual obligations, or
they claimed that their assistance did not cover military ("lethal") items,87 or they
simply acted clandestinely. 88 Hence, State practice since 1945 is not apt "for prov-
ing that a new legal status of non-belligerency has emerged as a concept of law. It
would be all too easy to avoid duties of neutrality by just declaring a different sta-
tus."89 The fact that in many instances "non-belligerents" endeavored to conceal
their assistance indicates, if not proves, that they had not based their conduct on a
corresponding opinio juris.
Hence, State practice, as well as military manuals90 and the International Law
Association's Helsinki Principles,91 support the view that the traditional rules of
the law of maritime neutrality as codified in the 1907 Hague Convention XIII92
have neither become obsolete nor have they been extensively modified. Therefore,
the provisions of the San Remo Manual continue to reflect customary interna-
tional law.
Continuing Value of the Laws of Maritime Neutrality
The main reason why most States continue to pledge allegiance to the laws ofmari-
time neutrality is the intrinsic value of its principles and rules. On the one hand,
this body of law serves the interests of neutral States by protecting them, their na-
tionals, their merchant shipping and their aviation against the harmful effects of
ongoing hostilities.93 On the other hand, it guarantees that legitimate belligerent
interests are not jeopardized by neutral States, their nationals, their merchant ship-
ping and aviation unduly interfering in the warfighting and war-sustaining effort.94
It should be remembered, however, that the applicability of that law in its en-
tirety is not triggered automatically as soon as an international armed conflict is in
existence. This only holds true with regard to those rules of the law of maritime
neutrality that are essential for safeguarding its object and purpose (essentialia
neutralitatis) . There is widespread agreement that the following rules of the law of
maritime neutrality become applicable to every armed conflict at sea, irrespective
of a declaration of war or of a declaration of neutrality: protection of neutral wa-
ters,95 the obligation of neutral States to terminate violations of their neutral sta-
tus,96 and the prohibition of unneutral service.97
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It needs to be emphasized that, despite allegations to the contrary,98 the 24-hour
rule" also belongs to those essentialia neutralitatis. If a neutral State does not, on a
non-discriminatory basis, prohibit access to its territorial sea and its internal wa-
ters by belligerent warships, 100 a passage or sojourn exceeding 24 hours (unless un-
avoidable on account of damage or stress of weather) would amount to the use of
neutral waters as a sanctuary. If the neutral State does not terminate that violation
of its neutral status, the aggrieved belligerent will be entitled to take appropriate
countermeasures. 101 The ensuing potentialities for escalation are obvious. The fact
that the international armed conflict takes place in areas remote from the neutral
waters in question is irrelevant. While the aggrieved belligerent may not be in a po-
sition to enforce the neutral State's obligations by directly interfering with its war-
ships or military aircraft, it would certainly be entitled to take other measures in
response to that violation of international law. Even if the aggrieved belligerent
does not react at all, this does mean that there has not been a violation unless the
aggrieved belligerent's conduct amounts to acquiescence.
Of course, the 24-hour rule implies some inconveniences for belligerent war-
ships and auxiliaries, especially if their visit in a neutral port is unrelated to the on-
going international armed conflict. However, the object and purpose of the 24-
hour rule is not limited to the protection of the belligerents, it also contributes to
the protection of neutral States. If neutral States wish to remain under the protec-
tion of the law of maritime neutrality they are under an obligation to apply and to
enforce the 24-hour rule. It should not be forgotten that the rule may prove a most
valuable tool in pursuing belligerent goals as the case of the GrafSpee clearly dem-
onstrates. 102
Measures Short ofWar
A final criticism of the San Remo Manual relates to its section on "measures short
ofattack," i.e., prize law. The United Kingdom in particular has long taken the view
that this part of the law of naval warfare and neutrality at sea has been considerably
modified by the jus ad helium. This approach must be rejected. The provisions of
the San Remo Manual on prize measures certainly reflect customary international
law. There are, however, two aspects that should be reconsidered.
Prize Law—Modified by the Jus ad Bellum?
The San Remo Manual—as well as the military manuals of some navies—starts
from the premise that the jus ad bellum and the ius in hello are two distinct parts of
international law. 103 In view ofthe basic principle ofthe equal application ofthe ius
in hello, 104 the San Remo Manual does not distinguish between the aggressor and
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the victim of aggression, unless the UN Security Council has acted under Chapter
VII of the Charter of the United Nations. 105 Accordingly, it allows all parties to an
international armed conflict at sea to make use ofthe full spectrum ofmethods and
means of naval warfare, including measures short of attack. 106
According to the UK Manual, however, "the conduct of armed conflict at sea is
subject to the limitations imposed by the UN Charter on all use of force." There-
fore, in "a conflict oflimited scope ... a belligerent state is constrained, to a greater
extent than the rules set out in the present chapter might suggest, in the action that
it may lawfully take against the shipping or aircraft of states not involved in the
conflict." 107
This position is far from new. The UK government has maintained it since the
1980s—and has been heavily criticized for it. According to the position taken here,
this criticism is well-founded. The British position would, if adopted by other
States, lead to a most unfortunate lack oflegal clarity and it would enable some ma-
levolent States to arbitrarily deny the legality of measures taken by a belligerent
against the shipping and aviation of States not parties to an ongoing international
armed conflict.
This position is not shared by the UK's allies who are unwilling to limit the spec-
trum of methods and means provided by the law of naval warfare. 108 Obviously,
those allies maintain that it will be up to them to decide whether and to what extent
they will interfere with neutral shipping and aviation when engaged in an interna-
tional armed conflict. And indeed the question arises as to who other than the bel-
ligerent State is competent to decide what is "necessary and proportionate to the
achievement of the goal for which force may be used."
Of course, in case ofan authoritative decision by the UN Security Council based
upon Chapter VII ofthe UN Charter, a belligerent may be prevented from making
use of the full spectrum provided by the law of naval warfare. However, if there is
no such decision by the Security Council, it is generally recognized that the bellig-
erent States alone are entitled to decide whether they will interfere with neutral
shipping and aviation. The affected neutral States will be limited to a legal evalua-
tion of the concrete measures taken, i.e., they may judge their legality in the light of
the law ofnaval warfare and the law ofmaritime neutrality. 109 The right to judge, in
a legally binding manner, the legality ofthe initial decision to resort to actions such
as visit and search has been conferred upon the UN Security Council. Therefore,
statements by neutral States on the legality of measures short of attack based upon
rules other than those of the ius in hello (including the law of maritime neutrality)
are to be considered merely political in character.
Another concern with the UK position is that it may lead to an arbitrary applica-
tion of the law of naval warfare. In this respect, the British conduct during the
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Falklands War (1982) and during the Iran-Iraq War (1980-1988) may serve as an
example. 110
As is well known, during the Falklands War the British government, on April 28,
1982, announced a Total Exclusion Zone (TEZ). 111 According to the wording of
that proclamation the UK was prepared to attack every ship encountered within
the limits of the TEZ. In the light of the jurisprudence of the Nuremberg Tribunal
and ofcustomary international law the legality of the TEZ, or of attacks performed
therein, would have been more than doubtful. 112 It may well be that the proclama-
tion was intended to deter rather than to serve as a legal basis for attacks on neutral
shipping. It may well be that it was, after all, nothing but a
—
permissible—ruse of
war. Taken at face value, however, and in view of the fact that the British govern-
ment tried to justify the TEZ by referring to the right of self-defense, the British
conduct during the Falklands War could also justify the following conclusion: if
the British Government considers it necessary for its self-defense, it may decide to
go beyond what is provided for by the law of naval warfare by establishing and en-
forcing a "free-fire zone."
During the Iran-Iraq War, the British Government chose the same approach.
That time, however, it did not lead to a widening but rather to a restriction of the
spectrum of measures provided by the law of naval warfare. After Iranian forces
had stopped the British merchant vessel Barber Perseus^ the Foreign Office, on Jan-
uary 28, 1986, declared:
[U]nder Article 51 of the United Nations Charter a State such as Iran, actively engaged
in an armed conflict, is entitled in exercise of its inherent right of self-defence, to stop
and search a foreign merchant ship on the high seas if there is reasonable ground for
suspecting that the ship is taking arms to the other side for use in the conflict. . . ." 113
Thus, the British Government claimed the right to judge the legality of belligerent
measures not in the light of the law of naval warfare alone, but also in the light of
Article 51 of the UN Charter.
In other words, if party to an international armed conflict, the British Govern-
ment, by referring to its inherent right of self-defense, considers itself entitled to
enlarge the spectrum of methods and means under the law of naval warfare. If not
party to an international armed conflict, the British government denies that very
right to the belligerents but claims to be entitled to judge and declare what is neces-
sary and proportionate for the belligerents' self-defense.
Hence, the British position will not lead to operable and practicable solutions.
Of course, in theory it is always possible to identify a breach of the jus ad bellum.
However, it must be emphasized that the prohibition of the use of force is an
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integral part oftheUN system ofcollective security. 114 Ifthe Security Council is not
in a position to authoritatively determine the limits ofthe right of self-defense in a
given case, it remains with the parties to the conflict to determine and decide which
measures are necessary. The only operable legal yardstick providing practical solu-
tions will then be the jus in hello . Moreover, the British position is irreconcilable
with the principle ofthe equal application ofthe ius in hello. The continuing valid-
ity of that principle is confirmed by State practice since 1945 and by the Preamble
to the 1977 Additional Protocol I. Accordingly, there is an overwhelming interna-
tional consensus that the jus in hello does not discriminate between the alleged ag-
gressor and the alleged victim of aggression. Moreover, that position may prove
counterproductive for British interests in case the United Kingdom is party to an
international armed conflict at sea. The use ofprize measures by the Royal Navy, as
provided for in the UK Manual, 115 could be qualified as illegal by other States that
may refer to this very statement.
Prize Measures and the Necessity of Prize Courts
In view of the fact that, under customary international law, belligerents, by resort-
ing to prize measures, are entitled to interfere with enemy and neutral merchant
shipping and aviation, 116 it is indispensable to provide for the establishment of
prize courts. There is no evidence in State practice or in legal writings that the tradi-
tional maxim "Toute prise doit etre jugee" has become obsolete by desuetude. 117
Rather, pre- and post-World War II practice and scholarly statements give ample
proof that the maxim remains in force. 118
Aspects to Be Reconsidered
It has been shown in the foregoing that the provisions of the San Remo Manual on
prize measures indeed restate the customary rules and principles on the subject
matter. Still, the question remains whether those rules sufficiently take into ac-
count practical requirements.
On the one hand, there seems to be an unjustified discrimination between
warships and military aircraft. As regards the rules applicable to military aircraft
conducting visit and search operations, the San Remo Manual unnecessarily de-
nies military aircraft the same rights as warships. While paragraphs 139 and 151
allow, "as an exceptional measure," the destruction of enemy and of neutral mer-
chant vessels, there is no such exception for enemy or neutral civil aircraft. It
should be kept in mind that, according to Articles 57 to 59 of the 1923 Hague
Rules, 119 the destruction of such aircraft would be permissible if certain condi-
tions are met beforehand. 120
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Moreover, the San Remo Manual, in paragraph 128, obliges belligerents "to ad-
here to safe procedures for intercepting civil aircraft as issued by the competent in-
ternational organization," i.e., to the International Civil Aviation Organization's
(ICAO) Manual concerning Interception of Civil Aircraft. 121 While it is true that
"the ICAO manual contains detailed procedures for interception," 122 those provi-
sions are designed for interception operations in times of peace. It is, therefore, far
from settled whether and to what extent the detailed procedures laid down in the
ICAO manual are operable in times of armed conflict.
On the other hand, a further alternative to visit and search should be consid-
ered. Modern armed forces possess multi-sensors enabling them to identify certain
cargoes, like chemicals or explosives. 123 Therefore, as an alternative to visit and
search conducted in the traditional way, a belligerent may very well be satisfied
with verifying the innocent character of cargo on board neutral merchant vessels
and civil aircraft by merely "scanning" the vessels or aircraft with such sensors. Of
course, whether the use of sensors is practicable and sufficient will depend upon
the circumstances of each case.
Conclusion
The 1994 San Remo Manual has contributed in an invaluable manner to a clarifica-
tion ofthe law applicable to naval warfare and maritime neutrality. The vast major-
ity of its provisions are a contemporary restatement of customary international
law. Since those provisions almost perfectly balance the interests of belligerents
and of neutrals alike everything feasible should be undertaken to safeguard its tre-
mendous achievement in restating a body of law that had not been comprehen-
sively addressed since the adoption of the Oxford Manual124 in 1913.
We do, however, live in a time ofrapid technological development that certainly
has a deep impact upon military doctrine and on the conduct of hostilities. Disre-
garding that development and the way modern armed conflicts are fought would
marginalize the San Remo Manual and could even make it obsolete. While thanks
to Yoram Dinstein considerable efforts are being undertaken to fill the Manual's
gaps with regard to the aerial issues involved, the other issues addressed here
should be thoroughly scrutinized and ultimately solved. The best way of adapting
the San Remo Manual to the said developments would be to reconvene, under the
auspices of the International Institute of International Humanitarian Law and of
the International Committee of the Red Cross, a group of experts with a view to
adopt an informal declaration that would not substitute for but merely amend or
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The US Navy is transforming to deal with a wider range of missions than the
traditional blue-water, major combat operations which it has traditionally
been equipped to handle. 1 That emerging transformation has resulted in a number
ofnew programs, technologies, and strategies that raise interesting, and sometimes
complex, legal issues. Lawyers advising the Navy's leadership through this
transformational process are analyzing these legal issues now, in the present, to en-
sure that the future US Navy is properly, and legally, organized, trained and
equipped. This article will address five topics ofinterest for naval planners and legal
advisors who are building the Navy of tomorrow.
Civilian Mariners and Sea Basing
The US Navy currently maintains a force of approximately 550,000 full-time per-
sonnel, about 35% ofwhom are civilians. At any given time, 130-plus ofthe Navy's
283 ships are underway. That constitutes about 45% ofthe total ship inventory. 2 In
2004, former Chief of Naval Operations (CNO) Admiral Vern Clark directed the
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Navy to maximize capabilities, minimize payroll, improve productivity and elimi-
nate unnecessary billets. 3 One way to meet those goals is to remove sailors from bil-
lets that have little to do with warfighting, and replace them with civilians. At sea,
sailors cut hair, serve meals, maintain the engineering plant, chip paint—all tasks
that civilians are equally capable of performing, and do perform, at commands
ashore. Placing civilians on warships to perform those tasks is a logical extension of
the CNO's guidance and would free sailors to engage in combat-related activities.
The Navy's answer to the CNO's challenge is an experimental program to place
federal civil service mariners onboard warships. These civilian mariners perform
tasks sailors have traditionally performed onboard warships, but that civilian mari-
ners have performed onboard auxiliary vessels for decades and onboard merchant
vessels for centuries—navigation, engineering, and deck seamanship. For example,
in early 2005, USS Mount Whitney (LCC/JCC-20) deployed to the European the-
ater as the new US Sixth Fleet and North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)
command ship—one of the most sophisticated Command, Control, Communica-
tions, Computer, and Intelligence (C4I) ships ever commissioned.4 Mount Whitney
is manned by a hybrid crew consisting of 157 US Navy sailors and 143 civilian mar-
iners employed by the Military Sealift Command. These 300 personnel represent a
reduction of 276 people from the previous all active-duty Navy crew. "By supple-
menting the .crew with civilian mariners," the Sixth Fleet Public Affairs Office re-
ports, "the Navy is operating the command ship at a reduced cost and employing
captured uniformed personnel billets on forward combatant vessels."5 Mount
Whitney will be engaged in NATO exercises and Standing Naval Forces Mediterra-
nean maritime operations and will be available as a command and control ship for
future combat operations if required.
In addition to placing civilian mariners on warships performing functions active-
duty sailors have performed in the past, the Navy is simultaneously pursuing the
concept of "sea basing" as a transformational initiative. Sea basing is the Navy's an-
swer to the concern that access to bases in foreign territory will be less predictable
and more ad hoc than in the past. This concern is not an idle or speculative one, as
evidenced by Turkey's refusal during Operation Iraqi Freedom to permit the 4th
Infantry Division to cross Turkish territory into Northern Iraq.
The sea base is envisioned as a system ofsystems—a flotilla ofships that serves as
a staging and sustainment area for ground forces to launch attacks ashore in a non-
permissive environment—sometimes referred to as "forcible entry operations."
Though no one knows exactly what the sea base will look like in any detail, it will
probably consist of a "network of ships providing offshore artillery fire, air sup-
port, supplies and a secure home for troops fighting on land."6 The primary com-
ponents of the sea base could include the Maritime Prepositioning Force Future
298
Jane G. Dalton
(MPF-F) cargo ship, the next generation destroyer (DDX), the Littoral Combat
Ship (LCS) and the Amphibious Assault Ship (LHA-R) in conjunction with exist-
ing guided-missile cruisers and destroyers, aircraft carriers, and submarines. 7
Of particular interest for this discussion is the role of the MPF-F cargo ship in
sea basing operations. The MPF-F is designed as the replacement for today's
prepositioning force cargo ships and would serve as a floating logistics center. One
report notes that it would be "nearly as large as an aircraft carrier" and would "ac-
commodate heavy-lift helicopters and perhaps cargo planes as large as the Air
Force's C-130. It would be able to move supplies and equipment to those aircraft
and other ships while at sea."8 Another report, however, depicts a role directly in-
volved in combat operations. It refers to the MPF-F as a replacement for the big-
deck Tarawa-class ships and describes it as a "fighting logistics ship with a flight
deck big enough to send hundreds ofMarines ashore in rotorcraft and launch Joint
Strike Fighters."9
If the MPF-F ship is manned similar to existing prepositioning ships, the crew
will consist entirely of civilian mariners. There is no legal prohibition against man-
ning naval auxiliaries such as oilers, ammunition ships, supply ships, and
prepositioning ships with civilian mariners. In fact, these mariners have a recog-
nized status under the Geneva Conventions as "civilians accompanying the force"
and are entitled to prisoner ofwar status if captured. 10 Issues arise, however, if the
MPF-F is indeed to become part of the "assault echelon"—if Marines or soldiers
actually launch from the ship into combat operations ashore. Similar issues arise if
Mount Whitney, with a hybrid crew of active-duty sailors and civilian mariners, is
employed as a C4I ship in a future armed conflict.
The issues that arise are twofold: First, under conventional and customary inter-
national law, a warship is manned by a crew under regular armed forces discipline.
Second, civilians who assist in operating and maintaining a warship engaged in in-
ternational armed conflict could be viewed as participating actively or directly in
hostilities, and thus as having lost their protected status as civilians accompanying
the force. These two issues will be addressed in turn.
Article 29 of the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea 11 and
Article 8 ofthe 1958 Convention on the High Seas 12 identify warships by four char-
acteristics: they belong to the armed forces of a State; they bear external marks dis-
tinguishing warships of their nationality; they are commanded by officers duly
commissioned by the government of the State and whose names appear in the ap-
propriate service lists or equivalents; and they are manned by crews under regular
armed forces discipline. These characteristics originated in the 1856 Declaration of
Paris 13 which abolished privateering, and the 1907 Hague Convention VII 14 which
established the conditions for converting merchant ships into warships. The rules
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served to distinguish bona fide warships from privateers, which operated from
motives of personal gain, by clearly establishing that the warships operated on be-
half of a State. They also furthered the requirement in Hague VII that warships are
to observe the laws and customs of war. These four characteristics are so univer-
sally identified with warships throughout the world that they may be said to have
attained the status of customary international law.
Left undefined, however, is what the phrase "manned by a crew" actually
means in practice. Many US Navy warships today have civilians onboard perform-
ing a variety of functions—technical representatives, science advisors, contrac-
tors. Under customary practice, warships have carried civilians onboard. In the
War of 1812, for example, Commodore Stephen Decatur's ship, the frigate United
States, embarked female contract nurses to care for the sick and wounded. 15 The
mere presence of small numbers of civilians clearly does not deprive a warship of
its status as a warship. But the issue takes on greater meaning if one-third or one-
half of a warship's complement is composed of civilians who, though subject to a
civilian disciplinary system, are not subject to the Uniform Code of Military Jus-
tice. 16 Though there is no "bright line" rule that determines what percentage of a
warship's crew should be active-duty sailors, it is fair to say that the greater the
percentage of civilians onboard performing functions traditionally accomplished
by sailors, the less likely the warship will be able to maintain swift and effective dis-
cipline over its entire manning complement. The inability to effectively discipline
a crew thus calls into question the ship's ability to "observe the laws and customs
of war" as required by Hague VII.
The first issue concerning civilian mariners, as just discussed, implicates the
warship's ability to meet its international obligation to observe the laws and cus-
toms of war and to meet the criteria established for warships in conventional and
customary law. The second issue is related to the civilian mariners themselves and
to their status if they are captured during an international armed conflict. One of
the basic principles of the law of armed conflict is that of "distinction"—combat-
ants and noncombatants must be distinguished so as to spare noncombatants as
much as possible from the exigencies of war. 17 A corollary of the basic principle is
that noncombatants (civilians) enjoy protections under the law of armed conflict
unless and until they take a direct or active part in hostilities. 18 Civilians accompa-
nying the force certainly assume the risk ofbecoming casualties ofwar due to their
proximity to military operations. For example, civilian mariners manning oilers
replenishing warships at sea are aware that the platforms on which they serve are
legitimate military objectives. The mariners themselves, however, retain their status
as "persons who accompany the armed forces without actually being members
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thereof." They carry identification cards reflecting their authority to accompany
the force, and are entitled to prisoner of war status if captured. 19
Ifthe civilian mariners are employed onboard a warship engaged in combat op-
erations, however, it is possible that questions could be raised as to their status. Un-
fortunately, there is no authoritative definition of "direct" or "active" participation
in hostilities. 20 Purely collateral duties such as cutting hair, running the ship's store
and performing housekeeping functions may contribute to the quality of life
onboard the warship, but are not necessary to its combat effectiveness. On the
other end of the spectrum, firing weapons, maintaining the weapons systems or
serving as members of belligerent boarding parties are more akin to actual partici-
pation. Running the engineering plant, navigating the ship and operating the small
boats and cranes could be considered collateral functions or could be considered
actual participation.
A sailor who needs a haircut can nevertheless man the weapons systems or serve
on a boarding party. A ship that is not within its assigned Tomahawk Land Attack
Missile (T-LAM) launch basket or is not properly heading into the wind for the
launch of fighter aircraft cannot perform its combat function. Further, the warship
itself is a weapons system and the full crew complement is required for the weapons
system to be effective. Civilian engineers running the propulsion plant, navigators
plotting ship's movement, and technicians working on the missile system all con-
tribute to the war fighting effectiveness ofthe ship. It is difficult to argue that any of
these personnel are not actively and directly contributing to the combat functions
of the ship. It is conceivable that an opposing belligerent could perceive civilian
mariners serving onboard a warship engaged in international armed conflict, par-
ticularly those engaged in engineering, navigation and deck seamanship, as having
taken an active and direct part in hostilities. That same enemy belligerent would
also be unlikely to grant the civilian mariners combatant immunity for such acts
and could prosecute them for murder, arson and other violations of the belliger-
ent's domestic law.
The above discussion posits the most extreme examples. To date, the only war-
ships manned with civilian mariners have been those warships designated as com-
mand and control platforms such as Mount Whitney. The MPF-F ships are still in
the planning stages and it is not determined exactly how they will be employed in
the sea basing construct. As the Navy continues its transformational efforts, how-
ever, there will no doubt be continued pressure to contract out or seek civilian sub-
stitution for more and more administrative and support functions in order to free
active-duty sailors for actual combat duties.
To address both issues raised by the potential "civilianization" ofwarship crews,
the Navy has proposed legislation21 that would create a 5-year pilot program to
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require civilian mariners employed by the Navy to affiliate with a special Navy Re-
serve component. Ifthe legislation is enacted, the mariners will remain civilian fed-
eral employees unless the ship is ordered into combat operations in international
armed conflict, at which time the mariners will be ordered to active duty. In their
active duty status, the mariners will be subject to the Uniform Code ofMilitary Jus-
tice, thus ensuring that the entire crew is subject to armed forces discipline. Fur-
ther, if captured, they will be members of the active duty force entitled not only to
prisoner of war status, but also to combatant immunity for any belligerent acts in
which the warship engaged. Though there may be other ways to approach the in-
ternational law concerns raised by placing hybrid crews on warships, the proposed
legislation is attractive in that it resolves both issues satisfactorily and provides the
civilian mariners with the highest degree of protection under international law in
the event they are captured during belligerent operations.
Unmanned Aerial and Underwater Systems
In April 2005, General John Jumper reported that there were over 750 unmanned
aerial vehicles operating in Iraq. 23 At about the same time, the US Navy deployed
its first operational unmanned undersea vehicle, a Remote Minehunting System
(RMS), to identify and chart suspicious objects in Khwar Abd Allah channel at the
Iraqi port ofUmm Qasr. 24 Most readers are surely familiar with the use ofthe Pred-
ator as a precision weapon in Iraq, Afghanistan and Yemen.25 There is even talk ofa
future unmanned aerial system which would track and engage targets without a
"man in the loop."26 The relatively low cost, ease of transport, technological so-
phistication, and lack of manned crew combine to make unmanned systems the
surveillance platform and armed weapon of choice for the foreseeable future,27
even to the point ofreplacing F- 16 and KC- 135 aircraft in the current US Air Force
inventory.28
The use of these unmanned systems, however, raises a primary legal issue:
Should they be treated under international law like their manned counterparts
—
airplanes and submarines? For example, do the regimes ofinnocent passage, straits
transit passage and archipelagic sea lanes passage apply? Are they required to com-
ply with the International Regulations for the Prevention of Collisions at Sea
(COLREGs)? Do they enjoy sovereign immunity? What is the legal framework for
attacking an unmanned system? Unfortunately, developing a complete answer to
most of these questions is beyond the scope of this article, and each could be the
topic of a scholarly legal treatise. Some ofthe answers, however, are relatively intu-
itive and will be addressed below.
302
Jane G. Dalton
Take, for example, a carrier strike group transiting the Strait of Hormuz and
employing an unmanned Scan Eagle intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance
vehicle29 for a "channel sweep" mission. The Strait ofHormuz, as an international
strait connecting the Arabian Gulf with the Gulf of Oman and the Arabian Sea, is
subject to the regime of straits transit passage throughout the strait and its ap-
proaches.30 Under that regime, all states enjoy the right of unimpeded navigation
and overflight solely for the purpose of continuous and expeditious transit of the
strait. 31 While exercising the right of transit passage, ships and aircraft "shall re-
frain from any activities other than those incident to their normal modes ofcontin-
uous and expeditious transit." 32
Accordingly, in analyzing whether a carrier strike group may employ a recon-
naissance vehicle during straits transit passage, the question is not whether the ve-
hicle is manned or unmanned,33 but whether it is consistent with the strike group's
"continuous and expeditious transit" in its "normal mode" ofoperation. The Com-
mander's Handbook on the Law ofNaval Operations provides that the normal mode
of operation for surface ships includes "transit in a manner consistent with sound
navigational practices and the security of the force, including formation steaming
and the launching and recovery of aircraft."34 The San Remo Manual addresses
straits transit passage during armed conflict and concludes that belligerents "are
permitted to take defensive measures consistent with their security, including
launching and recovery of aircraft, screen formation steaming, and acoustic and
electronic surveillance." 35
The Scan Eagle's "channel sweep" mission is a surveillance mission designed for
force protection and navigational safety—normal operational concerns for all
Navy vessels wherever they are transiting and whether the transit is in peacetime, in
a period of heightened tensions, or during an armed conflict. The need for defen-
sive, force protection measures is particularly acute when transiting in relatively
close proximity to land, in high traffic areas such as the straits, where an asymmet-
ric enemy such as a terrorist could strike without warning. 36 Accordingly, employ-
ment of the Scan Eagle in a force protection and safety of navigation surveillance
and reconnaissance mode is completely consistent with the regime of straits transit
passage. It maybe launched from the aircraft carrier or other surface platform. If it
were an unmanned undersea vehicle, it could operate submerged, if that is consis-
tent with its normal mode of operation. The same would apply if the strike group
were operating in archipelagic sea lanes transit through an archipelagic nation.
It must be noted, however, that the Scan Eagle is also an intelligence-gathering
platform. The rules concerning straits transit passage provide that passage must be
"solely for the purpose of continuous and expeditious transit of the strait,"37 and
States are to "refrain from any activities other than those incident to their normal
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modes of continuous and expeditious transit unless rendered necessary by force
majeure or by distress."38 States are also to refrain from "the threat or use of force
against the sovereignty, territorial integrity or political independence of States
bordering the strait, or in any other manner in violation of the principles of inter-
national law embodied in the Charter of the United Nations."39 Importantly, un-
like the rules governing innocent passage through territorial seas, intelligence-
gathering is not identified as inconsistent with straits transit passage. Indeed, some
amount ofphotographic or electronic intelligence-gathering may inevitably occur
incidental to the "channel sweep" mission. Such intelligence-gathering would not
be inconsistent with the regime of transit passage since the "channel sweep" mis-
sion is related to safety of navigation and security of the force.40
Compare the transit passage regime with that ofinnocent passage through terri-
torial seas. When engaged in innocent passage, submarines are required to operate
on the surface, ships may not launch or recover aircraft or any military device, and
any act aimed at collecting information to the prejudice of the defense or security
of the coastal State is considered inconsistent with the innocent passage regime.41
Accordingly, a carrier strike group engaged in innocent passage could not launch
or recover the Scan Eagle or the RMS underwater vehicle. Since there is no right of
innocent passage through a nation's territorial airspace, an unmanned aircraft
launched outside the territorial sea would not be entitled to innocent passage over
the territorial sea.
Consider, though, whether an unmanned undersea vehicle launched prior to
entry into the territorial sea is entitled to innocent passage on the surface as other
submarines are. The 1982 LOS Convention provides that "ships of all States . . . en-
joy the right of innocent passage through the territorial sea."42 The Convention
does not define "ship," but it does define "warship" as "a ship belonging to the
armed forces of a State bearing the external marks distinguishing such ships of its
nationality, under the command of an officer duly commissioned by the govern-
ment of the State and whose name appears in the appropriate service list or its
equivalent, and manned by a crew which is under regular armed forces disci-
pline."43 Arguably, the RMS vehicle fits this definition if one considers that the
commanding officer of the ship from which it is launched is in "command" of the
RMS and the crew operating it is "manning" the vehicle. In any event, the RMS
does not have to be a warship to be entitled to innocent passage, since the right ap-
plies to "ships" of all States. Webster's dictionary distinguishes between ships,
rather large vessels adapted for deep-water navigation, and boats, rather small,
usually open, craft.44 But Webster's also notes that for legal purposes, a ship is "a
vessel intended for marine transportation, without regard to form, rig or means of
propulsion."45 Arguably, then, an unmanned undersea vehicle, if it is considered a
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ship, could engage in continuous, expeditious innocent passage, provided it
transited on the surface, showed its flag, and did not engage in intelligence collec-
tion to the prejudice of the defense or security of the coastal state.
A related issue is whether unmanned systems like the RMS are "vessels" which
must comply with the Regulations for the Prevention of Collisions at Sea
(COLREGs). The COLREGs apply to "all vessels on the high seas," and define a
vessel to include "every description of watercraft, including non-displacement
craft and seaplanes, used or capable of being used as a means of transportation on
water."46 The COLREGs definition is also found in US statutes47 and is the gener-
ally accepted definition in admiralty law. The US Supreme Court has ruled on this
subject, and continues to expand the type of watercraft encompassed by the term
"vessel."48 Though the RMS system is incapable of transporting people, it does
carry a payload of sensors, other instrumentation and equipment, has its own pro-
pulsion system of up to 16 knots, and is able to operate as far as 14 nautical miles
from the launch platform.49 Ifthe RMS and similar systems are "vessels," they must
meet a number of design and operational requirements, such as being equipped
with lookouts, sound, lighting, and dayshapes. 50
Regardless whether the RMS is required to comply with the COLREGs require-
ments, those in command of the launching platform and the unmanned system
have a duty to act with due regard for the safety of others on the high seas—a duty
imposed by both the COLREGs51 and the Law ofthe Sea. 52 The RMS system is cur-
rently equipped with a mast-mounted camera that allows the operator to safely
avoid surface objects; forward-looking sonar to alert the operator to submerged
objects; and a mast-mounted strobe light to advise nearby vessels of its presence. A
radar reflector may also be mounted on the mast. 53 Given the unsettled state of the
law on the status ofunmanned undersea systems,54 the prudent course ofaction for
the US Navy is to ensure these systems comply with all applicable COLREGs re-
quirements or obtain appropriate exemptions.
Hospital Ships
Military hospital ships are granted extraordinary protection under the Second
Geneva Convention. Current technology and the threat of global terrorism, how-
ever, are posing two vexing problems for navies of the future.
Military hospital ships are those ships built and equipped solely to assist, treat
and transport the wounded, sick and shipwrecked. 55 They may "in no circum-
stances" be attacked or captured, but shall "at all times be respected and pro-
tected," provided that the parties to the conflict are notified of their names and
descriptions ten days before the ships are employed. 56 Hospital ships are entitled to
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the aforementioned protections "unless they are used to commit . . . acts harmful to
the enemy."57 The presence on board hospital ships of "apparatus exclusively in-
tended to facilitate navigation or communication" does not deprive the ships ofthe
protections due them. 58 Somewhat in contradiction, however, it is expressly for-
bidden for hospital ships to "possess or use a secret code for their wireless or other
means of communication."59 It is this prohibition that proves difficult to imple-
ment in this day and age.
Professor Richard Grunawalt has conducted an in-depth analysis of the origins
of this prohibition,60 which derived from a desire to conclusively prevent any fur-
ther instances of hospital ships being used to signal and provide non-medical ser-
vices to combatants, as occurred during the Russo-Japanese War of 1904-1 90561
and again during World War I.62 Even as the Second Geneva Convention was being
negotiated, it was recognized that a prohibition on the use ofsecret codes by hospi-
tal ships would be difficult to implement in practice. So the Diplomatic Conference
recommended that the High Contracting Parties draw up an international code
providing regulations for the use of "modern means of communication" between
hospital ships and warships and military aircraft.63 Unfortunately, that code never
came into being, and the High Contracting Parties are left with the prohibition as it
was drafted in 1949.
Interestingly, the equally authentic French text of the Convention contains a
prohibition only on the use of a secret code to transmit64 traffic, not to receive it. In
addition, Article 28(2) of Additional Protocol I of 1977, concerning medical air-
craft provides that such aircraft "shall not be used to collect or transmit intelligence
data and shall not carry any equipment intended for such purposes," but does not
prohibit the use of a secret code or encrypted communications to further the hu-
manitarian mission ofthe aircraft.65 Additional Protocol I clearly takes a more real-
istic approach that recognizes the developments in communications technology
since 1949. The French text of the 1949 Geneva Convention also appears to recog-
nize the necessity for hospital ships to receive encrypted communications, at a
minimum.
Professor Grunawalt's article provides ample discussion of the problems in-
herent in the use of unencrypted communications by hospital ships, not the least
of which is that US federal privacy standards require that patient medical infor-
mation be transmitted over secure circuits if it is reasonable and appropriate to
do so.66 There are also practical security issues with transmitting patient informa-
tion, such as social security numbers, in the clear. With identity theft an ever-
growing concern, it would be unfortunate if wounded and injured personnel
were exposed to yet an additional risk as a consequence of being treated onboard
a hospital ship. Further, it has been reported that when USNS Mercy (T-AH 19)
306
Jane G. Dalton
deployed in support of Operation Iraqi Freedom in January 2003, it in fact was
equipped with encrypted communications systems. 67 There is no need in this ar-
ticle to further belabor the point that the prohibition on use of a "secret code" by
hospital ships is anachronistic, unrealistic, and unworkable in today's high tech-
nology environment where satellite communications are both routinely en-
crypted and routinely employed by military systems. Accordingly, this author
joins with Professor Grunawalt68 in recommending that the US Navy formally
abandon adherence to this requirement, while reaffirming adherence to the un-
derlying mandate that hospital ships may not be used for military purposes harm-
ful to an adversary.
The second vexation facing hospital ships is the need to arm them for force pro-
tection against USS Cole-type attacks. Again, the Second Geneva Convention pro-
vides the baseline legal requirement—and in this instance the basic rule is far more
realistic than the one just discussed prohibiting the use of a secret code. Article
35(1) provides that arming the crews of hospital ships for the maintenance of or-
der, or for their own defense or the defense of the sick and wounded, does not de-
prive the ships of their protected status.69 In this author's opinion, that should end
all debate, and the Navy should not hesitate to man its hospital ships with security
teams armed with crew-served weapons—such as machine guns and grenade
launchers for close-in defense against attacks by terrorists or others who do not
comply with the law ofarmed conflict. Professor Grunawalt, however, aptly points
out the very legitimate reasons one should be cautious about deploying hospital
ships bristling with defensive armaments.70 And on this topic, the San Remo Manual
has taken a decidedly anachronistic viewpoint by opining that hospital ships may be
armed "only" with "deflective" means of defense (such as chaff and flares) and "not
with means that could be used in offensive fashion, such as anti-aircraft guns."71
Not only are chaff and flares ineffective against a determined suicide attack like
that launched against Cole, but the requirement as stated in the San Remo Manual
is nowhere found in the Geneva Conventions and is an unnecessary and untimely
restriction ofthe plain letter ofthe law. Accordingly, this author concurs with Pro-
fessor Grunawalt that in addition to crew-served weapons like .50 caliber machine
guns, hospital ships should be equipped with the Phalanx Close-in Weapons Sys-
tem or other state-of-the art defensive anti-air and anti-surface weapons systems. 72
While the Royal Navy concurs that encryption equipment may be fitted in hospital
ships "to assist with the humanitarian mission," they are not as supportive on the
arming issue. A Royal Navy official told Jane's Defence Weekly that any armaments
beyond small sidearms "would compromise the protected status ofthe vessels" un-
der current international law. 73 The Royal Navy approach at present, apparently
due to budgetary rather than legal considerations74—to develop more versatile
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platforms that can accomplish other missions in addition to caring for the
wounded and sick—may be more in line with the US Navy's plans for sea basing.
As Dr. Arthur M. Smith pointed out in a recent edition ofthe Naval War College
Review, "plans for afloat casualty care and strategic evacuation may be dramatically
altered" under the Navy's sea basing concept. 75 He suggests that commercially
chartered cruise ships or Military Sealift Command logistics ships might deliver
troops and equipment to the sea base, and then be converted to casualty care. Fur-
ther, given the terrorist threat worldwide, aeromedical evacuation could provide a
more practical method to care for and evacuate the wounded than evacuation by
hospital ships. Given that potential terrorists could view white ships with large red
crosses as attractive targets rather than as specially protected vessels, force protec-
tion considerations alone could dictate developing flexible, multi-mission plat-
forms as substitutes for traditional white-hulled hospital ships. As Dr. Smith points
out, combatant commanders will define their casualty care and evacuation re-
quirements in the future, and those requirements might not include ships like
USNS Comfort and USNS Mercy. 76
The Law ofthe Sea Convention and the Future ofNaval Warfare
As the Navy looks to sea basing and the future, some have questioned whether
Navy leadership's long-standing support for United States accession to the Law of
the Sea Convention continues to be in the best interests of the Navy and the United
States. Some have asked whether the Convention helps or hinders the Navy's vision
of sea basing. Throughout his term as Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral Clark
never wavered from his strong position in favor ofthe Convention. He testified be-
fore Senate committees on more than one occasion that the Convention supports
sea basing and "provides the stable and predictable legal regime with which to con-
duct our operations today and in the future. Joining the Convention will support
ongoing U.S. military operations, including continued prosecution of the Global
War on Terrorism."77 Likewise, the current Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral
Michael Mullen, follows a long line of distinguished predecessors in his support of
United States accession to the Convention. 78 It is this author's opinion that the Law
of the Sea Convention preserves our ability to fully leverage use of the world's
oceans by providing a body of widely accepted and recognized law that protects
navigational freedoms and our ability to operate on the high seas.
First, the Convention does not impair or inhibit the inherent right of self-defense.
The Convention was negotiated under the auspices of the United Nations and the
precepts of the Charter, Article 5 1 of which clearly recognizes and reflects the in-
herent right of self-defense. Second, the stipulation in the Convention that "The
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high seas shall be reserved for peaceful purposes"79 must be read in light ofArticle
58, which specifically reserves freedom of navigation and overflight and "other in-
ternationally lawful uses of the sea related to these freedoms" to be enjoyed by all
States. 80 State practice over hundreds of years, by which the navies of the world
have operated and trained in waters seaward of other nations' territorial seas—in-
cluding what is now recognized as their contiguous and exclusive economic
zones—confirms that military uses ofthe seas that do not violate Article 2(4) ofthe
United Nations Charter81 are lawful under customary international law.
The Law of the Sea Convention reaffirms this position by limiting military activi-
ties in only a few narrow circumstances, such as Article 19 regarding innocent pas-
sage through the territorial sea. Moreover, the Resolution ofAdvice and Consent to
Ratification approved by the Senate Foreign Relations Committee specifically pro-
vides that "The advice and consent ofthe Senate ... is subject to the following . . . un-
derstandings: (1) The United States understands that nothing in the Convention,
including any provisions referring to 'peaceful uses' or 'peaceful purposes' impairs
the inherent right ofindividual or collective self-defense or rights during armed con-
flict."82 The "peaceful purposes" provision of the Law of the Sea Convention creates
no new rights or obligations and imposes no restraints on military operations or tra-
ditional uses of the seas any more than does the equivalent provision in the Outer
Space Treaty, which provides that the moon and other celestial bodies shall be used
"exclusively for peaceful purposes."83 It has long been the position of the United
States that "peaceful purposes" means "nonaggressive" purposes. Consequently,
military activity not constituting the use ofarmed force against the sovereignty, terri-
torial integrity or political independence of another nation, and not otherwise in-
consistent with the United Nations Charter, is permissible.84
Third, a word about innocent passage. Some have argued that the Law ofthe Sea
Convention would negatively impact national security because the innocent pas-
sage regime "prohibits" or makes "illegal" intelligence gathering or submerged
submarine operations within a coastal nation's 12 nautical mile territorial sea.
What the critics do not recognize or acknowledge is that the United States has been
complying with the navigational provisions of the Convention since 1983. In his
Ocean Policy Statement of March 10, 1983, President Reagan announced that the
Law of the Sea Convention "contains provisions with respect to traditional uses of
the oceans which generally confirm existing maritime law and practice and fairly
balance the interests of all States," and that the United States would "accept and
act" in accordance with those provisions.85 Further, the United States is a party to
the 1958 Convention on the Territorial Sea and Contiguous Zone, which contains
innocent passage provisions similar to those in the Law of the Sea Convention,
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including that submarines in innocent passage are "required to navigate on the
surface and to show their flag."86
Like the Territorial Sea Convention, the Law of the Sea Convention requires
that submarines engaged in innocent passage navigate on the surface and show
their flag. 87 The Law of the Sea Convention, however, is an improvement over the
Territorial Sea Convention, in that it specifically delineates those activities that
may be considered prejudicial to the peace, good order, or security of the coastal
State—thus shielding the United States and other sea-going nations from efforts by
coastal States to regulate other types of conduct in the territorial sea. It denotes
"any act aimed at collecting information to the prejudice of the defence or security
of the coastal State" as inconsistent with innocent passage and prejudicial to the
peace, good order or security of the coastal State.88 Such activities are not deemed
"illegal," nor are they forbidden. The coastal State may have national laws prohibit-
ing such activities, may take necessary steps to prevent passage which is not inno-
cent,89 and may require a warship to leave the territorial sea "immediately" if the
warship disregards requests by the coastal State to comply with its national laws and
regulations concerning passage through the territorial sea.90 These provisions reflect
the carefully crafted balance the United States sought to protect its own interests as
both a coastal State and a flag State. Thus, if a warship or submarine transits through
the territorial sea in innocent passage, it must comply with the requirements for in-
nocent passage. If it does not do so, the coastal State that becomes aware ofsuch non-
innocent passage may require the warship to depart the territorial sea immediately,
and may then address the matter through diplomatic channels.
Fourth, accession to the Law ofthe Sea Convention would in no way negatively
affect the President's Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI). The PSI is a global ef-
fort to stop trafficking of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and their delivery
systems to and from States ofproliferation concern. It is not a treaty or a formal or-
ganization. It is a cooperative effort to apply all the tools at the disposal of the PSI
partner nations—intelligence, diplomacy, law enforcement, military, customs au-
thorities, financial—to prevent transfers of WMD-related items at sea, in the air,
and on land. More than 60 countries around the world have indicated their sup-
port for PSI—most, if not all, of which are parties to the Law of the Sea Conven-
tion. While the goal is "to create a more dynamic, creative, and proactive
approach" to preventing proliferation, "actions taken in support of the PSI will be
consistent with national legal authorities and relevant international law and frame-
works."91 Certainly the goal is to strengthen existing authorities where they are
weak or inefficient, but only within the bounds of national and international law,
which includes the Law of the Sea Convention. Numerous multilateral exercises
have taken place, and the initiative had one publicly announced success, in the fall of
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2003, when four nations (the United States, the United Kingdom, Italy and Ger-
many) cooperated to interdict and prevent a shipment ofcentrifuge parts to Libya.92
Conflict Resolution in the Exclusive Economic Zone
There is no doubt that the Navy's plans for sea basing could give pause to allies and
potential competitors alike. After all, it is based on the notion that "America will
never seek a permission slip to defend the security of our country."93 Lieutenant
General James Mattis, head of the Marine Corps Combat Development Com-
mand, says the idea is to minimize the need for the United States military to rely on
allies to supply territory from which United States forces can operate abroad. 94 One
hears phrases like "using the sea as maneuver space," exploiting the United States'
"control of the seas," and, from a large display in the Pentagon in June 2005, the
"command of the commons."95 Carried to its logical conclusion, it will inevitably
involve the staging of large, floating military bases off the coasts of other nations,
probably in their contiguous or exclusive economic zones, from which joint forces
and weapons could be projected ashore in a future conflict. Sea basing also has a
more benign side. Former Naval Sea System Commander Vice Admiral Phillip
Balisle pointed to the Navy's tsunami relief efforts in Indonesia as an example of
sea basing in action. Relief efforts were launched and directed from a collection of
ships stationed off-shore. "We have always had a sea base, or at least for many
years. What we're talking about now is the shaping of that sea base for [a] 21st-
century environment."96
Will the sea base impact the sovereignly ofother nations, threaten their security
or convert the oceans to "non-peaceful" purposes? The answer is no. Each sea base
will be established consistent with principles of law applicable to the operation in
question—whether it be humanitarian relief operations, international armed con-
flict, or United Nations sanctions enforcement. Is it possible that other nations
may disagree with the United States over the applicable legal principles? Of course.
Conflicts and disagreements will arise in the future, as they have in the past. One
has only to recall the P-3 incident off Hainan Island in the People's Republic of
China and the difference of opinion between the United States and China over the
propriety ofmilitary activities conducted in a coastal State's exclusive economic zone
to realize that there will often be differing interpretations of the applicable law.97
Because of these differing interpretations, particularly as between the United
States and the People's Republic of China, one might ask whether it would be advis-
able for the United States to attempt to negotiate an agreement with China similar to
the 1972 Incidents at Sea Agreement98 or the 1989 Dangerous Military Activities
Agreement99 with the former Soviet Union. At the time of those agreements, both
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the United States and the former Soviet Union had substantial blue-water navies.
Several dangerous incidents had occurred between units ofthe two nations and the
potential for unpredictable future confrontations existed around the world.
With China, the potential for confrontation exists primarily within China's ex-
clusive economic zone due to China's objections to US military activities there
such as surveillance and military surveys. An existing mechanism, the Military
Maritime Consultative Agreement, 100 is available and is probably sufficient, given
the limited area and scope of potential confrontations, to address these issues con-
cerning military activities in areas where high seas freedoms apply. In fact, it was
presumably under the auspices of this agreement that Ambassador Prueher pro-
posed a meeting to discuss the EP-3 incident, and suggested that the agenda in-
clude a "discussion of causes of the accident and possible recommendations
whereby such collisions could be avoided in the future." 101 However, this author
would not rule out the value of a more comprehensive agreement, embodying spe-
cial signals like those in the Incidents at Sea Agreement, for indicating one's inten-
tions and operations, if the consultative mechanism proves unsuccessful in
preventing future dangerous encounters.
It is certainly appropriate that the United States continue to communicate with
our allies and potential competitors alike concerning plans for the Navy of the fu-
ture. Concerning all five of the issues discussed in this article, it would be advisable
to inform other nations of United States intentions and engage in a dialogue with
them concerning the legal bases for our actions. A cooperative, consultative ap-
proach would be useful in obtaining the support and understanding of potential
coalition partners, as well as alleviating the concerns of potential competitors. In a
recent speech to the US Naval War College, Chief of Naval Operations Admiral
Mullen stressed how important coalition partners will be to future naval opera-
tions. 102 And while President Bush has made it clear that the United States will not
jeopardize its national security by acquiescing to "the objections ofthe few," 103 the
preferred modus operandi is to seek international support and international part-
nerships. The Proliferation Security Initiative, for example, is evidence that the
President wants to work with multi-national partners to the maximum extent pos-
sible. The issues discussed in this article provide ample opportunities for collabora-
tion and cooperation on the international level.
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